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Abstract	  	  This	  is	  a	  comparative	  study	  of	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  head	  of	  the	  judiciary	  through	  a	  decade	  of	  change,	  up	  to	  2009,	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya.	   	   It	  draws	  on	  a	  conceptual	   framework	  developed	   from	  Burns’s	   theory	  of	  transformational	   leadership	   and	   the	   “dynamics	   of	   the	   leadership	  process”,	   and	  other	   scholarship	   on	   leadership	   ethics.	   	   The	   constitutional,	   legal	   and	   political	  structures	   surrounding	   the	   office	   of	   Chief	   Justice	   are	   analysed	   alongside	  empirical	  data	  gathered	  from	  interviews.	  It	  addresses	  three	  main	  questions.	  How	  do	  we	  understand	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	   Justice	   in	  Africa?	  How	  is	  this	  role	   evolving?	   	  What	   consequences	  does	   the	  distinction	  between	   “judicial”	   and	  “administrative”	  functions	  have	  for	  leadership	  in	  the	  judiciary?	  	  	  The	   study	   finds,	   first,	   that	   the	   leadership	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   includes	  intellectual	   leadership,	   administrative	   leadership,	   and	   acting	   as	   the	  representative	   of	   the	   judiciary.	   	   Second,	   the	   role	   of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	   shifting	  from	  one	  of	  headship	  to	  one	  of	  leadership:	  Chief	  Justices	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  the	  visible,	  accountable	   leaders	  of	  the	  third	  arm	  of	  government.	   	  Third,	  recognising	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  leader	  of	  the	  third	  arm	  of	  government	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	   usefulness	   of	   retaining	   the	   distinction	   between	   judicial	   and	   administrative	  functions	  to	  divide	  responsibility	  for	  court	  administration	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	   executive.	   For	  Chief	   Justices	   to	   lead	   effectively,	   they	  must	  be	   free	   to	  make	  decisions	  on	  all	  matters	  relating	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  This	  need	  not	  require	   immersion	   in	   the	   daily	   minutiae	   of	   court	   administration.	   	   Instead,	  practices	   in	   South	   Africa	   and	   Ghana	   suggest	   that	   leadership	   could	   involve	  collaborating	   with,	   delegating	   to	   and	   consulting	   relevant	   “constituents”	   of	   the	  Chief	   Justice’s	   leadership.	   	   This	   would	   be	   consistent	   with	   a	   transformational	  leadership	   approach,	   which	   it	   is	   here	   argued	   is	   the	  most	   appropriate	   form	   of	  leadership	  for	  the	  judiciary.	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Chapter	  One	  –	  Introduction	  and	  Context	  	  	  In	  2005	  Arthur	  Chaskalson,	  the	  outgoing	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  South	  Africa,	  asked	  Pius	  Langa,	  then	  his	  deputy	  and	  soon	  to	  be	  his	  successor,	  for	  his	  views	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  "Deputy	  Chief	  Justice,"	  he	  said,	  "can	  you	  talk	  in	  fairly	  general	  terms...	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  what	  you	  would	  see	  as	  your	  role?"	  To	  which	  Langa	  DCJ	  replied:	  	  “…	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  should	  be	  able	  to	  recognise	  the	  talent	  and	  be	  able	  to	  use	  that	  talent	  among	  other	  colleagues...	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  course	  would	  be	   the	   leader	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   third	   arm	   of	   government.	   The	   Chief	  Justice	   would	   be	   the	   person	   looked	   up	   to	   by	   all	   the	   judges	   to	   give	  leadership	   when	   there	   is	   a	   crisis	   ...The	   Chief	   Justice	   would	   be	   the	   link	  between	   that	   third	   arm	   of	   government	   with	   the	   other	   arms	   of	  government.	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  would	  be	  the	  person	  who	  people	  look	  up	  to	  when	  we	  look	  for	  stability	   in	  the	  whole	   judiciary	   ...	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  also	  should	  be	  somebody	  who	  is	  able	  to	  work	  with	  other	  people	  because	  the	  challenges	   facing	  our	   community,	   the	   challenges	   facing	   South	  Africa	   are	  enormous.”1	  	  Langa	  DCJ’s	  answer	  is	   interesting	  because	  when	  asked	  to	  give	  a	  view	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  general	  terms,	  he	  gave	  an	  answer	  about	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  identified	  specific	  aspects	  of	  that	  role.	  His	  assertion	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  "of	  course	  would	  be	  the	  leader	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  third	  arm	  of	   government"	   is	   especially	   remarkable.	   It	   suggests	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice	   as	   leader	   of	   the	   judiciary	   is	   obvious,	   widely	   accepted	   and	   well	  understood.	  Yet	  that	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  This	   study	   aims	   to	   shed	   some	   light	   on	   the	   leadership	   role	   of	   Chief	   Justices	   in	  Commonwealth	  Africa	  by	  comparing	  the	  office	  of	  Chief	  Justice,	  over	  a	  decade	  up	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 Justice Langa, "Responses to questions from the JSC" (4 April, 2005) 
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to	   2009,	   in	   three	   Commonwealth	   African	   countries:	   South	   Africa,	   Ghana,	   and	  Kenya.	   	   Informed	   by	   qualitative	   interviews	   conducted	   in	   each	   of	   the	   three	  countries,	   this	  study	  uses	  a	  conceptual	   framework	  derived	  from	  scholarship	  on	  judicial	  leadership,	  transformational	  leadership	  and	  leadership	  ethics	  to	  analyse	  the	   role	   of	   Chief	   Justices	   in	   Commonwealth	   Africa.	   	   This	   chapter	   outlines	   the	  context	  of	  the	  study,	  describes	  the	  methodology	  and	  methods	  used	  and	  sets	  out	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  chapters	  that	  follow.	  	  	  
1.1	  Context	  of	  the	  Study	  	  
Constitutionalism	  and	  judicial	  power	  in	  Africa	  	  The	   focus	   of	   this	   study	   is	   the	   leadership	   role	   of	   Chief	   Justices	   in	   three	  Commonwealth	   African	   countries.	   	   Not	   so	   long	   ago	  many	  would	   have	   reacted	  against	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   leadership	   of	   judges	   by	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   citing	   the	  concept	  of	  the	  mutual	  independence	  of	  individual	  judges	  as	  a	  barrier	  to	  influence	  of	  any	  kind,	  and	  therefore	  to	  influence	  by	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  “leading”	  the	  judiciary.	  	  It	   was	   sufficient	   for	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   titular	   head	   of	   the	  judiciary,	   the	   most	   senior	   judge.	   	   In	   Africa	   the	   judiciary	   was	   historically	  considered	   to	   be	   the	   weak	   arm	   of	   government,	   and	   for	   post-­‐independence	  governments	   establishing	   an	   independent	   judiciary	   was	   not	   a	   high	   priority.2	  However,	   things	   have	   changed.	   The	   “winds	   of	   constitutional	   change	   that	   blew	  through	   Africa	   in	   the	   early	   1990s”,3	   the	   so-­‐called	   “third	  wave	   of	   democracy”,4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 KA Mingst, 'Judicial Systems of Sub-Saharan Africa: An Analysis of Neglect' [African Studies 
Association] 31 African Studies Review 135, p. 3 J Hatchard, M Ndulo and P Slinn, Comparative Constitutionalism and Good Governance in the 
Commonwealth: An Eastern and Southern African Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, U.K. 2004) 4 See, for example: T Roux, 'Democracy' in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds), Constitutional Law of 
South Africa (2nd edn, Juta, 2002); C Fombad, 'Challenges to Constitutionalism and Constitutional 
Rights in Africa and the Enabling Role of Political Parties: Lessons and Perspectives from Southern 
Africa' (2007) 55 American Journal of Comparative Law 1; HK Prempeh, 'Africa's "Constitutionalism 
Revival": False Start or New Dawn?' 5 International Journal of Constitutional Law 469 
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ushered	   in	   an	   “epidemic	   of	   constitution	   making”.5	   	   And	   whether	   you	   are	   an	  optimistic	  “constitutional	  enthusiast”	  or	  you	  see	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  third	  wave	  in	  less	  rosy	  terms,6	  the	  constitutions	  that	  came	  out	  of	  the	  process	  of	  constitutional	  renewal	   nevertheless	   represent	   a	   tentative	   shift	   away	   from7	   the	   position	  described	  by	  Okoth-­‐Ogendo	  in	  which	  African	  nations	  had	  “constitutions	  without	  constitutionalism”,8	   towards	   constitutional	   democracy9	   in	   which	   democracy,	  constitutions,	  and	  the	  judiciary,	  have	  greater	  relevance	  to	  the	  populace.10	  	  	  	  	  The	   programme	   of	   transformation	   and	   constitutional	   renewal	   that	   has	   swept	  Africa	  since	  the	  1990s	  means	  that	  the	  “new”	  African	  constitutions	  do	  much	  more	  to	  emphasize	  constitutional	  values,	  the	  enforcement	  of	   justiciable	  bills	  of	  rights	  and	   access	   to	   constitutional	   redress	   than	   the	   independence	   and	   post	  independence	  constitutions	  did.11	  	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  of	  the	  Final	  Constitution	  of	   South	  Africa	   and	   the	  Fourth	  Republican	  Constitution	  of	  Ghana.12	   	   There	   is	   a	  strong	  consensus	  of	  opinion	  that	  these	  constitutional	  transformations	  have	  not,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5 Fombad, 'Challenges to Constitutionalism and Constitutional Rights in Africa and the Enabling Role 
of Political Parties: Lessons and Perspectives from Southern Africa', p.2 6 Ibid. 7 O Akiba (ed), Constitutionalism and Society in Africa (Contemporary Perspectives on Developing 
Societies Ashgate 2004) 8 HWO Okoth-Ogendo, 'Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African 
Political Paradox” ' in IG Shivji (ed) State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on Democracy 
(Human Rights and Constitutionalism Series, No.1 Southern African Political Economy Series 
(SAPES) Trust, Harare, Zimbabwe, 1991) 9 Roux, 'Democracy',  § 10-18 10 See, for example, AfroBarometer, 'AfroBarometer Round 1: Compendium of Comparative Data 
from a twelve-nation Survey' (AfroBArometer, 2002), and AfroBarometer, 'Working Paper No.34, 
AfroBarometer Round 2: Compendium of Comparative Data from a twelve-nation Survey' (2004), p.44 
– on average 60% of those surveyed agree that “our constitution expresses the hopes and values of our 
people”, even in Kenya, the report points out.  11 Akiba (ed), Constitutionalism and Society in Africa  12 Not only do these constitutions outline the values underpinning the constitution in the Preamble and 
Directive Principles of State policy, they are also “justiciable constitutions” (see: H Klug, Constituting 
Democracy: Law Globalism and South Africa's Political Reconstruction (Cambridge University Press, 
2000), p.18  
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so	  far,	  brought	  about	  the	  radical,	  quick	  “liberation”	  that	  was	  hoped	  for,	  but	  that	  does	  not	  diminish	  the	  emerging	  role	  of	  courts	  -­‐	  the	  power	  of	  the	  judges	  is	  now	  a	  prominent	  political	  issue	  that	  has	  captured	  the	  public	  imagination	  too.	  	  	  	  The	   independence	   constitutions	   of	   Commonwealth	   Africa	   were	   inevitably	  moulded	  on	  the	  “Westminster	  model”,	  which	  created	  parliamentary	  democracies	  with	  written	  constitutions.	   	  The	   trend	   in	   the	   third	  wave	  of	  African	  constitution	  making	  has	  been	  to	  move	  away	  from	  the	  Westminster	  model:	  “newly	  democratic	  states	  have	  mostly	  rejected	  parliamentary	  sovereignty	  in	  favour	  of	  constitutional	  democracy”.13	  This	  model	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  the	  courts	   in	  interpreting	  and	  upholding	   the	   constitution,	   curbing	   executive	   power,	   and	   enforcing	   the	   bill	   of	  rights,	  with	  the	  consequent	  empowerment	  of	  the	  judiciary.14	  And	  the	  courts	  are	  becoming	   more	   “surefooted	   about	   their	   newly	   enhanced	   constitutional	  powers.”15	  	  	  However,	   having	   been	   the	   weak	   arm	   of	   government,16	   and	   with	   endemic	  corruption	  a	  major	  problem,	  the	  courts	  still	  have	  to	  address	  enduring	  mistrust	  in	  the	  system	  and	  have	  to	  work	  hard	  to	  gain	  public	  confidence	  and	  build	  legitimacy.	  	  As	  the	  judges	  assert	  themselves	  through	  their	  judgements,	  the	  judiciary	  also	  has	  to	   assert	   its	   institutional	   legitimacy	   and	   identity.	   	   This	   means	   that	   the	   Chief	  Justice,	  as	  head	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  is	  now	  more	  visible.	  	  As	  democracy	  takes	  shape	  and	   accountable	   leaders	   are	   sought	   out	   by	   citizens	   growing	   tired	   of	   powerful	  elites,	   questions	   about	   the	   judiciary	   become	   questions	   about	   the	   Chief	   Justice	  and	  what	  he	  or	  she	  is	  doing,	  or	  should	  be	  doing,	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  Judiciary	  is	  an	  effective	   institution.	   	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  Chief	   Justice	  was	  considered	   leader	  of	  the	  judiciary	  before,	  leadership,	  and	  often	  blame,	  is	  now	  being	  attributed	  to	  Chief	  Justices	  from	  several	  quarters.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13 Roux, 'Democracy', § 10-19 14 HK Prempeh, 'Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the challenge of constitutionalism in 
contemporary Africa' [2005-2006] Tulane Law Review 1239 15 Ibid., p.1241 16 See for example: Ibid., p.1242, and K Mingst, 'Judicial Systems of sub-Saharan Africa: An Analysis 
of Neglect' 31 African Studies Review 135 
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Building	  institutions	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  	  	  As	   constitutional	   transformation	   takes	   shape	   debates	   intensify	   about	   the	  structure	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   and	   crucially	   in	  Africa	  the	  accountability	  of	  the	  judiciary.17	  Commonwealth	  governments,	  at	  least	  at	   the	   formal	   diplomatic	   level,	   have	   acknowledged	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  relationship	   between	   the	   three	   branches	   of	   government,	   and	   have,	   through	  Heads	   of	   Government	   Meetings	   and	   meetings	   of	   Law	   Ministers,	   sought	   to	  articulate	  ways	   in	  which	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   three	   branches	   and	   the	  accountability	   of	   the	   three	   branches	   can	   be	   appropriately	   expressed	   and	  implemented	   in	  each	  of	   their	  nations.	   	   	  The	  emphasis	   in	   the	  Commonwealth	   is	  now	   on	   a	   still-­‐evolving	   model	   of	   co-­‐operative	   governance,	   in	   which	   the	   three	  branches	  co-­‐operate,	  each	  respect	  the	  constitutional	  functions	  and	  boundaries	  of	  the	   other,	   communicate,	   and	   ultimately	   hold	   each	   other	   appropriately	  accountable	  for	  their	  actions.	  	  This	  potentially	  creates	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  three	  branches	  in	  many	  countries.	  The	  judiciary	  must	  now	  be	  considerably	  more	  transparent	  and	  accountable,	  and	  must	  also	  somehow	  establish	   and	   retain	   its	   independence	  while	   communicating	   and	   engaging	  with	  the	  very	  institutions	  that	  it	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  been	  under	  threat	  from	  for	  so	  long.	  	  	  While	   the	  past	   couple	  of	   decades	  have	   seen	  an	   increase	   in	   academic	  discourse	  about	   comparative	   judicial	   studies	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	   courts	   in	   transitional	  democracies,	  very	  little	  of	  this	  attention	  has	  been	  focused	  on	  Africa.	  	  Or,	  at	  least	  as	  Dudziak	  notes,	   such	  scholarly	   interest	  as	   there	   is	   in	   these	   issues	  has	   largely	  been	  focused	  on	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  in	  South	  Africa.18	  For	  the	  rest	  of	  Africa,	  the	  picture	  has	  been	  rather	  bleak	  for	  decades	  –	  a	  review	  of	  the	  comparative	  law	  and	   comparative	   politics	   literature	   on	   African	   judicial	   systems	   up	   to	   1988	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17 See, for example, ICJ, 'Judicial Independence. Corruption and Reform' (ICJ Kenya, 2005); Ghana 
Integrity Report on Judicial Corruption.  18 M Dudziak, 'Who Cares About Courts? Creating a Constituency for Judicial Independence in Africa' 
(2003) 101 Michigan Law Review 1622 
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described	  the	  situation	  as	  “an	  analysis	  of	  neglect”.19	  	  And	  since	  then	  scholarship	  on	   courts	   in	   Africa	   has	   been	   relatively	   sparse,20	   but	   this	   picture	   is	   slowly	  beginning	   to	   change,	  with	   attention	  directed	   to	   institution	  building,	   the	   rule	  of	  law	  and	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary.21	  The	  historically	  low	  status	  of	  formal	  courts	   and	   judiciaries	   in	   African	   societies	   and	   African	   political	   systems	   is	   an	  important	  problem.	  	  According	  to	  Mingst,	  the	  lack	  of	  research	  interest	  in	  African	  judiciaries,	  and	  the	  poor	  standing	  of	  judges	  and	  courts	  in	  African	  societies	  were	  the	   consequence	   of	   several	   factors.	   	   First,	   post-­‐independence	   African	   legal	  scholarship	   was	   dominated	   by	   anthropological	   studies	   of	   customary	   laws	   and	  traditional	  courts.	  	  Second,	  judiciaries	  were	  inevitably	  weak,	  if	  not	  irrelevant	  as	  a	  result	   of	   the	  political	   culture	   inherited	   from	  colonial	   administrations.	   	  Africans	  were	  usually	  only	  subject	  to	  administrative	  laws	  and	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  the	  courts,	   and	   although	   in	   former	   British	   colonies	   “separate”	   judiciaries	   were	  established	   under	  most	   independence	   constitutions,	   they	   “never	   functioned	   as	  anticipated”	  because	  they	  were	  new	  institutions	  with	  no	  precedents	  to	  fall	  back	  on,	  while	   in	   former	   French	   colonies	   independent	   judiciaries	   “were	   never	   even	  envisaged.”22	  	  Third,	  establishing	  an	  independent	  judiciary	  was	  rather	  low	  on	  the	  list	   of	   things	   to	   do	   for	   most	   post-­‐colonial	   leaders	   as	   “the	   goal	   of	   most	  independence	   political	   leaders	   was	   to	   create	   strong	   national	   governments”	   in	  which	  national	  integration	  and	  public	  order	  (i.e.	  derogation	  of	  some	  basic	  human	  rights	   to	   keep	   control	   of	   fragile	   states)	   was	   the	   priority.	   	   And	   finally,	   African	  judicial	  systems	  remained	  understudied	  as	  a	  result	  of	  perceptions	  (controversial	  as	  they	  are)	  about	  the	  dependency	  of	  African	  states	  on	  the	  international	  system,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19 Mingst, 'Judicial Systems of Sub-Saharan Africa: An Analysis of Neglect'  20 HK Prempeh, 'African judges, in their own cause: Reconstituting independent courts in 
contemporary Africa (Review Essay)' 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 592 21 See, for example: B Ajibola and D van Zyl (eds), The Judiciary in Africa (Juta & Co. Ltd., 1998); JA 
Widner, Building the Rule of Law in Africa: Francis Nyalali and the road to judicial independence in 
Africa (W W Norton & Company, London 2001); WF Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: 
the Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (2nd edn Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006); B 
Nwabueze, Constitutional Democracy in Africa: the Pillars Supporting Constitutional Democracy 
(Spectrum Books Lts, Abuja, Benin City, Lagos, Owerri 2004); Economic Commission for Africa, 
'African Governance Report' (UNECA, Addis Ababa 2005) 22 Mingst, 'Judicial Systems of Sub-Saharan Africa: An Analysis of Neglect'  
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their	  lack	  of	  autonomy	  and	  their	  illegitimacy	  in	  determining	  the	  law.	  	  All	  of	  these	  factors	   combined	   to	   leave	   African	   judiciaries	   with	   a	   “very	   minor,	   perhaps	  irrelevant	  role	  in	  African	  societies”	  because:	  	  	   “Never	   having	   established	   themselves	   prior	   to	   independence,	   the	  experiences	  of	   independence	  only	  exacerbated	   this	   trend	  among	   judges.	  	  After	  independence,	  when	  most	  regimes	  embarked	  on	  policies	  of	  change,	  the	  judiciary	  was	  seldom	  viewed	  as	  a	  viable	  institution	  to	  implement	  that	  change	  ...	  And	  what	  Africa	  needed	  was	  problem-­‐solving	  institutions.”23	  
	  Two	  decades	  on	  and	  African	  judiciaries	  are	  still	  regarded	  with	  some	  disdain	  by	  national	   governments	   and	  with	   considerable	   caution	  by	   society.24	   	   Yet	   now,	   in	  the	  21st	  century,	  their	  potential	  is	  seen	  as	  something	  that	  must	  be	  harnessed	  for	  the	  cause	  of	  democracy.	  	  In	  Commonwealth	  Africa	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  central	  to	  understanding	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  courts	  function.	  	  A	  biography	   of	   the	   longest	   serving	   Chief	   Justice	   in	   Africa,	   the	   late	   former	   Chief	  Justice	   of	   Tanzania,	   Francis	   Nyalali,	   illustrates	   just	   how	   important	   the	   Chief	  Justice	  is	  in	  the	  life	  of	  an	  African	  judiciary.25	  Historically,	  the	  courts	  have	  been	  in	  a	  serious	  predicament:	  	  	   “Law	   and	   courts	   could	   be	   harnessed	   to	   help	   to	   establish	   a	   system	   of	  checks	   and	   balances—a	   sober	   second	   thought	   to	   help	   prevent	   abuse	   of	  public	  trust.	  	  They	  provided	  a	  mechanism	  for	  building	  accountability.	  	  But	  the	  courts	  had	  no	  inherent	  legitimacy,	  and	  unless	  people	  were	  willing	  to	  use	   them	   and	   accept	   them,	   it	   would	   be	   too	   easy	   for	   an	   unsympathetic	  head	  of	  state	  to	  undermine	  their	  very	  basis	  without	  so	  much	  as	  a	  modest	  protest	  from	  anyone.”26	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23 Ibid., pp 138-139 24 AfroBarometer, 'AfroBarometer Round 1: Compendium of Comparative Data from a twelve-nation 
Survey'  25 Widner, Building the Rule of Law in Africa: Francis Nyalali and the road to judicial independence 
in Africa  26 Ibid., p.391 
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  Jennifer	  Widner	  asks	  the	  question:	  is	  it	  possible,	  in	  these	  circumstances,	  to	  create	  independence	   from	   partisan	   influence	   in	   particular	   cases?	   	   She	   concludes	   that	  Chief	   Justice	   Nyalali’s	   “actions	   during	   preceding	   years,	   taken	   together	   with	  insights	  gleaned	  from	  experience	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  region,	  suggested	  a	  way	  to	  think	   about	   the	   task.”27	   	   Four	   important	   issues	   arose	   from	   the	   general	  observations	   of	   Chief	   Justice	   Nyalali	   and	   his	   colleagues.	   	   First,	   formulas	   and	  generalised	  laws	  are	  not	  the	  answer	  in	  building	  independent	  courts.	  	  Courts	  and	  institutions	  that	  “govern	  social	  life”	  are	  “crafted	  through	  a	  process	  of	  bargaining	  and	  negotiation.	  	  Instead	  of	  looking	  for	  a	  formula,	  people	  need	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	   smartest	   strategy	   for	   building	   an	   independent	   judiciary	   would	   always	  depend	   on	   the	   behavior	   of	   many	   people,	   outside	   the	   court	   as	   well	   as	   inside.”	  Second,	   experience	   in	   Africa	   shows	   that	   “not	   all	   historical	   periods	   presented	  equally	   auspicious	   points	   of	   departure	   for	   institutional	   change”	   and	   while	  “conditions	  didn’t	  determine	  whether	   independent	  courts	  could	  emerge	  …	  they	  did	   affect	   the	   probabilities	   of	   success.”	   	   Third,	   while	   resource	   scarcity	   shapes	  bargaining	   between	   institutions	   (“Bad	   telephone	   service,	   shortages	   of	   paper,	  failure	  to	  publish	  law	  reports,	  no	  money	  to	  pay	  witnesses,	  poor	  training	  of	  police,	  economies	   that	  meant	   judges	  worked	  out	  of	  prosecutors’	  offices”),	   these	   things	  “did	   not	   dictate	   outcomes.”	   	   Fourth,	   the	   substantive	   law	   matters:	   “a	   realistic	  understanding	   of	   the	   options	   available	   and	   effective	   means	   of	   pursuing	   them	  depended	   on	   knowledge	   of	   the	   law	   …	   The	   substantive	   law	   and	   methods	   of	  interpretation	  mattered	   for	  building	  bridges.	   	   So	  did	  efforts	   to	   communicate	   in	  ways	  ordinary	  people	  could	  understand.”28	  	  Finally,	  in	  trying	  to	  understand	  how	  best	  to	  move	  forward	  in	  the	  face	  of	  these	  setbacks,	  Widner	  found	  that:	  	  	   “…	   under	   these	   circumstances,	   the	   best	   advice	   one	   court	   could	   give	  another	  was	  to	  point	  to	  some	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  change,	  the	  properties	  of	   different	   structures	   and	   arrangements,	   and	   experiences	   with	   local	  experiments.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27 Ibid., p.392 28 Ibid., p.393 
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  These	   observations	   about	   the	   task	   of	   building	   and	   maintaining	   judicial	  independence	   and	   judicial	   accountability	   in	   Africa	   also	   point	   to	   another	  important	   tool	   in	   building	   the	   rule	   of	   law:	   leadership	   by	   the	   Chief	   Justice.	  	  	  Widner’s	   study	   indicates	   that	   historical	   circumstances	   and	   resource	   scarcity	  alone	  cannot	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  judiciary	  in	  Africa	  is	  independent:	  	  	   “The	   existence	   of	   considerable	   variation	   in	   trends	   across	   countries	   that	  are	   similarly	   situated	   pointed	   to	   the	   recognition	   that	   institutional	  relationships	   were	   the	   product	   of	   negotiation	   and	   that	   organizational	  leaders	  had	   some	  space	   to	   shape	   results	   even	   if	  poverty	   created	   special	  obstacles.”29	  	  Widner	  argues,	  in	  later	  work,	  that:	  	  	   “Successful	  efforts	   to	  build	   independent,	   effective	  courts	  people	  will	  use	  to	   make	   officials	   accountable	   all	   encounter	   some	   shared	  challenges...including	  the	  need	  to	  reduce	  points	  of	  potential	  interference,	  enhance	   monitoring	   within	   the	   judiciary	   itself,	   and	   build	   a	   popular	  following.	   	   But	   we	   also	   must	   be	   mindful	   of	   the	   important	   roles	   of	  leadership,	  timing,	  ideas,	  framing,	  networking	  and	  internal	  capacity.”30	  	  
The	  Commonwealth	  	  	  The	   Commonwealth	   of	   Nations	   began	   life	   as	   the	   power	   of	   British	   Imperialism	  waned.	   	   	   The	   first	   Colonial	   Conference	   was	   held	   in	   1887.	   	   By	   the	   time	   of	   the	  Imperial	  Conference	  of	  1926	  the	  British	  Commonwealth	  of	  Nations	  was	  officially	  recognised,	  and	   in	  1931	   the	  Statute	  of	  Westminster	  ensured	   the	   legal	   status	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29 Ibid., p.392 30 J Widner, 'How Some Reflections on the United States' Experience May Inform African Efforts to 
Build Court Systems and the Rule of Law' in S Gloppen, R Gargarella and E Skaar (eds), 
Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of the Courts in New Democracies (F 
Cass, 2004), p.44 
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the	   independence	  of	  Australia,	  Canada,	   the	  Irish	  Free	  Sate,	  Newfoundland,	  New	  Zealand	   and	   South	   Africa.	   	   	   The	   birth	   of	   the	   modern	   Commonwealth	   of	  independent	  nations	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  1949,	  when	  the	  London	  Declaration	  allowed	  India	  (which	  had	  recently	  become	  a	  republic)	  to	  remain	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	   Commonwealth	   of	   Nations.	   	   	   As	   former	   British	   colonies	   gained	   their	  independence	  this	  association	  of	  nations	  grew	  and	  it	  has	  since	  developed	  into	  a	  group	  of	  independent	  states	  cultivating	  mutual	  cooperation	  and	  shared	  learning	  into	  the	  21st	  century.	  	  	  	  The	  Commonwealth	  is	  now	  a	  group	  of	  53	  nations	  on	  five	  continents	  and	  across	  three	   oceans.	  Nearly	   2	   billion	  people,	   or	   about	   30%	  of	   the	  world’s	   population,	  live	  in	  the	  Commonwealth,	  and	  18	  of	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  are	  in	  Africa.	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  composed	  of	  a	  diverse	  group	  of	  governments	  and	  citizens	  who	  share	  a	  common	  history	  and	  who,	  over	  the	  half	  century	  of	  its	  existence,	  have	  developed	  common	  values.31	  	  These	  values	  are	  articulated	  in	  inter-­‐governmental	  declarations	   and	   agreements	   and	   include:	   ‘the	   liberty	   of	   the	   individual’,	   ‘equal	  rights	  for	  all	  citizens	  regardless	  of	  race,	  colour,	  creed	  or	  political	  belief’	  and	  the	  ‘inalienable	   right	   to	   participate	   by	   means	   of	   free	   and	   democratic	   political	  processes	  in	  framing	  the	  society’.	  Commonwealth	  governments	  have	  pledged	  to	  ‘strive	  to	  promote	  in	  each	  of	  our	  countries	  those	  representative	  institutions	  and	  guarantees	  for	  personal	  freedom	  under	  the	  law	  that	  are	  our	  common	  heritage.’32	  	  	  	  In	  the	  Commonwealth,	  concerns	  about	  improving	  the	  governance	  structures	  and	  strengthening	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  Africa.33	  	  The	  Commonwealth	  as	  a	  whole	   has	   engaged	   in	   a	   concerted	   programme	   of	   democratization	   that	   can	   be	  traced	  back	  to	  1971,	  when	  heads	  of	  government	  pledged	  to	  “strive	  to	  promote	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31 See for example: Report of the Commonwealth Secretary-General 2007, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
October 2007 32 The Commonwealth Declaration of Common Principles, 1971, issued at the Heads of Government 
Meeting in Singapore on 22 January, 1971, para.6 33 The Commonwealth of Nations has 53 member states.  For an account of Commonwealth statistics 
see for example: Commonwealth Secretariat, 'Report of the Commonwealth Secretary-General 2007' 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, London 2007) 
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each	   of	   our	   countries	   those	   representative	   institutions	   and	   guarantees	   for	  personal	  freedoms	  under	  the	  law	  that	  are	  our	  common	  heritage.”34	  	  This	  pledge	  was	   reasserted	   in	   the	  1991	  Harare	  Declaration,	   in	  which	  heads	  of	   government	  expressed	   their	   commitment	   to	   the	   “fundamental	   political	   values	   of	   the	  Commonwealth”.35	   Since	   then	   the	  movement	   to	   promote	   and	   implement	   these	  political	  values	  has	  gathered	  momentum,	  culminating	  in	  the	  adoption,	  in	  2003,	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  (Latimer	  House)	  Principles	  on	  the	  Relationship	  Between	  and	  the	  Accountability	  of	  the	  Three	  Branches	  of	  Government	  (hereafter	  the	  Latimer	  House	  Principles).36	  	  The	  ethos	  of	   the	  Commonwealth	  as	  an	  association	  of	  nations	   is	  captured	   in	  the	  Harare	  Declaration	  of	  1991:	  	  	   “The	  special	  strength	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  lies	  in	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  diversity	   of	   its	   members	   with	   their	   shared	   inheritance	   in	   language,	  culture	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  The	  Commonwealth	  way	  is	  to	  seek	  consensus	  through	  consultation	  and	  the	  sharing	  of	  experience.”37	  
	  The	   Latimer	   House	   Principles	   have	   developed	   in	   precisely	   this	   way,	   through	  consultation	  and	  consensus.	  	  	  They	  are	  the	  product	  of	  a	  process	  in	  which	  political	  rhetoric	  and	  increasing	  political	  will	  coincided	  with	  a	  long-­‐standing	  profession-­‐lead	   campaign	   to	   convert	   state-­‐level	   conjecture	   into	   tangible	   change.38	   	   This	  gives	  them	  considerable	  weight	  as	  a	  set	  of	  guidelines	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  and	  as	  a	  set	  of	  goals	  to	  achieve.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34 Commonwealth Declaration of Commonwealth Principles 1971, para.6 35 Harare Commonwealth Declaration 1991, para.9 36 51 of the 53 member countries attended the meeting, of which 38 were represented by their Heads of 
State or Government (Abudja Communiqué 2003, para.1).  Of the 18 African Commonwealth 
members, all were represented by their Heads of State or Government except Tanzania (Abudja 
Communiqué 2003, pp.45-47). 37 Harare Commonwealth Declaration para.3 38 JE Hatchard and PE Slinn, Parliamentary supremacy and judicial independence: a Commonwealth 
approach (Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1999) 
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The	  Harare	  Declaration	  of	  1991	  was	  the	  first	   to	  highlight	  the	  significant	  role	  of	  the	   judiciary	   in	   the	  emergence	  of	  sustainable	  democracy.	   	  Then	  came	  what	  can	  now	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  key	  catalyst	  for	  change:	  the	  1998	  Commonwealth	  Colloquium	  on	   “Parliamentary	   Supremacy	   and	   Judicial	   Independence...Towards	   a	  Commonwealth	   Model”,	   which	   brought	   together	   parliamentarians,	   judges,	  lawyers	   and	   legal	   academics	   to	   discuss	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   democratic	  principles	   of	   the	   Commonwealth.	   Out	   of	   this	   colloquium	   emerged	   the	   Latimer	  House	  Guidelines	  on	  Parliamentary	  Supremacy	  and	  Judicial	  Independence.	   	  The	  Guidelines	   were	   endorsed	   by	   Commonwealth	   Law	   Ministers	   and	   several	  Commonwealth	   groups,	   including	   Commonwealth	   Chief	   Justices,	   who	   at	   a	  Commonwealth	   Magistrates’	   and	   Judges’	   Association	   meeting	   in	   Edinburgh	   in	  2000	  recommended	  that	  they	  be	  considered	  by	  Heads	  of	  Government.39	  	  By	  2002	  a	   slightly	   modified	   version,	   the	   Latimer	   House	   Principles,	   was	   placed	   on	   the	  agenda	  for	  the	  2003	  Heads	  of	  Government	  Meeting,	  where	  they	  were	  endorsed	  in	  full.	  By	  2003,	  therefore,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  role	  played	  by	  lawyers,	  judges	  and	  judiciaries	  in	  a	  “healthy	  democracy”	  was	  fully	  recognised	  by	  Commonwealth	  Heads	   of	   Government.	   	   Indeed,	   the	   Abuja	   Communiqué	   “acknowledged	   that	  judicial	  independence	  and	  delivery	  of	  efficient	  justice	  services	  was	  important	  for	  maintaining	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   between	   the	   Executive,	   Legislature	   and	  Judiciary.”40	  	  	  	  
1.2	  The	  focus	  on	  Chief	  Justices	  	  
Headship	  and	  leadership	  of	  the	  judiciary	  	  Nowhere	  in	  the	  South	  African	  Constitution,	  nor	  in	  the	  constitutions	  of	  most	  other	  Commonwealth	  African	  countries	   (except	  Ghana),	   is	   it	  explicitly	  stated	   that	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	   head	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   let	   alone	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   judiciary.41	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39 "Chief Justices' Statement" (Commonwealth Magistrates' and Judges' Association Edinburgh 2000) 40 'Abuja Communiqué' (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 2003 2003) , para.8 41 Correct at time of research, up to April 2009. At time of writing proposed legislation is in the early 
stages of parliamentary scrutiny.  
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However,	  in	  South	  Africa,	  although	  there	  is	  no	  express	  constitutional	  articulation	  of	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  being	  “head”	  or	  “leader”	  of	  the	  Judiciary,	  according	  to	  the	  General	  Council	  of	  the	  Bar	  of	  South	  Africa,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  leader	  of	  the	  judiciary	   “is	   recognised	   in	   State	   protocol	   for	   all	   State	   occasions”42	   and	   it	   is	  “beyond	  question	   that	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	   head	  of	   the	   judiciary	   of	   South	  Africa	  and	  this	  has	  never	  required	  any	  statement	  in	  the	  Constitution”.43	  	  	  That	  the	  Chief	  Justice	   is	   “automatically	   leader	   of	   the	   Judiciary”44	   is	   said	   to	   be	   implicit	   in	   the	  wording	  of	   the	  constitution	  and	   the	  distinction	  made	  between	  the	  Chief	   Justice	  (and	  Deputy	  Chief	  Justice)	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa,	  and	  the	  other	  judges	  of	  the	   Constitutional	   Court.	   	   This	   apparent	   textual	   ambiguity,	   where	   the	   Chief	  Justice	  is	  listed	  as	  one	  of	  several	  other	  judges,	  and	  although	  charged	  with	  various	  constitutional	  duties	  throughout	  the	  text	  of	  the	  constitution,	   is	  not	  identified	  as	  “the	   head	   of	   the	   judiciary”	   in	   clear	   terms	   is	   a	   feature	   of	   most	   African	  Constitutions.	  Compared	  to	  many	  other	  African	  constitutions,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	   the	  constitution	  of	  Ghana,45	   the	  South	  African	  Constitution,	  by	  distinguishing	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  Deputy	  Chief	  Justice	  “of	  the	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa”	  from	  other	  judges	  “of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court”	  makes	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  more	   obvious	   than	   many	   other	   constitutions	   do.	   Most	   African	   constitutions	  simply	  state	  something	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  “the	  Supreme	  Court	  shall	  consist	  of	  the	  Chief	   Justice	   and	   such	   other	   judges	   as	   the	   President…appoints.”46	   	   The	   nature	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42 “Submissions to the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development on Behalf of 
the General Council of the Bar of South Africa, on the Constitution 14 Amendment Bill (2005) and the 
Superior Courts Bill (2005), p.9 43 Ibid., p.8 44 See “Submissions to the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development on Behalf 
of the General Council of the Bar of South Africa, on the Constitution 14th Amendment Bill (2005) 
and the Superior Courts Bill (2005), p.9 45 The Constitution of Ghana (1992), art.125(4) provides that “The Chief Justice shall, subject to this 
Constitution, be the Head of the Judiciary and shall be responsible for the administration and 
supervision of the Judiciary”. 46 See for example the Constitution of Namibia (1990), art.79(1); Constitution of Malawi (1994), 
s.105(1): “the Justices of the Supreme Court shall be: (a) the Chief Justice…; and Constitution of 
Kenya (1963), s.64(2): “the judges of the Court of Appeal shall be the Chief Justice and such number 
… of other judges…” 
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and	   extent	   of	   this	   implicit	   leadership	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   not	   been	  studied,	  yet,	  Justice	  Langa	  suggests	  that	  it	  extends	  well	  beyond	  merely	  being	  the	  most	   senior	   judge	   and	   is	   in	   reality	   a	  more	   complicated	   role	   that	   encompasses	  judging,	  managing	  and	  leading	  a	  complex	  organization.	  	  	  	  
Transformation	  and	  evolving	  expectations	  in	  the	  Commonwealth	  	  Justice	   Langa	   points	   to	   the	   enormous	   challenges	   facing	   South	   Africa,	   as	   it	  embraces	   the	   values	   of	   the	   post-­‐apartheid	   constitution	   and	   works	   towards	  “healing	   the	   divisions	   of	   the	   past”	   and	   establishing	   a	   “society	   based	   on	  democratic	   values,	   social	   justice	   and	   fundamental	   human	   rights”.47	   	   For	   the	  Judiciary,	  these	  challenges	  involve	  the	  “transformation”,48	  and	  the	  unification	  of	  the	   Judiciary.	   	   South	   Africa	   is	   not	   alone	   in	   facing	   enormous	   challenges	   and	  changes	   of	   this	   kind	   and	   these	   concerns	   are	   echoed	   in	   other	   Commonwealth	  African	  countries	  too.	  The	  Latimer	  House	  Principles	  are	  intended	  to	  provide	  an	  “effective	   framework	   for	   the	   implementation	  by	  governments,	  parliaments	  and	  judiciaries	  of	  the	  Commonwealth’s	  fundamental	  values”	  and	  the	  framework	  they	  set	   out	   is	   one	   of	   cooperative	   governance,	  which	   emphasizes	   the	   independence	  and	  accountability	  of	  the	  judiciary.	   	  According	  to	  the	  guidelines,	  Parliament	  has	  “primary	  responsibility	   for	   law-­‐making”,	  but	   the	  courts	  have	  “responsibility	   for	  the	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   the	   law”	   and	   “best	   democratic	   principles	  require	   that	   the	   actions	   of	   governments	   are	   open	   to	   scrutiny	   by	   the	   courts,	   to	  ensure	  that	  decisions	  taken	  comply	  with	  the	  Constitution,	  with	  relevant	  statutes	  and	  other	  law.”49	  	  	  The	  adoption	  of	  the	  Latimer	  House	  Principles	  has	  generated	  much	  activity	  by	  the	  Commonwealth	  Secretariat	  and	  other	  Commonwealth	  associations,	  and	  the	  first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Preamble 48 The “Transformation of the Judiciary” was the subject of a highly controversial ANC Resolution in 
2007, and the concept was discussed in detail at a symposium on “Judges of the World” held at the 
University of Witwatersrand in October 2008.  See K McLean and M Pieterse (eds), Special Issue: 
Focus on the Judiciary (South African Journal on Human Rights, 2008). 49 Commonwealth Secretariat, "The Latimer House Principles" (2003) 
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major	   regional	   forum	   on	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Principles	   was	   the	   Pan-­‐African	   Forum	   on	   the	   Latimer	   House	   Principles	   held	   in	   Nairobi	   in	   2005.50	  	  Lawyers,	   judges,	   members	   of	   government	   and	   politicians	   from	   across	   Africa	  discussed	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   three	   branches	   of	   government	   and	  considered	  ways	  of	  implementing	  the	  Latimer	  House	  Principles.	  	  They	  concluded	  with	  a	  “Plan	  of	  Action	  for	  Africa”	  on	  the	  Latimer	  House	  Principles	  (hereafter	  the	  Africa	   Plan).	   Discussing	   ways	   in	   which	   to	   implement	   the	   Latimer	   House	  Principles,	   delegates	   of	   the	   Pan-­‐African	   Forum	   on	   the	   Commonwealth	   Latimer	  House	   Principles	   held	   in	   Nairobi	   in	   2005	   considered	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice.51	   	   Their	   suggestions	   are	  one	   example	  of	   the	   attribution	  of	   a	   leadership	  role	   to	   Chief	   Justices,	   suggesting	   as	   they	   did	   that	   the	   “fight	   against	   corruption	  should	  be	  spearheaded	  by	  Chief	  Justices”.	  	  They	  outlined	  other	  specific	  tasks	  for	  Chief	  Justices	  that	  include	  ensuring	  that	  “court	  operations	  were	  transparent,	  and	  open	  to	  the	  public	  through	  awareness	  programmes,	  appropriate	  interaction	  with	  the	  media,	   preparation	   of	   annual	   reports	   accessible	   to	   the	   public,	   and	   regular	  meetings	  with	  the	  Bench	  and	  Bar.”	  	  	  	  Justice	  Langa’s	  reference	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  the	  “link	  between	  [the]	  third	  arm	  of	   government	   with	   the	   other	   arms	   of	   government”	   raises	   particularly	  perplexing	   questions	   relating	   to	   the	   separation	   of	   powers	   and	   the	   appropriate	  boundaries	  between	  the	  Judiciary	  and	  the	  other	  arms	  of	  government.	  	  There	  is	  a	  deep	  concern	  expressed	  throughout	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  Latimer	  House	  Principles	  and	  in	  the	  Pan-­‐African	  forum	  that	  real	  separation	  of	  powers	  is	  achieved.	  	  But	  this	  is	  tempered	  by	  an	  equally	  strong	  concern	  that	  practices	  of	  mutual	  understanding	  and	  respect	  for	  the	  distinct	  roles	  of	  each	  branch	  are	  fostered	  and	  maintained.52	  	  For	  example,	  para.2.1.1	  of	  the	  Africa	  Plan	  states	  the	  following:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50 Commonwealth Secretariat, 'Report of the Pan-African Forum on the Commonwealth (Latimer 
House) Principles on the Accountability of and the Relationship Between the Three Branches of 
Government' (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005) 51 Ibid. 52 P Slinn, 'Report of the Conference Proceedings' in J Hatchard and P Slinn (eds), Parliamentary 
Supremacy and Judicial Independence: A Commonwealth Approach (Cavendish Publishing, 1999)  
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“It	  was	  affirmed	  that	  Commonwealth	  Africa	  should	  devote	  more	  attention	  to	   establishing	   and	  maintaining	   processes	   of	   democratisation	   that	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  Africa’s	  historical,	  cultural	  and	  economic	  realities	  but	  always	  in	   accordance	   with	   the	   letter	   and	   spirit	   of	   the	   Principles.	   	   This	  relationship	   should	   be	   governed	   by	   the	   principle	   of	   cooperative	  governance,	  with	   each	  branch	   fulfilling	   their	   respective	   critical	   role	   in	   a	  constitutional,	  complementary	  and	  constructive	  manner.”	  	  The	   proposed	   action	   to	   implement	   this	   is	   that	   “governments	   and	  judiciaries...establish	  mechanisms	  of	  communication	  between	  the	  executive	  and	  the	  judiciary	  so	  as	  to	  strengthen	  mutual	  understanding	  of	  their	  respective	  roles.”	  	  These	   are,	   however,	   rather	   vague	   terms	   that	   leave	   open	   the	   question	   of	   how	  exactly	   to	  manage	   these	   interactions,	  and	  who	  should	  be	   responsible	   for	   them.	  	  While	  serious	  concerns	  were	  raised	  in	  the	  Pan-­‐African	  forum,	  one	  thing	  remains	  clear	   is	   the	  vital	  role	  of	   the	  courts	   in	   the	   future	  democratisation	  programme	  of	  Commonwealth	  African	  countries.	  	  An	  inevitable	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that	  Chief	  Justices,	  as	  heads,	  and	  leaders,	  of	  judiciaries,	  will	  have	  an	  increasingly	  significant	  part	   to	   play	   in	   future	   reforms	   and	   in	   developing	   good	   relations	   between	   the	  branches	  of	  government.	  	  What	  is	  expected	  of	  the	  judiciary	  in	  Africa?	  	  What	  are	  “effective	   mechanisms	   of	   communication	   between	   the	   executive	   and	   the	  judiciary”?	   	   Where	   do	   we	   draw	   the	   line	   between	   proper	   and	   improper	  engagement	   between	   the	   branches,	   especially	   in	   systems	  where	   the	   danger	   of	  patronage,	  coercion	  and	  corruption	  is	  very	  real?	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  the	  “link”	  between	  the	  Judiciary	  and	  the	  other	  branches	  suggests	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  should	  somehow	  be	  the	  conduit	  for	  all	  interactions	  between	  the	  Judiciary	  and	   the	   other	   arms	   of	   government.	   	   However,	   on	   a	   daily	   basis	   judges	   interact	  with	   administrative	   court	   staff	  who	   are	  ultimately	   accountable	   to	   an	   executive	  department.	   	   But	  what	   factors	  might	   affect	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   ability	   to	   create	  appropriate	   links	  between	   the	   Judiciary	  and	   the	  other	  branches,	   links	   that	  will	  not	   interfere	  with	   the	   fundamental	  principles	  of	   judicial	   independence?	   	  These	  are	   all	   questions	   that	   feed	   into	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   leadership	   role	   of	   the	  Chief	  Justices.	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  These	  examples	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  many	  challenges	  facing	  African	  Judiciaries	  today,	  and	  point	  to	  the	  expectation	  that	  Chief	  Justices	  lead	  in	  dealing	  with	  these	  issues.	  	  	  	  The	  scope	  and	  content	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  leadership	  role	  has	  not	  been	  studied	   before	   now,	   but	   as	   many	   African	   countries	   grapple	   with	   immense	  constitutional	   and	  democratic	   changes,	   the	   expectations	  of	  Chief	   Justices	   grow,	  and	  a	  study	  of	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  therefore	  very	  timely.	  	  	  	  
Collective	  leadership	  by	  Chief	  Justices	  	  Individual	  Chief	  Justices	  are	  expected	  to	  lead	  their	  own	  judiciaries	  in	  addressing	  the	   challenges	   of	   transformation	   reform,	   but	   the	   Pan-­‐African	   Forum	   also	  recommended	  that	  Chief	  Justices	  in	  Africa	  “forge	  a	  union	  and	  meet	  annually”	  so	  that	  they	  can	  exchange	  experiences,	   learn	  from	  one	  another	  and	  promote	  “best	  practices	   and	   …	   strategies	   to	   improve	   relationships	   with	   other	   arms	   of	  government.”53	  	  	  In	  fact,	  a	  union	  between	  some	  Chief	  Justices	  in	  Africa	  has	  already	  been	  forged—the	   Chief	   Justices	   of	   the	   southern	   African	   region	   came	   together	   in	   2003	   in	  Windhoek,	   in	   Namibia	   and	   with	   the	   support	   of	   the	   Venice	   Commission	   (the	  European	   Commission	   for	   Democracy	   through	   Law),	   formed	   the	   Southern	  African	   Judges’	   Commission.	   	   The	   purpose	   of	   the	   Commission	   is	   to	   provide	   a	  support	  network	  for	  Chief	  Justices,	  their	  senior	  judges	  and	  their	  judiciaries.	  	  Part	  of	   the	   work	   of	   the	   Venice	   Commission	   is	   to	   encourage	   co-­‐operation	   and	   the	  exchange	   of	   information,	   experiences	   and	   judgements	   between	   constitutional	  courts	  of	  the	  world.	  	  As	  the	  synopsis	  of	  the	  meeting	  explains:	  	  	  	   “The	  overall	  goal	  of	  this	  programme	  is	  to	  foster	  closer	  ties	  between	  these	  courts	   in	   view	   of	   enabling	   them	   to	   assist	   each	   other	   in	   case	   of	   undue	  interference	   from	   the	   executive	   or	   legislative	   powers.	   The	   imminent	  establishment	  of	  the	  Southern	  African	  Judges’	  Commission	  (SAJC)	  uniting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53 Report of the Pan-Africa Forum, para.32, at p.xiii 
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the	   President	   of	   these	   courts	   on	   6-­‐7	   December	   2003	   is	   a	   major	  achievement	   in	   this	   respect.	   Already	   before	   the	   formal	   creation	   of	   the	  SAJC,	   the	   presidents	   of	   the	   courts	   undertook	   action	   in	   favour	   of	   their	  peers	  in	  Swaziland	  and	  in	  Zimbabwe.”	  	  The	   SAJC	   is	   clearly	   envisaged	   as	  means	   of	   peer	   support	   for	   Chief	   Justices	   and	  senior	   judges	   in	   the	   region	   in	   dealing	  with	   the	  many	   obstacles	   and	   challenges	  they	  face,	  especially	  in	  securing	  their	  constitutional	  boundaries	  and	  maintaining	  effective	  judicial	  independence	  for	  domestic	  courts.	  	  	  	  	  Chief	  Justices	  have	  already	  exercised	  collective	  leadership	  in	  reform	  efforts	  in	  the	  Commonwealth.	   	   First,	   at	   the	   CMJA	   Edinburgh	   Conference,	   in	   a	   statement	  was	  endorsed	  by	  31	  Commonwealth	  Chief	  Justices	  (representing	  just	  over	  half	  of	  all	  Commonwealth	   judiciaries),	   and	   one	   non-­‐Commonwealth	   Chief	   Justice,	   Chief	  Justices	   indicated	   that	   they	   too	   have	   a	   role	   to	   play	   in	   building	   the	   framework	  within	  which	  democratic	  changes	  take	  place.	  Chief	  Justices	  used	  this	  opportunity	  not	   only	   to	   commend	   the	   Guidelines	   to	   the	   Heads	   of	   Government	   but	   also	   to	  point	   to	   the	   issues	   that	   they	   considered	   to	   be	   key:	   judicial	   independence,	   the	  need	   for	  adequate	   funding	   “which	  when	  approved	  by	   the	   legislature	   should	  be	  under	   the	   control	   of	   the	   Judiciary”,	   and	   the	   need	   to	   devise	   an	   effective	  monitoring	  procedure	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Guidelines	  once	  adopted.54	  	  	  Now,	  through	  the	  SAJC	  (11	  of	  the	  13	  members	  represent	  Commonwealth	  African	  countries),	  Southern	  African	  Chief	   Justices	  are	   taking	  a	  more	   formal	   leadership	  role	   in	   building	   a	   solid	   foundation	   for	   the	   development	   of	   constitutional	  jurisprudence	  in	  Africa,	  and	  as	  has	  been	  seen,	  they	  have	  committed	  themselves	  to	   expressing	   and	   using	   their	   professional	   solidarity	   to	   defend	   judges	   against	  improper	  infringements	  by	  executive	  powers,	  even	  beyond	  their	  own	  borders.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54 ‘Chief Justices’ Statement in Beyond the Horizon: Justice in the 21st Century, Report of the CMJA 
Conference, Edinburgh 2000, at p.111 
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Current	  literature	  on	  Chief	  Justices	  	  Even	  outside	  Africa	  the	  Office	  of	  Chief	  Justice,	  and	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  head	  of	  the	  institutional	  judiciary,	  is	  little	  studied	  and	  little	  understood.	  	  Apart	  from	  a	  significant	  body	  of	  scholarship	  on	  judicial	  politics	  and	  leadership	  in	  the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   the	   United	   States,	   and	   some	   studies	   of	   the	   Canadian	  Supreme	   Court	   and	   the	   Australian	   High	   Court,	   the	   language	   of	   “leadership”,	  implying,	   as	   it	   does	   some	  kind	  of	   influence,	   has	  only	   relatively	   recently	   gained	  currency	  as	  being	  appropriate	  in	  the	  context	  of	  leadership	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  as	  an	  institution.	  	  And	  even	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  where	  this	  field	  of	  scholarship	  is	  most	  developed,	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   might	   exercise	   leadership	   over	   the	  Judiciary,	   as	   opposed	   to	   exercising	   leadership	   within	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   is	  relatively	   new.	   	   Indeed	   although	   numerous	   studies	   have	   been	   done	   of	   the	  influence	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  and	  of	  judicial	  leadership	  in	  the	  context	  of	  US	  court	  administration,	  the	  Office	  of	  Chief	  Justice,	  and	  the	  broader	  leadership	  role	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   in	  the	  United	  States,	  has	  had	   little	  attention.	  Theodore	  Ruger,	  introducing	  a	  symposium	  in	  a	  special	  issue	  of	  the	  University	  of	  
Pennsylvania	   Law	   Review	   in	   2006,	   points	   out	   that	   the	   “role	   that	   Chief	   Justice	  Roberts	   now	   occupies	   is	   vast	   in	   terms	   of	   public	   stature,	   importance	   to	   the	  workings	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Court,	   and	  broad	   influence	  over	   the	   federal	   judiciary	  and	  federal	   law	  generally”55	  and	  yet	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  “one	  of	  the	  most	  important,	  and	  least	  studied,	  major	  offices	  in	  the	  American	  government”.56	  	  	  	  The	  office	  of	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  an	  ancient	  office,	  which	   took	  root	   in	  England	  after	  the	  Norman	  Conquest,	  and	  was	  later	  exported	  by	  the	  British	  first	  to	  America,	  and	  then	   to	   the	   colonies	   and	   many	   of	   the	   countries	   that	   now	   make	   up	   the	  Commonwealth.	   	   The	   first	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   England	   (then	   known	   as	   the	   Chief	  Justiciar)	  was	  William	  the	  Conqueror’s	  brother,	  Odo.	  	  He	  was	  both	  a	  priest	  and	  a	  skilful	  soldier,	  and	  his	  leadership	  of	  a	  select	  group	  of	  men-­‐at-­‐arms	  in	  the	  Battle	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55 TW Ruger, ''Forward', Symposium: The Chief Justice and the Institutional Judiciary' 154 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 1323, p.1323 56 Ibid. 
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Hastings	   is	   commemorated	   in	   the	   Bayeux	   Tapestry.57	   	   The	   office	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justiciar	   in	   England	   under	   William’s	   rule	   was	   modelled	   on	   a	   similar	   office	   in	  Normandy	  where	  the	  Chief	  Justiciar	  “superintended	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	  over	   the	  whole	   dukedom,	   and	   on	  whom,	   according	   to	   the	  manners	   of	   the	   age,	  both	  military	   and	   civil	   powers	   of	   great	  magnitude	  were	   conferred.”58	  Odo	  was	  appointed	   in	   1066	   and,	   according	   to	   contemporary	   commentary,	   ‘“Next	   to	   the	  King	   himself,	   he	   was	   chief	   in	   power	   and	   authority,	   and	   when	   the	   King	   was	  beyond	   seas	   (which	   frequently	   happened)	   he	   governed	   the	   realm	   like	   a	  viceroy.”’59	  	  Over	  time,	  however,	  the	  rank	  and	  power	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  declined	  considerably,	   but	   the	   “identity	   of	   the	   office	   is	   distinctly	   traced”	   back	   to	   the	  Norman	  Conquest.60	  	  	  For	  such	  an	  ancient	  office,	  it	  is	  remarkable	  that	  is	  has	  received	  so	  little	  scholarly	  attention.	   	  Odo’s	  story	  is	  set	  out	  in	  what	  is,	  though	  far	  from	  complete,	  probably	  the	  most	   comprehensive	  biography	  of	  English	  Chief	   Justices.	   	   It	  was	  written	   in	  1849	   by	   John	   Campbell,	   1st	   Baron	   of	   St	   Andrews,	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   the	   Queen’s	  Bench.	  While	   Odo’s	   exploits	   are	   featured	   in	   this	   review	   of	   the	   lives	   of	   several	  Chief	  Justices	  of	  England,	  it	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  full	  account	  of	  all	  the	  Chief	  Justices	  of	   England	   because,	   the	   author	   explains,	   Chief	   Justices	   were	   generally	   “quite	  obscure	   until	   they	   were	   elevated	   to	   the	   bench”	   and	   then	   they	   had	   a	   habit	   of	  “confining	  themselves	  to	  the	  routine	  discharge	  of	  their	  official	  duties”.	  	  Campbell,	  clearly	   wishing	   to	   provide	   a	   lively	   account	   of	   the	   office,	   rather	   than	   a	   merely	  chronological	   one	   “used	   the	   freedom	   to	   pass	   over	   entirely	   or	   with	   very	   slight	  notice”	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  many	  individuals	  whom	  he	  “could	  not	  reasonably	  hope	  to	  make	  entertaining	  or	  edifying.”61	  	  Lord	  Campbell	  suggests	  that	  one	  reason	  for	  his	  selective	  approach	  to	  examining	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  English	  Chief	  Justices	  is	  that	  they	  did	  not	  usually	  have	  very	  remarkable	  or	  sensational	  professional	  lives,	  and	  there	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57 Lord Campbell, The Lives of the Chief Justices of England from the Norman Conquest till the Death 
of Lord Tenterden (John Murray, London 1849), p.4 58 Ibid., p.2 59 Quoted in Ibid., at pp.2-3 60 Ibid., p.3 61 Ibid., p.vi   
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was	   not	   much	   about	   them	   that	   was	   very	   “entertaining”	   or	   “edifying”.	   	   This	  approach	   to	   studying	   Chief	   Justices	   has	   continued	   through	   the	   centuries,	   and	  even	  now,	  studies	  of	  Chief	  Justices	  tend	  to	  be	  biographical	  accounts	  of	  interesting	  Chief	  Justices	  and	  analyses	  of	  their	  influence	  over	  particular	  courts	  in	  particular	  eras.	   	   	   In	  America,	   for	   example,	   even	   though	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  has	   always	  been	  head	   of	   the	   Federal	   Judiciary,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   tended	   to	   be	  studied	   with	   in	   a	   rather	   limited	   way	   -­‐	   within	   the	   confines	   of	   the	   possible	  influence	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  might	  exert	  on	  a	  particular	  court,	  and	  the	  consequences	  such	  influence	  might	  have	  on	  opinions	  and	  Supreme	  Court	  decisions.	  In	  England,	  by	   contrast,	   the	   Lord	   Chancellor	   was	   for	   centuries	   the	   head	   of	   the	   Judiciary,	  rather	   than	   the	   Chief	   Justice.	   	   The	   Chief	   Justiciar,	   who	   had	   been	   immensely	  powerful,	  became	  rather	  less	  so	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  thirteenth	  century	  when	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  assumed	  prominence.62	  From	  then	  until	  as	  recently	  as	  2005,	  when	   the	  Constitutional	  Reform	  Act	  2005	  placed	   leadership	  of	   the	   Judiciary	   in	  the	   hands	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   England	   and	  Wales	  was	   not	  head	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  so	  there	  was	  no	  reason	  to	  study	  that	  aspect	  of	  the	  office.	  	  	  
Leadership	  in	  the	  judiciary	  	  Leadership	   in	   the	   judiciary	   must	   not	   undermine	   the	   important	   values	   and	  qualities	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  administration	  of	  justice.	  Judicial	  independence,	  for	   example,	   means	   that	   judicial	   leadership	   cannot	   be	   command	   leadership	   –	  individual	   judges	   must	   act	   independently.	   	   Yet	   individuals	   must	   also	   identify	  with	  the	  collective	  –	  the	   independent	   institution	  –	  and	  work	  towards	  achieving	  shared	   institutional	   goals.	   Both	   individuals	   and	   the	   institution	   must	   also	   be	  accountable.	   	   In	   most	   cases,	   judges	   must	   also	   work	   with	   others	   such	   as	  administrative	   support	   staff	   who	   are	   not	   always	   considered	   to	   be	   part	   of	   the	  judiciary,	  but	   instead	  offer	  a	  support	  service	  provided	  by	   the	  executive.	   	   	  Keith	  Grint,	   a	   leadership	   scholar	   in	   the	   UK,	   argues	   that	   leadership	   is	   an	   “essentially	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62 Lord Campbell, The Lives of the Lord Chancellors (1846), p.5 
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contested	   concept”,63	   and	   that	   the	   way	   that	   leadership	   is	   defined	   has	   “vital	  implications	  for	  how	  organizations	  work	  –	  or	  don’t	  work.”64	  	  	  This	  resonates	  with	  potential	  concerns	  about	  leadership	  in	  the	  judiciary	  where	  the	  question	  of	  what	  constitutes	  proper	  or	  improper	  influence	  is	  paramount	  and	  only	  leadership	  that	  accommodates	  the	  necessary	  individuality	  and	  independence	  of	  each	  judge	  will	  be	  appropriate.	  	  The	  conceptual	  framework	  used	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  located	  in	  what	  is	   sometimes	   described	   as	   the	   “New	   Leadership”	   approach	   to	   leadership,	  combing	   theories	   of	   transformational	   leadership	  with	   advances	   in	   thinking	   on	  leadership	   ethics,	   context	   and	   culture.	   	   This	   is	   because	   of	   the	   emphasis	   in	   this	  collection	  of	  leadership	  literature	  on	  motivation,	  autonomy,	  empowerment,	  and	  the	  resulting	  focus	  on	  leadership	  that	  enhances	  and	  takes	  account	  of	  individuals,	  and	   importantly	   in	   the	   context	  of	   judges,	   the	   autonomy	  of	   individuals	  working	  towards	   collective	   goals.	   	   The	   leadership	   literature	   and	   the	   theoretical	  framework	  that	  forms	  of	  the	  basis	  of	  my	  analysis,	  is	  outlined	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Two.	  	  	  
1.3	  Methodology	  and	  Methods	  	  An	   analysis	   of	   Commonwealth	   norms,	   national	   constitutions,	   legislation	   and	  practices	   is	   enriched	   by	   empirical	   data,	   gathered	   from	   interviews	   with	   a	  selection	   of	   individuals	   in	   each	   system,	   to	   produce	   a	   picture	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   a	  Chief	  Justice’s	  powers,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  office	  of	  Chief	  Justice,	  and	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	   leadership	   challenges	   faced	   by	   Chief	   Justices	   in	   meeting	   the	   demands	   of	  building	  and	  maintaining	  judicial	  independence	  while	  also	  establishing	  effective	  and	  appropriate	  accountability	  mechanisms.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63 K Grint, Leadership : limits and possibilities (Management, work and organisations, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke 2005), pp.17-18. Grint takes his definition of an essentially contested concept 
from W.B. Gallie in Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (New York, Schoken Books, 1964) 
at pp.187-8): “Recognition of a given concept as essentially contested implies recognition of rival uses 
of it (such as oneself repudiates) as not only logically possible and humanly ‘likely’, but as of 
permanent potential critical value to one’s own use or interpretation of the concept in question.” 64 Ibid. 
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Research	  Questions	  	  
	  This	   study	   aims	   to	   contribute	   to	   research	   on	   judicial	   studies	   and	   institution	  building	  in	  Commonwealth	  Africa	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	   in	   the	   modern	   African	   judiciary	   as	   the	   courts	   play	   their	   part	   in	  implementing	   the	   “fundamental	   political	   values	   of	   the	   Commonwealth”.	   As	  complex	   constitutional	   issues	   arise	   out	   of	   complex	   constitutions,	   the	   courts	   in	  Africa	   have	   a	   crucial	   role	   to	   play	   in	   interpreting	   these	   constitutions	   and	  developing	  each	  country’s	  domestic	   jurisprudence.	   	  However,	  the	  decisions	  and	  jurisprudence	  courts	  produce	  do	  not	  present	  the	  full	  picture	  of	  the	  changes	  that	  are	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  judiciaries	  of	  the	  three	  countries	  in	  this	  study.	  	  The	  focus	  of	   this	   research	   is	   on	   the	   judiciary	   as	   an	   organization:	   an	   organization	   which	  must	  operate	  within	  very	  specific	  constitutional	  parameters,	  and	  which	  in	  most	  cases	   is	   subjected	   to	   considerable	   constraints	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   resources	  available	   to	   it,	   and	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   organization	   and	   its	   resources	   are	  managed.	   The	   role	   and	   office	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   study	   for	  several	  reasons.	  	  	  	  The	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  complex	  but	  little	  understood	  and	  it	  has	  not	  been	  studied,	   but	   Chief	   Justices	   are	   frequently	   the	   subjects	   of	  much	   criticism.	   	   This	  means	   that	   Chief	   Justices	   are	   increasingly	   being	   called	   upon	   to	   address	   these	  issues.	   Reform	   initiatives	   in	   the	   Commonwealth,	   and	   plans	   for	   their	  implementation	   in	  Africa,	  envisage	  a	  much	  more	  prominent	  role	   for	   the	  courts,	  and	  for	  Chief	  Justices,	  than	  ever	  before.	  	  The	  way	  that	  the	  judiciary	  operates	  and	  accounts	   for	   itself	   is	   now	  under	  more	   scrutiny	  now	   than	  ever	  before,	  meaning	  that	   the	  Chief	   Justice,	  as	  head	  of	   the	   judiciary,	   is	  under	  ever	  more	  scrutiny	   too.	  	  And	   the	   highly	   political	   nature	   of	   the	   office	   in	  Africa	   puts	   Chief	   Justices	   in	   the	  spotlight	   as	   they	   try	   to	   adapt	   cumbersome,	   growing	   organisations	   while	  somehow	   maintaining	   the	   sometimes-­‐precarious	   independence	   of	   both	  individual	   judges,	   and	   the	   institution	   itself.	   Chief	   Justices,	   as	   head	   of	   the	  Judiciary,	   are	   now	   expected	   to	   take	   a	  more	   proactive	   stance	   in	   developing	   the	  role	  of	   the	   judiciary	  and	   in	   increasing	  public	  confidence	   in	   the	   institution.	   	  Yet,	  nowhere	   is	   the	   precise	   nature	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   role	   clearly	   formulated.	   	   In	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general	   existing	   literature	   on	   Chief	   Justices	   tends	   to	   focus	   on	   “interesting”	  examples,	  rather	  than	  systematic	  studies	  of	  the	  role	  and	  the	  institutional	  setting.	  	  	  The	  current	  literature	  on	  judicial	  leadership	  and	  Chief	  Justices	  focuses	  mainly	  on	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  of	  the	  final	  appellate	  court,	  and	  most	  of	  this	  literature	  emanates	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  	  But	  in	  Africa,	  as	  Justice	  Langa	  suggests,	  there	  is	  much	  more	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  role,	  and	   he	   or	   she,	   as	   head,	   indeed	   leader,	   of	   the	   judiciary	   has	   to	   identify	  working	  practices	  that	  encourage	  and	  allow	  independent	  judges	  to	  work	  together	  as	  part	  of	   an	   independent	   institution	   charged	  with	   upholding	   and	   protecting	   complex	  constitutional	  values.	  	  	  	  Three	  questions	  form	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  study:	  	  1. How	  do	  we	  understand	   the	   leadership	  role	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice?	  This	  question	  concerns	  what	   Chief	   Justices	   do,	   and	   the	   processes	   and	   practices	   involved.	  	  Early	   in	   the	   research	   process	   it	   was	   anticipated	   that	   the	   emphasis	   on	  leadership	   would	   be	   on	   the	   leadership	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   in	   judicial	  reform	  (with	  engagement	  in	  reform	  being	  one	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  was	  used	  to	  identify	   case	   studies),65	   however,	   as	   the	   research	   progressed	   and	   the	   data	  emerged	   from	   the	   interviews,	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   the	   changing	   role	   of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   and	   the	   overall,	   broad	   leadership	   role	   of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  was	  the	   real	   focus.	   The	   research	  questions	  were	   revisited	   and	   refined	   to	   reflect	  the	   data	   as	   it	  was	   analysed,	   and	   the	   end	   result	  was	   a	   focus	   on	   the	   general	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  that	  is	  shaped	  and	  moulded	  by	  numerous	  expectations	  and	  demands	  that	  the	  Chief	   Justice	  should	   lead	   in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  	  2. How	   is	   that	   role	   evolving?	   This	  question	   is	   about	   the	  evolving	  nature	  of	   the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  As	  the	  research	  progressed	  it	  became	  apparent	  that	  where	  once	  it	  may	  have	  been	  sufficient	  for	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  to	  behave	  as,	  and	  to	  be	  seen	  merely	  as	  the	  “head	  of	  the	  judiciary”,	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  case	  –	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65 See below.  
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the	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   evolving	   into	   one	   in	  which	   the	   Chief	   Justice	  must	  establish	  him	  or	  herself	  as	   the	   leader	  of	   the	   third	  arm	  of	  government,	  even	   though	   this	   leadership	   role	   is	   not	   necessarily	   expressly	   formalized	   in	  law.	  	  3. What	   consequences	   does	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   “judicial”	   functions	   and	  
“administrative”	   functions	   in	   the	   administration	   of	   courts,	   have	   for	   the	  
leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice?	   	  In	  charting	  the	  various	  roles	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  leadership	  opportunities	  that	  exist,	  there	  emerged	  a	  constant	  tension	   between	   concepts	   and	   ideas	   relating	   to	   the	   “judicial	   function”	   and	  “judicial	   leadership”	   and	   to	   the	   “administrative	   function”	   and	   the	   Chief	  Justice’s	   leadership	   role	   in	   relation	   to	   “administrative	   matters”.	   	   This	  question	  therefore	  addresses	  that	  tension	  and	  seeks	  to	  illuminate	  how	  these	  concepts	   impact	   on	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   leadership	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice.	  	  	  
Leadership	  as	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  	  
Judicial	  leadership	  literature	  	  The	   conceptual	   framework	   used	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   derived	   from	   the	   “New	  Leadership”	  approach	   to	   leadership	  and	  combines	   theories	  of	   transformational	  leadership	  with	  advances	   in	   thinking	  on	   leadership	  ethics,	   context	  and	  culture.	  This	   approach,	   as	   set	   out	   by	   James	   McGregor	   Burns,	   identifies	   four	   “relevant	  crucial	   variables”	   which	   underlie	   the	   “dynamics	   of	   the	   leadership	   process”:	  power,	  conflict,	  values	  and	  change.	   	  The	  dynamics	  of	   the	   leadership	  process,	  as	  understood	   in	   transformational	   leadership	   theory,	   and	   the	   concepts	   associated	  with,	  it	  offers	  a	  language	  for	  understanding	  how	  Chief	  Justices	  can	  appropriately	  influence	   and	   motivate	   judges	   and	   court	   administrators	   towards	   greater	  efficiency	  and	  organizational	  management	  without	  improperly	  impinging	  on	  the	  individual	  needs	  of	  independent	  judges.	  	  	  
	   34	  
Scholarship	  on	  judicial	   leadership	  in	  the	  United	  States	   illuminates	  the	  “paradox	  of	   judicial	   leadership”	   and	   the	   idea	   that	   “in	   a	   sensitive	   but	   healthy”	   court	  organization	  “to	  lead	  may	  be	  to	  appear	  not	  to	  lead,	  not	  to	  be	  out	  in	  front	  but	  to	  enable	  others	  to	  lead.”	   	  Much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  leadership	  by	  Chief	  Justices	  is	  concentrated	  on	   the	  US	  experience	   and	   it	   builds	  on	   the	  work	  of	  Danelski,	  who	  applied	   an	   interaction	   process	   analysis	   	   -­‐	   “task”	   and	   “social”	   leadership	   -­‐	   to	  assess	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Chief	   Justice	   in	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court.	   	  According	  to	  Danelski	  leadership	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  influence,	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  judges,	  influence	  is	  understood	  as	  the	  choices	  a	  judge	  makes	  in	  response	  to	  the	  activities	  of	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   and	   these	   choices	   are	   determined	   by	   a	   combination	   of	  expectations,	  values	  and	  the	  attitudes	  of	  both	  judge	  and	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  
Leadership	  studies	  and	  choosing	  the	  right	  approach	  When	  discussing	  and	  applying	  theories	  of	  leadership	  it	  is	  widely	  accepted	  in	  the	  field	  of	  leadership	  studies	  that	  scholars	  and	  practitioners	  have	  to	  make	  a	  choice	  between	  approaches	  because	   theories	  of	   leadership	  can	  be	  used	   in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  and	  have	  varying	  implications.	  	  As	  Grint	  puts	  it,	  leadership	  is	  an	  “essentially	  contested	   concept”	   and	   the	  way	   that	   leadership	   is	  defined	  has	   implications	   for	  the	  way	   that	   organizations	  work.	   	   In	   considering	   the	   appropriate	   approach	   to	  leadership	   in	   the	   judiciary,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   take	   account	   of	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  judicial	   organization.	   The	   appropriate	   form	  of	   leadership	   in	   the	   judiciary	  must	  accommodate	  the	  important	  values	  and	  qualities	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  
An	  appropriate	  conceptual	  framework	  for	  leadership	  in	  the	  judiciary	  An	   approach	   that	   combines	   the	   theory	   of	   transformational	   leadership,	   Burns’	  later	   approach	   to	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   leadership	   process	   and	   the	   variables	   of	  power,	  conflict,	  values	  and	  change	  and	  leadership	  ethics,	  addresses	  the	  concerns	  of	  leadership	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  	  	  Transformational	  leadership	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  leadership	  process	  emphasize	  the	  motivation,	  autonomy	  and	  empowerment	  of	   individuals	   in	   acting	   towards	   collective	   goals.	   	   Studies	   of	   transformational	  leadership	   in	   organizations	   demonstrate	   that	   even	   though	   it	   was	   originally	  conceived	  as	  a	  political	  theory	  of	  leadership	  it	  is	  effective	  in	  organizations,	  and	  it	  is	   	   “autonomy-­‐supporting”.	   	   The	   dynamics	   of	   the	   leadership	   process,	   which	  emphasizes	  process	  over	  personal	   style	   and	   focuses	  on	   the	   concepts	  of	  power,	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conflict,	  values	  and	  change,	  builds	  on	  the	  theory	  of	  transformational	   leadership	  and	  provides	  a	  means	  of	  understanding	  and	  mapping	  some	  of	  the	  more	  difficult	  aspects	  of	  the	  paradox	  of	  judicial	  leadership.	  	  Such	  issues	  include:	  the	  scope	  and	  effect	  of	  broad	  discretionary	  powers;	  implicit	  conflicts	  and	  tensions	  in	  leading	  an	  organization	   in	   which	   law	   and	   discretion	   must	   be	   balanced,	   conflicting	   goals	  must	  be	  resolved,	  and	  complete	  control	  over	  resources	  and	  operational	  decisions	  is	  not	  always	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  leader;	  the	  identification	  and	  articulation	  of	  the	  values	   and	   goals	   of	   the	   organization	   which	   are	   inevitably	   constrained	   by	  constitutional	   and	   legal	   values	   and	   principles;	   and	   the	   need	   for	   a	   dynamic	  organisation	   that	   reflects	   the	  needs	  of	   society.	   	   	   Leadership	  ethics	   expands	   the	  content	  of	   the	   term	   “values”	  and	  offers	  a	  way	  of	  understanding	  and	  evaluating	  leadership	   processes,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   what	   is	   “morally	   good”	   and	   what	   is	  “technically	  good	  or	  effective”.	  	  	  This	  resonates	  with	  the	  requirement	  that	  judges	  (and	  of	  course	  Chief	   Justices)	  should	  be	  people	  of	   integrity	  and	  moral	   fortitude	  and	   that	   both	   the	   individuals	   and	   the	   organization	   should	   adhere	   to	   certain	  ethical	  standards	  in	  all	  that	  they	  do,	  which	  might	  reasonably	  include	  the	  way	  in	  with	   they	   manage,	   and	   lead,	   their	   organization.	   	   Leadership	   ethics	   addresses	  concerns	  about	  accountability	  and	  fairness,	  which,	  understood	  as	  a	  form	  of	  “soft	  accountability”	  regulates	  conduct	  and	  checks	  against	  abuse	  of	  power.	  	  	  	  
The	  function	  of	  the	  leadership	  literature	  Once	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   research	   was	   on	   the	   headship	   of	   the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  the	  literature	  on	  leadership	  was	  explored.	  	  Applying	  the	  practices	  of	  leadership	  scholarship,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	   identify	   an	   appropriate	   approach	   to	   leadership	   from	   which	   to	   draw	   the	  leadership	   concepts	   that	   would	   complement	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   legal	   and	  empirical	   materials	   that	   would	   be	   gathered	   in	   field	   research.	   	   The	   qualitative	  methodology	  was	  used	  to	  analyse	  using	  the	  constant	  comparative	  method.	  	  This	  research	   did	   not	   begin	   with	   a	   hypothesis	   about	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   particular	  model	   of	   leadership	   existed	   in	   the	   real	  world.	   	   However,	   it	   did	   begin	  with	   the	  assertion	  that,	  at	  least	  on	  a	  theoretical	  level,	  the	  approach	  to	  leadership,	  and	  the	  leadership	   concepts	   that	   resulted	   from	   that	   approach	   are	   consistent	   with	   the	  unique	   features	   of	   the	   judicial	   organisation,	   and	   that	   therefore	   the	   concepts	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embodied	   in	   these	   theories	   of	   leadership	  were	   appropriate	   for	   this	   study.	   The	  focus	  on	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  set	  against	  the	  background	  of	  the	   fundamental	   constitutional	  Commonwealth	  values	  of	   judicial	   independence	  and	  accountability,	  and	  how	  they	  are	  or	  can	  be	  applied	  in	  varied	  African	  nations.	  	  The	   connection	   and	   interplay	   between	   judicial	   independence	   and	   judicial	  accountability,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  judges/the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  other	  branches	   is	   examined	   using	   a	   concept	   of	   leadership	   in	   which	   power,	   conflict,	  values	   and	   change	   come	   into	   play	   as	   part	   of	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   leadership	  process.	  	  	  	  
Planning	  and	  Research	  
Law	  and	  policy	  research	  The	   starting	   point	   was	   the	   movement	   in	   the	   Commonwealth	   to	   realise	  democratic	  reform	  across	  the	  Commonwealth	  through	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Latimer	   House	   Principles.	   	   There	   were	   two	   aspects	   to	   the	   law	   and	   policy	  research	   undertaken.	   	   First	   was	   the	   selection	   of	   case	   studies	   based	   on	   a	   brief	  comparative	   review	   of	   the	   judicial	   systems	   of	   Commonwealth	   Africa	   through	  which	   three	   countries,	   with	   both	   similarities	   and	   differences	   in	   their	   judicial	  systems	  and	  in	  the	  character	  of	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  were	  identified.	  The	  similarities	  enabled	  comparison,	  but	  the	  differences	  were	  expected	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  more	  general	  nature	  of	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  Chief	  Justices.	  	  	  Second,	  the	  constitutional	   and	   legal	   framework	   surrounding	   the	   office	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	  was	  examined	  in	  each	  country.	  	  This	  was	  informed	  by	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  research	  focused	  on	  certain	  issues	  to	  begin	  with:	  the	  legal	  powers	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  any	  evidence	  of	  conflicts	  that	  had	  arisen	  between	  the	  courts	   and	   others,	   the	   constitutional	   values	   that	   inform	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice	   and	  organization	  of	   the	   judiciary,	   and	   judicial	   reform	  efforts	  during	   the	  decade	  under	  study.	  	  	  	  
Selecting	  case	  studies	  	  	  1. The	  Commonwealth	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The	  impetus	  for	  this	  study	  arises	  out	  of	  the	  current	  harmonizing	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  democratization	  agenda	  of	  the	  Commonwealth,	  and	  the	  global	  movement	  to	  consolidate	  governance	  institutions,	  particularly	  in	  Africa.	  	  The	  adoption	  of	  the	  Latimer	  House	  Principles	  and	  subsequent	  implementation	  efforts	  suggest	  that	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	   assume	   here	   that	   (a)	   the	   fundamental	   political	  principles	   of	   the	   Commonwealth	   are	   universally	   acceptable	   across	   the	  Commonwealth	  and	  uniformly	  applicable	  to	  some	  extent	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  legal	  systems,	   societies	   and	   cultures;	   and	   (b)	   that	   there	   are	   basic	   features	   of	  governance	   structures	   that	   can	  be	   implemented	  while	   accommodating,	   and	  perhaps	   even	   encouraging,	   diversity.	   	   These	   principles	   and	   values	   are	   now	  considered	   to	   be	   among	   the	   “core	   criteria”66	   for	   membership	   to	   the	  Commonwealth.	   	   New	   applicants	   are	   required	   to	   comply	   with	   the	  “Commonwealth	  values,	  principles	  and	  priorities”,	  including	  a	  “demonstrable	  commitment”	   to	   “democracy	   and	   democratic	   processes,	   including	   free	   and	  fair	   elections	   and	   representative	   legislatures;	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	  independence	   of	   the	   judiciary;	   good	   governance,	   including	   a	   well-­‐trained	  public	   service	  and	   transparent	  public	  accounts;	  protection	  of	  human	  rights,	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  and	  equality	  of	  opportunity”.	  (Many	  of	  the	  values	  and	  principles	  articulated	  in	  the	  Latimer	  House	  Principles,	  which	  are	  seen	  as	  “an	  integral	   part”	   of	   the	   Commonwealth’s	   fundamental	   values.)	   The	   countries	  selected	   are	   all	   members	   of	   the	   Commonwealth,	   subscribe	   to	   the	  fundamental	   political	   values	   of	   the	   Commonwealth	   and	   have	   pledged	   to	  actively	   promote	   and	   implement	   those	   principles	   (section	   40	   of	   the	  Constitution	   of	   Ghana	   requires	   the	   state	   to	   “adhere	   to	   the	   principles	  enshrined	  in	  or…	  the	  aims	  and	  ideals	  of…	  the	  Commonwealth”).	  	  	  2. Court	  structures	  based	  on	  common	  law	  	  The	   legal	   systems	   in	   Commonwealth	   Africa	   are	   very	   diverse,	   but	   a	   shared	  feature	   of	   most	   is	   that	   their	   judicial	   institutions	   are	   based	   on	   the	   English	  common	   law.	   	   Most,	   incorporate	   elements	   of	   common	   law,	   whether	  mixed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66 Commonwealth Secretariat, 'CHOGM Report of the Committee on Memership of the 
Commonwealth' (2007) 
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common	  and	  civil	  systems,	  or	  common	  law	  based	  systems.	  Most	  can	  also	  be	  described	   as	   plural	   systems,	   incorporating	   different	   degrees	   of	   customary	  law,	  which	  includes	  the	  customary	  laws	  of	  traditional	  and	  tribal	  communities	  as	  well	  as	  Islamic	  law.	  	  Their	  legal	  systems,	  while	  diverse,	  all	  include	  a	  strong	  element	  of	  the	  common	  law,	  specifically	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  rules	  and	  procedures	  which	  dictate	  the	  way	  that	  the	  courts	  function,	  the	  use	  of	  precedent	  and	  the	  adversarial	   system.	   	   	   And	   while	   there	   are	   differences	   between	   the	   three	  countries,	   there	   are	   also	   sufficient	   similarities	   to	   enable	  meaningful/instructive	  comparison.	  	  	  	  	  3. Chief	  Justice	  as	  head	  of	  the	  judiciary	  	  They	  all	  have	  a	  Chief	   Justice	  as	  head	  of	  the	   judiciary;	  a	  president	  as	  head	  of	  state,	  who	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  appointment	  of	  both	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  other	  members	   of	   the	   judiciary;	   a	   Council	   or	   Commission	   involved	   to	   varying	  degrees	   in	   both	   appointment	   and	   removal	   of	   judges;	   all	  make	   a	   distinction	  between	   the	   appointments	   procedures	   for	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   and	   all	   other	  judges;	   all	   have	   long-­‐term	   policies	   and	   reform	   programmes	   aimed	   at	  improving	  the	  judiciary	  or	  the	  judicial	  services	  in	  some	  way.	  	  	  4. Engagement	  in	  reform	  	  The	  ministries	   of	   justice	   in	   all	   three	   countries	   are	   committed	   to	   long-­‐term	  justice-­‐sector	  reform	  programmes	  –	  although	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  judiciary	  and	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   involved	   varies	   in	   each	   country.	   	   In	   Kenya,	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Justice	   and	   Constitutional	   Affairs	   is	   leading	   the	   Governance,	  Justice,	  Law	  and	  Order	  Sector	  Reform	  Programme	  with	  minimal	   input	   from	  the	   Judiciary;	   in	   Ghana,	   the	   judiciary	   itself	   has	   a	   Judicial	   Reform	   Project	  Development	   and	   Implementation	   Unit;	   and	   in	   South	   Africa	   the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Justice	  Vision	  2000,	   lead	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	   is	  ongoing,	  with	  the	  Judiciary	  as	  a	  key	  partner	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  working	  not	  only	   with	   the	   ministry	   but	   also	   through	   several	   management	   committees	  with	  the	  Administrative	  Support	  Staff	  of	  the	  Judiciary,	   for	  whom	  developing	  “administrative	  leadership”	  is	  a	  key	  strategic	  area	  in	  the	  coming	  years.	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In	  Commonwealth	  Africa,	  all	  the	  legal	  systems	  are	  mixed	  to	  some	  degree	  (but	  not	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense	  of	  the	  term)	  -­‐	  the	  product	  of	  complex	  histories	  of	  migration	  and	   colonialism.	   	   The	   countries	   under	   study	   here	   are	   all	   common-­‐law	   based	  systems	  differentiated	  by	   the	  variety	  and	  degree	  of	   influence	  of	  other	   systems.	  	  So,	   South	   Africa	   is	   often	   cited	   as	   an	   example	   of	   the	   classic,	   narrowly	   defined	  “mixed	   system”	   being	  made	   up,	   as	   it	   is,	   of	   civil	   and	   common	   law.	   	   But	   it	   also	  includes	  customary	  law.	  	  Kenya	  is	  a	  predominantly	  common	  law	  system	  in	  which	  both	  customary	  law	  and	  Islamic	  law	  are	  recognised	  as	  legitimate	  sources	  of	  law.	  	  Ghana	  falls	  into	  the	  category	  of	  mixed	  customary	  and	  common	  law.	  	  	  They	  are	  all	  mixed	  systems	  with	  a	  strong	  common	  law	  element.	  	  	  	  The	  main	  unifying	  factor	  between	  these	  countries	  is	  that	  they	  have	  all	  signed	  up	  to	   the	   Commonwealth	   declarations	   outlining	   the	   fundamental	   constitutional	  values	  of	   the	  Commonwealth	  and	  they	  have	  all	  signed	  up	  to	  the	  Latimer	  House	  Principles	   of	   2003	  which	  means	   that	   each	   of	   their	   governments	   have	   asserted	  their	  commitment	  to	  ensuring	  effective	  judicial	  independence	  and	  accountability	  between	   the	   three	  branches.	   	   	  They	  are	  all	   governed	  by	  a	  President	  as	  head	  of	  State	  and	  head	  of	   the	  executive;	   they	  all	  have	  a	  constitutional	  body	   involved	   in	  appointments	  and	  removals	  of	  judges.	  	  They	  all	  have	  a	  distinction	  made	  between	  the	  CJ	  and	  other	  judges	  in	  terms	  of	  appointments	  and	  removals.	  	  
Currency	  of	  the	  study	  This	  study	  looks	  at	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  over	  a	  decade,	  from	  1999	  (when	  the	   Latimer	   House	   Principles	   first	   came	   into	   being)	   to	   2009.	   	   In	   each	   of	   the	  countries,	  transformation	  and	  reform	  efforts	  have	  continued,	  so	  there	  have	  been	  changes	   that	   could	   affect	   the	   office	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice.	   	   However,	   this	   study	  analyses	   materials	   and	   developments	   up	   to	   2009	   and	   not	   beyond	   that.	   	   This	  means	   that	   developments	   in	   the	   progress	   of	   the	   Superior	   Courts	   Bills	   through	  Parliament	  in	  South	  Africa	  are	  only	  considered	  up	  to	  2009.	  In	  Ghana	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Review	  Commission	  that	  was	  set	  up	  in	  2010	  does	  not	  feature	  in	   this	   study.	   In	  Kenya,	   the	  applicable	  constitution	   is	   the	  1963	  Constitution	   (as	  amended	   to	  2008),	  not	   the	  new	  constitution	   that	  was	  adopted	   in	  August	  2010,	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which	  radically	  reorganizes	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  and	  introduces	  a	  new	  Deputy	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  	  
Interviews	  	  
Sample	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  interviews	  This	   is	   a	   qualitative	   study	   and	   therefore	   the	   sample	   was	   not	   intended	   to	   be	  statistically	   significant.	   	   Selection	  depended	   to	  a	   considerable	  extent	  on	  access,	  and	   interview	   subjects	  were	   largely	   selected	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   recommendations	  using	  the	  “snowballing	  technique”.	  	  	  	  	  Three	  groups	  of	  participants	  were	   interviewed	   in	  order	   to	  generate	  qualitative	  data	   to	   inform	   this	   study:	   Chief	   Justices,	   Judges,	   and	   other	   key	   actors	   in	   the	  justice	   system.	   	   The	   aim	   of	   conducting	   interviews	   with	   a	   broad	   spectrum	   of	  individuals	  was	  that	  the	  data	  would	  offer	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  from	  multiple	  perspectives.	  	  The	   first	   group	   of	   potential	   interviewees	  was	   retired	   or	   serving	   Chief	   Justices.	  The	  interviews	  were	  intended	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  insights	  an	  office	  holder	  can	  offer	   about	   the	   practicalities	   of	   being	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   and	   experienced	   views	  about	  the	  precise	  role	  of	  a	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  As	  such	  the	  topics	  covered	  ranged	  from	  the	  goals	  and	  functions	  of	  a	  chief	  justice,	  the	  interactions	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  engages	  in	   between	   political	   powers	   and	   judges,	   and	   the	   perceived	   or	   actual	   influence	  that	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  may	  or	  may	  not	  exert	  over	  relevant	  actors	  and	  issues,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  reform	  potential	  of	  an	  individual	  Chief	  Justice.	   	   	  One	  serving	  Chief	  Justice	  was	  interviewed.	  	  	  The	  second	  group	  was	  retired	  or	  serving	   judges.	   	  For	   the	  most	  part,	   they	  were	  interviewed	   individually,	   on	   a	   confidential	   semi-­‐structured	   basis,	   for	  approximately	  one	  hour.	  	  Two	  individuals	  agreed	  to	  be	  interviewed	  on	  the	  basis	  that	   interviewed	   together,	   “in	   conversation”,	   informally.	   	   These	   interviews	  had	  two	   purposes,	   one	  was	   to	   gain	   a	   deeper	   understanding	   of	   the	   system	   of	   court	  governance	   in	   each	   country,	   and	   the	   other	   was	   to	   understand	   the	   potential	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impact,	  real	  or	  perceived,	  that	  this	  had	  on	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  working	  environment	  of	  individual	  judges.	  	  As	  such,	  topics	  included	  the	  possible	  representative	  nature	  of	   the	   office	   of	   Chief	   Justice,	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   leadership	   activities	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice,	  and	  delegation	  and	  reform	  activities	  of	   judges	  and	  Chief	   Justices.	   	  Eight	  serving	  judges,	  and	  one	  retired	  judge	  were	  interviewed.	  	  	  The	  final	  group	  consisted	  of	  a	  selection	  of	  other	  actors	  associated	  with	  the	  justice	  system	  who	  were	  considered	  able	  to	  comment	  on	  the	  countries	  selected	  for	  the	  study,	  or	  the	  Commonwealth	  as	  whole.	  	  The	  aim	  of	  these	  interviews	  was	  to	  offer	  an	   external	   view	   of	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice.	   	   Interview	   subjects	   in	   this	  category	   included	   court	   administrators,	   civil	   servants,	   policy-­‐makers,	   lawyers	  and	  academics.	  They	  were,	   in	   the	  main,	   interviewed	  in	  person,	   individually	  (on	  one	  occasion,	   three	   individuals	  agreed	  to	  be	   interviewed	  on	  the	  basis	   that	   they	  would	  be	  interviewed	  together	  “in	  conversation”,	  rather	  than	  individually).	  	  One	  individual	  was	  interviewed	  over	  the	  telephone.	  Interviews	  with	  academics	  were	  primarily	   used	   as	   a	   way	   of	   orienting	   the	   researcher	   in	   each	   country.	   Four	   of	  these	   interviews,	   with	   court	   administrators,	   were	   conducted	   on	   the	   record	  without	   a	   confidentiality	   agreement,	   and	   the	   rest	   were	   conducted	   on	   an	  anonymous	  basis.	  	  
Conducting	  the	  interviews	  Interviews	  were	  set	  up	  with	  an	  initial	  inquiry	  by	  email	  or	  telephone,	  followed	  by	  an	   email	   including	   a	   letter	   setting	   out	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   interview	   followed	   by	  confirmation	  of	   the	   interview	  and	  the	  date	  place	  and	  time	  from	  them	  by	  email.	  	  As	  all	  of	  these	  individuals	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  elite	  interviewees,	  their	  consent	  to	  be	  interviewed	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  consent	  to	  be	  interviewed	  on	  the	  terms	  set	  out	  in	  the	   letter	   arranging	   the	   interview.	   	   Initially	   it	   was	   anticipated	   that	   all	   “other	  justice	  system	  actors”	  would	  be	  offered	  confidential	   interviews,	  in	  other	  words,	  any	  attributions	  would	  only	  be	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   their	  permission	  and	  otherwise	  “all	  reasonable	  efforts”	  would	  be	  made	  “to	  avoid	  identification	  of	  [them]	  or	  any	  person	  [they]	  refer	  to”.	  However,	  once	  it	  became	  clear	  in	  the	  field	  that	  there	  were	  certain	  individuals	  whose	  input	  would	  be	  relevant,	  and	  they	  appeared	  willing	  to	  be	  interviewed,	  it	  also	  became	  clear	  that	  because	  of	  their	  positions,	  it	  would	  be	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very	  difficult	  to	  anonymise	  their	  contributions.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  therefore,	  a	  few	  interviewees	   from	   the	   “other	   justice	   system	   actors”	   category	  were	   not	   offered	  confidentiality.	   	  They	  were	   instead	  simply	  asked	   if	   they	  would	  agree	   to	  a	   tape-­‐recorded	   interview	   and	   given	   the	   option	   to	   “decline	   to	   answer	   any	   of	   [my]	  questions	  or	  discuss	  other	  issues	  that	  you	  feel	  are	  relevant.”67	  	  	  
Analysis	  and	  use	  of	  the	  interviews	  The	  interviews	  were	  analysed	  using	  the	  constant	  comparative	  method.	  	  Initially	  notes	   and	   recordings	  were	   reviewed	   shortly	   after	   interviews	  were	   conducted.	  	  Later,	   notes	   and	   recordings	   were	   returned	   to.	   	   Recordings	   were	   listened	   to	  repeatedly	   and	   this	   generated	   notes	   producing	   transcriptions	   of	   several	   of	   the	  interviews.	   	   The	   transcripts,	   the	   notes	   and	   the	   field	   notes	   from	   unrecorded	  interviews	  were	   then	   analysed	   and	   compared.	   	   	   The	   interview	   data	   is	   used	   in	  conjunction	   with	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   and	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   legal	  framework	  that	  shapes	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  The	  data	  initially	  generated	  general	   themes	   that	   guided	   the	   legal	   analysis,	   and	   as	   it	   was	   reviewed	   and	  compared,	  more	   refined	   themes	   emerged	   that	   run	   through	   the	   study,	   and	   the	  data	  generated	  the	  definitions	  of	  the	  leadership	  roles	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  which	  are	   understood	   with	   reference	   to	   leadership	   approach	   provided	   by	   the	  conceptual	  framework	  drawn	  from	  the	  leadership	  literature.	  	  	  
1.4	  Organization	  of	  Chapters	  	  	  This	  study	  is	  organized	  around	  themes	  generated	  from	  the	  data	  that	  is	  analyzed	  with	   reference	   to	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   drawn	   from	   the	   theories	   of	  transformational	   leadership,	   especially	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	  leadership	  process,	  and	  leadership	  ethics.	  	  Chapter	  2	  is	  devoted	  to	  the	  leadership	  literature	  that	  generates	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  used	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  It	  begins	  by	  exploring	  the	  literature	  on	  judicial	  leadership	  that	  largely	  emanates	  from	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada.	  This	  literature	  is	  relevant	  here	  because	  it	  is	  the	  most	  prominent	  and	  developed	  body	  of	  literature	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  judicial	  leadership	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67 See Appendix A for the text of the letters sent to interviewees.  
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and	   because	   it	   highlights	   many	   of	   the	   complexities	   and	   issues	   that	   are	   most	  challenging	  for	  the	  judiciaries	  in	  this	  study.	  Chapter	  2	  explains	  why,	  even	  though	  it	   is	   a	   political	   theory	   of	   leadership,	   a	   transformational	   leadership	   approach	   is	  appropriate	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	   leadership	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  It	  concludes	  by	  setting	  out	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  that	  is	  used	  to	  analyse	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  justice.	  	  	  	  	  	  Central	  to	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  is	  Burns’	  understanding	  of	  the	  “dynamics	  of	  the	  leadership	  process”	  and	  the	  “relevant	  crucial	  variables”	  that	  he	  identifies	  as	  power,	   conflict,	   values	   and	   change.	   	   Chapter	   three	   sets	   out	   the	   constitutional	  basis	  of	  “values”	  for	  leadership	  in	  the	  judiciary,	  and	  the	  ethics	  that	  must	  inform	  conduct	   and	   leadership	   in	   the	   judiciary.	   	   Chapter	   three	   therefore	   looks	   at	   the	  domestic	  content	  of	  the	  “fundamental	  political	  values	  of	  the	  Commonwealth”	  and	  their	   potential	   contribution	   to	   leadership	   by	   the	  Chief	   Justice.	   	   The	  purpose	   of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  constitutional	  foundations	  of	  values	  in	  judicial	  leadership,	   and	   to	   highlight	   the	   constraints	   that	   impact	   leadership	   in	   the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  judiciary	  as	  an	  organization	  must	  resonate	   with	   the	   accepted	   constitutional	   principles	   and	   values	   of	   society.	  	  Interviews	   demonstrate	   that	   these	   values	   inform	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   work	   of	   the	  judiciary	  and	  must	  therefore	  inform	  the	  approach	  to	  leadership	  taken	  by	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  judiciary	  as	  institution.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Chapter	  4	  and	  Chapter	  5	  address	  the	  variable	  of	  power.	  	  Chapter	  4	  considers	  the	  factors	  that	  might	  affect	  the	  overall	  social	  (or	  even	  political)	  power	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  –	  the	  status	  of	  the	  office,	  the	  practical	  arrangements	  supporting	  the	  office	  and	   the	   context	   of	   the	   office	   –	   both	   the	   institutional	   context	   (practical	  arrangements	  for	  relations	  with	  the	  other	  branches)	  and	  the	  context	  of	  the	  office	  in	   the	   justice	   system	   of	   each	   country.	   	   This	   chapter	   focuses	   on	   the	   practical	  arrangements	   for	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Chief	   Justice	  (and	  the	   judiciary)	  and	  the	  other	  branches.	  	  Chapter	   5	  maps	   the	   powers	   and	   practices	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   and	   defines	   the	  leadership	  roles	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice.	   	  The	  main	   focus	   is	  on	   the	  role	  of	   the	  Chief	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Justice	   as	   a	   judge,	   manager	   and	   administrator,	   and	   supervisor	   of	   professional	  standards.	  	  	  	  Chapter	   6	   gives	   examples	   of	   overt	   disagreements	   between	   the	   judiciary,	   the	  executive,	   parliament	   and	   the	   public	   to	   some	   extent.	   	   It	   illustrates	   the	  representative	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  and	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  role	  in	  building	  legitimacy	  and	  integrity	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  	  	  	  	  Chapter	   7	   concludes,	   and	   sets	   out	   the	   leadership	   roles	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   as	  understood	   from	   the	   data	   alongside	   an	   analysis	   of	   how	   the	   leadership	   role	   is	  evolving	   and	   how	   thinking	   about	   judicial	   leadership	   in	   terms	   of	   a	  transformational	   leadership	   approach	   could	   suggest	   a	   way	   of	   overcoming	   the	  difficulties	   that	   arise	   in	   practice	   from	   the	   distinction	   between	   “judicial”	   and	  “administrative”	  functions.	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Chapter	  2	  –	  Leadership	  as	  a	  Conceptual	  Framework	  	  	  
2.1	  Introduction	  	  	  This	   chapter	   introduces	   the	   leadership	   literature	   and	   outlines	   the	   conceptual	  framework	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  is	  divided	  into	  three	  parts.	  	  It	  begins	  with	  an	  account	  of	  the	  literature	  relating	  to	  judicial	   leadership	  which	  largely	  emanates	  from	  the	  United	  States	  and	  is	  focused	  on	  two	  issues:	  one	  is	  the	  influence	  of,	  and	  leadership	  by,	  Chief	   Justices	   in	   the	  Supreme	  Court,	   and	   the	  other	   is	   on	   judicial	   leadership	  and	  “court	  excellence”	  which	  refers	  to	  judicial	  leadership	  in	  the	  context	  of	  court	  administration	   and	   standards	   of	   service	   and	   efficiency.	   An	   associated	   body	   of	  literature,	   on	   “leadership	   development”,	   relates	   to	   efforts	   to	   develop	   the	  leadership	  potential	  of	  judges	  as	  they	  manage	  their	  caseloads	  and	  contribute	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  law.	  	  The	  work	  on	  influence	  by	  Chief	  Justices	  suggests	  a	  framework	  for	  understanding	  how	  both	  Chief	  Justices	  and	  their	  fellow	  judges	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  general	  characterisation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  which	  is	  moulded	   by	   the	   expectations	   surrounding	   the	   position,	   and	   the	   underlying	  values	   and	   attitudes	  which	   shape	   those	   expectations.	   It	   also	   suggests	   a	  way	  of	  understanding	   the	   kinds	  of	   influence	   a	  Chief	   Justice	  might	  have.	  	  And	   although	  this	  work	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  of	   the	  US	  Supreme	  Court,	   it	  does	   suggest	   a	   concept	  of	   influence	   that	  can	  be	  applied	  more	  broadly	  to	  influence	  by	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  not	  only	  in	  the	  small	  group	  setting,	  but	  also	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  a	  larger	  organization	  engaging	  with	  judges	  and	  others	  and	   in	   that	  way	  shaping	  expectations	  and	  drawing	  on	  attitudes	  and	  values	  within	   the	   organisation.	  	   The	   literature	   on	   judicial	   leadership	   and	   court	  excellence	   is	   relevant	   because	   it	   emanates	   from	   the	   now	   firmly	   established	  profession	   in	   the	  US	  of	  professional	   court	   administrators.	  	  And	  while	   there	  are	  important	  differences	  between	  the	  application	  of	  these	  concepts	  in	  the	  US	  and	  in	  African	   countries,	   the	   examples	   given	   show	   that	   US	   experiences	   nevertheless	  offer	  many	  useful	  concepts	  that	  can	  be	  applied	   in	  Commonwealth	  Africa	  where	  the	   notion	   of	   leadership	   by	   Chief	   Justices	   is	   new	   and	   evolving.	   	   Widner,	  comparing	  the	  US	  and	  African	  experiences,	  argues	  that	  there	  “is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	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a	   theory	   to	   guide	   us	   in	   all	   times	   and	   countries.	   	   Nonetheless,	   reformers	  everywhere	  face	  the	  same	  basic	  challenges:	  leaders	  must	  appear,	  they	  must	  have	  a	  way	   to	   support	   themselves	   and	   their	   ambitions	   through	   the	   reform	  process,	  and	  opportunity	  must	   arise.”68	   	   I	   shall	   argue	   that	   in	   Commonwealth	  Africa	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  must	   lead,	  and	   that	  real	  opportunities	   for	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   to	   lead	  effectively	   must	   be	   created	   because	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   increasingly	   being	  expected	   to	   lead.	   	   The	   first	   section	   addresses	   complexities	   of	   the	   judicial	  organization	   and	   explains	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   “paradox	   of	   judicial	   leadership”	  which	   refers	   to	   the	   difficulties	   of	   leading	   an	   organization	   of	   independent	  individuals	   that	   depends	   others	   for	   resources	   and	   for	   outcomes	   (such	   as	  enforcement	  of	  decisions,	  for	  example).	  	  	  	  	  The	  next	  section	  introduces	  the	  wider	  field	  of	  leadership	  studies,	  and	  establishes	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  the	  selection	  of	  transformational	  leadership	  and	  leadership	  ethics	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  used	  in	  this	  study.	  	  When	  discussing	  and	  applying	  theories	  of	  leadership	  it	  is	  widely	  accepted	  in	  the	  field	  of	  leadership	  studies	  that	  scholars	  and	  practitioners	  have	  to	  make	  a	  choice	  between	  approaches	  because	  theories	  of	  leadership	  can	  be	  used	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  and	  have	  varying	   implications.	   	  This	  section	  sets	  out	   the	  theory	  of	   transformational	  leadership,	   the	  dynamics	  of	   the	   leadership	  process	  and	  the	  ethics	  of	   leadership	  and	  explains	  their	  relevance	  to	  leadership	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  	  	  	  	  Finally,	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   is	   explained	   as	   it	   applies	   to	   the	   judiciary.	  	  Many	   African	   constitutions	   specifically	   provide	   for	   judicial	   independence,	  whether	  by	   statements	  articulating	   the	   importance	  of	   judicial	   independence	  or	  by	   imposing	   duties	   on	   public	   officials	   to	   observe	   and	   promote	   the	   principles.	  	  Some	   countries,	   like	   South	   Africa,	   also	   require	   transparency	   in	   public	  administration,	   which	   means	   that	   the	   judiciary,	   just	   as	   any	   other	   organ	   of	  government,	  must	   be	   accountable	   and	   transparent.	   	   Judges	   in	   Africa	   are	   often	  working	   with	   limited	   resources,	   in	   sometimes-­‐hostile	   environments,	   to	   meet	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68 Widner, 'How Some Reflections on the United States' Experience May Inform African Efforts to 
Build Court Systems and the Rule of Law', p.41 
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modern	   standards	   of	   access	   to	   justice,	   judicial	   independence	   and	   judicial	  accountability.	   	   At	   the	   helm	  of	   these	   judiciaries	   are	   Chief	   Justices	  who	  may	   be	  torn	  between	  the	  political	  expectations	  of	  the	  governments	  who	  appointed	  them,	  demands	   for	   a	   stable	   judicial	   institution	   from	   fellow	   judges,	   calls	   for	   better	  access	   to	   justice	   from	   the	   public	  who	   are	   increasingly	   turning	   to	   the	   courts	   to	  resolve	   disputes,	   and	   the	   administrative	   burdens	   of	   heading	   growing,	   complex	  organizations.	   	   	   Leadership	   is	   an	   important	   tool	   in	   managing	   these	   often	  competing	   demands	   on	   the	   judiciary,	   especially	   in	   Africa.	   	   A	   Chief	   Justice	   will	  always	  occupy	  a	  position	  of	  headship,	  and	  as	   the	  administrative	  duties	  of	  Chief	  Justices	  expand	  and	  the	  details	  of	  appropriate	  judicial	  accountability	  are	  refined,	  Chief	   Justices	   will,	   to	   some	   extent,	   have	   to	   be	   managers	   too.	   	   However,	   that	  cannot	  be	  all	  that	  they	  do.	  	  	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice,	  who	  is	  at	  once	  the	  representative	  of	  judges	  and	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  main	  channel	  of	  judiciary	  accountability	  to	  the	  government,	  is	  in	   a	   prime	   position	   to	   ensure	   that	   judges	   feel	   confident	   in	   their	   independence	  while	   the	  government	  and	  the	  public	   feel	  confident	   in	   the	   judiciary.	   	  As	  will	  be	  seen,	  the	  idea,	  articulated	  by	  Saari	  that	  in	  the	  judiciary	  “to	  lead	  may	  be	  to	  appear	  not	   to	   lead”	   hints	   at	   the	   kind	   of	   leadership	   which	   might	   be	   appropriate	   in	   a	  judiciary—something	   beyond	   simple	   resource	  management	   and	   delegation—it	  suggests	  that	  a	   level	  of	  subtle	  motivation	  is	  required	  which	  engages	  judges	  and	  all	   of	   those	   involved	  without	   undermining	   the	   essence	   of	   their	   autonomy	   and	  independence.	  	  	  	  	  
2.2	  Judicial	  Leadership	  	  
The	  paradox	  of	  judicial	  leadership	  	  The	   notion	   of	   the	   leadership	   of	   judges	   by	   judges	   is	   not	   new,	   although	   it	   is	  relatively	   understudied.	   Widner’s	   account	   of	   the	   life	   and	   challenges	   of	   Chief	  Justice	  Nyalali	   in	  Tanzania	  illustrates	  what	  some	  American	  scholars	  have	  called	  the	  “paradox	  of	  judicial	  leadership”.	  	  Geoff	  Gallas,	  writing	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  about	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“leadership	   excellence”	   in	   judicial	   administration	   in	   the	   US	   describes	   this	  paradox:	  	  	   “simple	  action	  versus	  conflicting	  goals;	  overriding	  concern	  for	  the	  court’s	  ‘consumers’	   versus	   deep	   caring	   for	   the	   people	   in	   the	   organization;	   law	  versus	  the	  need	  for	  discretion	  to	  achieve	   justice;	  being	   in	  control	  versus	  allowing	   others	   to	   control;	   spending	   resources	   versus	   conserving	  assets.”69	  	  The	  success	  of	  organizations,	  writes	  Gallas,	  depends	  on	  the	  ability	  of	   leaders	  to	  maintain	   effective	   routines,	   while	   simultaneously	   questioning	   and	   disrupting	  them.	   David	   Saari,	   commenting	   on	   Gallas’	   paper	   (and	   in	   other	   work),	   has	  expanded	  on	  this	  paradox.	  	  Describing	  it	  as	  the	  “tension	  between	  uncertainty	  and	  determinateness	   in	   all	   leadership”,	   he	   applies	   it	   to	   the	   judicial	   context	   and	  explains	  that	  	  “…	  in	  the	  healthy	  but	  sensitive	  court	  organization,	  to	  lead	  may	  be	  to	   appear	   not	   to	   lead,	   not	   to	   be	   out	   in	   front,	   but	   rather	   to	   enable	   others	   to	  lead…”70	  	  	  	  Because	   judiciaries	   in	   Africa	   are	   under	   so	   much	   pressure	   to	   reform	   and	  modernise,	  much	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  work	  will	  involve	  reforms	  of	  some	  kind	  as	  courts	   adjust	   to	   increasing	   demand	   and	   extensive	   caseloads.71	   There	   are	   both	  internal	   and	   external	   obstacles	   to	   reform	   in	   judiciaries,72	   and	   again,	   the	   US	  experience	   offers	   some	   perspective	   on	   this.	   	   In	   a	   biography	   of	   Judge	   George	  Nicola	   in	   New	   Jersey	   Wice	   identifies	   “inhibiting	   factors	   unique	   to	   the	   courts”	  which	   lead	  to	  a	  “nearly	   insurmountable	  hurdle	   to	   judicial	  reform”.73	  These	  are:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69 G Gallas, 'Judicial Leadership Excellence' 12 The Justice System Journal 39, at p.40 70 D Saari, 'Comments on Judicial Leadership Excellence ' 12 The Justice System Journal 61 71 Chapter 5 considers the “reform” role of the Chief Justice in brief.  However, because the judiciaries 
in each of the three countries are all involved in programmes of reform that encompass much of their 
work, the Chief Justice faces many of the obstacles identified by Wice on a daily basis.   72 “Judicial reform” is defined in Chapter 3.  73 PB Wice, Court Reform and Judicial Leadership: Judge George Nicola and the New Jersey Justice 
System (Praeger, Westport 1995), at p.18 
	   49	  
(1)	   the	   fragmented	   structure	   of	   the	   American	   legal	   system;	   (2)	   the	   “inherent	  conservatism	   of	   the	   American	   judicial	   system	   and	   its	   historical	   resistance	   to	  change”;	  (3)	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  to	  isolate	  itself	  from	  public	  scrutiny;	  (4)	  deep-­‐rooted	  disagreements	  as	  to	  what	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  the	  system	  should	  be;	  (5)	  unrealistic	  expectations	  of	  the	  public;	  and	  (6)	  the	  difficulty	  of	  replicating	  isolated	   successful	   reform	   programmes	   due	   to	   differences	   in	   the	   “local	   legal	  cultures”.	   74	   While	   the	   details	   of	   these	   factors	   are	   clearly	   products	   of	   the	  American	  legal	  and	  judicial	  system	  and	  its	  history,	  these	  would	  look	  familiar	  to	  many	  judges	  and	  judicial	  leaders.	  	  	  	  
Evolving	  expectations	  of	  Chief	  Justices	  	  The	  story	  of	   judicial	   leadership	  begins	   in	   the	  United	  States	  with	   the	  analysis	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  three	  Chief	  Justices	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  of	  the	  court	   by	   David	   Danelski,	   using	   the	   interaction	   process	   analysis	   developed	   by	  Robert	  Bales.75	  	  While	  the	  focus	  of	  Danelski’s	  work	  is	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  on	  other	  Justices	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	   the	   United	   States,	   an	   issue	  which	   is	   not	   the	   central	   focus	   of	   this	   thesis,	   his	  essay	  suggests	  a	  way	  of	   thinking	  about	   the	  role	  of	  Chief	   Justices	  which	  extends	  beyond	   the	  peculiarities	  of	   the	  decision-­‐making	  procedures	  of	   the	  US	  Supreme	  Court.	   	  While	  Danelski’s	  study	  applies	  Bales’	  analysis	  to	  the	  specific	  and	  unique	  setting	   of	   the	   US	   Supreme	   Court,	   some	   of	   the	   concepts	   and	   distinctions	   he	  developed	  are	  relevant	  beyond	  the	  appellate	  court	  situation.	  	  Danelski	  highlights	  the	   distinction	   between	   headship	   and	   leadership:	   this	   is	   an	   issue	   that	   African	  Chief	  Justices,	  historically	  seen	  as	  the	  “head”	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  and	  now	  expected	  to	  act	  as	  the	  “leader”,	  are	  grappling	  with.	  	  Danelski’s	  articulation	  of	  the	  concepts	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74 Ibid. 75 RF Bales, Interaction process analysis (Addison-Wesley Press, Cambridge, Mass 1950) in DJ 
Danelski, 'The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court' in S 
Goldman and A Sarat (eds), American Court Systems: Readings in Judicial Process and Behaviour 
(1978). Although most of the footnotes have been omitted in this version (see p.506), it is clear from 
references to the original paper that Bales’ theory is applied (see e.g. WF Murphy, 'Courts As Small 
Groups' 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1565) 
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of	  “influence”	  and	  “expectations”	  can	  be	  applied	  beyond	  the	  small	  group	  setting	  too,	  and	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  below,	  they	  are	  relevant	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  more	  broadly.	  	  	  	  	  The	   first	  point	   that	  Danelski	  makes	  which	   is	  broadly	  relevant	   is	   the	  distinction	  between	   leadership	   and	   headship:	   “the	   Chief	   Justiceship	   does	   not	   guarantee	  leadership.	  It	  only	  offers	  its	  incumbent	  an	  opportunity	  to	  lead.”76	  	  And	  this	  is	  an	  important	  point,	  because	  it	  is	  widely	  accepted	  that	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  leadership	   and	   headship,	   just	   as	   there	   is	   a	   difference	   between	   leadership	   and	  management.	   As	   Chief	   Justices	   are	   appointed	   to	   office	   this	   distinction	   is	  important,	  and	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  even	  though	  the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  appointed,	  and	  therefore	  is	  in	  a	  position	  of	  “assigned”	  leadership,	  he	  or	  she	  can	  and	  must	  engage	  in	   a	   process	   of	   leadership,	   rather	   than	   acting	   only	   as	   a	   figure-­‐head	   or	   simple	  manager,	   in	   order	   to	   accommodate	   the	   unique	   features	   of	   the	   judicial	  organisation,	  especially	  in	  times	  of	  institutional	  change	  and	  reform.	  	  Headship	  is	  considered	   to	   be	   imposed	   on	   a	   group,	   whereas	   leadership	   is	   accorded	   by	   a	  group.77	   In	   headship	   the	   head	   and	   the	   group	   have	   little	   or	   no	   sense	   of	   shared	  feeling	  or	   joint	  action	  and	  there	  is	  a	  “wide	  social	  gap”	  between	  the	  members	  of	  the	   group	   and	   their	   head.78	   	   However,	   as	   Bass	   explains	   in	   the	   Handbook	   of	  
Leadership,	   “In	   its	   conception	   leadership	   can	   include	   headship.”79	   	   So,	   the	  assigned	  head	  of	  a	  group	  can	  also	  be	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  group,	  but	  the	  actual	  leader	  of	   a	   group	   need	   not	   be	   the	   assigned	   head.	   	   As	   for	   the	   distinction	   between	  leadership	   and	  management,	   in	   very	   general	   terms,	   leadership	   is	   about	   vision,	  commitment,	  motivation,	   and	   collective	   action	   towards	   achieving	   shared	  goals.	  	  Management,	   by	   contrast,	   is	  more	   about	   organization,	   structure,	   authority	   and	  control.80	   	  A	  Chief	   Justice	  will	  always	  occupy	  a	  position	  of	  headship,	  and	  as	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76 Danelski, 'The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court' 77 BM Bass, Bass & Stogdill's handbook of leadership : theory, research, and managerial applications 
(3rd ed. edn Free Press ; London : Collier Macmillan, New York 1990), p.18 (emphasis added). 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 PG Northouse, Leadership: Theory and Practice (4th edn SAGE, Thousand Oaks, London 2007), 
the variations on this distinction are discussed at pp.9-11. 
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administrative	   duties	   of	   Chief	   Justices	   expand	   and	   the	   details	   of	   appropriate	  judicial	   accountability	   are	   refined,	   Chief	   Justices	   will,	   to	   some	   extent,	   be	  managers	  too.	  	  However,	  that	  cannot	  be	  all	  that	  they	  do,	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  leadership	   process	   offers	   a	   way	   of	   understanding	   how	   Chief	   Justices	   can	  appropriately	   influence	   and	  motivate	   judges	   and	   court	   administrators	   towards	  greater	   efficiency	   and	   organizational	   management	   without	   improperly	  impinging	   on	   the	   individual	   needs	   of	   independent	   judges.	   The	   nature	   of	   the	  opportunities	   for	   leadership	   by	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   that	   exist	   within	   the	   judicial	  system	  will,	  therefore,	  perhaps	  affect	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  leads.	  	  This	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  potential	  effect	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  office	  has	  on	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  independence	  of	  judges:	  do	  the	  structures	  and	  powers	  of	   the	   system	  mean	   that	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  does	  not	   lead	  at	   all,	   and	  that	  direction	  comes	  from	  some	  external	  source?	  Or	  do	  internal	  mechanisms	  of	  the	   judiciary	  overly	   favour	  a	  coercive	   leadership	  style	   that	  might	  affect	   judicial	  independence	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	   style	   of	   leadership	   which	   ensures	   judicial	  independence?	   	  Does	   it	  matter	  what	  kind	  of	  opportunities	   there	  are	   for	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  to	  lead?	  	  	  Does	  it	  matter	  whether	  he	  or	  she	  takes	  those	  opportunities?	  	  
	  Second,	  while	  Danelski’s	  study	  may	  be	  limited	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  context	  as	  a	  study	  of	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court,	  his	  analysis	  of	  influence	  and	  his	  emphasis	  on	  expectations	  suggests	  a	  way	  to	  think	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  more	  general	  terms.	  	  For	  Danelski,	   leadership	   in	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   is	   “best	   understood	   in	   terms	  of	  influence:	  CJ	  influences	  J	  to	  do	  x	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  CJ	  performs	  some	  activity	  y	  as	  a	   result	   of	  which	   J	   chooses	   to	   do	   x.”81	   	  Danelski	   distinguishes	   between	   several	  important	  concepts	  and	  dimensions	  that	  enrich	  his	  definition,	  and	  which	  can	  be	  applied	   to	  other	  contexts	   in	  which	  Chief	   Justices	  might	   lead.	   	  His	  conception	  of	  influence	  is	  what	  is	  relevant	  here:	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81 Danelski, 'The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court', 
pp.506-507 
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“Influence...implies	   more	   than	   surface	   activity	   and	   interaction,	   for	  frequently	   underlying	   these	   phenomena	   are	   expectations,	   values,	   and	  attitudes	  of	  CJ	  and	  J.”82	  	  	  	  Third,	   this	   understanding	   of	   influence	   leads	   to	   another	   important	   issue:	  expectations.	   Expectations	   are	   important	   because	   in	   most	   Commonwealth	  countries	   the	  precise	  details	  of	   the	   role	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  are	  not	  articulated,	  and	  the	  only	  measure	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  fulfilling	  his	  or	  her	  role	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  or	  she	  is	  meeting	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  But,	  this	  leads	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whose	  expectations?	  	  For	  Danelski,	  expectations	  are	  “evaluative	   standards	   applied	   to	   an	   incumbent	   of	   a	   position,	   such	   as	   the	   Chief	  Justice,	  and	  a	  set	  of	  those	  expectations	  define	  his	  role.”	   	  Danelski	  uses	  the	  term	  here	  in	  a	  normative	  sense	  rather	  than	  the	  predictive	  sense,	  so	  meaning	  that	  the	  “CJ	   should	  do	   y”	   rather	   than	   the	   “CJ	  will	   do	   y”.	   	   Related	   to	   expectations	   is	   the	  concept	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice:	  	  	   “…the	  expectations	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  Justices	  hold	  for	  themselves	  and	  each	  other	   affect	   their	   activity.	   	   Conversely	   activity	   affects	   expectations.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice,	  by	  his	  activity,	  can	  create	  new	  expectations	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  thereby	  redefine	  his	  role	  and	  even	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  Justices.”83	  	  But	  how	  far	  can,	  or	  does,	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  go	  in	  defining	  these	  roles?	  	  How	  can	  we	  ensure	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  meeting	  the	  relevant	  expectations	  and	  defining	  his	  or	   her	   role	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   consistent	   with	   both	   judicial	   independence	   and	  judicial	  accountability?	  	  	  Two	   further	   dimensions	   of	   influence	   in	   the	   Court,	   according	   to	   Danelski,	   are	  “likeability”	  and	  “esteem”.	  	  Likeability	  is	  “an	  important	  variable	  in	  influence,	  for	  it	  is	  related	  to	  the	  degree	  and	  kind	  of	  interaction	  between	  Court	  members”	  and	  because	  the	  social	  structure	  of	  the	  court	   is	  significant	  in	  the	  decisional	  process.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 
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Esteem	   is	   important	  because	   there	   is	   “no	  doubt”	   that	   “ranking	  occurs”	  and	   the	  Justice	  with	   the	   highest	   esteem	  will	   be	   the	   one	  who	   is	   regarded	   as	   having	   the	  best	  ideas	  in	  conference,	  and	  best	  able	  to	  handle	  difficult	  cases.	  	  	  The	  “position	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  itself…probably	  adds	  only	  a	  little	  to	  the	  esteem	  of	  its	  incumbent	  in	   the	  eyes	  of	  his	   associates.	   	   	   In	   the	  Court	  his	   esteem	  depends	  more	  upon	  his	  over-­‐all	  ability	  and	  how	  well	  he	  fulfils	  his	  role	  as	  Chief	  Justice.”	  	  In	   Canada,	   a	   “typology	   of	   Chief	   Justice	   performance”	   was	   developed	   by	   Peter	  McCormick	   in	  a	  1993	  study	  of	   the	   importance	  of	  Chief	   Justice	   leadership	   in	  the	  Canadian	  Supreme	  Court.84	  	  Again	  the	  opportunity	  for	  leadership	  in	  the	  Canadian	  Supreme	  Court	  is	  found	  to	  evolve	  out	  of	  the	  decisional	  processes	  that	  the	  Court	  adopts.	   	   McCormick	   asks	   of	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice:	   “how	   important,	   and	  important	  how?”85	  	  Judicial	  leadership,	  he	  argues,	  “does	  not	  look	  like	  a	  command,	  at	   least	  not	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  course	  and	  not	   in	  ways	  that	  can	  easily	  be	  measured,	  and	  most	  certainly	  not	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  decisions	  around	  which	  the	  study	  of	  the	   Court	   must	   be	   organized;	   the	   judicial	   hierarchy	   is	   not	   like	   the	   military	  hierarchy,	  or	  even	  the	  bureaucratic	  hierarchy.”86	  	  Acknowledging	  that	  leadership	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  extends	  beyond	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  and	  delivery	  of	  decisions,	  McCormick	  focuses	  on	  delivery	  of	  decisions	  because	  “it	  seems	  obvious	  that	  the	  most	  important	  and	  lasting	  dimension	  of	  judicial	  impact,	  and	  therefore	  of	  Chief	   Justice	   leadership,	   revolves	  around	  the	  delivery	  of	  decisions	   that	  carry	  the	  weight	   of	   the	   court.”	   	   	   As	  will	   be	   seen	   in	   Chapter	   5,	   while	   in	   Africa	   other	  aspects	   of	   judicial	   leadership	   are	   very	   important,	   there	   is	   a	   very	   clear	  expectation	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  should	  be	  the	  intellectual	  leader	  of	  the	  Supreme	  or	  Constitutional	  Court,	  and	  this	  analysis	  is	  therefore	  relevant	  in	  that	  context.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84 P McCormick, 'Assessing Leadership on the Supreme Court of Canada ' 4 The Supreme Court Law 
Review 409; P McCormick, 'Follow the Leader: Judicial Power and Judicial Leadership on the Laskin 
Court, 1973-1984' 24 Queen's Law Journal 237 McCormick, 'Assessing Leadership on the Supreme 
Court of Canada ' ;P McCormick, 'The Choral Court: Separate Concurrence and the McLachlin Court 
2000-2004' 37 Ottawa Law Review 1 85McCormick, 'Assessing Leadership on the Supreme Court of Canada ' p.410 86 Ibid. 
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Transformational	  leadership	  meets	  the	  concerns	  of	  leadership	  in	  the	  judiciary	  	  	  Keith	   Grint’s	   argument	   that	   leadership	   is	   an	   “essentially	   contested	   concept”,87	  and	   that	   the	   way	   that	   leadership	   is	   defined	   has	   “vital	   implications	   for	   how	  organizations	  work	  –	  or	  don’t	  work”88	  resonates	  with	  potential	  concerns	  about	  leadership	   in	   the	   judiciary	   where	   the	   question	   of	   what	   constitutes	   proper	   or	  improper	  influence	  is	  paramount.	  	  	  
	  
2.3	  Defining	  leadership	  	   	  	  
An	  Essentially	  Contested	  Concept	  	  The	   study	   of	   leadership	   spans	   centuries	   and	   disciplines	   and	   ranges	   from	  discussions	  about	  the	  qualities	  of	   the	   leader	  and	   leadership	  styles,	   to	  what	   it	   is	  that	   leaders	   and	   their	   followers	   do	   when	   engaged	   in	   a	   process	   of	   leadership.	  	  	  There	  is	  a	  lively	  debate	  in	  leadership	  studies	  about	  approaches	  to	  leadership	  and	  leadership	   theory,	   and	   about	   the	   precise	   definition	   of	   leadership,	   meaning	  leadership	   research	   is	   often	   considered	   fragmented.	   	   Indeed,	   the	   difficulties	   of	  attempting	   to	   create	   an	   integrated	   view	   of	   leadership	   have	   been	   described	   as	  similar	   to	   trying	   to	   combine	   “bits	   and	  pieces	   of	   several	   sets	   of	   jigsaw	  puzzles”	  into	   one	   complete	   picture.89	   	   Early	   discussions	   of	   leaders	   concentrated	   on	   the	  person	  who	  leads,	  and	  his	  or	  her	  characteristics	  or	  behaviours.	  	  It	  was	  only	  in	  the	  early	  part	  of	   the	  nineteenth	  century	   that	  references	  were	  made	  to	   leadership.90	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87 Grint, Leadership: limits and possibilities, pp.17-18. Grint takes his definition of an essentially 
contested concept from W.B. Gallie in Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (New York, 
Schoken Books, 1964) at pp.187-8): “Recognition of a given concept as essentially contested implies 
recognition of rival uses of it (such as oneself repudiates) as not only logically possible and humanly 
‘likely’, but as of permanent potential critical value to one’s own use or interpretation of the concept in 
question.” 88 Ibid. 89 J Antonakis, AT Cianciolo and RJ Sternberg, The nature of leadership (Sage Publications, Thousand 
Oaks, CA ; London 2004), p.4 90 Ibid, p.11 
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While	  there	  are	  multiple	  ways	  of	  categorising	  leader	  traits,	  behaviours	  and	  skills,	  there	   are	   also	   several	  ways	   of	   conceptualizing	   the	   process	   of	   leadership.	   	   It	   is	  often	   relatively	   easy	   to	   identify	   leadership	   when	   you	   see	   it,	   but	   extremely	  difficult	  to	  define	  it	  with	  any	  precision.	  	  Some	  say	  that	  there	  are	  almost	  as	  many	  definitions	  of	   leadership	  as	   there	  are	  people	  who	  have	   tried	   to	  define	   it.91	  The	  possibilities	   are	   seemingly	   endless.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   Encyclopaedia	   of	  
Leadership,	   which	   runs	   to	   nearly	   2000	   pages	   contained	   in	   four	   volumes,	   lists	  thirty-­‐four	  entries	  for	  ‘personal	  characteristics	  of	  leaders’,	  seventeen	  entries	  for	  ‘leadership	   styles’,	   and	   thirty-­‐eight	   entries	   for	   ‘theories	   of	   leadership’.92	  	  	  However,	  according	  to	  Bass	  and	  Stogdill’s	  Handbook	  on	  Leadership:	  	  	   …there	  is	  sufficient	  similarity	  among	  definitions	  of	  leadership	  to	  permit	  a	  rough	   scheme	   of	   classification.	   	   	   Leadership	   has	   been	   conceived	   of	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   group	   processes,	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   personality,	   as	   a	   matter	   of	  inducing	   compliance,	   as	   the	   exercise	   of	   influence,	   as	   particular	  behaviours,	  as	  a	  power	  relation,	  as	  an	  instrument	  to	  achieve	  goals,	  as	  an	  effect	  of	   interaction,	  as	  a	  differentiated	  role,	  as	  an	  initiation	  of	  structure,	  and	  as	  many	  combinations	  of	  these	  definitions.93	  	  The	   presentation	   of	   schools	   of	   thought	   in	   leadership	   studies	   varies,	   but	   most	  accounts	   of	   leadership	   offer	   an	   overview	   of	   approaches	   to,	   and	   in	   general	  theories	  and	  models	  can	  be	  approximately	  grouped	  into	  five	  categories:94	  	  	   1. Personal	   and	   situational	   theories	   which	   are	   concerned	  with	   identifying	  the	  qualities	  of	  individuals	  which	  make	  them	  leaders,	  or	  the	  situations	  in	  which	  individuals	  will	  emerge	  as	  leaders	  2. Theories	   and	   models	   of	   interactive	   processes,	   which	   account	   for	  leadership	  and	  leader-­‐follower	  relations	  as	  an	  interactive	  process	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91Bass, Handbook of Leadership , p.11 92 GR Goethals, GJ Sorenson and J MacGregor Burns (eds), Encyclopedia of Leadership (Sage, 
London 2004), p.xii and xv 93 Bass, Handbook of Leadership, p.11 94 Ibid., Ch.3 
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3. Interaction	  and	  social	  learning	  theories,	  which	  explain	  the	  leader-­‐follower	  relationship	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   leader’s	   interaction	  with	   followers	  and	  circumstances	  4. Perceptual	   and	   cognitive	   theories	   which	   make	   use	   of	   cognitive	  psychology,	  especially	  used	  in	  leadership	  education	  5. Hybrid	  theories,	  which	  include	  the	  normative	  theory	  of	  transformational	  leadership	   developed	   in	   1978	   by	   James	   MacGregor	   Burns	   (sometimes	  described	   as	   the	   “father	   of	   modern	   leadership	   studies”95),	   in	   his	  influential	  book	  Leadership,96	  and	  built	  on	  by	  Bass	  and	  others.	  	  	  According	  to	  Burns,	  transformational	  leadership	  occurs	  when	  “one	  or	  more	  persons	  
engage	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   leaders	   and	   followers	   raise	   one	   another	   to	  higher	   levels	   of	   motivation	   and	   reality.”97	   	   Antonakis,	   Cianciolo	   and	  Sternberg	  call	  the	  ensuing	  scholarship	  on	  transformational	  leadership	  the	  “New	   Leadership”	   or	   the	   “Neocharismatic/Transformational/Visionary	  School”.98	  	  	  
The	  problems	  of	  definition	  	  It	   is	   becoming	   more	   widely	   accepted	   that	   in	   talking	   about	   and	   applying	  “leadership”	   scholars	   and	   practitioners	   have	   to	   make	   a	   choice	   between	  approaches.	   	   This	   is	   because	   the	   breadth	   of	   thinking	   on	   issues	   surrounding	  leadership,	   and	   the	   multiplicity	   of	   approaches,	   means	   that	   research,	  conceptualizations,	   definitions	   and	   theories	   of	   leadership	   can	   be	   used	   in	   a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  and	  have	  varying	  implications.	  	  	  Keith	  Grint	  argues	  not	  only	  that	  leadership	   scholars	   should	   accept	   that	   leadership	   is	   an	   essentially	   contested	  concept,99	   but	   also	   that	   the	   practice	   of	   simply	   identifying	   and	   categorising	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95 B Jackson and K Parry, A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap book about Studying 
Leadership (Sage London, Thousan Oaks 2008), p.11 96 J MacGregor Burns, Leadership (Harper & Row, New York 1978) 97 Ibid., p.20 (original emphasis) 98 Antonakis, Cianciolo and Sternberg, The nature of leadership, p.9 99 Grint, Leadership: limits and possibilities, pp.17-18. Grint takes his definition of an essentially 
contested concept from W.B. Gallie in Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (New York, 
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“variegated	   properties”	   of	   leadership	   definitions	   only	   leaves	   us	   “more	   rather	  than	  less	  confused	  by	  them.”100	  	  He	  explains	  that	  attempting	  to	  find	  similarities	  in	  approaches	   means	   that	   “even	   if	   there	   are	   similarities	   the	   complexities	  undermine	  most	  attempts	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  differences	  exist.”101	  	  His	  position	  is	  that	   the	   way	   that	   leadership	   is	   defined	   has	   “vital	   implications	   for	   how	  organizations	  work	  –	  or	  don’t	  work.”102	   	  To	  deal	  with	   this	  problem	  he	  offers	   a	  non-­‐hierarchical	   taxonomy	   of	   leadership,	   based	   on	   his	   assessment	   that	  disagreements	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  leadership	  are	  focused	  around	  four	  areas	  of	  dispute.	   	   These	   are	   leadership	   defined	   as	   “person”,	   “result”,	   “position”,	   and	  “process”.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  four	  alternative	  “ideal	  types”:	  	  	  
• Leadership	  as	  Person:	  is	  it	  WHO	  ‘leaders’	  are	  that	  makes	  them	  leaders?	  
• Leadership	   as	   Result:	   is	   it	   WHAT	   ‘leaders’	   achieve	   that	   makes	   them	  leaders?	  
• Leadership	   as	   Position:	   is	   it	   WHERE	   ‘leaders’	   operate	   that	   make	   them	  leaders?	  
• Leadership	   as	   Process:	   is	   it	   HOW	   ‘leaders’	   get	   things	   done	   that	   makes	  them	  leaders?103	  	  We	  have	  to	  then	  choose	  which	  form	  of	  leadership	  we	  are	  talking	  about,	  although	  empirical	  examples	  of	  leadership	  “may	  embody	  elements	  of	  all	  four	  forms.”104	  	  	  Joanne	   Ciulla	   would	   agree	   that	   there	   are	   fundamental	   problems	   with	   the	  definition	   of	   leadership,	   and	   writes	   that	   “it	   takes	   more	   than	   one	   scholar,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Schoken Books, 1964) at pp.187-8): “Recognition of a given concept as essentially contested implies 
recognition of rival uses of it (such as oneself repudiates) as not only logically possible and humanly 
‘likely’, but as of permanent potential critical value to one’s own use or interpretation of the concept in 
question.” 100 Ibid., p.17 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid., p.18 (original emphasis) 104 Ibid.p.18 
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discipline,	  or	  theoretical	  approach	  to	  understand	  leadership.”105	  She	  argues	  that	  “Leadership	   scholars	   who	   worry	   about	   constructing	   the	   ultimate	   definition	   of	  leadership	  are	  asking	  the	  wrong	  question,	  but	  inadvertently	  trying	  to	  answer	  the	  right	  one.”106	  	  For	  her,	  the	  disagreements	  over	  definition	  and	  the	  “ultimate	  point”	  of	   studying	   leadership	   is	   to	   try	   to	   answer	   the	   question	   “What	   is	   good	  leadership?”107	   The	   term	   “good”	   is	   used	   here	   to	   mean	   two	   things:	   the	   first	   is	  “morally	  good”	  and	  the	  second	  is	  “technically	  good	  or	  effective”.108	  	  In	  her	  view,	  the	   ethics	   of	   leadership	  must	   become	   central,	   and	  must	   be	   “examined	   along	   a	  variety	  of	  dimensions	  that	  cannot	  be	  understood	  separately.”109	  	  These	  are:	  	  	   1. The	  ethics	  of	  the	  leader	  as	  a	  person	  	  2. The	   ethics	   of	   the	   leader-­‐follower	   relationship	   (“how	   they	   treat	   each	  other”)	  3. The	  ethics	  of	  the	  process	  of	  leadership	  4. The	  ethics	  of	  what	  the	  leader	  does	  or	  does	  not	  do.110	  	  
Trends	  in	  leadership	  studies	  	  One	   dominant	   approach	   is	   to	   address	   questions	   about	   the	   leadership	   process.	  	  Despite	   the	  many	   conceptions	   of	   leadership,	   there	   is	   at	   least	   some	   consensus	  about	   the	   basic	   elements	   of	   the	   leadership	   process.	   	   In	   the	   2007	   edition	   of	  
Leadership:	   Theory	   and	   Practice,	   Peter	   Northouse	   aims	   to	   “bridge	   the	   gap	  between	   the	   often	   simplistic	   popular	   approaches	   to	   leadership	   and	   the	   more	  abstract	   theoretical	   approaches”,111	   and	   his	   book	   is	   intended	   to	   explore	   how	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105 JB Ciulla, 'What we learned along the way: a commentary' in GR Goethals and GJ Sorenson (eds), 
The Quest for a General Theory of Leadership (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2006), p.233 106 JB Ciulla (ed), Ethics, the heart of leadership (2nd ed. edn Praeger, Westport, Conn. ; London 
2004), p.13 107 Ibid. (original emphasis) 108 Ibid. 109 JB Ciulla, 'Ethics and Leadership Effectiveness' in J Antonakis, AT Cianciolo and RJ Sternberg 
(eds), The Nature of Leadership (2003), p.325 110 Ibid. 111 Northouse, Leadership: Theory and Practice, p.xvii 
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leadership	   theory	   can	   “inform	   and	   direct	   the	   way	   leadership	   is	   practiced.”112	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  explanation	  of	  the	  many	  approaches	  to	  leadership,	  Northouse	  offers	  a	  simple	  descriptive	  definition	  of	   leadership	  made	  up	  of	  its	  central	  components:	  	   ‘Leadership	   is	   a	   process	   whereby	   an	   individual	   influences	   a	   group	   of	  individuals	  to	  achieve	  a	  common	  goal.’113	  	  This	   definition	   represents	   a	   baseline	   of	   agreement	   across	   a	   broad	   spectrum	  of	  leadership	   scholars.	   The	   Handbook	   of	   Leadership,	   published	   in	   1990,	   gives	   a	  slightly	  more	  complex	  definition:	  	  	  
“Leadership	   is	  an	   interaction	  between	  two	  or	  more	  members	  of	  a	  group	  that	   involves	   a	   structuring	   or	   restructuring	   of	   the	   situation	   and	   the	  perceptions	   and	   expectations	   of	   its	   members.	   	   	   Leaders	   are	   agents	   of	  change—persons	  whose	  acts	  affect	  other	  people	  more	  than	  other	  people’s	  acts	   affect	   them.	   	   Leadership	   occurs	  when	   one	   group	  member	  modifies	  the	  motivation	  or	  competencies	  of	  others	  in	  the	  group.”114	  	  In	   The	   Nature	   of	   Leadership,	   published	   in	   2003,	   Antonakis,	   Cianciolo	   and	  Sternberg	   offer	   a	   definition	   that	   merges	   several	   different	   approaches	   to	  leadership,	   and	   importantly	   reflects	   the	   increasing	   acceptance	   of	   the	   need	   to	  include	  context	  and	  ethics	  in	  a	  conception	  of	  leadership:	  	   “Most	   leadership	   scholars	  would	   agree,	   in	  principle,	   that	   leadership	   can	  be	   defined	   as	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   leadership	   process—and	   its	   resultant	  outcomes—that	   occurs	   between	   a	   leader	   and	   followers	   and	   how	   this	  influencing	   process	   is	   explained	   by	   the	   leader’s	   dispositional	  characteristics	   and	   behaviours,	   follower	   perceptions	   and	   attributions	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112 Ibid. 113 Ibid., p.3 114 BM Bass (ed), Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research and Managerial 
Applications (3rd edn The Free Press New York 1990), pp 19-20 
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the	  leader,	  and	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  influencing	  process	  occurs.	  	  	  For	  us,	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	   effective	   and	   authentic	   leadership	   is	   the	  creation	  of	  empowered	  followers	  in	  pursuit	  of	  a	  moral	  purpose,	  leading	  to	  moral	  outcomes	  guided	  by	  moral	  means.”115	  	  	  	  Two	  further	  emerging	  issues	  in	  leadership	  studies	  are	  context	  and	  ethics.	   	   	  The	  significance	   of	   context	   in	   leadership	   arises	   from	   decades	   of	   research	   into	  national	   culture	   and	   leadership.116	   	   Proponents	   of	   the	   contextual	   approach	   to	  leadership	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  “crucial	  to	  understand	  the	  contextual	  factors	  in	  which	  leadership	   is	  embedded	  before	  we	  can	  obtain	  a	  more	  general	  understanding	  of	  leadership.”117	  The	  significance	  of	  ethics	  in	  leadership	  is	  gaining	  recognition	  too,	  and	   proponents	   of	   ethics	   in	   leadership	   argue	   that	   leaders	   cannot	   be	   effective	  unless	   they	   are	   ethical.	   	   This	   trend	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   the	   theory	   of	  transformational	  leadership	  developed	  by	  James	  MacGregor	  Burns	  in	  his	  seminal	  text	  Leadership,	  in	  1978,	  which	  intertwines	  leadership	  and	  morality.118	  	  Ciulla,	  a	  powerful	   advocate	   for	   the	   appropriate	   recognition	   of	   ethics	   in	   leadership,	  believes	  that	  “leadership	  is	  ultimately	  a	  moral	  endeavour.”119	  Importantly,	  Ciulla	  distinguishes	   between	   coercion	   and	   leadership,	   with	   ethics	   being	   “at	   the	   very	  heart	   of	   leadership.”120	   Ethics	   and	  morality	   are,	   therefore,	   an	   essential	   kind	   of	  leader-­‐accountability.	  	  	  	  	  
2.4	  Transformational	  leadership	  	  
Transformational	  Leadership	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115 Antonakis, Cianciolo and Sternberg, The nature of leadership, p.5 116 Hofstede, GLOBE 117 Antonakis, Cianciolo and Sternberg, The nature of leadership, p.10 118 MacGregor Burns, Leadership  119 Ciulla, 'What we learned along the way: a commentary', p.232 120 JB Ciulla, Ethics, the heart of leadership (Praeger, Westport, Conn. ; London 1998), p.xv 
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The	  “New	  Leadership”	  approach	  to	  leadership,	  which	  includes	  context	  and	  ethics	  in	   the	   conception	   of	   leadership121	   has	   broadly	   developed	   from	   the	   theory	   of	  political	   leadership	   that	   emphasises	   the	   moral	   commitment	   of	   leaders	   to	   the	  needs	   and	   values	   of	   their	   followers	   expounded	   by	   James	   McGregor	   Burns	   in	  1978.	  	  Burns	  conceives	  of	  power	  as	  a	  relationship	  founded	  on	  the	  two	  essentials	  of	  motives	  and	  resources,	  and	  defines	  the	  process	  of	  leadership	  as:	  	  	   “...leaders	   inducing	   followers	   to	   act	   for	   certain	   goals	   that	   represent	   the	  values	   and	   motivations—the	   wants	   and	   needs,	   the	   aspirations	   and	  expectations—of	  both	  leaders	  and	  followers.	  And	  the	  genius	  of	  leadership	  lies	   in	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   leaders	   see	   and	   act	   on	   their	   own	   and	   their	  followers’	  values	  and	  motivations.”122	  	  Burns	  distinguishes	  between	   two	   forms	  of	   leadership.	   	  The	   first,	   “transactional	  leadership”	   consists	   of	   an	   interaction	   in	   which	   leader	   and	   follower	   engage	   to	  fulfil	   a	  briefly	  shared	  goal	  or	  purpose,	   “when	  one	  person	   takes	   the	   initiative	   in	  making	   contact	   with	   others	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   an	   exchange	   of	   valued	  things….The	  bargainers	  have	  no	  enduring	  purpose	  that	  holds	  them	  together…”123	  	  The	  second	  kind	  of	  leadership,	  “transforming	  leadership”,	  by	  contrasts	  occurs:	  	  	   “when	  one	  or	  more	  persons	  engage	  with	  others	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  leaders	  and	   followers	   raise	   one	   another	   to	   higher	   levels	   of	   motivation	   and	  morality…Their	   purposes,	   which	   might	   have	   started	   as	   separate	   but	  related,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  transactional	  leadership,	  become	  fused.”124	  	  The	   result	   of	   transforming	   leadership,	   says	   Burns,	   is	   a	   relationship	   between	  leader	  and	  follower	  of	  “mutual	  stimulation	  and	  elevation	  that	  converts	  followers	  into	   leaders	   and	  may	   convert	   leaders	   into	  moral	   agents.”125	   	  Moral	   values	   are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121 Antonakis, Cianciolo and Sternberg, The nature of leadership, p.5; see above. 122 Burns, Leadership, p.19 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid., p.20 (original emphasis)  125 Ibid., p.4 
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seen	   as	   “monitors”	   of	   leadership	   and	   both	   kinds	   of	   leadership	   have	   moral	  implications.	  	  	  The	  “chief	  monitors”	  of	  transactional	  leadership	  are	  what	  he	  calls	  “modal	   values”—“values	   of	   means”—which	   include	   honesty,	   responsibility,	  fairness,	   the	   honouring	   of	   commitments.126	   	   Transforming	   leadership	   is	  concerned	   with	   “end-­values,	   such	   as	   liberty,	   justice,	   equality.”127	   Transforming	  leaders	  are	  said	  to	  “‘raise’	  their	   followers	  up	  through	  levels	  of	  morality,	   though	  insufficient	  attention	  to	  means	  can	  corrupt	  ends.”128	  	  	  	  
Transformational	  leadership	  is	  effective	  in	  organizations	  	  	  	  The	   effects	   of	   transformational	   leadership	  were	   tested	   through	   the	   training	   of	  thousands	  of	  private	  sector	  leaders,	  and	  community	  leaders	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  by	   Bass	   and	   Avolio.129	   They	   developed	   the	   full	   range	   leadership	  model	   which	  outlines	   four	   components	   of	   transformational	   leadership,	   two	   components	   of	  transactional	   leadership,	   and	   “laissez-­‐faire”	   leadership	   (the	   absence	   of	  leadership,	   or	   the	   least	   effective	   leadership	   style).130	   	   According	   to	   this	   study,	  transformational	   leaders	   demonstrate	   high	   standards	   of	   ethical	   conduct	   that	  followers	  wish	  to	  emulate,	  and	  they	  are	  admired,	  respected	  and	  trusted	  by	  their	  followers;	   they	   provide	   “meaning	   and	   challenge”	   and	   they	   “arouse	   team	   spirit,	  envision	   attractive	   futures,	   and	   demonstrate	   a	   clear	   sense	   of	   purpose	   and	  commitment	   to	   the	   mission.”131	   	   Through	   intellectual	   stimulation	  transformational	  leaders	  “frame	  and	  reframe	  problems”,	  approach	  old	  situations	  in	  new	  ways,	  and	  stimulate	  followers	  and	  peers	  to	  “be	  innovative	  and	  creative”.	  	  	  And	   finally,	   transformational	   leaders	   show	   individual	   consideration,	   which	  means	  that	  they	  show	  concern	  “for	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  each	  person	  they	  work	  with,	  and	   treat	  each	  as	  an	   individual	  with	  unique	  needs	  and	  capabilities.”	   	   	  Bass	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126 Ibid., p.426 127 Ibid. (original emphasis) 128 Ibid. 129 BJ Avolio and BM Bass (eds), Developing Potential Accross a Full Range of Leadership: Cases on 
Transactional and Transformational Leadership (Lawrence Erlbaun Associates, London 2002), p.3 130 Ibid., p.4 131 Ibid., pp.viii and 2-3 
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Avolio	   found	   that	   the	   most	   effective	   leaders	   are	   both	   transactional	   to	   some	  extent	  and	  transformational,	  132	  and	  they	  conclude	  that:	  	  	   “Among	   the	   components	   of	   transformational	   leadership,	   idealized	  influence	   and	   inspirational	   leadership	   are	  most	   effective	   and	   satisfying;	  individualized	  consideration	  is	  a	  bit	  less	  so.	  	  But	  in	  turn,	  all	  the	  four	  Is	  of	  transformational	   leadership	   are	   more	   effective	   than	   is	   constructive	  transaction.	   	   However,	   constructive	   transactions	   remain	   reasonably	  effective	  and	  satisfying	   in	  most	  situations,	  except	  where	  a	   leader	  has	  no	  control	  of	  the	  ways	  a	  follower	  may	  be	  rewarded	  for	  good	  performance.”133	  	  This	  is	  important,	  because	  in	  a	  judiciary	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  usually	  constrained	  by	  (a)	  being	  dependent	  on	  someone	  else	   for	  resources	  and	  not	  having	   full	   control	  over	  budget;	  and	  (b)	  not	  being	  able	  to	  “reward”	   judges	  for	  “good	  performance”	  by	   promises	   of	   pay	   rises	   or	   better	   conditions.	   	   A	   judiciary	   needs	   more	   than	  simple	   transactional	   leadership—the	   rewards	   of	   being	   a	   good	   judge	   are	   often	  intangible	   and	   therefore	   need	   to	   be	   articulated	   through	   leadership	   which	  motivates	   and	   empowers	   judges	   to	   be	   the	   best	   that	   they	   can	   be	   within	   the	  constraints	  of	  judicial	  office,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  many	  African	  countries,	  within	  the	  constraints	  of	  severe	  resource	  scarcity.	  	  	  	  	  
Transformational	  leadership	  is	  autonomy-­‐supporting	  Autonomy	  is	  central	  to	  transformational	   leadership.	   	  This	  idea	  was	  explored	  by	  Shamir	  et	  al	   in	  1993	  and	  later	  tested	  by	  Bono	  and	  Judge	  in	  2003.	   	   	  Shamir	  et	  al	  used	   a	   motivational	   theory	   (the	   self-­‐concept-­‐based	   theory)	   to	   account	   for	   the	  effect	  of	   charismatic	   leaders	  on	   followers.	   	  According	   to	   their	   theory,	   there	  are	  three	  main	  ways	  in	  which	  transformational	  leaders	  motivate	  followers:	  the	  first	  is	   by	   increasing	   follower	   self-­‐efficacy,	   the	   second	   is	   by	   facilitating	   the	   social	  identification	  of	   the	   follower	  with	   their	  group,	  and	  the	   third	   is	  by	   linking	  work	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132 Ibid.  This is a presentation of 28 cases involving transactional and/or transformational leadership in 
a variety of organizations. 133 BJ Avolio and BM Bass, Developing potential across a full range of leadership: cases on 
transactional and transformational leadership (Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, N.J. ; London 2002), p.6 
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values	   to	   follower	  values.134	   	  These	  effects	  represent	   “three	  common	  processes	  of	   psychological	   attachment”:	   personal	   identification,	   which	   refers	   to	   the	  situation	   when	   a	   person	   (follower)	   identifies	   with	   and	   emulates	   the	   leader;	  social	  identification,	  which	  relates	  to	  the	  follower’s	  relation	  to	  the	  group	  identity,	  where	   each	   follower	   closely	   identifies	   with	   the	   collective	   as	   whole—which	   is	  enhanced	   by	   the	   leader	   defining	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   collective	   and	  emphasizing	   its	   “distinctiveness,	   prestige	   and	   competition	   with	   other	  groups”;135and	   finally,	   value	   internalization,	  which	   describes	   the	   incorporation	  of	  values	  in	  the	  self	  as	  guiding	  principles.	  	  According	  to	  Bono	  and	  Judge,	  who	  in	  2003	  tested	  these	  motivational	  effects	  of	  transformational	  leadership	  both	  in	  the	  field	   and	   in	   a	   controlled	   experiment,	   this	   theory	   appears	   to	   play	   out	   in	  practice.136	   	   Their	   study	   found	   that	   transformational	   leadership	   is	   in	   fact	  “autonomy-­‐supportive”	   and	   they	   concluded	   that	   their	   results	   “lend	   empirical	  support	  to	  psychological	  theories	  of	  the	  motivational	  effects	  of	  transformational	  leadership”.137	  	  	  	  
Leadership	  ethics	  and	  accountability	  function	  	  Most	   leadership	   scholars	   would	   agree	   that	   ethics	   is	   important	   in	   leadership.	  	  However,	   despite	   this	   general	   agreement	   there	   is	   very	   little	   scholarship	   that	  charts	  the	  place	  of	  ethics	  in	  leadership.	  	  Ciulla,	  in	  Ethics,	  the	  Heart	  of	  Leadership	  laments	  the	  fact	  that	   few	  leadership	  scholars	  really	  explore	  the	  ethical	   features	  of	  leadership	  in	  a	  sustained	  way.	  	  She	  argues	  that	  this	  has	  to	  change,	  and	  indeed	  that	  ethics	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  leadership.	  	  	  	  As	   shown	   above,	   for	   Ciulla,	   the	   “most	   attractive”	   element	   of	   transforming	  leadership	   is	   “the	   idea	   that	   a	   leader	   elevates	   his	   followers	   and	   makes	   them	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134 B Shamir, RJ House and MB Arthur, 'The Motivational Effects of Charismatic Leadership: A self-
concept based theory’ 4 Organization Science 577, p.586 135 Ibid. 136 JE Bono and TA Judge, 'Self-concordance at work: toward understanding the motivational effects 
of transformational leaders’ 46 Academy of Management Journal 554, p.556 137 Ibid., p.568 
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leaders.”138	   However,	   commenting	   about	   his	   distinction	   between	   “modal”	   and	  “end”	  values,	  she	  cautions	  that	  Burns’	  “use	  of	  the	  word	  value	  to	  talk	  about	  ethics	  is	   problematic	   because	   it	   encompasses	   so	   many	   different	   kinds	   of	   things—economic	   values,	   organizational	   values,	   personal	   values,	   and	   moral	   values.”139	  	  And	   while	   Ciulla	   agrees	   that	   Burns	   offers	   a	   “provocative	   moral	   account	   of	  leadership”	  she	  calls	  for	  better	  conceptual	  clarity.140	  And	  this	  is	  because:	  “Values	  do	  not	  tie	  people	  together	  the	  way	  moral	  concepts	  like	  duty	  and	  utility	  do…most	  people	   subscribe	   to	   the	   view	   that	   ‘I	   have	   my	   values	   and	   you	   have	   yours.’”141	  	  Ciulla	  argues	   that	  ethics	  and	  effectiveness	  are	  “inextricably	   intertwined”142	  and	  that	  ethics	  is	  “at	  the	  heart	  of	  leadership”.143	  	  	  Critics	   of	   transforming	   leadership	   argue	   that	   charisma	   (which	   is	   part	   of,	   for	  example,	   Bass’s	   “idealized	   influence”)	   can	   either	   be	   very	   positive,	   or	   terribly	  destructive.	   	  And	  Bass	  initially	  agreed	  and	  contended	  that	  transforming	  leaders	  (especially	   by	   virtue	   of	   their	   charismatic	   characteristics)	   could	   be	   either	  “virtuous	  or	  villainous”.	  However,	  in	  more	  recent	  work,	  with	  Paul	  Steidlmeier,	  he	  modified	  his	   view,	   arguing	   that	  previously	  he	  was	   “mistaken”.144	   	  He	   therefore	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  “authentic	  transformational	   leaders”	  and	  “pseudo-­‐transformational	  leaders”	  who	  are	  inauthentic	  (and	  villainous),	  arguing	  that	  “It	  is	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  such	  a	  moral	  foundation	  of	  the	  leader	  as	  moral	  agent	  that	  grounds	   the	  distinction	  between	  authentic	   versus	  pseudo-­‐transformational	  leadership.”145	   	  For	  Bass	  and	  Steidlmeier,	  the	  ethics	  of	  leadership	  is	  founded	  on	  three	  pillars:	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138 Ciulla (ed), Ethics, the heart of leadership, p.16 139 Ciulla, 'Ethics and Leadership Effectiveness', p.318 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid., p.325 143 Ciulla (ed), Ethics, the heart of leadership, p.18 144 BM Bass and P Steidlmeier, 'Ethics, Character and Authentic Transformational Leadership 
Behaviour' in JB Ciulla (ed) Ethics, the Heart of Leadership (Praeger, London 2004), p.179 145 Ibid., p.178 
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1. “the	  moral	  character	  of	  the	  leader”	  2. “the	  ethical	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  values	  embedded	  in	  the	  leader’s	  vision,	  articulation,	  and	  program	  which	  followers	  either	  embrace	  or	  reject”	  3. “the	  morality	  of	  the	  processes	  of	  social	  ethical	  choice	  and	  action	  that	  leaders	  and	  followers	  engage	  in	  collectively	  and	  pursue”146	  	  
Transformational	  and	  ethical	  leadership	  are	  highly	  valued	  across	  cultures	  	  	  In	   the	   1990s	   four	   major	   cross-­‐cultural	   leadership	   studies	   were	   carried	   out.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  influential	  and	  broad-­‐ranging	  is	  what	  is	  known	  as	  the	  GLOBE	  study	   (Global	   Leadership	   and	   Organizational	   Behaviour	   Effectiveness)	   carried	  out	  by	  Robert	  House	  et	  al.147	  	  Building	  on	  a	  model	  developed	  by	  Geert	  Hofstede	  which	   identified	   five	   dimensions	   of	   national	   culture,	   GLOBE	   identified	   18,	   and	  conducted	   research	   based	   on	   the	   responses	   of	   17,000	   managers	   in	   over	   950	  organizations	   in	   62	   societies	   around	   the	  world.	   	   GLOBE	   then	   identified	   global	  leadership	  behaviours,	  and	  produced	  profiles	  of	  the	  various	  regions	  of	  the	  world.	  	  	  These	   are:	   charismatic/value-­‐based	   leadership	   which	   involves	   the	   ability	   to	  inspire,	  motivate	  and	  expect	  high	  performance	  based	  on	  core	  values,	  as	  well	  as	  being	   trustworthy,	   decisive,	   performance-­‐oriented;	   team-­‐oriented	   leadership	  which	  emphasizes	  team	  building	  and	  common	  purpose;	  participative	  leadership	  which	   reflects	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   leaders	   involve	   others	   in	   making	   and	  implementing	   decisions;	   humane	   oriented	   leadership	   which	   means	   being	  supportive	   and	   considerate;	   autonomous	   leadership	  which	   is	   independent	   and	  individualistic	   behaviour	   by	   the	   leader;	   and	   self-­‐protective	   leadership	   which	  seeks	   to	   ensure	   the	   safety	   and	   security	   of	   the	   leader	   and	   the	   group,	   including	  leadership	   that	   is	   self-­‐centred.	   	   	   The	   study	   grouped	   the	   results	   into	   9	   cultural	  “clusters”,	   and	   their	   commitment	   to	  each	  of	   the	   leader	  behaviours	  was	  ranked.	  	  In	   the	   Anglo	   cluster	   (covering	   Canada,	   USA,	   Australia,	   Ireland,	   England,	   white	  South	   Africa	   and	   New	   Zealand)	   charismatic/value-­‐based	   leadership	   ranked	  highest,	  followed	  by	  participative	  leadership,	  humane	  oriented-­‐leadership,	  team-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146 Ibid., p.175 147 As explained and reproduced in Northouse, Leadership: Theory and Practice, Ch. 13 
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oriented	  leadership,	  and	  autonomous	  leadership,	  with	  self-­‐protective	  leadership	  coming	  last.	  	  In	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (which	  included	  Zimbabwe,	  Namibia,	  Zambia,	  Nigeria	   and	   black	   South	   Africa)	   humane-­‐oriented	   leadership	   ranked	   highest,	  followed	   by	   charismatic/value-­‐based	   leadership,	   team-­‐oriented	   leadership,	  participative	   leadership,	   self-­‐protective	   leadership,	   and	   finally	   autonomous	  leadership.	  	  The	  transformational	  leadership	  approach	  is	  therefore	  highly	  valued	  across	   cultures	   and	   resonates	   with	   African	   societal	   values	   too	   (see	   more	   on	  African	  values	  and	  leadership	  in	  Chapter	  3).	  	  	  In	   2006	   Resick	   et	   al	   analysed	   the	   GLOBE	   data	   to	   test	   whether	   or	   not	   ethical	  leadership	  would	  be	  endorsed	  across	  cultures.	   	   	  They	  did	  this	  by	  identifying	  six	  “key	   attributes	   that	   appear	   to	   characterize	   ethical	   leadership”.148	   	   These	   are:	  character	  and	   integrity,	   “which	  refers	   to	   ‘the	  pattern	  of	   intentions,	   inclinations,	  and	  virtues’	  that	  provide	  the	  ethical	  or	  moral	  foundation	  for	  behavior’”;149	  ethical	  awareness,	  which	  relates	  to	   the “‘capacity to perceive and be sensitive to relevant 
moral issues that deserve consideration in making choices that will have a significant 
impact on others’’’;150 community/people-orientation which is based on the finding 
that ethical leaders focus on “serving the greater-good” which means they are people-
oriented and aware of their impact on others;151 motivating, which means that ethical 
leaders motivate followers to put the interests of the group ahead of their own, and it 
involves an “intellectual and emotional commitment	   between	   leaders	   and	  followers”;	   ethical	   leaders	   are	   encouraging	   an	   empowering	   “so	   that	   followers	  gain	   a	   sense	   of	   personal	   competence	   that	   allows	   them	   to	   be	   self-­‐sufficient”;152	  and	   the	   final	   attribute	   is	  managing	   ethical	   accountability	   –	   “ethical	   leadership	  entails	   a	   transactional	   component	   that	   involves	   setting	   standards	   and	  expectations	   of	   ethical	   conduct	   for	   followers.”	   153	   	   The	   study	   found	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148 CJ Resick and others, 'A Cross-Cultural Examination of the Endorsement of Ethical Leadership' 63 
Journal of Business Ethics 345, p.346 149 Ibid.p.346 150 Ibid.p.347 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid. 153 Ibid. 
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Character/Integrity,	   Altruism,	   Collective	   Motivation,	   and	   Encouragement	   are	  universally	  supported,	  although	  there	  are	  cultural	  subtleties	  in	  the	  application	  of	  these	  principles.154	  
	  
2.5	  The	  dynamics	  of	  the	  leadership	  process	  	  
Burns	  and	  the	  General	  Theory	  of	  Leadership	  Group	  	  In	  1978	  Burns	  was	  aiming	  to	  “fashion	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  political	  leadership”.155	  By	   2001,	   he	   was	   hoping	   to	   develop	   a	   “general	   theory	   of	   leadership”.156	   In	  November	  2001	  he	  convened	  a	  group	  of	   interdisciplinary	   leadership	  experts	  to	  try	  to	  do	  this.	  	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  “provide	  people	  studying	  or	  practicing	  leadership	  with	  a	  general	  guide	  or	  orientation	  –	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  that	  are	  universal	  which	  can	   then	   be	   adapted	   to	   different	   situations.”157	   This	   was	   a	   bold	   ambition,	  especially	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  at	  least	  a	  hundred	  years	  of	  sustained	  scholarship	  on	  leadership	  no	  such	  theory	  has	  so	  far	  been	  agreed.158	   	   	  However,	  despite	  this	  history,	  25	  academics	   from	  a	  variety	  of	  disciplines	   joined	   the	  group	  and	  began	  the	   quest	   for	   a	   general	   theory	   of	   leadership.	   	  What	   followed	  was	   a	   process	   of	  discussion,	  exchange	  and	  development.	  	  It	  emerged	  that	  there	  was	  considerable	  consensus	   among	   the	   group	   about	   the	   scope	   or	   elements	   of	   leadership:	  “Leadership	   is	   part	   of	   the	   human	   condition	   and,	   as	   such,	   is	   about	   wants	   and	  needs,	   power,	   conflict,	   equality,	   liberty,	   change,	   causality,	   group	   dynamics,	  cooperation,	   coordination,	   leader-­‐follower	   relationships,	   ethics,	   meaning,	  context,	   culture”.159	   	  The	  work	  of	  GTOL	   is	  predominantly	  about	  political,	   social	  and	  community	  leadership.160	  	  The	  emphasis	  on	  political	  and	  social	  leadership	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154 Ibid.p.354 155 MacGregor Burns, Leadership, p.5 156 GR Goethals and GLJ Sorenson (eds), The Quest for a General Theory of Leadership (New 
Horizons in Leadership Studies Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2006) 157 Ibid., p.2 158 See accounts in, for example, Antonakis, Cianciolo and Sternberg, The nature of leadership  159 Goethals and Sorenson (eds), The Quest for a General Theory of Leadership  160 Ciulla, 'What we learned along the way: a commentary', p.223 
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relevant	   in	  relation	  to	   judicial	   leadership	  because	  of	   the	  role	  of	   the	   judiciary	   in	  society	   and	   the	   constitutional	   make	   up	   of	   a	   country.	   	   Political	   and	   social	  leadership	   is	   more	   relevant	   than	   business	   leadership	   because	   interactions	   in	  business	  and	  in	  politics	  are	  different,	  and	  judiciaries,	  as	  public	  institutions,	  must	  be	   concerned	  more	  with	   their	   public	   and	   democratic	   role	   than	  with	   business-­‐oriented	  effectiveness.	   	   	  As	  Ciulla	  wrote	   in	  her	   summary	  of	   the	  outcome	  of	   the	  GTOL	   project,	   “there	   exists	   one	   major	   difference	   between	   the	   relationship	   of	  leaders	   and	   followers	   in	   business	   and	   politics	   –	   business	   leaders	   are	   not	  democratic.”161	  	  The	  difference	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  political	  leaders	  are	  elected	  by	  those	   that	   follow	   them,	  and	  must	  consequently	  be	  accountable	   to	   them.	   	  While	  judges	  are	  more	  often	  than	  not	  unelected,	  they	  do	  nevertheless	  operate	  within	  a	  political	   and	   democratic	   context,	   and	   they	   have	   a	   particular	   role	   in,	   and	   fulfil	  particular	  needs	  of,	  democracy.	  And,	  as	  Ciulla	  went	  on	  to	  say	  “assumptions	  about	  democracy	  make	  a	  bigger	  difference	   in	  how	  scholars	   theorize	  about	   leadership	  than	   we	   generally	   acknowledge.”162	   The	   overall	   result	   is	   that	   the	   democratic	  function	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  context	  within	  which	  judges	  operate	  will	  inevitably	  inform	  the	  way	  we	  can,	  and	  do,	  think	  about	  leadership	  opportunities,	  strategies	  and	  outcomes	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  	  	  	  	  According	   to	   GTOL	   the	   key	   themes	   that	   are	   important	   to	   understanding	  leadership	   however	   you	   choose	   to	   approach	   it	   are:	   equality,	   power,	   change,	  agency	   and	   context.	   	   Equality	   relates	   to	   both	   social	   inequalities	   in	   general	   and	  inequality	   in	   the	   leader-­‐follower	   relationship.	   	  While	   there	   will	   be	   differences	  between	   leaders	   and	   followers	   in	  many	   respects,	  moral	   equality	   demands	   that	  leaders	   are	   for	   example,	   consistent	   and	   do	   not	   allow	   for	   exceptions	   for	   family	  and	   friends	   –	   morality	   applies	   to	   everyone.163	   	   Discussions	   about	   power	  examined	   the	   causal	   effect	   of	   power	   on	   inequality,	   the	   understanding	   that	  “leadership	   is	   a	   constant	   power	   transaction”	   and	   that	   fact	   that	   “Leaders	   who	  behave	  morally	  or	  represent	  important	  ideals	  of	  justice,	  fairness,	  equality,	  liberty	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161 J.B. Ciulla, ‘What we Learned Along the Way’, in Goethals and Sorenson (eds), The Quest for a 
General Theory of Leadership, p.221 at p.223 162 ibid 163 Ciulla, 'What we learned along the way: a commentary', p.227 
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etc	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   have	   lasting	   influence	   on	   people.”	   	   Also	   important	   in	  discussions	  about	  power	  was	  procedural	  justice	  as	  “Leaders	  who	  use	  procedural	  justice	  make	  part	  of	  their	  notion	  of	  fairness	  visible.”164	  	  A	  clear	  outcome	  of	  these	  discussions	  was	  a	  move	  in	  scholarly	  interest	  towards	  the	  ethics	  of	  leadership	  and	  the	  fundamental	  role	  of	  ethics	  in	  understanding	  leadership.	  	  	  
The	  Variables	  of	  the	  Leadership	  Process	  	  In	  the	  final	  essay	  of	  the	  Quest	  for	  a	  General	  Theory	  of	  Leadership	  Burns	  outlines	  his	   current	   approach	   to	   leadership,	   which	   provides	   the	   bare	   bones	   of	   the	  framework	   developed	   here.	   	   Building	   on	   the	   general	   GTOL	   themes,	   Burns	  identifies	  power,	  values,	  conflict	  and	  change	  as	  “relevant	  crucial	  variables”	  in	  the	  dynamics	   of	   the	   leadership	   process.165	   	   The	   combination	   of	   the	   analysis	  Burns	  develops	   with	   the	   work	   of	   the	   GTOL	   provides	   a	   basis	   for	   developing	   both	   a	  descriptive	  and	  conceptual	   framework	   for	  assessing	   leadership	   in	   the	   judiciary	  and	  understanding	   issues	  of	   the	   independence	  and	  accountability	  of	   individual	  judges	  and	  the	  judiciary	  as	  whole.	  	  	  There	   are	   three	   aspects	   to	   Burns’	   structure.	   	   First	   he	   identifies	   a	   definition	   of	  “leadership	   in	  action”,	  which	   is	   informed	  by	  his	  view	  of	  “the	   job	  of	   leadership”.	  	  Second,	   he	   analyses	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   leadership	   process	  with	   reference	   to	  what	   he	   describes	   as	   the	   “relevant	   crucial	   variables”	   of	   power,	   conflict,	   values	  and	   change.	   	   And	   finally,	   he	   offers	   a	   means	   of	   evaluating	   leadership	   with	  reference	   to	   ethical	   and	   moral	   values,	   and	   with	   reference	   to	   levels	   of	   change	  brought	  about	  by	  leadership:	  	  	  Leadership	   in	   action	   –	   the	  mobilization,	   by	   leaders/activists,	   of	   followers,	  who	  themselves	  become	  leaders/activists,	  focusing	  on	  “collective	  leadership”	  The	  dynamics	  of	  the	  leadership	  process	  –	  values,	  conflict,	  power	  and	  change	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  164 Ibid., pp 227-228 165 JM Burns, 'Afterword' in GR Goethals and GJ Sorenson (eds), The Quest for a General Theory of 
Leadership (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2006) 
	   71	  
Evaluation	  of	  leadership	  –	  (a)	  the	  evaluation	  of	  how	  leadership	  is	  mobilized	  with	  reference	  to	  ethical	  values;	  (b)	  evaluation	  of	  what	  leadership	  is	  mobilized	  for	  by	  moral	  values.	  	  	  	  The	   “job	   of	   leadership”	   is	   to	   legitimate	   the	   wants	   and	   needs	   of	   followers;	   to	  “educate	   and	   instruct	   and	   guide	   followers	   towards	   solutions”;	   to	   articulate	   the	  goals	  of	   individuals	  and	   the	  group	  and	   to	   identify	   the	  means	  of	   realizing	   them;	  and	   to	   meet	   “the	   priority	   of	   order”;	   but,	   he	   says	   “order	   in	   itself	   is	   hopelessly	  inadequate	  unless	  it	   is	  employed	  to	  meet	  a	  second	  challenge:	  that	  of	  protecting	  core	  values,	  such	  as	   freedom,	   justice,	  opportunity,	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  or	  of	  condition,	  or	  ultimately	  happiness.”166	  	  	  	  Finally,	  Burns	  gives	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  project	  so	  far	  and	  outlines	  the	  way	  in	  which	  leadership	  might	  be	  evaluated:	  	  	   “As	   the	   search	   for	   a	   general	   theory	   of	   leadership	   continues,	   that	   theory	  will	  require	  a	  definition	  of	  leadership	  in	  action.	  	  We	  know	  that	  leadership	  is	   the	   mobilization,	   by	   activists,	   of	   followers,	   some	   of	   whom	   become	  leaders	   of	   the	   original	   activists.	   	   	   How	   this	   collective	   leadership	   is	  mobilized	  is	  tested	  by	  ethical	  values;	  what	  this	  leadership	  is	  mobilized	  for	  –	   its	  purposes	  or	  ends	  –	  by	  moral	  values.	   	  The	   interplay	  of	   these	   factors	  will	  be	  grounded	  in	  the	  economic,	  social,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  forces	  that	  our	   group	   has	   analyzed.	   	   These	   forces	  will	   lie	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   a	   general	  theory	  of	  leadership.”167	  	  	  	  He	  then	  outlines	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  group’s	  “collective	  wisdom”	  on	  the	  “construct	  of	  leadership”,	  which	  is	  a	  definition	  that	  he	  developed	  in	  2002	  from	  the	  group’s	  first	  two	  meetings:	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166 Ibid., p.235 167 Burns, 'Afterword', p.239 
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…we	   now	   see	   leadership	   as	   an	   influence	   process,	   both	   visible	   and	  invisible,	   in	   a	   society	   inherited,	   constructed,	   and	   perceived	   as	   the	  interaction	  of	  persons	  in	  human	  (and	  inhuman)	  conditions	  of	  inequality	  –	  an	  interaction	  measured	  by	  ethical	  and	  moral	  values	  and	  by	  the	  degree	  of	  realization	  of	  intended,	  comprehensive,	  and	  durable	  change.168	  	  This	  construct	  of	  leadership	  recognises	  the	  paradox	  of	  leadership,	  and	  allows	  for	  the	   possibility	   that	   people	   are	   motivated	   by	   a	   variety	   of	   factors	   when	   they	  respond	   to	   leadership.	   	   	   The	   “relevant	   crucial	   variables”169	   of	   values,	   conflict,	  power	  and	  change	  underlie	  the	  “dynamics	  of	  the	  leadership	  process”.	  	  	  
Power	  Power	   is	   seen	   as	   causation	   –	   power	   has	   a	   causal	   role	   in	   “empowering	   other	  humans”	   and	   “the	   empowering	   of	   values	   in	   bringing	   about	   comprehensive	  change.”170	   	   Burns	   cites	   Ciulla,	   who	   writes	   that	   human	   empowerment	   gives	  people	   “the	   confidence,	   the	   freedom,	   and	   resources	   to	   act	   on	   their	   own	  judgments”	   and	   it	   “entails	   a	   distinct	   set	   of	   moral	   understandings	   and	  commitments	   between	   leaders	   and	   followers.”	   	   But,	   she	   warns	   of	   “bogus	  empowerment”	   when	   leaders	   ignore	   “the	   moral	   commitments	   of	  empowerment”,171	  and	  instead	  use	  “the	  forms	  and	  language	  of	  empowerment	  to	  exploit	   followers	   more	   efficiently.”172	   	   Burns	   rejects	   “simplistic	   and	   popular”	  approaches	  to	  power.	  	  Power	  is	  “complex,	  despite	  all	  the	  simplistic	  and	  popular	  accounts	   that	   impute	   vast	   and	   permanent	   authority	   and	   supremacy	   to	   various	  leaders	   and	   rulers.”173	   Power	   is	   quantitative,	   qualitative	   and	   subjective.	   	   It	   is	  measured	   by	   both	   “dollars	   or	   guns	   or	   votes”,	   and	   by	   “leaders’	   and	   followers’	  wants	   and	   feelings	   and	   attitudes.”	   	   Motives	   are	   highly	   relevant,	   and	   motives	  “empower	  leadership”	  and	  leadership	  in	  turn	  “empowers	  or	  at	  least	  legitimates	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid., p.237 171 Ciulla (ed), Ethics, the heart of leadership, pp 59, 70 172 Burns, 'Afterword', p.237 173 Ibid., p.238 
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motives”.174	   	   And,	   importantly,	   empowerment	   is	   not	   seen	   as	   diminishing	  leadership,	  but	   rather	  as	  enhancing	   it.	   	  As	  Gallas’	  description	  of	   the	  paradox	  of	  leadership	  suggests,	  leadership	  can	  be	  either	  visible	  or	  invisible,	  and	  so	  too	  can	  power	   be	   “exerted	   through	   inaction.”	   Power	   takes	   many	   forms,	   and	  “empowering	  leadership	  is	  not	  simply	  one-­‐directional”.	  	  	  	  
Conflict	  	  Conflict	  arises	  out	  of	  competing	  values,	  and	  “conflict	  is	  another	  crucial	  aspect	  or	  element	   of	   leadership”.	   	   	   The	   leadership-­‐conflict	   relationship	   is	   complex	   –	   as	  conflict	   is	   both	   interpersonal	   and	   intrapersonal.	   	   However,	   “strong	   leadership	  does	   not	   reject	   conflict	   –	   it	   thrives	   on	   it.”175	   	   The	   recognition	   of	   both	  interpersonal	   and	   intrapersonal	   conflict	   may	   be	   a	   useful	   analytical	   tool	   in	  relation	  to	  judges.	  	  Judges	  have	  personal	  motives,	  views	  and	  ideologies,	  but	  they	  are	  constrained	  by	  fairness,	  the	  law,	  and	  the	  facts	  of	  each	  case.	   	   	  They	  may	  well	  have	   to	   overcome	   huge	   intrapersonal	   conflicts	   in	   order	   to	   be	   effective	   and	  impartial.	  	  	  They	  do	  also	  of	  course	  have	  to	  balance	  conflicts	  of	  values,	  principles	  and	  rights	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  	  	  Another	  aspect	  of	  conflict	  refers	  to	  the	  ever	  present	  debate	  in	  a	  healthy	  democratic	  society,	  and	  there	  is	  the	  question	  of	  how	  best	  to	  resolve	   conflict	   in	   that	   context:	   “Is	   progress	   toward	   the	   realisation	   of	   ‘higher’	  values	   achieved	   more	   surely	   and	   lastingly	   through	   consensual	   step-­‐by-­‐step	  ‘mutual	  satsificing,’	  or	  through	  confrontation,	  choosing	  of	  sides	  and	  hence	  clearly	  and	   even	   dramatically	   posed	   conflict?”176	   	   	   This	   concern	   about	   how	   to	   resolve	  conflict	   of	   this	   kind	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	   judiciary,	   and	   the	   continuous	   need	   to	  balance	  judicial	  independence	  and	  judicial	  accountability	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  rule	   of	   law.	   	   	   There	   are	   inevitable	   tensions	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	  executive,	  for	  example,	  but	  the	  question	  is	  how	  to	  manage	  these	  tensions	  so	  that	  they	  remain	  “healthy”	  without	  undermining	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  and	  public	  trust	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174 Ibid. 175 Ibid., p.237 176 Ibid. 
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Values	  Values	   refer	   to	   the	   ethics	   of	   the	   situation	   on	   two	   levels.	   	   Ethics	   “concerns	   the	  morality	   of	   their	   goals”	   and	   also	   “what	   they	   do	   and	   how	   they	   treat	   people	   in	  achieving	  these	  goals.”177	   	  There	  are	  two	  facets	  to	  this:	   	   first,	   is	   the	   issue	  of	   the	  morality	   of	   the	   goals	   –	   the	  morality	   of	   the	   goals	   of	   leaders,	  what	   they	   seek	   to	  achieve	   in	   undertaking	   the	   tasks	   of	   leadership;	   and	   second,	   is	   the	  morality	   of	  their	   actions,	   a	   judgement	   about	   the	   processes	   they	   use,	   and	   their	   interaction	  with	  people	  in	  achieving	  goals.	  	  So,	  individuals	  have	  goals,	  and	  by	  virtue	  of	  them	  being	   interdependent,	   there	   has	   to	   be	   some	   scheme	   for	   managing	   and	  prioritising	  their	  goals,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  job	  of	  leaders,	  or	  leadership.	   	  But	  leaders	  have	  goals	  too,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  job	  of	  ethics	  and	  values	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  their	  goals	  match	  and	  enable	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  broader	  ‘group’	  goals.	  	  	  Burns’	  use	  of	  the	  broad	  term	  of	  “values”	  to	  refer	  to	  ethical	  makes	  room	  for	  variation	  in	  the	   values	   that	   are	   prioritized,	   and	   the	   way	   in	   which	   they	   are	   prioritized.	  	  Importantly,	  Burns	  leaves	  the	  task	  of	  reconciling	  values	  and	  ethics	  to	  the	  leaders	  themselves	   within	   the	   constraints	   of	   what	   is	   basically	   morally	   acceptable.	   	   A	  2006	   study	   of	   leadership	   ethics	   across	   cultures	   suggests	   that	   the	   constraining	  components	   of	   leadership	   fit	   well	   with	   the	   components	   of	   transforming	  leadership	   and	   are	   highly	   valued	   across	   a	   spectrum	   of	   cultures.	   	   	   Resick	   et	   al	  found	   that	   their	   four	   components	   of	   ethical	   leadership	   (Character/Integrity,	  Altruism,	  Collective	  Motivation	  and	  Encouragement)	  are	  “universally	  supported,	  and	  viewed	  as	  behaviours	  and	  characteristics	  that	  contribute	  to	  a	  person	  being	  an	   effective	   leader	   across	   cultures.”178	   However,	   in	   line	  with	   Burns’	   approach,	  they	   found	   that	   this	   is	   a	   “variform	   universal”	   that	   “exists	   when	   a	   principle	   is	  viewed	   similarly	   around	   the	   world,	   however	   cultural	   subtleties	   lead	   to	  differences	   in	   the	   enactment	   of	   that	   principle	   across	   cultures.”179	   	   This	   study	  appears	  to	  support	  theories	  of	  leadership	  ethics,	  and	  support	  Burns’	  approach	  to	  values	   and	   ethics	   –	   creating	   baseline	   standards	   that	   can	   vary	   to	   some	   extent	  across	  cultures,	  and	  also	  be	  complemented	  by	  additional	  value	  commitments.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177 Ibid., p.236 178 Resick and others, 'A Cross-Cultural Examination of the Endorsement of Ethical Leadership', p.354 179 Ibid. 
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Change	  The	  elements	  of	  values,	  conflict	  and	  power	  all	  lead	  to	  the	  “transcending	  question	  of	   grand	   change.”180	   Change	   brought	   about	   by	   leadership	   must,	   according	   to	  Burns,	   be	   “intended,	   comprehensive,	   durable	   and	   grounded	   in	   values.”	   	   In	   the	  context	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   and	   particularly	   judiciaries	   in	   developing	   nations,	   the	  question	  of	   change,	   and	   the	   sustainability	  of	   fundamental	   reforms,	   is	   vital,	   and	  this	   study	  will	   explore	   the	   role	  of	  Chief	   Justices	   in	  developing	  and	  maintaining	  institutional	  stability	  while	  implementing	  reforms.	  	  	  
The	  dynamics	  of	  the	  leadership	  process	  as	  applied	  to	  the	  judiciary	  	  	  Gallas’	  account	  of	  the	  concerns	  of	  leadership	  in	  the	  judicial	  setting	  indicates	  the	  complexity	   and	   constraints	   of	   the	   judicial	   organization,	   and	   the	   potential	  conflicts	  involved	  in	  the	  daily	  operations	  of	  the	  courts.	   	  As	  head	  of	  the	  judiciary	  the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   multiple	   functions,	   and	   as	   a	   consequence,	   has	   several	  potential	  groups	  of	  “constituents”	  to	  lead.	  	   	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  in	  a	  position	  not	  only	  to	  lead	  and	  influence	  the	  actual	  functioning	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  but	  also	  to	  lead	  and	  influence	  relations	  with	  other	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  system.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  will	   at	   once	   be	   serving	   the	   interests	   and	   needs	   of	   judges	   and	   the	   judiciary,	   be	  aware	  of	  and	  sensitive	  to	  the	   limitations	  on	  the	  public	  purse	  and	  the	  resources	  that	   the	   judiciary	  can	  command,	  and	   the	  need	   to	  make	   the	  courts	  accessible	   to	  and	   effective	   for	   those	   whom	   they	   ultimately	   serve,	   that	   is	   members	   of	   the	  public.	  	  	  It	  is	  worth	  thinking	  a	  little	  more	  about	  the	  character	  of	  the	  relationships	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  might	  have	  with	  the	  various	  constituencies	  involved	  in	  the	  justice	  system,	   formulated	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   potential	   functions	   and	   goals	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice	  with	  reference	  to	  different	  groups.	  	  	  
	  Burns’	  analysis	  provides	  a	  way	  of	  combining	  all	  of	  these	  concerns	  into	  a	  guiding	  framework	  along	  three	  aspects:	  (1)	  describing	  leadership	  in	  action,	  (2)	  analysing	  the	  dynamics	  of	  leadership	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  comparative	  concepts	  of	  power,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  180 Burns, 'Afterword' 
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conflict,	  values	  and	  change,	  and	  finally,	  (3)	  assessing	  the	  ethics	  of	   leadership	  in	  action	   and	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   process	   with	   reference	   to	   ethical	   values	   and	  norms	   which	   will	   be	   informed	   by	   the	   context	   of	   judicial	   leadership,	   and	   the	  varying	   cultural	   commitments	   in	   the	   countries	   that	   are	   studied.	   	   	  This	   study	   is	  organized	  around	  the	  “dynamics	  of	  the	  leadership	  process”	  because	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  process	  of	  leadership	  and	  the	  relationships	  involved,	  rather	  than	  specifics	  of	   judicial	   leader	   personalities	   and	   traits.	   	   Throughout,	   the	   processes	   of	  leadership,	  how	  leadership	  is	  conducted,	  and	  the	  purposes	  of	  leadership	  will	  be	  measured	  with	  reference	  to	  an	  ethical	  framework	  informed	  by	  (a)	  fundamental	  constitutional	   values	   or	   principles	   that	   apply	   to	   the	   judiciary	   (as	   identified	   in	  international,	   regional	   and	   national	   laws	   and	   conventions	   to	   which	   each	  jurisdiction	  subscribes);	   (b)	   the	  basic	  moral	   standards	   identified	  as	   “universal”	  by	   cross-­‐cultural	   leadership	   studies;	   and	   (c)	   culture-­‐specific	  moral	   values	   that	  might	  affect	  people’s	  perceptions	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  leadership.	  	  	  	  Clearly,	   leading	   a	   judiciary,	   or	   even	   one	   court,	   is	   a	   complex	   exercise.	   	   The	  leadership	   approach	   that	   prioritizes	   the	   leader-­‐follower	   relationship	   is	  necessarily	  multi-­‐layered,	  or	  multi-­‐dimensional.	   	  The	  role	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  similar.	  	  He	  or	  she	  relates	  to	  a	  broad	  variety	  of	  constituents	  in	  a	  broad	  variety	  of	  ways.	   	   	   Before	   setting	   out	   the	   overarching	   conceptual	   framework	   that	   will	   be	  used,	   it	   is,	   therefore,	   important	   to	   understand	   the	   different	   levels	   of	   analysis	  involved.	  	  	  	  	  First,	  there	  is	  the	  multi-­‐layered	  character	  of	  judicial	  interactions	  and	  activities	  to	  consider.	  	  	  The	  judiciary	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  layers,	  or	  zones	  of	  activity.	  	  	  The	   individual	   layer	  refers	  to	   judges	  (including	  the	  Chief	   Justice)	  as	   individuals	  with	   personal	   and	   social	   backgrounds,	   concerns,	   motives	   and	   goals.	   	   	   At	   the	  professional	   level,	   individual	   judges	   (including	   the	   Chief	   Justice)	   have	   a	   clear	  professional	  role,	  each	  has	  taken	  a	  specific	  professional	  path,	  and	  each	  will	  have	  certain	   professional	   goals.	   	   	   At	   the	   institutional	   level,	   judges	   are	   part	   of	   an	  institution	  that	  serves	  a	  very	  specific	  function	  in	  society,	  and	  with	  that	  comes	  the	  responsibility	   of	   meeting	   the	   goals	   and	   requirements	   of	   that	   institution	   as	   a	  whole.	   	   	   And	   finally,	   we	  might	   think	   of	   the	   larger	   picture,	   and	   the	   national	   or	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international	   framework	   within	   which	   courts	   operate,	   having	   to	   reconcile	  national	   social	   needs	  with	   potential	   international	   commitments	  made	   by	   their	  government.	  	  	  So,	  for	  example,	  in	  “motivating”	  judges,	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  to	  take	  account	  of	   all	  of	   these	   layers,	   and	  emphasize	  each	   to	  an	  appropriate	  degree	   so	  that	  each	  individual	  judge	  exercises	  his	  or	  her	  independence	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  their	   personal	   beliefs	   do	   not	   interfere	   with	   their	   decisions,	   but	   coincide	   with	  their	  professional	  goals.	  	  	  	  Secondly,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   leadership	   can	   be,	   and	   often	   is,	   used	   both	   at	   the	  theoretical	  or	  conceptual	  level,	  and	  as	  a	  descriptive	  tool	  to	  describe	  activities	  and	  interactions.	   	   	   At	   the	   conceptual	   level	   the	   language	   of	   leadership	   as	   described	  above,	  provides	  a	   “conceptual	   tool	  box”	  of	   terms	   to	  use	  as	   comparisons	  across	  countries	   in	   the	  Commonwealth.	   	  One	  of	   the	  pitfalls	  of	   legal	  comparison	   is	   that	  what	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  similar	  legal	  terms	  in	  two	  different	  legal	  settings,	  might	  in	  fact	   have	   very	   different	   legal	   meanings	   in	   practice.	   The	   basic	   concepts	   I	   have	  identified	   in	   the	   leadership	   literature	   will	   instead	   be	   used	   as	   the	   basic	  comparators.	   	   So	  while	   the	   exercise	   of	   power,	   or	   the	   content	   of	   values,	   or	   the	  extent	  of	  conflict	  and	  change	  might	  vary	  across	  countries,	  they	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  power,	  values,	   conflict	  or	   change.	   	   	   	  At	   the	  descriptive	   level,	   the	   language	  of	  leadership	   can	   be	   used	   to	   describe	   specific	   interactions	   and	   their	   impact,	  thinking	  about	  the	  judiciary	  or	  the	  judicial	  system	  as	  being	  made	  up	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  constituents	  (or	  followers)	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  might	  always,	  or	  from	  time	  to	  time,	  lead	  towards	  particular	  goals.	  	  	  	  	  Going	  back	  to	  the	  approach	  Grint	  suggests	  of	  person,	  result,	  position	  and	  process,	  it	  will	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  ideal	  judge,	  and	  the	  ideal	  Chief	  Justice,	  has	  Shientag’s	  “optimal	   judicial	   temperament”	   which	   includes:	   “independence,	   courtesy	   and	  patience,	  dignity,	  open-­‐mindedness,	  and	  social	  consciousness.”181	   	  The	  question	  of	  what	   the	   leader	  does,	  will	  certainly	  come	   into	   it,	  as	  will	   the	  question	  of	  how	  (using	   transformational	   and	   leadership	   ethics	   theories).	   	   	   As	   for	   position,	   it	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181 PB Wice, Court reform and judicial leadership: Judge George Nicola and the New Jersey justice 
system Praeger, Westport, Conn. ; London, 1995), discussed at p.34 
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argued	   that	   a	   Chief	   Justice	   in	   a	   modern	   judiciary	   has	   to	   lead	   in	   order	   to	  accommodate	   the	   multiple	   demands	   on	   the	   judiciary,	   so	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	  position	  therefore	  makes	  him	  or	  her	  a	  leader.	  	  	  	  Turning	  to	  ethical	  leadership,	  the	  dimensions	  suggested	  by	  both	  Ciulla	  and	  Bass	  and	  Steidlmeier	  are	  very	  similar.	  	  They	  both	  address	  the	  personal	  ethics	  or	  moral	  character	  of	  the	  leader.	  	  Again,	  an	  ideal	  Chief	  Justice	  will	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  of	  the	  highest	   moral	   character;	   they	   both	   address	   the	   ethics	   of	   the	   process	   of	  leadership,	  with	  Ciulla	  prioritizing	  the	  ethics	  of	  the	  leader-­‐follower	  relationship	  and	  the	  overall	  process	  of	  leadership,	  and	  Bass	  and	  Steidlemeier	  emphasizing	  the	  ethical	  values	  embedded	   in	   the	  vision,	  action	  and	  programme	   through	  which	  a	  leader	   leads.	   They	   also	   both	   talk	   of	   the	   ethical	   dimensions	   of	   the	   outcome	   of	  leadership	  (the	  result).	  	  	  	  	  Looking	   at	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   with	   reference	   to	   the	   power	   variable	  involves	   a	   reading	   of	   national	   constitutions,	   legislation,	   delegated	   legislation,	  rules	  of	  court	  and	  policy	  to	   identify	  the	  powers	  and	  potential	   for	   influence	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  enjoys,	  whether	  formally	  or	  informally;	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  chief	  justice;	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  judiciary;	  and	  the	  matrix	  of	   relationships	   that	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   engages.	   	   It	   involves,	   for	   example,	   the	  identification	   of	   his	   or	   her	   interactions	   and	   involvement	   with	   judges,	   judicial	  administrators,	   politicians	   and	   the	   public	   in	   several	   different	   ways	   including	  selection,	   discipline,	   and	   administration.	   Chapter	   4	   analyses	   office	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice	  and	   the	  arrangements	   for	  relations	  between	   the	   judiciary	  and	   the	  other	  branches	   –	   this	   context	   provides	   the	   background	   to	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   “social	  power”	  and	  considers	  the	  external	  relationships	  that	  Chief	  Justice	  must	  draw	  on	  in	  leading	  the	  judiciary.	  	  It	  sets	  up	  the	  framework	  within	  which	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  represents	  the	  interests	  of	  judiciary.	  	  	  The	   perspective	   of	   conflict	   allows	   us	   to	   gain	   further	   insights	   into	   the	   role	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   plays	   in	   balancing	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   judiciary	   against	   those	   of	  political	   bodies	   and	   the	   public.	   	   	   Potential	   conflicts	   might	   include	   conflicts	  between	  the	  various	  functions	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice—assessing	  functions	  in	  terms	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of	  conflict	  allows	  us	  to	  identify	  points	  at	  which,	  for	  example,	  formal	  and	  informal	  functions	  undermine	  each	  other.	   	   It	  also	  allows	  us	   to	   identify	   the	  core,	  priority	  functions	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice.	   	   There	   will	   inevitably	   be	   competing	   goals	   too:	  judiciary	   ambitions	   for	   reform	   may	   not	   match	   government	   goals	   for	   reform.	  Conflicting	  values	  and	  consequent	   inequalities	  will	   show	  up	   in	   this	  perspective	  too,	  these	  may	  be	  between	  institutions,	  or	  be	  inter-­‐personal,	  or	  indeed,	  be	  intra-­‐personal,	   with	   formal	   judicial	   systems	   not	   adequately	   reflecting	   the	   cultural	  background	  of	  judges	  and	  members	  of	  the	  public.182	  	  	  Values	   invigorate	   leadership	   by	   helping	   to	   (a)	   “sustain	   the	   mobilization	   of	  leaders”	   and	   (b)	   deepen	   the	   empowerment	   of	   followers	   in	   conditions	   of	  competition	  and	  conflict,	  they	  also	  “strengthen	  leaders’	  capacity	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  wider	   publics”	   to	   “gain	   support	   for	   still	   broader	   values	   (i.e.	   equality	   of	  opportunity	   as	   well	   as	   condition)”,	   and	   “empower	   leaders”	   by	   providing	   a	  “foundation	   for	   governing”.	   Values	   also	   help	   to	   clarify	   questions	   about	   the	  relationship	   between	   competing	   rights	   and	   perspectives,	   addressing	   issues	   of	  basic	  human	  nature.	   	   	  This	  perspective	  allows	  an	  assessment	  of	   the	   role	  of	   the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  developing	  and	  maintaining	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  judicial	  process	  with	  reference	  to	  accepted	  ethical	  standards	  and	  culture-­‐specific	  values.	  	  The	  element	  of	  change	  enables	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  judiciary’s	  ability	  to	  respond	  to	  social	   and	  political	   norms,	   and	   to	   be	   sensitive	   to	   the	  needs	   of	   society.	   	   	   It	   also	  allows	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  judiciary	  in	  terms	  of	  levels	  or	  stages	  of	  reform,	  and	  of	  judicial	  and	  government	  policies	  relating	  to	  reform	  and	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  	  
2.6	  Conclusion	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182 See for example: Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: the Legal Systems of Asia and 
Africa  
	   80	  
Much	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   judicial	   leadership	   has	   tended	   to	   focus	   on	   the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  head	  of	  a	  court	  making	  a	  collective	  decision	  –	  Danelski’s	  analysis	  is	  an	  example	  of	  this.	  	  Debates	  about	  the	  “paradox	  of	  judicial	  leadership”	   however,	   are	   focused	   less	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   of	  judges	   and	   more	   on	   the	   challenges	   court	   administrators	   in	   leading	   the	  administration	   of	   the	   courts.	   	   Transformational	   leadership,	   especially	   when	  practiced	   in	   organizations,	   together	   with	   Burn’s	   dynamics	   of	   the	   leadership	  process,	   provides	   a	   conceptual	   framework	   that	   accommodates	   the	   concepts	  articulated	  by	  Danelski	  (focusing	  as	  it	  does	  on	  values	  and	  attitudes	  of	  individuals,	  and	   engaging	   them	   in	   a	   collective	   leadership	   process)	   and	   addresses	   the	  concerns	  underlying	  the	  paradox	  of	   judicial	   leadership	  and	  the	  need	  to	  balance	  “action	  versus	  conflicting	  goals”,	   “law	  versus	   the	  need	   for	  discretion	   to	  achieve	  justice”,	   “being	   in	   control	   versus	   allowing	   others	   to	   control”,	   and	   spending	  resources	  versus	  conserving	  assets”.	   	   	   In	  the	  judicial	  organization,	  transactional	  leadership	   (which	   involves	   exchange	   and	   reward)	   is	   not	   appropriate	   –	  transformational	   leadership	  may	  be	   the	  only	  appropriate	   form	  of	   leadership	   in	  an	   organization	   that	   is	   dependent	   on	   external	   sources	   for	   resources	   and	   that	  values	   individual	   autonomy	   and	   independence	   so	   highly.	   	   But	   the	   concepts	  applied	  by	  Danelski	  resonate	  with	  transformational	  leadership	  beyond	  the	  small	  group	   situation	   because	   influence	   “implies	   more	   than	   surface	   activity	   and	  interaction”	  and	  because	  “underlying	  these	  phenomena	  are	  expectations,	  values	  and	   attitudes	   of	   CJ	   and	   judge”.183	   Through	   transformational	   leadership	   of	   the	  judicial	   organization	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   can	   induce	   judges	   (in	   each	   of	   the	   three	  countries	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	   responsible	   for	  approximately	  200-­‐300	   judges)184	  and	  others	  to	  “act	  for	  certain	  goals	  that	  represent	  the	  values	  and	  motivations—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  183 Danelski, “The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court”, pp 
506-507 184 In South Africa the Superior Courts are made up of 205 judges (with just under 2,000 magistrates 
who are not presently part of the “judiciary”), see DOJCD Annual Report 2008-2009); In Ghana there 
are approximately 300 judges and the Chief Justice is also responsible for the several hundred judicial 
support staff (official statistics were not available); and in Kenya the total number of magistrates and 
judges is just over 350, but many of the post created to enhance capacity have not yet been filled – see: 
Kenya Judiciary Strategic Plan 2009-2012.  
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the	   wants	   and	   needs,	   the	   aspirations	   and	   expectations—of	   both	   leaders	   and	  followers.”185	  	  	  	  An	   approach	   that	   combines	   the	   theory	   of	   transformational	   leadership,	   Burns’	  later	   approach	   to	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   leadership	   process	   and	   the	   variables	   of	  power,	  conflict,	  values	  and	  change	  and	  leadership	  ethics,	  addresses	  the	  concerns	  of	  leadership	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  	  	  Transformational	  leadership	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  leadership	  process	  emphasize	  the	  motivation,	  autonomy	  and	  empowerment	  of	   individuals	   in	   acting	   towards	   collective	   goals.	   	   Studies	   of	   transformational	  leadership	   in	   organizations	   demonstrate	   that	   even	   though	   it	   was	   originally	  conceived	  as	  a	  political	  theory	  of	  leadership	  it	  is	  effective	  in	  organizations,	  and	  it	  is	   	   “autonomy-­‐supporting”.	   	   	   The	   dynamics	   of	   the	   leadership	   process,	   which	  emphasizes	  process	  over	  personal	   style	   and	   focuses	  on	   the	   concepts	  of	  power,	  conflict,	  values	  and	  change,	  builds	  on	  the	  theory	  of	  transformational	   leadership	  and	  provides	  a	  means	  of	  understanding	  and	  mapping	  some	  of	  the	  more	  difficult	  aspects	  of	  the	  paradox	  of	  judicial	  leadership.	  	  Such	  issues	  include:	  the	  scope	  and	  effect	  of	  broad	  discretionary	  powers;	  implicit	  conflicts	  and	  tensions	  in	  leading	  an	  organization	   in	   which	   law	   and	   discretion	   must	   be	   balanced,	   conflicting	   goals	  must	  be	  resolved,	  and	  complete	  control	  over	  resources	  and	  operational	  decisions	  is	  not	  always	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  leader;	  the	  identification	  and	  articulation	  of	  the	  values	   and	   goals	   of	   the	   organization	   which	   are	   inevitably	   constrained	   by	  constitutional	   and	   legal	   values	   and	   principles;	   and	   the	   need	   for	   a	   dynamic	  organisation	   that	   reflects	   the	  needs	  of	   society.	   	   	   Leadership	  ethics	   expands	   the	  content	  of	   the	   term	   “values”	  and	  offers	  a	  way	  of	  understanding	  and	  evaluating	  leadership	   processes,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   what	   is	   “morally	   good”	   and	   what	   is	  “technically	  good	  or	  effective”.	  	  	  This	  resonates	  with	  the	  requirement	  that	  judges	  (and	  of	  course	  Chief	   Justices)	  should	  be	  people	  of	   integrity	  and	  moral	   fortitude	  and	   that	   both	   the	   individuals	   and	   the	   organization	   should	   adhere	   to	   certain	  ethical	  standards	  in	  all	  that	  they	  do,	  which	  might	  reasonably	  include	  the	  way	  in	  with	   they	   manage,	   and	   lead,	   their	   organization.	   	   Leadership	   ethics	   addresses	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185 This is Burns’ definition of transformation leadership: Burns, Leadership, p.19 
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concerns	  about	  accountability	  and	  fairness,	  which,	  understood	  as	  a	  form	  of	  “soft	  accountability”	  regulates	  conduct	  and	  checks	  against	  abuse	  of	  power.	  	  	  	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice,	  as	  head	  of	  the	  third	  arm	  of	  government	  has	  to	  engage	  different	  groups	   of	   followers	   or	   “constituents”.	   	   It	   is	   therefore	   important	   that	   the	   Chief	  Justice	  creates	  order	  among	  these	  constituents	  and	  that	  he	  or	  she	  articulates,	  and	  finds	  the	  means	  to	  realize,	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  judiciary	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  of	  these	  groups.	   	   In	   established	   democracies	   this	   is	   most	   visibly	   be	   done	   through	   the	  giving	  of	   leading	   judgements,	  but	   it	  can	  also	  be	  done	   in	  other	  ways:	   in	  the	  way	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  interacts	  with	  judges	  on	  a	  daily	  basis;	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	   communicates	   and	   interacts	  with	   the	   executive	   and	   Parliament;	   and	   in	  the	  way	   that	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   interacts	  with	   the	  media	  and	   the	  public.	  Some	  of	  these	   channels	   of	   communication	  will	   be	   formally	   set	   out	   in	   legal	   and	  political	  processes,	   but	   some	   will	   be	   determined	   by	   the	   way	   that	   each	   Chief	   Justice	  engages	  with	  his	  or	  her	  role	  and	  moulds	  expectations	  surrounding	  the	  office.	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Chapter	  3	  –	  Constitutional	  Foundations	  of	  Values	  in	  
Leadership	  	  
3.1	  Introduction	  	  Part	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice's	  leadership	  role	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  institution	  engages	  with	  and	  reflects	  the	  core	  values	  that	  it	  is	  intended	  to	  protect	  and	  that	  others	  are	  motivated	   to	   engage	  with	   and	   uphold	   them	   as	  well.	   This	   chapter	   explores	   the	  content	  of	  the	  “fundamental	  political	  values”	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  (“democracy,	  democratic	  processes	  and	  institutions	  which	  reflect	  national	  circumstances,	   the	  rule	   of	   law	   and	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   judiciary”	   and	   “just	   and	   honest	  government”.186)	   both	   in	   the	   context	   of	   international	   standards	   and	   theories	  about	   these	  values,	   and	  by	   looking	  more	   closely	   at	  domestic	   interpretations	  of	  the	   values	   in	   each	   country.	   	   There	   are	   specific	   values	   that	   the	   judiciary	   is	  supposed	  to	  expound,	  adhere	  to	  and	  uphold.	   	  Chapter	  5	  addresses	  the	  activities	  of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   and	   the	   expectations	   of	   judges	   and	   others	   that	   inform	   or	  derive	  from	  that	  activity.	  	  As	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  this	  study	  is	  set	  against	  the	  background	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Commonwealth	   Latimer	   House	  Principles	   that	   are	   intended	   to	   provide	   guidance	   for	   Commonwealth	  governments	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  so-­‐called	  “fundamental	  political	  values”	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  are	  applicable	  in	  diverse	  societies,	  and	  therefore	  what	  role	  (or	  responsibilities)	  the	  Chief	   Justice,	  as	   leader	  of	  the	  third	  arm	  of	  government,	  might	   have	   in	   upholding	   those	   values.	   	   Before	   continuing	   on	   to	   a	   detailed	  consideration	   of	   the	   office	   of	   Chief	   justice	   (in	   Chapter	   4)	   and	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  Chief	   Justice’s	   powers	   (in	   Chapter	   5),	   this	   chapter	   considers	   the	   domestic	  jurisprudence	   surrounding	   the	   application	   of	   constitutional	   principles	   and	  fundamental	   values.	   	   As	   has	   been	   shown	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   a	   leader	  must	   identify,	  articulate,	  and	  prioritise	  the	  collective	  goals	  of	  the	  group	  or	  institution	  he	  or	  she	  is	  leading.	  	  A	  judiciary	  is	  a	  unique	  organisation	  in	  many	  ways,	  not	  least	  because	  it	  has	   a	   very	   specific	   function	   in	   society.	   	   Judges	   and	   the	   courts	   are	  directed	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186 Harare Commonwealth Declaration, para.9 
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constrained	  by	  the	  constitution	  and	  laws	  of	  their	  country	  and	  by	  their	  function	  as	  the	   interpreters	   of	   those	   laws.	   	   In	   leading	   the	   judiciary,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   will	  frame,	   follow	   and	   apply,	   basic	   constitutional	   principles	   governing	   the	   role	   and	  functioning	  of	  the	  courts.	  	  In	   Chapter	   2,	   the	   literature	   on	   judicial	   leadership,	   transforming	   leadership,	  ethical	   or	   authentic	   leadership,	   and	   culture	   and	   leadership	   was	   reviewed.	  	  Common	   to	   all	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   values	   are	   an	   important	   part	   of	   leadership.	  	  Following	  Burns’	  approach	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  leadership,	  values	  are	  a	  “relevant	  crucial	   variable”	  which	   serve	   both	   to	   evaluate	   the	  morality	   of	   a	   leader’s	   goals	  (and	  how	  those	  goals	  as	  identified	  by	  the	  leader	  match,	  or	  don’t	  match,	  the	  goals	  of	   the	   individuals	  and	  institution	  that	  he	  or	  she	   is	   leading);	  and	  to	  evaluate	  the	  processes	  of	  leadership—what	  leaders	  do	  and	  how	  they	  treat	  people	  in	  realizing	  those	  goals.	  	  Ciulla	  points	  to	  Burns’	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “values”	  instead	  of	  “ethics”	  as	  a	  weakness	   in	  his	  approach	  because	  values	  can	  vary	   in	  content,	  whereas	  ethics	  as	   a	   set	   of	   moral	   standards,	   will	   not	   vary.	   	   However,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  judiciary,	   and	   particularly	   in	   the	   context	   of	   judiciaries	   undergoing	   change	   and	  reform,	  both	  terms	  are	  relevant.	  	  	  	  The	   framework	   adopted	   by	   Commonwealth	   heads	   of	   government,	   the	   Latimer	  House	   Principles	   that	   have	   garnered	   so	  much	   support	   from	   representatives	   of	  the	  different	  branches	  of	  government	  across	   the	  Commonwealth,	  are	  careful	   to	  refer	  to	  the	  “fundamental	  political	  values”	  of	  the	  Commonwealth.	  	  This	  is	  because	  any	   inter-­‐governmental	   declaration	   or	   set	   of	   standards	   will,	   of	   course,	   be	  sensitive	   not	   to	   impinge	   on	   the	   sovereignty	   and	   national	   identity	   of	   each	  Commonwealth	  nation.	  	  The	  fundamental	  political	  values	  are	  therefore	  couched	  in	   terms	   of	   “democracy	   and	   democratic	   processes	   that	   reflect	   national	  
circumstances”.	   	   And	   the	   extent	   and	   way	   in	   which	   these	   political	   values	   are	  reflected	   in	   domestic	   laws	   varies	   between	   countries.	   But	   the	   content	   of	   these	  values	   is	   not	   generated	   in	   a	   vacuum,	   and	   international	   standards	   inform	   the	  details	  of	  the	  articulation	  of	  national	  constitutional	  and	  political	  standards.	  	  Chief	  Justices,	   as	   leaders,	  must	   identify	   the	  goals	  and	  processes	  of	   the	   judiciary	  with	  reference	   to	   these	   values	   because	   not	   only	   are	   the	   courts	   responsible	   for	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interpreting	  laws	  and	  constitutions	  and	  ensuring	  that	  others	  abide	  by	  them,	  but	  they	  must	   also	   adhere	   to	   them	   too.	   	   Turning	   from	   values	   to	   ethics,	   ethics	   and	  professional	   standards	   in	   the	   judiciary	   may	   once	   have	   been	   considered	   the	  province	   of	   individual	   judiciaries	   but	   with	   the	   success	   of	   the	   Bangalore	  Principles	  on	  Judicial	  Conduct,	  there	  is	  widespread	  agreement	  among	  judges,	  and	  crucially	  Chief	  Justices,	  as	  to	  the	  details	  of	  judicial	  ethics	  and	  the	  standards	  to	  be	  met.	   	   And	   each	   of	   the	   countries	   in	   this	   study	   has	   incorporated	   the	   Bangalore	  Principles	  into	  their	  practices	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	  Codes	  of	  Judicial	  Conduct	  that	  are	  largely	  modelled	  on	  the	  Bangalore	  Principles.	  	  	  	  
3.2	  Values	  and	  ethics	  in	  Leadership	  	  Danelski’s	  account	  of	  leadership	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	   States	   describes	   influence	   as	   implying	   “more	   than	   surface	   activity	   and	  interaction,	  for	  frequently	  underlying	  those	  phenomena	  are	  expectations,	  values	  and	   attitudes	   of	   Chief	   Justice	   and	   Judge.”187	   	   Expectations	   are	   “evaluative	  standards	  applied	  to	  an	  incumbent	  of	  a	  position,	  such	  as	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  and	  a	  set	   of	   those	   expectations	   define	   his	   role.”188	   	   As	   was	   shown	   in	   Chapter	   2,189	  values	   are	   important	  part	   of	   leadership	   in	   three	  ways.	   	   The	   first	  way	   in	  which	  values	  relate	   to	   leadership,	   is	   that,	  according	  to	  Burns,	  a	   leader	  must	  articulate	  and	  prioritise	  goals	  but	  the	  prioritising	  of	  goals	  must	  be	  to	  protect	  core	  values.	  Another	  way	  in	  which	  values	  relates	  to	   leadership	  is	   in	  their	  role	   in	  motivating	  followers.	   Transformational	   leaders	  motivate	   followers	   by	   both	   identifying	   the	  follower	   with	   a	   group	   and	   by	   linking	   the	   “work	   values”	   to	   follower	   values.190	  Third,	  values	  have	  an	  evaluative	  function	  as	  well.	  Ethics,	  which	  is	  central	  to	  any	  evaluation	  of	  leadership,	  and	  “concerns	  the	  morality	  of	  [leaders’]	  goals”	  and	  also	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187 DJ Danelski, 'The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court' in 
S Goldman and A Sarat (eds), American Court Systems: Readings in Judicial Process and Behaviour 
(1978), pp 506-507 188 Ibid. 189 See above, pp 65-67, and pp 71 and 72 190 Shamir, House and Arthur, 'The Motivational Effects of Charismatic Leadership: A self-concept 
based theory'  
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“what	  [leaders]	  do	  and	  how	  they	  treat	  people	  in	  achieving	  these	  goals.”191	  	  Ethics	  and	   values	   also	   form	   the	   basis	   for	   assessing	   the	   processes	   used	   in	   achieving	  those	  institutional	  goals,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  the	  leader	  and	  follower	  “treat	  each	  other"	  or	  the	  “morality	  of	  the	  “processes	  of	  …choice	  and	  action”	  that	  leaders	  and	  followers	  engage	   in	  and	  collectively	  pursue.192	  Values	   can	   therefore,	   serve	  as	  a	  means	   of	   regulating	   and	   constraining	   the	   actions	   and	   processes	   applied	   in	   the	  judiciary.	   Furthermore,	   the	   values	   of	   the	   judiciary	   must	   be	   drawn	   from	   the	  constitutional	  values	  of	  the	  nation.	  	  	  Values:	  	  	  
• invigorate	   leadership	  by	  helping	   to	   (a)	   “sustain	   the	  mobilization	  of	   leaders”	  and	  (b)	  deepen	  the	  empowerment	  of	   followers	   in	  conditions	  of	  competition	  and	  conflict	  	  
• “strengthen	   leaders’	   capacity	   to	   reach	   out	   to	   wider	   publics”	   to	   (a)	   “gain	  support	   for	   still	   broader	   values	   (i.e.	   equality	   of	   opportunity	   as	   well	   as	  condition)”,	   and	   (b)	   “empower	   leaders”	   by	   providing	   a	   “foundation	   for	  governing”	  
• Values	   help	   to	   clarify	   questions	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	   competing	  rights	  and	  perspectives,	  addressing	  issues	  of	  basic	  human	  nature.	  	  	  	  	  
African	  Values	  and	  Leadership	  	  Some	  would	   argue	   that	   for	   the	  most	   part	   the	   leadership	   literature	   is	   very	  US-­‐centric	  and	  may	  have	  little	  relevance	  in	  Africa.193	  	  However,	  others	  would	  argue	  that,	  with	  the	  surge	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  crucial	  role	  of	  leadership	  in	  development,194	  transforming	   leadership,	   and	   essentially	   “good”	   public	   leadership	   is	   sorely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  191 ibid, p.236 192 Bass and Steidlmeier, 'Ethics, Character and Authentic Transformational Leadership Behaviour', 
p.175 193 Ebben van Zyl (ed), Leadership in the African Context (Juta, 2009) 194 See for example, World Bank Leadership for Development (2007) 
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lacking	  and	  is	  much	  needed.	  195	  	  This	  chapter	  attempts	  to	  ground	  the	  discussion	  of	   leadership	   in	   the	   domestic	   values	   of	   each	   country	   in	   the	   study.	   	   The	   cross-­‐cultural	   studies	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   2	   suggest	   that	   the	   transformational	  leadership	  approach	  is	  highly	  valued	  across	  cultures,	  and	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  below,	  it	  also	  resonates	  with	  many	  African	  societal	  values	  too.	  	  	  In	  South	  Africa	  the	  values	  enshrined	  in	  ubuntu	  permeate	  public	  life,	  and	  indeed	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.196	  	  Ubuntu	  is	  a	  difficult	  concept	  to	  define,	  but	  it	  stands	  for	  a	  number	  of	  things,	  and	  is	  founded	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  “a	  person	   can	   only	   be	   a	   person	   through	   others”.	   	   It	   stands	   for	   group	   solidarity,	  compassion,	  respect,	  human	  dignity	  and	  collective	  unity:	  	  	   “….	   ubuntu	   blends	   individual	   rights	   with	   communal	   philanthropy	   and	  philosophy,	   and,	   in	   so	   doing,	   unifies	   the	   many	   provisions	   of	   the	   Bill	   of	  Rights”197	  	  It	  is	  a	  concept	  that,	  while	  perhaps	  not	  strictly	  expressed	  in	  the	  same	  way	  all	  over	  Africa,	  has	  considerable	  resonance	  in	  other	  African	  nations.	  	  	  	  This	   chapter	   explores	   the	   content	   of	   the	   fundamental	   political	   values	   of	   the	  Commonwealth	   in	   the	   domestic	   context	   of	   each	   of	   the	   three	   countries	   in	   this	  study.	  	  “Values”	  are	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  leadership	  process:	  the	  leader	  must	  identify	  and	   articulate	   the	   values	   of	   the	   organization	   and	   engage	   followers	   or	  constituents	   with	   those	   values.	   	   For	   the	   judiciary,	   its	   “core	   values”	   must	   be	  grounded	   in	   the	   constitutional	   values	   of	   the	   legal	   system.	   	   This	   chapter	   is	  therefore	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  values	  that	  inform	  the	  goals	  and	  organization	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195 See for example Erik Masinde Aseka Transformational Leadership in East Africa (2005); 
Lovemore Mbigi and Jenny Maree, kkkUbuntu: The Spirit of African Transformation Management 
(1995) 196 See: Pius Langa “A Reply to Professor Binchy: “Constitutionality, the Rule of Law and Socio-
Economic Development”, paper presented to the Southern African Judges Forum (2009); J.Y. 
Mokgoro “Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa” 1997 197 Pius Langa “A Reply to Professor Binchy, p.7 
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the	  judiciary	  and	  is	  organized	  around	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  “fundamental	  political	  values”	   of	   the	   Commonwealth.	   	   It	   begins	   first,	   with	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	  international	   standards	  of	   judicial	   ethics,	   and	   then	   considers	   the	   constitutional	  order	  of	  each	  country,	  before	  considering	  in	  detail	  the	  values	  of	  democracy,	  the	  rule	   of	   law,	   judicial	   independence	   and	   transparency	   (just	   and	   honest	  government).	  	  	  
3.3	  Ethics	  and	  values	  in	  the	  judiciary	  	  	  The	   focus	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   the	   principles	   and	   values	   that	   inform	   views	   about	  what	   is	  required	  of	  a	   judge	  –	   the	  requisite	  ethical	  standards	  he	  or	  she	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  meeting.	   	  Chapter	  5	  will	  consider	  the	  scope	  of	   the	   leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  However,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  values	  embedded	  in	  a	  Chief	  Justice’s	  vision	  will	  be	  measured	  against	  his	  or	  her	  ability	  to	  interpret	  constitutional	  and	  political	  values	  and	  apply	  them	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  	  	  	  
International	  and	  Regional	  Expectations	  There	   have,	   on	   occasion,	   been	   calls	   for	   a	   global,	   or	   perhaps	   Commonwealth	  organisation	   of	   Chief	   Justices	   to	   be	   established	   so	   that	   they	   may	   collectively	  respond	   to	   threats	   to	   judicial	   independence.	   	   Lord	   Woolf,	   former	   Lord	   Chief	  Justice	   of	   England	   and	  Wales,	   when	   speaking	   at	   the	   13th	   Commonwealth	   Law	  Conference	   in	   Melbourne	   in	   2003,	   expressed	   doubts	   about	   whether	   or	   not	   it	  would	  be	  “practical	  or	  even	  possible”	  to	  create	  such	  an	  organization,	  but	  urged	  colleagues	   to	   continue	   to	   be	   vigilant	   against	   “worrying	   threats	   to	   the	  independence	   of	   the	   judiciary	   in	   some	   jurisdictions.”198	   As	   has	   been	   seen	   in	  Chapter	   One,	   a	   union	   between	   some	   Chief	   Justices	   in	   Africa	   has	   already	   been	  forged—the	  Chief	  Justices	  of	  the	  southern	  African	  region	  came	  together	  in	  2003	  in	  Windhoek,	   in	  Namibia	   and	  with	   the	   support	   of	   the	  Venice	   Commission	   (the	  European	   Commission	   for	   Democracy	   through	   Law),	   formed	   the	   Southern	  African	  Judges’	  Commission.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198 Lord Woolf, The Pursuit of Justice (Oxford University Press, 2008), p.404 
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Chief	   Justices,	   as	   heads	   of	   their	   judiciaries,	   are	   simultaneously	   the	   main	  defenders	   of	   judicial	   independence	   and	   the	   public	   accountable	   face	   of	   the	  judiciary.	  	  A	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  therefore	  uniquely	  placed	  at	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  dilemma	  between	   judicial	   independence	  and	  accountability,	   and	   is	   therefore	  placed	   in	   a	  position	   in	  which	   he	   or	   she	   can,	   perhaps	   should	   and	   inevitably	   does,	   exercise	  leadership	   in	   varying	   forms.	   	   	   Chief	   Justices	   have	   clearly	   already	   exercised	  collective	  leadership	  in	  reform	  efforts	  in	  the	  Commonwealth.	  	  First,	  at	  the	  CMJA	  Edinburgh	   Conference,	   tentative	   steps	   were	   taken	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	  endorsement	  of	  the	  Latimer	  House	  Guidelines	  and	  their	  recommendation	  to	  the	  Heads	  of	  Government:	   the	  Chief	   Justices	   statement	   indicates	   that	  Chief	   Justices	  jointly	   have	   a	   role	   to	   play	   in	   building	   the	   framework	  within	  which	  democratic	  changes	   take	   place.	   	   In	   October	   2001	   that	   statement	   was	   endorsed	   by	   31	  Commonwealth	  Chief	  Justices	  (representing	  just	  over	  half	  of	  all	  Commonwealth	  judiciaries)	   and	  one	  non-­‐Commonwealth	  Chief	   Justice.	   	   Chief	   Justices	   used	   this	  opportunity	  not	  only	  to	  commend	  the	  Guidelines	  to	  the	  Heads	  of	  Government	  but	  also	  to	  point	  to	  the	  issues	  that	  they	  considered	  to	  be	  key:	  judicial	  independence	  and	   the	   need	   for	   adequate	   funding	   ‘which	   when	   approved	   by	   the	   legislature	  should	  be	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Judiciary’	  and	  the	  need	  to	  devise	  an	  effective	  monitoring	  procedure	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Guidelines	  once	  adopted.199	  	  	  	  Now,	  through	  the	  SAJC,	  Southern	  African	  Chief	  Justices	  are	  taking	  a	  more	  formal	  leadership	   role	   in	   building	   a	   solid	   foundation	   for	   the	   development	   of	  constitutional	   jurisprudence	   in	   Africa,	   and	   as	   has	   been	   seen,	   they	   have	  committed	   themselves	   to	   expressing	   and	   using	   their	   professional	   solidarity	   to	  defend	   judges	   against	   improper	   infringements	   by	   executive	   powers,	   even	  beyond	  their	  own	  borders.	  	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  Chief	  Justices	  have	  a	  significant	  part	  to	  play	  in	  moulding	  the	   future	   constitutional	   make	   up	   of	   African	   nations.	   	   Expectations	   of	   Chief	  Justices	   in	   emerging	   Commonwealth	   African	   democracies	   are	   high:	   the	   Pan-­‐African	  Forum,	  for	  example,	  expects	  that	  they	  should	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  addressing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199 ‘Chief Justices’ Statement in Beyond the Horizon: Justice in the 21st Century, Report of the CMJA 
Conference, Edinburgh 2000, at p.111 
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corruption	   in	   judicial	   systems,	   engage	   with	   and	   educate	   the	   public	   about	   the	  courts	  and	  court	  reform,	  communicate	  with	  fellow	  judges	  and	  with	  members	  of	  the	  legal	  profession,	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  develop	  best	  practices	  and	  strategies	  for	   improving	   and	   inevitably	   maintaining	   relations	   with	   the	   other	   arms	   of	  government.	  Not	  only	  are	   they	  expected	   to	  engage	  and	   share	  experiences	  with	  their	   colleagues,	   but	   they	   must	   then	   be	   expected	   to	   put	   what	   they	   learn	   into	  practice.	   This	   trend	   is	   not	   confined	   to	   judiciaries	   in	   Commonwealth	   Africa.	  	  	  Constitutional	   reform	   in	   the	   UK	   under	   which	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   now	   taken	  over	  hundreds	  of	  duties	  from	  the	  former	  Lord	  Chancellor,	  is	  but	  one	  example	  of	  the	  expanding	  role	  of	  Chief	  Justices	  in	  more	  developed	  Commonwealth	  countries.	  	  Chief	   Justices	   in	  modern	  Commonwealth	   judiciaries	   carry	  a	  very	  heavy	  burden	  indeed.	  	  	  	  
Judicial	  Independence	  and	  Judicial	  Conduct	  	  	  The	   Latimer	   House	   Principles	   are	   but	   one	   example	   of	   a	   whole	   host	   of	  international	   declarations200	   and	   inter-­‐governmental	   agreements	   that	   espouse	  the	   virtues	   of	   judicial	   independence	   in	   one	   form	   or	   another.201	   	   However,	   the	  precise	  content	  of	  the	  concept	  is	  unclear.	  	  	  	  
	  Traditionally,	   the	  hallmarks	  of	   judicial	   independence	  are	   security	  of	   tenure	   for	  judges;	   fair,	   independent	   appointments	   processes	   based	   on	   merit;	   fair	   and	  adequate	   remuneration	   for	   judges;	   and	   some	   level	   of	   financial	   and	  administrative	  autonomy	  for	  the	  court	  system.202	   	   Judicial	   independence	  is	  also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200 The UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary agreed by the UN General Assembly 
in 1985 represents the declaration with the most consensus, but several regional instruments exist.   See 
D.P. Cumaraswamy ‘International and Regional Standards for the Protection of Judicial Independence’ 
(1998) 12 Commonwealth Judicial Journal 9-19 for a broad overview.    201 For example, European Convention of Human Rights (1950), Art.6(1); International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966), Art.14; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981), 
Art.7(1) 202 The international and regional standards detail these requirements in a variety of forms, as does the 
literature.  See for example: An Independent Judiciary – Report of the ABA Commission on Separation 
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conventionally	   understood	   as	   two	   ideas:	   institutional	   (or	   collective)	   judicial	  independence,	  and	  individual	  (or	  decisional)	  independence.	  	  But	  again,	  precisely	  what	  these	  concepts	  mean,	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  each	  other	  is	  not	  settled.	  	  	  The	  debate	   about	   the	   meaning	   of	   judicial	   independence	   has	   been	   said	   to	   produce	  ‘more	   heat	   than	   light’203	   and	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   all	   too	   often	   those	   engaged	   in	   the	  conversation	  about	  it	  talk	  past	  one	  another.204	  What	  is	  generally	  accepted	  is	  that	  judicial	  independence	  is	  multi-­‐dimensional,	  and	  is	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end,	  rather	  than	  an	  end	  in	  itself.205	   	   	   	  The	  fact	  of	  it	  being	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end	  inevitably	  raises	  the	  question,	  ‘a	  means	  to	  what	  end?’,	  ‘independent	  of	  whom,	  or	  from	  what?’	  and	  this	  is	  ultimately	  a	  question	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  courts	  and	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  judiciary	  in	  society.	  	  	  The	   literature	  on	   judicial	   independence	   is	  vast,	  and	   the	  project	  of	  developing	  a	  general	   theory	  of	   judicial	   independence	  proceeds,	  with	  caution.206	   	  While	  some	  question	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  judicial	  independence	  in	  its	  entirety,	  207	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of Powers and Judicial Independence (ABA, 1997); P.H. Russell (ed), Judicial Independence in the 
Age of Democracy: Critical Perspectives from Around the World (University Press of Virginia, 2001) 203 S.B. Burbank and B Friedman (eds), Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An interdisciplinary 
approach (SAGE Publications, 2002) at p.4 204 Ibid. 205 For example, S.B. Burbank and B. Friedman, ‘Reconsidering Judicial Independence’ in S.B. 
Burbank and B Friedman (eds), Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An interdisciplinary 
approach (SAGE Publications, 2002); P.H. Russell ‘Toward a General Theory of Judicial 
Independence’ in P.H. Russell and D. O’Brien (eds), Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy: 
Critical Perspectives from Around the World (University Press of Virginia, 2001); K. Malleson, The 
New Judiciary: Effects of expansionism and activism (Ashgate, 1999) 206 P.H. Russell, ‘Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence’ in P.H. Russell (ed), Judicial 
Independence in the Age of Democracy: Critical Perspectives from Around the World (University 
Press of Virginia, 2001) and S.B. Burbank and B. Friedman, ‘Reconsidering Judicial Independence’ in 
S.B. Burbank and B Friedman (eds), Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An interdisciplinary 
approach (SAGE Publications, 2002) 207 L.A. Kornhauser ‘Is Judicial Independence a Useful Concept?’, in S.B. Burbank and B Friedman 
(eds), Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An interdisciplinary approach (SAGE Publications, 
2002), pp.45-55 
	   92	  
whether	  or	  not	  judicial	  independence	  even	  exists,208	  most	  advocate	  that	  at	  least	  some	   measure	   of	   judicial	   independence	   serves	   to	   protect	   the	   independent-­‐mindedness	  of	  judges	  in	  making	  decisions.	  	  Questions	  about	  the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  concept	   flow	   from	   debates	   about	   theories	   of	   adjudication	   and	   the	   design	   of	  effective	   judicial	   systems.209	   	   Questions	   about	   the	   existence	   or	   otherwise	   of	  judicial	   independence	   relate	   to	   concerns	   about	   the	   empirical	   foundations	   of	   a	  very	   broad	   conception	   of	   judicial	   independence,	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘judicial	  independence	   myth’.210	   	   All	   of	   which	   is	   to	   say,	   there	   is	   a	   problem	   with	   the	  conventional	  approach	  to	  judicial	  independence.	  	   	  Constructing	  a	  broad	  concept	  of	   judicial	   independence	   in	   terms	   of	   institutional	   independence	   and	   individual	  independence	   masks	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   key	   issue	   is	   the	   independence	   and	  impartiality	   of	   individual	   judges	   when	   making	   decisions	   in	   individual	   cases.	  	  Institutional	   judicial	   independence	   merely	   articulates	   the	   possible	   safeguards	  that	   can	   or	   should	   be	   incorporated	   into	   a	   system	   to	   protect	   decisional	  independence.	  	  In	   trying	   to	   refine	   the	   concept	   of	   judicial	   independence	   and	   develop	   a	   general	  theory,	  scholars	  have	  used	  several	  frameworks	  for	  understanding	  the	  issues	  and	  problems	  arising	  from	  the	  task	  of	  developing	  and	  maintaining	  necessary	  levels	  of	  judicial	   autonomy.	   It	   is,	   however,	   now	   generally	   agreed	   that	   a	   discussion	   of	  judicial	   independence	   must	   begin	   with	   an	   agreement	   about	   the	   purpose	   of	  judicial	  independence.	  	  	  	  	  	  Russell	   has	   outlined	   a	   framework	   for	   a	   theory	   of	   judicial	   independence	   that	   is	  based	  on	  the	  following	  rationale	  of	  judicial	  independence:	  	  	   ‘We	   want	   judges	   to	   enjoy	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   autonomy	   so	   that,	   when	  disputes	   arise	   about	   our	   legal	   rights	   and	   duties	   to	   one	   another	   and	   in	  relation	   to	   public	   authorities	   and	   these	   disputes	   cannot	   be	   settled	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  208 T. Jennings Paretti, ‘Does Judicial Independence Exist? The lessons of social science research’ in 
Judicial Independence at the Crossroads  209 L.A. Kornhauser, ‘Is Judicial Independence a Useful Concept?’  210 T. Jennings Paretti, ‘Does Judicial Independence Exist? The lessons of social science research’ 
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informally,	  we	  can	  submit	  them	  for	  resolution	  to	  judges	  whose	  autonomy	  or	   independence	   gives	   us	   reason	   to	   believe	   they	  will	   resolve	   the	   issues	  fairly,	  according	  to	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  law,	  and	  not	  out	  of	  fear	  of	  recrimination	  or	  hope	  of	  reward.’211	  	  	  Judicial	   independence	   can	   then	   be	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   ‘two-­‐dimensional	  concept’,	   the	   first	   dimension	   is	   that	   of	   ‘sources	   of	   dependency’,	   being	   both	  ‘external	  and	  internal	  controls	  and	  influence’	  and	  the	  second	  dimension	  is	  that	  of	  the	   ‘targets	   of	   influence	   or	   control’,	   distinguishing	   individual	   judges	   from	   the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole	  when	  making	  their	  decisions.212	  	  Malleson	  refers	  to	  judicial	  independence	  as	  a	  ‘qualified	  principle’	  which	  emphasises	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  the	  impartiality	  of	  judges	  as	  between	  parties	  in	  individual	  cases,	  and	  which:	  	  	   ‘…recognises	   that	   some	   forms	   of	   influence	   are	   acceptable	   and	   even	  desirable.	   	   	   The	   essential	   distinction	   is	   between	   proper	   influence	   and	  improper	   interference.	   	   	   The	   latter	   may	   come	   from	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  different	  sources,	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  to	  the	  judiciary;	  it	  may	  take	  the	  form	  of	  crude	  oppression	  or	  subtle	  cultural	  pressure.	  	  But	  the	  feature	  which	   is	   common	   to	   all	   improper	   interference	   is	   that,	   in	   contrast	   to	  proper	  influences,	  it	  threatens	  party	  impartiality	  in	  individual	  cases.’213	  
	  Accepting	   this	   narrower	   definition	   of	   judicial	   independence	   not	   only	   reflects	  more	   closely	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   environment	   within	   which	   judges	   operate,	   but	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  that	  judicial	  independence	  may	  be	  maintained	  while	  also	  allowing	  the	  introduction	  of	  measures	  of	  judicial	  accountability	  too.214	  	  Confining	  judicial	  independence	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  judges	  must	  exercise	  ‘party	  impartiality’,	  that	   is	   that	   they	   have	   a	   ‘duty	   to	   come	   to	   court	   with	   an	   open	   mind	   as	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  211 P.H. Russell, ‘Toward a General Theory of Judicial independence’, in Judicial Independence in the 
Age of Democracy at p.10 212 Ibid, at p.11 213 K. Malleson, The New Judiciary, at p.74 214 Ibid. 
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strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  different	  parties’	  cases’215	  means	  that	  attempts	  to	   attack	   this	   kind	   of	   impartiality	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   dangerous	   and	   should	   be	  prevented	  while	  also	  emphasizing	   the	  need	   for	   judges	   to	  be	  accountable	   to	   the	  law	  and	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  and	  fairness	  in	  each	  case,	  thus	  demanding	  some	  measure	   of	   accountability	   in	   their	   decision-­‐making.	   This	   also	   allows	   for	   the	  possibility	  that	  safeguards	  of	  judicial	  independence	  might	  vary	  from	  one	  system	  to	  another,	  and	  equally	  that	  accountability	  measures	  might	  vary	  too.216	  Focusing	  on	   a	   narrow	   understanding	   of	   decisional	   independence	   also	   enables	   the	  recognition	   that	  both	   formal	  and	   informal	  arrangements	  might	  have	  an	   impact	  on	   judicial	   independence.217	   	   Further,	   bringing	   the	   distinction	   between	   proper	  and	   improper	   interference	   to	   the	   centre	  of	   the	  debate,	   and	  understanding	   that	  potential	   influences	  may	  be	  both	   internal	   and	   external,	   and	  possibly	   formal	   or	  informal,	   accommodates	   the	   fact	   that	   judges	   might	   also	   be	   motivated	   by	   a	  multiplicity	  of	  complex	  incentives,	  some	  harmful	  and	  others	  not.218	  	  So,	  another	  way	   of	   understanding	   and	   protecting	   the	   requisite	   levels	   of	   judicial	  independence	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  judicial	  motivation:	  	  	   ‘…if	  we	  are	   to	  be	  successful	   in	  designing	   judicial	   systems	   to	  achieve	  our	  instrumental	   goals,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   take	   account	   of	   what	   motivates	  judges	  and	  allow	  for—or	  attempt	  to	  control—those	  motivations.’	  	  Cameron	   suggests	   another	   way	   for	   understanding	   what	   judicial	   independence	  means	  and	  why	  it	  matters.	  	  He	  offers	  a	  ‘power	  analysis’	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  	  Power	   here	   means	   ‘a	   causal	   relationship	   between	   preferences	   and	   outcomes’,	  and	  in	  this	  context	  he	  takes	  it	  to	  mean	  that	  ‘an	  actor	  has	  power	  when	  a	  particular	  outcome	  is	  desired	  and	  causes	  that	  outcome	  to	  transpire.	  	  By	  extension	  an	  actor	  (like	   a	   judge)	  has	   independence	  or	   autonomy	  when	  he	  or	   she	   consistently	  has	  power	   over	   the	   relevant	   outcome.’219	   	   The	   value	   of	   this	   approach	   is	   that	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  215 Ibid, at p.65 216 S.B. Burbank and B. Friedman, ‘Reconsidering Judicial Independence’, at p.22 217 Ibid., at p.20 218 Ibid, at p.22 219 C.M. Cameron ‘Judicial Independence: How can you tell it when you see it?’ at p.135 
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‘separates	  the	  operational	  fact	  of	  independence	  (or	  lack	  thereof)	  from	  structural	  features	   of	   a	   judicial	   system’	   which	   means	   that	   it	   can	   empirically	   establish	  whether	   or	   not	   structural	   features	   of	   a	   system	   and	   possible	   incentives	   or	  constraints	  actually	  affect	  decisions.220	  	  He	  argues	  that	  distinguishing	  between	  a	  definition	  of	  judicial	  independence	  that	  encompasses	  institutional	  independence	  and	  protections	  such	  as	  tenure	  and	  protected	  salaries	  from	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  actual	  influence	   or	   otherwise	   of	   formal	   and	   informal	   incentives	   makes	   judicial	  independence	  more	  meaningful.	   	  A	  brief	  survey	  of	  the	  few	  studies	  on	  this	  point	  suggests	  that	  ‘formal,	  structural	  protections	  are	  neither	  necessary	  nor	  sufficient	  to	  ensure	  judicial	  independence.’221	  	  Acknowledging	  this	  allows	  scholars	  to	  step	  back	  from	  the	  emotive	  ideology	  of	  judicial	  independence	  to	  look	  at	  what	  is	  really	  happening	  and	  how	  it	  is	  really	  related	  to	  rule	  of	  law	  values	  and	  economic	  growth,	  and	  Cameron	  points	  out	  that:	  	  	   ‘…it	   would	   be	   surprising	   if	   there	   were	   no	   relationship	   between	   formal	  protections	  and	  actual	   judicial	   independence	  because	  formal	  protections	  are	   so	   useful	   in	   sustaining	   social	   conventions	   by	   providing	   ‘bright	   line’	  demarcations.	   	   	  From	  one	  perspective	   it	   is	  ultimately	   those	  conventions,	  rather	   than	   the	   formal	   protections	   per	   se,	   that	   are	   the	   foundation	   for	  judicial	   independence.	   	   Unfortunately,	   our	   ability	   to	   investigate	   the	  emergence,	  maintenance,	  and	  breakdown	  of	  social	  conventions	  protecting	  judicial	   independence	   is	   severely	   limited	   by	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	  basic	  social	  mechanisms	  at	  work.’222	  	  There	   are	   studies	   that	   support	   the	   idea	   that	   formal	   structural	   protections	   are	  neither	  necessary	  nor	  sufficient	   to	  ensure	   judicial	   independence,	  and	   there	  are	  also	   studies	   that	   have	   gone	   some	   way	   towards	   making	   connections	   between	  judicial	  independence	  and	  social	  values	  and	  especially	  economic	  growth.223	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  220 C.M. Cameron ‘Judicial Independence: How can you tell it when you see it?’ at p.138 221 Ibid, p.140 222 Ibid, p.140 223 Ibid, p.142-144 
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For	  example,	  in	  a	  series	  of	  cross-­‐country	  studies	  Feld	  and	  Voigt	  have	  developed	  two	   indicators	   of	   judicial	   independence	   and	   used	   these	   to	   demonstrate	   the	  relationship	  between	  judicial	   independence	  and	  economic	  growth.224	   	   	  The	  first	  indicator,	   de	   jure	   independence,	   relates	   to	   formal	   protections	   of	   judicial	  independence:	  ‘based	  on	  legal	  foundations	  as	  found	  in	  legal	  documents’.225	  	  The	  second	  indicator,	  de	  facto	  independence,	  refers	  to	  the	  level	  of	  independence	  that	  the	   courts	   factually	   enjoy,	   measured	   with	   reference	   to	   things	   such	   as	   the	  potential	  of	  groups	  of	  judges	  to	  pressure	  individuals	  to	  fall	  in	  line	  with	  particular	  views	  (using	  the	  number	  of	  judges	  in	  each	  court:	  the	  more	  judges	  there	  are	  the	  more	  likely	  they	  are	  to	  exert	  this	  kind	  of	  cultural	  pressure);	  the	  actual	  longevity	  of	  high	  court	  judges;	  the	  stability	  of	  judicial	  salaries;	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  judicial	  decisions	   are	   enforced—with	   a	   high	   dependency	   on	   action	   from	   other	  government	   actors	   reducing	   the	   realistic	   autonomy	   of	   judges	   in	   enforcing	   the	  law.226	  	  	  	  In	  two	  studies	  covering	  over	  50	  countries,	  they	  found	  that	  judicial	  independence	  matters	   for	   economic	   growth.	   	   In	   fact,	   de	   facto	   judicial	   independence	   has	   a	  ‘robust	  and	  highly	  significant	  impact	  on	  economic	  growth’227	  which	  suggests	  that	  it	   is	  not	  enough	   to	   simply	  write	  protections	  of	   judicial	   independence	   into	   legal	  documents	  and	  constitutions:	  	   ‘It	  is	  necessary	  to	  shape	  JI	  by	  additional	  informal	  procedures	  that	  may	  be	  accompanied	   and	   enforced	   by	   informal	   social	   sanctions.	   	   Issues	   such	   as	  the	  average	  term	  length	  of	  judges,	   its	  deviation	  from	  the	  term	  lengths	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  224 See L.P. Feld and S.P. Voigt, ‘Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: cross-country 
evidence using a new set of indicators’ (2003) 19 European Journal of Political Economy 497 and 
‘Making Judges Independent – Some proposals regarding the Judiciary’ in R. Congleton (ed) 
Democratic Institutional Design and Public Policy – Analysis and Evidence (MIT Press, 2006) 225 L.P. Feld and S.P. Voigt, ‘Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: cross-country evidence 
using a new set of indicators’ (2003) 19 European Journal of Political Economy 497, at p.501 226 Ibid, p.504 227 Feld and Voigt, ‘Making Judges Independent – Some proposals regarding the Judiciary’ in R. 
Congleton (ed) Democratic Institutional Design and Public Policy – Analysis and Evidence (MIT 
Press, 2006) 
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be	   expected	   based	   on	   legal	   documents,	   effective	   removals	   of	   judges	  before	   the	  end	  of	   their	   terms,	   as	  well	   as	  a	   secure	   income	   for	   the	   judges	  appear	   to	   be	   more	   important	   for	   economic	   growth	   than	   de	   jure	  independence.’228	  	  	  	  However,	  	  	   ‘Looking	   at	   the	   components	   of	   de	   jure	   JI,	   the	   specification	   of	   the	  procedures,	   of	   the	   accessibility	   and	   of	   the	   term	   length	   of	   highest	   court	  judges	   in	   the	   constitution	   show	   a	   modestly	   significant	   impact	   on	  economic	  growth,	  while	  a	  wide	  accessibility	  of	  the	  highest	  court	  as	  well	  as	  the	   highest	   court’s	   power	   for	   constitutional	   review	   are	   negatively	  affecting	   economic	   growth.	   	   The	   other	   components	   of	   de	   jure	   JI	   do	   not	  appear	  to	  have	  an	  impact.’229	  	  In	  2000,	   the	  UN	  Office	  on	  Drug	  Control	   and	  Crime	  Prevention	   (UNODCCP)	  and	  Transparency	  International	  convened	  an	  informal	  meeting	  of	  Chief	   Justices	  and	  Senior	   judges	   from	  around	  the	  world	  with	  a	  view	  to	  combining	  their	  skills	  and	  expertise	   to	   develop	   programmes	   for	   “strengthening	   judicial	   integrity	  institutions	   and	   systems”	   as	   part	   of	   the	   UNODCCP’s	   efforts	   to	   “strengthen	  national	  integrity	  systems”	  in	  “participating	  states	  and	  beyond”230	  and	  tackle	  the	  persistent	  problem	  of	  perceptions	  of	   corruption	   in	   judicial	   systems	  around	   the	  world.	  This	  was,	  according	  to	  the	  Chair	  of	  the	  Group,	  “the	  first	  occasion	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  UN	  that	  judges	  were	  invited	  to	  put	  their	  own	  house	  in	  order;	  to	  develop	  a	  concept	  of	  judicial	  accountability	  that	  would	  complement	  the	  principle	  of	   judicial	  independence,	  and	  thereby	  raise	  the	  level	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  228 L.P. Feld and S.P. Voigt, ‘Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: cross-country evidence 
using a new set of indicators’ (2003) 19 European Journal of Political Economy 497, at p.516 229 Feld and Voigt, ‘Making Judges Independent – Some proposals regarding the Judiciary’ in R. 
Congleton (ed) Democratic Institutional Design and Public Policy – Analysis and Evidence (MIT 
Press, 2006) 230 UNODC, 'Report of the First Meeting of the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity' 
(UNODC, Vienna, Austria 2000), para.1 
	   98	  
Rule	  of	  Law.”	  	  This	  was,	  from	  the	  outset,	  a	  project	  that	  was	  intended	  to	  have	  an	  impact,	  and	  it	  did.	  	  	  	  Over	   the	   next	   seven	   years	   the	   Group	   consulted	  widely	  with	   senior	   judges	   and	  experts	   around	   the	  world	   and	  met	   frequently	   to	   develop	   and	   refine	   principles	  relating	   to	   judicial	   integrity	   and	   conduct,	   eventually	   producing	   the	   Bangalore	  Principles	  of	  Judicial	  Conduct.	  	  National	  Judiciaries	  either	  adopted	  the	  Bangalore	  Principles	   in	   full	   or	  modelled	   their	   own	   codes	   of	   judicial	   conduct	   on	   them.	   	   In	  2006	   the	   UN	   Economic	   and	   Social	   Council	   had	   adopted	   a	   resolution	   on	  “Strengthening	   Basic	   Principles	   of	   Judicial	   Conduct”,231	   inviting	  member	   States	  and	  national	  judiciaries	  to	  take	  the	  Bangalore	  Principles	  of	  Judicial	  Conduct	  into	  consideration	   when	   reviewing	   their	   rules	   and	   practices	   in	   relation	   to	   judicial	  conduct	   and	   professional	   standards,	   inviting	   comments	   and	   suggested	  amendments	  and	  requesting	  that	  the	  UNODCCP	  provide	  technical	  assistance	  for	  the	   implementation	   and	   monitoring	   of	   the	   application	   of	   the	   principles	   in	  Member	   States.	   By	   2007	   an	   intergovernmental	   expert	   group	   had	   produced	   a	  commentary	   on	   the	   Principles	   and	   considered	   suggestions	   and	   made	  amendments	  to	  the	  text.	  	  There	  are	  several	  regional	  instruments	  on	  judicial	  independence,	  and	  the	  UN	  too	  adopted	   the	  UN	  Basic	  Principles	  on	   the	   Independence	  of	   the	   Judiciary	   in	  1985.	  	  The	   Bangalore	   Principles	   on	   judicial	   conduct	   address	   issues	   of	   integrity	   and	  accountability	   in	   the	   context	   of	   preserving	   judicial	   independence.	   	   And,	  importantly,	  unlike	  the	  UN	  Basic	  Principles	  on	  the	  Independence	  of	  the	  Judiciary,	  which	   are	   addressed	   to	   UN	   Member	   States,	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   are	  addressed	   to	   national	   judiciaries,	   developed	   by	   judges	   for	   judges.	   	   As	   the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  Principles	  makes	  clear	  they	  are:	  	  	   “…	  intended	  to	  establish	  standards	  for	  ethical	  conduct	  of	  judges.	  They	  are	  designed	   to	   provide	   guidance	   to	   judges	   and	   to	   afford	   the	   judiciary	   a	  framework	   for	   regulating	   judicial	   conduct.	   They	   are	   also	   intended	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  231 Strengthening Basic Principles of Judicial Conduct (ECOSOC 2006/23) 2006 
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assist	  members	  of	  the	  executive	  and	  the	  legislature,	  and	  lawyers	  and	  the	  public	   in	  general,	   to	  better	  understand	  and	  support	   the	   judiciary.	  These	  principles	   presuppose	   that	   judges	   are	   accountable	   for	   their	   conduct	   to	  appropriate	  institutions	  established	  to	  maintain	  judicial	  standards,	  which	  are	   themselves	   independent	   and	   impartial,	   and	   are	   intended	   to	  supplement	   and	  not	   to	  derogate	   from	  existing	   rules	   of	   law	  and	   conduct	  which	  bind	  the	  judge.”	  	  Further,	   there	   is	   an	   acknowledgement	   that	   judges	   need	   to	   ensure	   public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary:	  	  	   “public	  confidence	   in	   the	   judicial	   system	  and	   in	   the	  moral	  authority	  and	  integrity	   of	   the	   judiciary	   is	   of	   the	   utmost	   importance	   in	   a	   modern	  democratic	  society”	  	  There	   is	   a	   presumption	   that	   adequate	   and	   appropriate	   mechanisms	   exist	   to	  address	   issues	   of	   judicial	   accountability	   and	   judicial	   conduct,	   the	   structures,	  procedures	  and	  practices	  of	  which	  will	  inevitably	  vary	  from	  country	  to	  country.	  	  One	  problem	  is	  that	  there	  may	  not	  be	  “appropriate”	  accountability	  mechanisms,	  and	   the	  development	  of	   accountability	  measures	   continues	   to	  be	  a	   contentious	  issue	   in	   many	   countries,	   and	   certainly	   in	   South	   Africa,	   Ghana	   and	   Kenya	   (see	  discussion	   below	   on	   judicial	   accountability	   generally,	   and	   Chapter	   6	   on	  disagreements	  over	  ethics	  and	  training).	  	  	  	  	  In	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles,	   “judicial	   independence”	   is	   distinguished	   from	  “impartiality”.	   	  Value	  1,	  is	  “independence”	  and	  the	  associated	  principle	  is	  stated	  as	  follows:	  	  	   “Judicial	  independence	  is	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  a	  fundamental	  guarantee	  of	  a	  fair	  trial.	  A	  judge	  shall	  therefore	  uphold	  and	  exemplify	  judicial	  independence	  in	  both	  its	  individual	  and	  institutional	  aspects.”	  	  According	  to	  the	  Judicial	  Integrity	  Group,	  judicial	  independence	  includes:	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   “…both	   the	   individual	   and	   the	   institutional	   independence	   required	   for	  decision-­‐making.	  Judicial	  independence	  is,	  therefore,	  both	  a	  state	  of	  mind	  and	   a	   set	   of	   institutional	   and	   operational	   arrangements.	   The	   former	   is	  concerned	  with	  the	  judge’s	  independence	  in	  fact;	  the	  latter	  with	  defining	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  others,	  particularly	  the	  other	  branches	   of	   government,	   so	   as	   to	   assure	   both	   the	   reality	   and	   the	  appearance	  of	  independence.	  The	  relationship	  between	  these	  two	  aspects	  of	  judicial	  independence	  is	  that	  an	  individual	  judge	  may	  possess	  that	  state	  of	  mind,	  but	  if	  the	  court	  over	  which	  he	  or	  she	  presides	  is	  not	  independent	  of	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  government	  in	  what	  is	  essential	  to	  its	  functions,	  the	  judge	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  be	  independent”232	  	  Judicial	   independence	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   responsibility	   rather	   than	   a	   privilege	   of	  judicial	   office,233	   and	   accordingly,	   “A	   judge	   shall	   encourage	   and	   uphold	  safeguards	  for	  the	  discharge	  of	  judicial	  duties	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  and	  enhance	  the	  institutional	  and	  operational	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary.”234	  	  Value	  2	  is	  “impartiality”:	  	  	   “Impartiality	   is	   essential	   to	   the	   proper	   discharge	   of	   the	   judicial	   office.	   It	  applies	   not	   only	   to	   the	   decision	   itself	   but	   also	   to	   the	   process	   by	  which	   the	  decision	  is	  made.”	  	  The	   distinction	   between	   individual	   and	   institutional	   independence	   is	   retained,	  and	   impartiality	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   essential	   in	   both	   the	   decisions	   and	   in	   the	  decision-­‐making	   processes.	   	   	   An	   early	   draft	   of	   the	   Principles	   expressed	   the	  principle	  of	  independence	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  relation	  to	  impartiality:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  232 Judicial Integrity Group, 'Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct' (2007), 
p.35, emphasis added. 233 Ibid. 234 Application of Value 1, para 1.5 
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“An	   independent	   judiciary	   is	   indispensable	   to	   impartial	   justice	  under	   law.	  A	  judge	  should	  therefore	  uphold	  and	  exemplify	  judicial	  independence	  in	  both	  its	  individual	  and	  institutional	  aspects”235	  	  The	  amendment	  was	  made	  in	  2002	  at	  the	  Round	  Table	  meeting	  of	  Chief	  Justices	  in	  which	  Chief	  Justices	  or	  their	  representatives	  reviewed	  the	  draft	  and	  agreed	  on	  changes.	  	  	  There	   are	   six	   core	   values	   elaborated	   in	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   (judicial	  independence,	   impartiality,	   integrity,	   propriety,	   equality	   and	   competence	   and	  diligence).	  And	  as	   concerns	  about	  accountability	  of	   the	   judiciary	   in	  Africa	  have	  grown,	  judiciaries	  have	  been	  under	  pressure	  to	  clearly	  set	  out	  ethical	  standards	  and	  develop	   transparent	  mechanisms	   for	   implementing	   them	  that	   reflect	   these	  values.	   	   In	   Kenya,	   this	   issue	   was	   addressed	   with	   the	   publication	   of	   a	   Code	   of	  Judicial	  Conduct	  1998,	  and	  later	  the	  Public	  Officers	  Ethics	  Act	  2003	  that	  applies	  to	  members	  of	  the	  judiciary	  just	  as	  it	  does	  to	  other	  office	  bearers.	   	  However,	  as	  will	   be	   seen	   in	   Chapter	   6,	   the	   approach	   taken	   by	   the	   Kenyan	   judiciary	   is	   not	  without	   its	   problems	   and	   falls	   short	   of	   the	   standards	   now	   set	   out	   in	   the	  Bangalore	  Principles	  and	  this	  has	  had	  an	  effect	  on	  public	  perceptions	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	   	   Both	   Ghana	   and	   South	   Africa	   have	   now	   adopted	   Judicial	   Codes	   of	  Conduct,	  and	  they	  are	  modelled	  on	  the	  Bangalore	  Principles.	  	  	  
Judicial	  Accountability	  	  As	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  Bangalore	  Principles	  demonstrates,	  the	  issue	  of	  judicial	  accountability	  is	  now	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  debates	  about	  judicial	  conduct	  and	  is	  seen	  as	   an	   essential	   complement	   to	   measures	   protecting	   judicial	   independence.	  	  	  Efforts	  to	  enhance	  judicial	  integrity	  have	  necessarily	  engaged	  with	  the	  question	  of	   how	   to	   hold	   judges	   accountable	   for	   their	   conduct,	   and	   the	   solution	   decided	  upon	  by	   the	   judicial	   integrity	  group	  was	   to	   set	  out	   standards	   that	  were	  widely	  agreed	   upon,	   on	   the	   condition	   (and	   trusting	   that)	   individual	   nations	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  235 Hague Report 2002 
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judiciaries	  would	  create	  appropriate	  mechanisms	  and	   institutions	   to	  apply	  and	  uphold	   these	   standards.	   	   	   Historically,	   however,	   the	   idea	   of	   holding	   judges	   to	  account	  was	   seen	   as	   incompatible	  with	   the	   principle	   of	   judicial	   independence.	  	  This	   was	   because	   accountability	   was	   seen	   as	   a	   “command-­‐and-­‐control”	  relationship,236	   and	   therefore	   involved	   the	   kind	   of	   oversight	   that	   contravened	  judicial	  independence.	  	  However,	  the	  concept	  of	  “accountability”	  is	  not	  that	  clear-­‐cut.	   	   It	   can	  mean	   different	   things	   to	   different	   people	   and	   refers	   to	   a	   range	   of	  issues	   from	   “good	   governance,	   transparency,	   equity,	   democracy,	   efficiency,	  responsiveness	  and	  responsibility	  to	  integrity”.237	  Recognition	  of	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	   concept	   of	   accountability	   now	   means	   that	   it	   is	   no	   longer	   seen	   as	   the	  antithesis	  of	  judicial	  independence	  and	  judges	  are	  now	  expected	  to	  meet	  certain	  standards	  and	  to	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  their	  conduct.	  	  	  	  As	   with	   the	   concept	   of	   judicial	   independence,	   judicial	   accountability	   can	   be	  divided	   into	   the	   individual	   accountability	   of	   judges,	   and	   the	   collective	  accountability	  of	  the	  judiciary	  as	  an	  institution.	  	  Le	  Sueur	  distinguishes	  between	  individual	  and	  collective	  accountability,	  and	  between	  formal	  accountability	  and	  scrutiny	   from	   civil	   society.238	   	   Individual	   accountability	   is	   personal	  accountability	   –	   judges	   may	   be	   individually	   accountable	   for	   their	   personal	  misconduct,	   their	   individual	   reasoned	   judgements	  and	   for	   their	  personal	  views	  on	   the	   law	   as	   expressed	   in	   public	   lectures	   and	   interviews.	   	   Collective	  accountability	  is	  the	  accountability	  of	  the	  institution:	  courts	  are	  accountable	  for	  their	  operations	  and	  might	   therefore	  be	  accountable	  by	  way	  of	  annual	   reports,	  consultations	   relating	   to	   proposed	   rule	   changes,	   hearing	   cases	   in	   public,	  appellate	   structure	   and	   rights	   of	   appeal,	   and	   parliamentary	   debates	   on	   the	  judicial	  function.	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  formal	  accountability	  and	  scrutiny	  by	  civil	   society	   demonstrates	   the	   broad	   ways	   in	   which	   judges	   and	   the	   judiciary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  236 See A Le Sueur, 'Developing Mechanisms for Judicial Accountability in the UK' (2004) 24 Legal 
Studies 73, and Judiciary of England and Wales, The Accountability of the Judiciary, (available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-in-detail/jud-acc-ind/principles-jud-acc) 237 M Bovens, 'Two Concepts of Accountability' (Kettering Symposium on Public Accountability 
2008)  238 Le Sueur, 'Developing Mechanisms for Judicial Accountability in the UK', pp 78-80 
	   103	  
might	   be	   accountable.	   	   Judges	   are	   formally	   accountable	   for	   their	   decisions	  because	   they	   have	   to	   publish	   written	   reasons	   their	   decisions,	   the	   appellate	  process	   and	   rights	   of	   appeal	   is	   another	   means	   of	   formal	   institutional	  accountability,	  as	  is	  the	  publication	  of	  annual	  reports,	  which	  many	  judiciaries	  are	  now	  doing.	  	  The	  judicial	  appointments	  process	  also	  represents	  a	  means	  of	  formal	  accountability.	   	   But	   the	   courts	   are	   also	   subject	   to	   scrutiny	   by	   the	   media,	  academics	   and	   in	   the	   context	   of	   debate	   and	  education	   in	   the	  Bar	   and	   the	   legal	  profession.239	  	  	  	  	  In	  these	  distinctions	  Le	  Sueur	  identifies	  what	  Bovens	  describes	  as	  the	  concept	  of	  accountability	   as	   a	   “social	   relation	   or	   mechanism”,	   which	   is	   essentially	   a	  “passive”	  concept	  that	  involves	  an	  “obligation	  to	  account	  and	  justify”.240	  	  	  Bovens	  also	   conceives	   of	   accountability	   as	   a	   “personal	   or	   organizational	   virtue”.	  Accountability	   is	   therefore	   also	   a	   normative	   concept	   –	   a	   	   “desirable	   quality	   of	  public	  officials	  and	  public	  organizations”.	   	  Accountability	  as	  a	  virtue	  connotes	  a	  desire	  to	  see	  public	  officials	  being	  actively	  responsible	  –	  a	  willingness	  to	  act	  in	  a	  transparent,	  fair	  and	  equitable	  way.241	  	  	  	  Bogdanor	  conceives	  of	  accountability	   in	  terms	  of	  “sacrificial”	  and	  “explanatory”	  accountability.242	  	  	  The	  “sacrificial”	  sense	  of	  accountability	  refers	  to	  the	  principle	  that	  ministers	  must	  take	  the	  blame	  for	  things	  that	  go	  wrong	  in	  their	  department	  and	  resign	  when	  that	  is	  warranted.	  	  Judicial	  independence,	  however,	  means	  that	  judges	  cannot	  be	  accountable	  to	  Parliament	  for	  their	  decisions	  –	  they	  cannot	  be	  accountable	   to	  other	  bodies	   in	   this	   “sacrificial”	   sense.	   	   Judges	  can,	  however,	  be	  accountable	   in	  what	  Bogdanor	   terms	   the	   “explanatory”	  sense	  of	  accountability:	  judicial	   independence	   does	   not	   preclude	   the	   possibility	   of	   senior	   judges	  appearing	   before	   parliament	   to	   answer	   questions	   on	   the	   “machinery	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  239 Ibid. 240 Bovens, 'Two Concepts of Accountability'   241 Ibid.  242 V Bogdanor, 'Accountability and the Media: Parliament and the Judiciary: The Problem of 
Accountability' (UK Public Administration Consortium 2006)  
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government	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  judiciary”.	  	  They	  cannot,	  of	  course	  be	  expected	  to	  comment	  on	  individual	  cases.243	  	  	  	  Individual	   accountability	   of	   judges	   can	   also	   be	   in	   the	   form	   of	   internal	  accountability	   to	  more	  senior	   judges	  or	  courts	  by	  way	  of	   the	  appellate	  process	  and	   measures	   for	   dealing	   with	   complaints	   about	   conduct.	   	   Judges	   cannot	   be	  personally	  externally	  accountable	   to	   the	  executive	  or	  parliament,	  except	  where	  their	   behaviour	   constitutes	   misconduct.	   	   So,	   while	   judges	   cannot	   be	   asked	   to	  resign	   for	   bad	   decisions,	   and	   in	   that	  way	   are	   not	   accountable	   in	   the	   sacrificial	  sense,	  they	  can	  be	  removed	  from	  office	  for	  incapacity	  or	  misconduct	  and,	  as	  the	  note	   on	   the	   judicial	   accountability	   published	   by	   the	   Judiciary	   of	   England	   and	  Wales	  explains:	  “It	  is	  generally	  accepted	  that,	  save	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Act	  of	  Settlement	  1701,	   judges	   cannot	  be	  held	   accountable	   either	   to	  Parliament	  or	   to	  the	   executive	   in	   the	   sacrificial	   sense	   and	   that	   they	   cannot	   be	   externally	  accountable	   for	   their	   decisions”.	   	   Where	   judges	   are	   found	   to	   be	   either	  incapacitated	  or	   guilty	  of	  misconduct	   they	   can	  be	   accountable	   in	   the	   sacrificial	  sense,	  and	  this	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  difficult	  issues	  in	  countries	  where	  corruption	  is	  a	  major	  problem.	  	  	  	  Striking	   the	   balance	   between	   sufficient	   internal	   accountability	   and	   the	  thresholds	  for	  the	  external	  accountability	  of	  individual	  judges	  is	  a	  major	  problem	  for	  countries	  in	  which	  corruption	  in	  the	  judiciary	  is	  a	  real	  issue.	  	  Politicians	  and	  the	  public	  want	  to	  see	  corrupt	  judges	  held	  to	  account,	  but	  the	  methods	  employed	  to	   do	   this	   can	   appear	   heavy-­‐handed	   and	   can	   be	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   principle	   of	  judicial	   independence.244	   	   	   If	   judicial	   accountability	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   virtue,	   a	  normative	  concept,	  it	  becomes	  important	  to	  imbue	  the	  judicial	  organization	  with	  this	   virtue	   –	   this	   is	   something	   that	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   as	   leader	   would	   do,	   and	  could	   do	   through	   his	   or	   her	   behaviour	   and	   the	   processes	   employed	   to	   ensure	  that	   judges	   embrace	   this	   institutional	   virtue.	   	   Accountability	   as	   a	   mechanism	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  243 Ibid.  244 See Chapter 6 for more detail on the problems of ensuring that standards of judicial conduct are 
met.  
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through	  which	  judges	  can	  be	  held	  accountable	  in	  the	  sacrificial	  sense	  becomes	  a	  secondary,	   last	   resort,	   in	   relation	   to	   issues	   of	   conduct,	   thereby	   insulating	  individual	   judges	   and	   the	   judiciary	   from	   the	   threat	   of	   external	   investigations.	  	  But	  where	  trust	  in	  the	  judiciary	  is	  very	  low,	  the	  threshold	  for	  triggering	  external	  accountability	  measures	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   fairly	   low	   too	   and	   this	   undermines	   the	  integrity	  of	  the	  institution.	  	  In	  contrast,	  where	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  seen	  as	  exercising	  effective	   leadership	   in	   addressing	   issues	   of	   judicial	   conduct,	   other	   bodies	   will	  have	   less	   reason	   to	   intervene	   and	   demand	   very	   public	   forms	   of	   sacrificial	  accountability.245	  	  
Democracy,	  transformation	  and	  the	  judiciary	  	  	  “Constitutionalism”,	   “good	   governance”	   and	   “rule	   of	   law”	   are	   all	   buzzwords	   on	  the	  global	  political	  scene,	  and	  they	  have	  a	  particular	  relevance	  in	  Africa,	  which	  as	  a	   continent	   has	   been	   under	   pressure	   for	   decades	   to	   “consolidate	   governance	  institutions”	   and	   “build	   the	   capable	   state”.246	   	   And,	   whether	   for	   pragmatic	   or	  ideological	  reasons,	  African	  leaders	  are	  now	  increasingly	  committing	  themselves	  and	   their	   governments,	   at	   the	   international	   level	   at	   least,	   to	   developing	   and	  maintaining	   democratic	   institutions	   and	   practicing	   “good	   governance”.	   	   The	  effectiveness	   of	   these	   commitments	   remains	   open	   to	   question,	   but	   the	   tone	   of	  inter-­‐governmental	  rhetoric	  is	  clear:	  on	  paper	  at	  least,	  African	  leaders	  pledge	  to	  embark	  on	  the	  journey	  of	  “democratisation.”247	  	  	  And	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  ownership	  of	  constitutions,	  the	  need	  for	  citizen	  participation	  in	  constitution	  making,	  is	  very	  keenly	   felt	   in	   Africa	   so	   it	   is	   important	   that	   the	   new	   constitutions	   (which	  represent	  a	  break	  away	   from	  old	   colonial	   influences),	   and	   the	  new	   institutions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  245 See Chapter 6 for an account of the process of “radical surgery” in the judiciary of Kenya meant 
that just under 100 judges and magistrates were “sacrificed” (investigated or forced to retire) for the 
purposes of purging the judiciary of corruption.  It is not clear that this exercise achieved much in the 
way of “cleaning up” the judiciary.  246 Economic Commission for Africa, "Governance for a Progressing Africa" (Economic Commission 
for Africa Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 2005).  Clarify these concepts: see e.g. AfriMAP: consolidation 
means a balance between demand and supply of democracy.  247 R.K. Edozie, Reconstructing the Third Wave of Democracy (2009) 
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they	   have	   created,	   are	   seen	   to	   be	   legitimate.	   	   As	   noted	   in	   Chapter	   One,	   the	  Commonwealth	  has	  now	  made	  it	  a	  criterion	  of	  membership	  that	  new	  members	  accept	   and	   comply	   with	   Commonwealth	   fundamental	   values,	   principles,	   and	  priorities	   as	   set	   out	   in	   the	   1971	  Declaration	   of	   Commonwealth	   Principles	   and	  developed	   in	   subsequent	   Declarations.248	   The	   very	  meaning	   of	   “democracy”	   is	  being	  questioned	  in	  Africa	  as	  constitutionalism	  finds	  its	   feet.249	  Modern	  African	  constitutions	   potentially	   offer	   a	   means	   of	   generating	   a	   culture	   of	   democracy	  imbued	   with	   the	   values	   and	   traditions	   of	   African	   societies,	   and	   this	   idea	   of	   a	  culture	  of	  democracy	  in	  Africa	  is	  strongly	  encouraged	  by	  the	  African	  Union.	  The	  much-­‐maligned	  African	  Union	  (formerly	  the	  Organization	  of	  African	  Unity	  which	  was	  once	  known	  as	  the	  “Dictator’s	  Club”)250	  has	  made	  moves	  towards	  generating	  a	  unified	  approach	  to	  democracy	  in	  Africa.251	  	  The	  African	  Charter	  on	  Democracy,	  Elections,	   and	   Governance,	   adopted	   in	   2007	   and	   to	   date	   signed	   by	   37	   of	   the	  African	   Union’s	   53	   member	   states,	   commits	   its	   members	   to	   the	   project	   of	  promoting	   democracy,	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   human	   rights.252	   	   This	   involves	   an	  undertaking	   by	   States	   to	   “develop	   the	   necessary	   legislative	   and	   policy	  frameworks	   to	   establish	   and	   strengthen	   a	   culture	   of	   democracy	   and	   peace”253	  and	   “to	   establish	   public	   institutions	   that	   promote	   and	   support	   democracy	   and	  the	   constitutional	   order.”254	   	   Failure	   to	   implement	   these	   standards	   carries	   the	  threat	  of	  sanctions	  for	  “illegal”	  and	  “unconstitutional”	  changes	  in	  government.255	  The	  existence	  of	  sanctions	  is	  a	  major	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  historical	  tendency	  of	  AU	  members	  not	  to	  interfere	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  their	  fellow	  member	  states.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  248 Commonwealth Secretariat, 'CHOGM Report of the Committee on Memership of the 
Commonwealth'  249 See for example: Okon Akiba (ed), Constitutionalism in Africa (2004); J-G Gros (ed), 
Democratization in Late Twentieth-century Africa: coping with uncertainty (1998) 250 See, for example, Paul Reynolds “African Union Replaces Dictators’ Club”, BBC News Online, 
July 8, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2115736.stm  251 For a discussion of the various views of the African Union and its turn around, see for example 
Reconstructing the Third Wave of Democracy (2009) 252 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007), art.4 253 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007), art.11 254 AU Charter, art.15 255 AU Charter, art.23 
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   “The	   principle	   of	   separation	   of	   powers	   is	   now	   entrenched	   in	   the	  constitutions	   of	   almost	   all	   African	   countries.	   	   The	   reforms	   in	   recent	  decades	  have	  created	  a	  more	  propitious	  environment	  for	  democracy	  and	  good	  governance.	  	  The	  once-­‐dominant	  civilian	  and	  authoritarian	  regimes	  –	  as	   in	  Ghana,	  Liberia,	  Nigeria	  and	  Lesotho	  –	  were	  obliged	  to	  embrace	  a	  multi-­‐party	   system.	   Single-­‐party	   systems	   –	   such	   as	   those	   in	   Angola,	  Cameroon,	   Republic	   of	   Congo,	   Djibouti,	   Ethiopia,	   Cote	   D’Ivoire,	   Kenya,	  Malawi,	   Mozambique,	   Mali,	   Seychelles,	   Swaziland,	   Sierra	   Leone	   and	  Zambia	   –	   have	   also	   embarked	   on	   multi-­‐party	   systems	   and	  decentralization.”256	  
	  
3.4	   Implementation	   of	   the	   “Fundamental	   Commonwealth	   Values”	  
through	  law	  
	  
Political	  values	  acquire	  new	  meanings	  	  	  The	   first	   decade	   of	   the	   twenty-­‐first	   century	   in	   Africa	   has	   been	   marked	   by	   a	  combination	   of	   hope	   and	   despair,	   anguish	   and	   delight.	   	   Across	   the	   continent	  newly	  elected	  governments,	  ushered	  in	  by	  populations	  hungry	  for	  change,	  have	  faced	  high	  expectations	  and	  fierce	  criticisms	  as	  emboldened	  citizens	  seek	  greater	  transparency,	   integrity	   and	   accountability	   from	   their	   leaders.	   The	   old	   guard	   of	  post-­‐independence	  leaders,	  cloistered	  by	  a	  loyal	  elite	  are	  losing	  their	  grip	  on	  the	  imaginations	  of	  citizens	  as	  “democracy”,	  “constitutionalism”	  and	  “rights”	  acquire	  new	  meanings	  for	  ordinary	  Africans	  through	  the	  new	  constitutions	  that	  several	  African	   countries	   adopted	   in	   the	   mid-­‐	   to	   late-­‐1990s.	   	   The	   might	   of	   these	  constitutions	   is	   now	   being	   tested	   as	   elections	   come	   and	   go,	   and	   leaders,	   now	  constrained	  by	  term	  limits	  in	  many	  cases,	  come	  and	  go	  too.	  	  But	  the	  transition	  to	  “democracy”	   in	   Africa	   is	   not	   an	   easy	   one,	   marred	   as	   it	   is,	   by	   fierce	   rhetorical	  resistance,	  and	  dangerous	  conflict.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  256 African Governance Report II, p.122 
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Any	   inter-­‐governmental	   declaration	   or	   set	   of	   standards	   must,	   of	   course,	   be	  sensitive	   not	   to	   impinge	   on	   the	   sovereignty	   and	   national	   identity	   of	   each	  Commonwealth	   nation,	   and	   therefore,	   the	   fundamental	   political	   values	   are	  couched	  in	  terms	  of	  “democracy	  and	  democratic	  processes	  which	  reflect	  national	  
circumstances”.	  Both	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  judicial	  independence	  are	  described	  as	  “political	   values”,	   and	   the	   extent	   and	   way	   in	   which	   these	   political	   values	   are	  reflected	  in	  applicable	  laws	  varies	  between	  countries.	  	  The	  “fundamental	  political	  values	   of	   the	   Commonwealth”	   are	   “democracy,	   democratic	   processes	   and	  institutions	   which	   reflect	   national	   circumstances,	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   the	  independence	   of	   the	   judiciary”	   and	   “just	   and	   honest	   government”.257	   In	   the	  Commonwealth,	   implementation	  of	  mutually	  agreed	  general	  principles	  at	  state-­‐level	  has	  tended	  to	  be	  a	  problem.	  	  However,	  the	  Latimer	  House	  Principles	  are	  the	  product	  of	  a	  long	  and	  inclusive	  process	  in	  which	  political	  rhetoric,	  and	  increasing	  political	   will,	   coincided	   with	   a	   long-­‐standing	   profession-­‐lead	   campaign	   to	  convert	   state-­‐level	   conjecture	   into	   tangible	   change.258	   	   This	   gives	   them	  considerable	  weight	  as	  a	  set	  of	  guidelines	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  and	  a	  set	  of	  goals	  to	  achieve.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  directive	  principles	  of	  state	  policy	  in	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Ghana	  declare	  that:	  “…the	  Government	  of	  Ghana	  shall…	  adhere	  to	  the	  principles	  enshrined	   in	   or	   as	   the	   case	   may	   be,	   the	   aims	   and	   ideals	   of…	   (iii)	   the	  Commonwealth.”259	  	  So,	  in	  Ghana	  the	  Government	  has	  a	  constitutional	  obligation	  to	  its	  people	  to	  uphold	  the	  values	  of	  the	  Commonwealth.	  	  	  	  The	   rule	   of	   law	   of	   is	   a	   fundamental	   principle	   of	   any	   democratic	   state,	   judicial	  independence	   is	   crucial	   in	   a	   society	   governed	   by	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   and	   a	  democratic	   society	   is	   founded	   on	   the	   principles	   of	   political	   accountability—government	   officials	   and	   elected	   representatives	   being	   answerable	   to	   citizens.	  This	   is	   a	   relatively	   uncontested	   statement,	   but	   there	   is	   very	   little	   agreement	  about	   what	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   is,	   or	   what	   judicial	   independence	   is	   or	   means	   in	  practice.	   	   	   Yet	   these	   two	   concepts	   are	   prioritised	   in	   democratic	   reform	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  257 Harare Commonwealth Declaration, para.9 258 Hatchard and Slinn, Parliamentary supremacy and judicial independence: a Commonwealth 
approach  259 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art.40(d) 
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programmes	  around	  the	  world.	  Democratisation	  is	  a	  global	  priority,	  with	  judges	  increasingly	  taking	  centre	  stage	  not	  only	  as	  targets	  of	  reform,	  but	  in	  some	  cases	  as	   motivators	   of	   reform.	   	   	   Added	   to	   this,	   the	   global	   emphasis	   on	   building	  democracy	   has	   meant	   that	   there	   is	   a	   new	   awareness	   that	   whatever	   judicial	  independence	  means,	   it	   has	   often	   in	   the	   past	   served	   to	   shield	   judges	   from	   the	  levels	   of	   accountability	   that	   would	   be	   required	   of	   the	   other	   branches	   of	  government.	   	   The	   central	   role	   of	   the	   courts	   in	   providing	   an	   avenue	   for	  government	  accountability	  through	  review	  of	  government	  action,	   in	  developing	  and	  maintaining	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence,	  and	  the	  increasing	  power	  of	  judges	  in	   this	   context,	   has	   lead	   to	   the	   realisation	   that	   judicial	   isolation	   is	   no	   longer	  sustainable	  in	  a	  truly	  democratic	  system.	   	  Further,	   in	  countries	  where	  it	   is	  now	  clear	  that	  governments	  and	  judiciaries	  suffer	  from	  endemic	  corruption,	  there	  is	  an	   urgent	   need	   to	   build	   accountability	   mechanisms	   into	   political	   and	   court	  systems	   whilst	   developing	   and	   maintaining	   the	   necessary	   levels	   of	   judicial	  independence.	  	  	  	  Each	   of	   the	   three	   countries	   in	   this	   study	   is	   currently	   in	   the	   throes	   of	   major	  national	   debates	   about	   constitutional	   reform	   and	   nation	   building.	   	   	   Effecting	  durable	   change	   that	   is	   grounded	   in	   widely	   held	   positive	   values	   seems	   to	   be	  particularly	   problematic	   in	   Africa.	   	   Governments	   come	   and	   go,	   each	   new	   one	  lamenting	   the	   failures	  of	   their	  predecessor	   and	  promising	   “better”	   change	   that	  really	  reflects	  the	  needs	  of	  society.	  	  	  With	  constitutionalism	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  at	  the	   forefront	   of	   much	   of	   the	   debate	   about	   change	   in	   these	   countries,	   the	  judiciaries	  have	  been	  thrown	  into	  the	  limelight.	  	  In	  South	  Africa,	  the	  government	  has	  been	  committed	  to	  a	  programme	  of	   judicial	  reform	  for	  years,	  yet	   it	  has	  not	  always	   been	   successful,	   with	   bills	   and	   proposals	   being	   criticized	   for	   failing	   to	  adequately	   live	   up	   to	   the	   standards	   of	   judicial	   independence	   enshrined	   in	   the	  constitution.	  	  This	  means	  that	  there	  has	  been	  considerable	  national	  debate	  about	  South	   African	   society’s	   expectations	   of	   the	   courts,	   and	   of	   government	   in	   their	  dealings	  with	  the	  courts.	  	  In	  Ghana,	  the	  nation	  remembers	  its	  past	  authoritarian	  rulers	   and	   violent	   history	   and	   hopes	   to	   build	   institutions	   to	   protect	   it	   from	  anything	  similar	  in	  the	  future,	  and	  citizens	  (or	  civil	  society	  speaking	  for	  citizens)	  take	  a	  keen	  interest	   in	  national	  reconciliation	  and	  seeing	  that	  the	  rule	  of	   law	  is	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embodied	  in	  the	  policies	  of	  governments.	   	  In	  the	  2008	  elections	  the	  question	  of	  how	   the	   courts	   should	   function	  was	  bound	  up	   in	  debates	   about	  what	   any	  new	  government	  should	  be	  doing	  and	  can	  do	  for	  the	  country.	  	  	  In	  Kenya,	  where	  efforts	  to	   reform	   the	   constitution	   in	   its	   entirety	  have	   consistently	   failed,	   and	   endemic	  corruption	  in	  politics,	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  the	  judiciary	  has	  called	  into	  question	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  courts	  and	  generated	  a	  culture	  of	  deep	  mistrust	  of	  legal	  processes,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  to	  do	  about	  the	  courts	  is	  central	  and	  painful.	  	  The	  likely	  success,	  or	  failure,	  of	  current	  government	  efforts	  to	  introduce	  reform	  and	  reconciliation	   legislation	   are	   intrinsically	   linked	   to	   national	   perceptions	   about	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  courts	  to	  effectively	  intervene	  to	  prevent	  the	  abuse	  of	  power	  by	  public	   officials,	   and	   the	   tone	   of	   present	   reforms	   suggests	   a	   worrying	   sense	   of	  government	  disdain	  for	  the	  future	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  courts.	  	  	  
The	  courts	  have	  a	  role	  in	  legitimising	  elections	  The	  old	  regimes	   in	  Africa	  are	   tumbling	  and	  the	  participatory	  election	  (whether	  completely	   democratic	   or	   not)	   is	   becoming	   the	   norm.	   	   But	   incumbent	   leaders	  leave	   reluctantly,	   and	   entrenched	   corruption	   and	   patronage	   in	   many	   African	  countries	  means	  that	  suspicions	  (and	  often	  the	  realities)	  of	  vote	  rigging	  are	  rife.	  	  Where	  there	  is	  mistrust	   in	  the	  electoral	  process,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  procedure	  for	  verifying	   its	   validity	   or	   otherwise.	   	   With	   international	   election	   monitors	  observing	  most	  African	  elections	  now,	  there	  are	  clear	  guidelines	  on	  the	  qualities	  of	   a	   “democratic”	   election,	   and	   these	   include	   processes	   and	   procedures	   for	  complaints	  and	  challenges	  to	  the	  results.	  	  International	  standards	  require	  a	  legal	  framework	  to	  govern	  possible	  disputes,	  and	  this	  is	  where	  perceptions	  about	  the	  courts	   are	   crucial.	   	   Following	   the	   disastrous	   2007	   elections	   in	   Kenya,	   a	   deep-­‐rooted	   lack	   of	   trust	   in	   the	   legal	   system	   and	   in	   the	   courts	   contributed	   to	   the	  ensuing	   chaos	   once	   the	   results	  were	   announced.	   	   Legal	   challenges	   to	   elections	  are	  notoriously	  difficult,	  and	  where	   the	  courts	  are	  considered	   inept	  or	  corrupt,	  they	   are	   even	  more	   difficult.	   	   A	   blogging	  Kenyan	   lawyer	   gives	   a	   flavour	   of	   the	  mood	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  courts	  in	  determining	  election	  disputes	  in	  Kenya:	  	  	   “For	  a	  legal	  practitioner	  like	  me	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  for	  me	  to	  understand	  the	  frustration	  and	  contempt,	  Hon	  Raila	  and	  the	  ODM	  have	  for	  the	  judiciary.	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The	   Constitution	   contemplates	   that	   all	   electoral	   disputes	   regarding	   the	  Presidential	   and	   Parliamentary	   elections	   will	   be	   resolved	   through	   the	  courts.	  But	  such	  a	  process	  is	  not	  only	  legal	  but	  also	  political	  and	  even	  the	  judges	   who	   are	   supposed	   to	   apply	   the	   law	   without	   fear	   or	   favor,	   are	  political	   animals	   judging	   real	   cases	   in	   a	   political	   context.	   If	   past	  experience	   is	   anything	   to	   go	   by,	   Presidential	   Elections	   petitions	   are	   the	  mirror	   through	  which	  our	   experience	   is	   judged.	   Election	  petitions	   are	   a	  political	  contest	  and	  anyone	  who	  ignores	  this	  is	  a	  fool.”260	  	  And	   Kenya	   has	   become	   a	   warning	   to	   other	   African	   nations	   embarking	   on	  democratic	  elections.	  The	  2008	  elections	   in	  Ghana,	   for	  example,	  were	  hailed	  as	  having	  been	  “conducted in an open, transparent and competitive environment”.261	  	  In	  preparation	   for	   the	   election,	   the	   judiciary	   published	   a	   manual	   on	   election	  petitions	   and	   ensured	   that	   two	   High	   Court	   judges	   from	   each	   region	   were	  available	  solely	  to	  hear	  election	  petitions.	  	  	  
Court	  reform	  as	  a	  political	  issue	  Furthermore,	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   courts	   has	   become	   a	   political	   issue,	   with	  candidates	   claiming	   that	   their	   approach	   to	   reform	   of,	   or	   organisation	   of	   the	  courts	  will	  be	  the	  best.	   	   In	  2007-­‐2008	  elections	  were	  held	   in	  each	  country,	  and	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  judiciary	  was	  very	  strongly	  felt.	  	  In	  South	  Africa,	  for	  example,	  “Amongst	   the	   new	   elite	   there	   is	   talk	   of	   an	   epochal	   moment	   in	   South	   Africa	  politics	  with	  the	  acronym	  PP	  –	  Post	  Polokwane”	  –	  this	  refers	  to	  the	  ANC	  National	  Conference	   in	   December	   2007	   when	   the	   ANC	   adopted	   a	   resolution	   on	   “The	  Transformation	   of	   the	   Judiciary”	   which	   led	  many	   to	   voice	   concerns	   about	   the	  ANC’s	  desire	  to	  “control	  and	  direct	  centres	  of	  power”.	  The	  problem	  goes	  back	  to	  a	  set	  of	  “Judiciary	  Bills”	  that	  were	  the	  subject	  of	  contentious	  debate	  between	  the	  executive,	   parliament	   and	   the	   judiciary	   in	   2005.	   	   The	   Ministry	   of	   Justice	   and	  Constitutional	  Development	   announced	   in	   2005	   that	   it	  would	  push	   though	   the	  Constitution	   14th	   Amendment	   Bill	   and	   the	   Superior	   Courts	   Bill	   2005,	   which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  260 http://kenyanjurist.blogspot.com/2008/01/random-thoughts-on-election-petitions.html 261 EU Report on Ghana Elections 2009 
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together	   are	   “fundamentally	   concerned	   with	   control	   of	   the	   judiciary	   and	  tethering	   it.”262	   There	   was	   an	   outcry	   and	   the	   Bills	   were	   shelved.	   The	   ANC	  resolution	  at	  Polokwane	  made	  it	  clear	  that,	  in	  the	  name	  of	  transformation	  of	  the	  judiciary,	   the	   government	   intended	   to	   “dust	   them	  off	   an	  put	   them	  back	  on	   the	  table”,263	  despite	  the	  strenuous	  objections	  that	  had	  been	  raised	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  impact	  they	  would	  have	  on	  judicial	  independence	  (see	  Chapter	  6	  for	  more	  on	  the	  Superior	  Courts	  Bill).	  	  	  	  In	  Ghana,	  questions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  and	  of	  judicial	  independence	  and	   accountability	   were	   much	   discussed	   in	   pre-­‐election	   debates.	   The	   Chief	  Justice	   in	   Ghana	   maintains	   a	   high	   profile	   and	   is	   well	   liked	   by	   the	   majority	   of	  Ghanaians.	   	  She	   is	  often	  travelling	  around	  the	  country	  raising	  the	  profile	  of	   the	  judiciary	   and	   encouraging	   the	   use	   of	   the	   courts.	   	   With	   the	   integration	   of	  customary	   laws	   and	   practices	   into	   mainstream	   courts	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	  judiciary	  is	  a	  key	  question	  in	  Ghanaian	  politics.	  	  And	   the	   experience	   in	   Kenya,	   again	   providing	   an	   example	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  continent	  of	  “what	  not	  to	  do”,	  shows	  the	  potential	  significance	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	   elections.	   	   Across	  Africa,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   responsible	   for	   swearing	   in	   the	  new	  President	   once	   election	   results	   have	   been	   confirmed.	   	   In	  Kenya,	   the	   Chief	  Justice	   was	   severely	   criticised	   for	   being	   too	   quick	   to	   accept	   the	   results	   and	  swearing	  President	  Kibaki	  into	  office.	  	  Some	  have	  argued	  that	  he	  had	  a	  duty	  to	  be	  sure	  that	  the	  results	  were	  correct	  before	  swearing-­‐in	  the	  President,	  and	  that	  he	  failed	   to	   do	   this.264	   	   Kenya	   has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   international	   scrutiny	   and	  control	  by	  donors	   for	  decades.	   	  Demonstrable	  reform	  is	  required	   if	  aid	   is	   to	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  262 B Spilg, 'Judicial Independence - impending constitutional crisis?' (Conference in the Justice Bills, 
Judicial Independence and the Restructuring of the Courts 2006) in General Council of the Bar of 
South Africa, "Conference on the Justice Bills, Judicial Independence and the Restructuring of the 
Courts" (Johannesburg 2006) 263 C Lewis, 'The Troubled State of South Africa's Judiciary - Address to the South African Institute of 
Race Relations' (2008)  264 See, for example: “Kenya’s Tin Man” blog entry on 
http://kenyanemergency.wordpress.com/category/how-the-election-was-stolen/  
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delivered.	  	  	  This	  has	  placed	  a	  huge	  pressure	  on	  the	  government	  to	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  changing.	   	   The	   urgency	   driving	   reform	   has	   meant	   that	   reform	   attempts	   have	  been	  superficial	  and	  unsustainable.	  	  	  Further,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  general	  attitude	  of	  Kenyans:	  they	  are	  now	  more	  identifiable	  as	  an	  electorate,	  a	  collective	  group	  of	  people	  who	  have	  some	  control	  over	  who	  governs	  them.	  	  This	  shift	  has	  had	   consequences	   for	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   reform,	   and	   has	   shifted	   control	   of	  constitutional	  principles	  from	  the	  government	  of	  the	  day	  to	  the	  individuals	  it	   is	  trying	   to	   remove	   in	   the	   name	   of	   reform.	   	   The	   constitution	   can	   no	   longer	   be	  simply	   changed	   –	   it	   has	   to	   be	   completely	   reviewed	   and	   reformed	   if	   it	   is	   to	   be	  altered.	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  new	  awareness	  of	  the	  potential	  significance	  of	  the	  constitution	  means	  that	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  risk	  to	  use	  constitutional	  arguments	  to	  challenge	  government	  activity	  or	  court	  decisions.	   	  This	  has	   led	  to	  a	  situation	   in	  which	   powerful	   individuals,	   who	   can	   afford	   the	   time	   and	   expense	   of	   a	  constitutional	  challenge,	  are	  using	   the	  constitution,	   the	  bill	  of	   rights	  and	  public	  law	  to	  prevent	  challenges	  to	  their	  past	  activities	  and	  to	  prevent	  change.	  	  The	  fact	  that	   the	  High	  Court	   also	   serves	   as	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   on	   an	   ad	   hoc	   basis	  means	  that	  this	  process	  can	  be	  further	  abused.	  	  When	  a	  constitutional	  reference	  is	  made,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  selects	  three	  High	  Court	  judges	  to	  hear	  the	  case	  as	  the	  constitutional	  court.	  	  There	  is	  now	  a	  general	  consensus	  of	  opinion	  that	  bringing	  a	  constitutional	  challenge	   is	  good	  because	  (a)	   it	  delays	   litigation	  and	  (b)	  you	  can	  choose	   your	   judges.	   	   	   For	   example,	   in	   2003	   two	   lawyers	   and	   two	   judges	   (in	  separate	  cases)	  challenged	  the	  constitutional	  review	  process	  	  (and	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Review	  Committee	  personally)	  using	  judicial	  review	  on	  the	  basis	   that	   they	   would	   be	   adversely	   affected	   by	   the	   proposed	   judicial	   reforms.	  	  	  Astonishingly,	   these	   arguments	   were	   heard,	   and	   accepted,	   so	   that	   the	  constitutional	   review	  process	  was	   stayed	   for	   a	   significant	  period	  of	   time.	  Now,	  judges	  who	  are	  being	  investigated	  by	  disciplinary	  tribunals	  are	  using	  the	  courts	  and	   judicial	   review	   to	   challenge	   the	   tribunals.	   	   	   It	   is	   not	   only	   judges	   who	   are	  experiencing	   the	   utility	   of	   rights	   arguments	   and	   judicial	   review;	   it	   is	   powerful	  former	   politicians	   too.	   	   For	   example,	   former	   Vice	   President,	   George	   Saitoti,	  staved	   off	   prosecution	   for	   his	   part	   in	   the	   infamous	   Goldenberg	   corruption	  scandal	   by	   successfully	   challenging	   the	  decision,	   and	   the	  way	   in	  which	  he	  was	  informed	  of	  the	  decision.	  The	  prosecution	  was	  dropped	  and	  he	  continued	  to	  play	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a	  major	  part	  in	  the	  political	  life	  of	  the	  country.	  	  	  	  
New	  Constitutional	  Orders	  	  In	   South	   Africa	   and	   Ghana	   these	   values	   are	   clearly	   part	   of	   the	   national	  constitutional	  order.	  	  In	  South	  Africa	  “supremacy	  of	  the	  Constitution	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law”	  are	  listed	  as	  “founding	  values”	  of	  the	  democratic	  state	  of	  South	  Africa.265	  	  In	  Ghana,	  the	  constitution	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  shaped	  to	  meet	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  rule	  of	   law,	   Directive	   Principles	   of	   State	   Policy	   contained	   in	   Chapter	   6	   guide	   all	  institutions,	   and	   judicial	   independence	   is	   protected.266	   In	   Kenya,	   however,	   the	  underlying	  values	  of	  the	  1963	  constitution	  are	  less	  clear.267	  	  Judicial	  power	  is	  not	  expressly	   vested	   in	   the	   Judiciary	   and	   a	   history	   of	   repeated	   amendments	   over	  decades,	   lead	   by	   executive	   dominance	   in	   Parliament,	   suggests	   that	   neither	   the	  government	  nor	  politicians	  in	  general	  consider	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  constitution	  to	  be	  very	  valuable.	  	  	  	  Like	   most	   Commonwealth	   countries,	   South	   Africa,	   Ghana	   and	   Kenya	   all	   have	  written	   constitutions.	   	   But	   the	   content	   of,	   history	   and	   background	   to	   each	  constitution,	   and	   the	   constitutional	   and	   jurisprudential	   infrastructure	   each	  constitution	  creates,	  are	  all	  slightly	  different.	  Each	  of	  these	  three	  countries	  has	  a	  recognisable,	  but	  to	  some	  extent	  changing,	  constitutional	  order.268	  	  	  The	   Final	   Constitution	   of	   South	   Africa	   was	   borne	   out	   of	   the	   struggle	   to	   end	  apartheid	   and	   reflects	   the	   country’s	   strong	   desire	   never	   to	   return	   to	   the	   way	  things	   were.	   	   The	   approach	   to	   constitutionalism	   and	   constitutional	   reform	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  265 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s1.(c) 266 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, Chapter 11 267 In 2010 Kenya adopted a new Constitution.  Many of the provisions have not yet come into force. 268 M Tushnet, A New Constitutional Order (Princeton University Press, 2003): “By constitutional 
order (or regime), I mean a reasonably stable set of institutions through which a nation’s fundamental 
decisions are made over a sustained period, and the principles that guide those decisions. These 
institutions and principles provide the structure within which ordinary political contention occurs, 
which is why I call them constitutional rather than merely political”, p.1 
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South	   Africa	   was	   bold	   and	   groundbreaking,	   but	   of	   course,	   not	   without	  considerable	   difficulty.	   	   And	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   involved	  highly	  charged,	  intensely	  political	  negotiations.269	  	  However,	  once	  it	  was	  created	  and	  recognised	  as	  a	   legal	   institution	  (as	  opposed	  to	  a	  political	  one270),	   the	  new	  Constitutional	   Court	   took	   on	   an	   active	   part	   in	   finalising	   the	   text	   of	   the	   new	  constitution.	   	   Through	   the	   certification	   judgement,	   which	   in	   itself	   was	  unprecedented,	  the	  new	  court	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  “measure	  each	  and	  every	  provision	   of	   the	   new	   constitution,	   viewed	   both	   singly	   and	   in	   conjunction	  with	  one	   another,	   against	   the	   stated	  Constitutional	   Principles”,	   and	   thereby	   actively	  engage	   in	   the	  constitution-­‐making	  process.	   	  However,	  South	  Africa’s	  history,	   in	  which	  law,	  the	  courts	  and	  judges	  were	  seen	  as	  symbols	  and	  tools	  of	  power	  and	  oppression,271	   means	   that	   the	   Constitutional	   Court,	   and	   the	   court	   system	  generally,	  has	  to	  work	  hard	  to	  earn	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  a	  diverse	  and	  often	  divided	  population.	  	  A	  study	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  South	  African	  Constitutional	  Court	  2003	  concluded:	  	   “First,	   courts	   are	   not	   always	   born	   with	   an	   endowment	   of	   legitimacy.	  Especially	   where	   legal	   institutions	   have	   been	   at	   the	   center	   of	   political	  struggles,	   as	   they	  were	   in	   South	  Africa,	   newly	   created	   courts	  must	   earn	  the	  respect	  and	  trust	  of	  their	  constituents.	  Second,	  when	  a	  society	  is	  riven	  by	   cleavages,	   even	   disagreements	   over	   the	   desirability	   of	   democratic	  institutions	   and	   processes,	   achieving	   broad-­‐based	   legitimacy	   may	   be	  difficult	   indeed.	   For	   many	   ordinary	   people,	   courts	   are	   the	   least	  “democratic”	  institutions,	  the	  most	  difficult	  to	  understand	  and	  grasp.	  That	  people	  would	   differ	   over	   extending	   legitimacy	   to	   largely	   unaccountable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  269 R Spitz and M Chaskalson, The politics of transition : a hidden history of South Africa's negotiated 
settlement (Hart Pub., Oxford 2000) 270 JL Gibson and GA Caldeira, 'Defenders of Democracy? Legitimacy, Popular Acceptance, and the 
South African Constitutional Court' 65 The Journal of Politics 1 271 See, for example, the work of John Dugard, and a more recent examination of the role of judges in 
society by his daughter, Jackie Dugard: J Dugard, 'Judging the Judges: Towards an Appropriate Role 
for the Judiciary in South Africa’s Transformation' (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 965 
	   116	  
judicial	   institutions	   seems	   inevitable,	   especially	   in	   deeply	   divided	  polities.”272	  	  The	  government	  of	  South	  Africa	  is	  “constituted	  as	  national,	  provincial	  and	  local	  spheres	   of	   government	   which	   are	   distinctive,	   interdependent	   and	  interrelated”.273	   Furthermore,	   “all	   spheres	   of	   government	  must	   adhere”	   to	   the	  principles	   contained	   in	  Chapter	  3	  on	  Co-­‐operative	   government.274	   	   So	   in	   South	  Africa,	  the	  notion	  of	  co-­‐operative	  government	  is	  one	  of	  the	  founding	  principles	  of	  public	   administration.	   	   	   Chapter	   3	   of	   the	   South	   African	   Constitution	   envisages	  that	   where	   relations	   between	   organs	   of	   state	   break	   down	   they	   will	   attempt	  settlement	  of	  their	  dispute	  amicably,	  but	  ultimately	  they	  do	  have	  recourse	  to	  the	  courts.275	   	   It	   is	  clear	  that	  the	  South	  African	  constitution	  established	  a	  system	  of	  the	   separation	   of	   powers	   between	   the	   executive,	   legislature	   and	   the	   judiciary,	  but	  also	  a	  system	  of	  checks	  and	  balances.	  	  And	  it	  has	  been	  accepted	  in	  the	  highest	  court	   that	   (a)	   there	  must	   be	   a	   strict	   separation	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	  other	  branches,	  but	   (b)	   there	  need	  not	  be	  such	  a	  strict	  separation	  between	  the	  executive	   and	   the	   legislature,	   especially	   at	   the	  ministerial	   level,	   provided	   that	  there	   are	   sufficient	   checks	   and	   balances.276	   	   But	   the	   spirit	   of	   cooperation	  nevertheless	  permeates	  the	  constitution	  and	  the	  constitutional	  principles	  of	  the	  nation.	  	  And	  the	  constitution	  is	  founded	  on	  the	  34	  constitutional	  principles	  listed	  in	   the	   Interim	   Constitution,	   and	   elucidated	   in	   the	   Certification	   Judgement	   of	  1996.277	  	  	  	  Ghana’s	   Fourth	   Republican	   Constitution	   of	   1992	   represents	   a	   concerted	   break	  away	   from	   a	   chequered	   history	   of	   violent,	   authoritarian	   regimes	   and	   military	  
coup	   d’etat.	   The	   Fourth	   Republican	   Constitution	   established	   a	   presidential	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  272 Gibson and Caldeira, 'Defenders of Democracy? Legitimacy, Popular Acceptance, and the South 
African Constitutional Court', at pp 23-24 273 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s.40(1) 274 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s.40(2) 275 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, ss 41(3) and (4) 276 Certification Judgment, paras 107-113, and para.123 277 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 CCT 23/96   
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system	  of	  government	  with	  a	  clearly	  articulated	  separation	  of	  powers,	  and	  paved	  the	  way	   for	   a	   reconstruction	  of	   the	   constitutional	   norms	  of	   the	   country278	   and	  Ghana’s	  slow,	  and	  sometimes,	  volatile	  progression	  towards	  democracy.279	   	  This	  transition	  has	  included	  three	  elections	  marred	  by	  allegations	  of	  vote	  rigging	  and	  violence;	   however,	   the	   most	   recent	   elections	   of	   2008	   were	   widely	   hailed	   as	  model	  elections	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  Africa	  as	  they	  were	  found	  to	  have	  been	  “conducted	  in	  an	  open,	  transparent	  and	  competitive	  environment.”280	  	  	  	  The	   first	   democratic	   election	   (meaning	   here	   that	   the	   President	   was	   elected	  rather	  than	  installed	  in	  office)	  was	  in	  1993,	  when	  Jerry	  Rawlings,	  former	  military	  ruler,	  won	  an	  uncontested	  election.	  	  He	  was	  re-­‐elected	  again	  for	  a	  second	  term	  in	  1997,	  until	   the	  hotly	   contested	  election	  of	  2001,	   in	  which	   the	  opposition	  party	  gained	  power	  and	   John	  Kufuor	  became	  President.	  One	  commentator	  notes	   that	  the	  parliamentary	  and	  presidential	  elections	  of	  2001	  “turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  straight	  contest	  between	  the	  continuity	  policy	  of	  the	  NDC	  and	  the	  positive	  change	  policy	  of	  the	  NPP.”281	   	   This	   “positive	   change	   policy”	   reflects	   less	   a	   radical	   change	   in	   the	  democratic	  movement	  in	  Ghana	  and	  more	  a	  change	  in	  political	  power	  -­‐	  the	  end	  of	  an	  era	  for	  Rawlings-­‐lead	  politics,	  first	  through	  the	  Provisional	  National	  Defence	  Council	   (PNDC)	   and	   then,	   from	   1993,	   the	   National	   Democratic	   Congress.	   	   The	  New	  Patriotic	  Party	  (NPP)	  took	  over	  in	  2001,	  for	  (in	  Ghanaian	  political	  history)	  a	  relatively	   brief	   stint,	   before	   being	   ousted	   by	   the	   NDC	   once	   more	   in	   the	   2008	  elections	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Professor	  Atta	  Mills,	  Ghana’s	  current	  President.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  278 See: EK Quashigah, 'The Constitution as Evolved by the Jurisprudence of the Courts of Ghana' in 
HJAN Mensa-Bonsu and others (eds), Ghana Law Since Independence: History, Developments and 
Prospects (Black Mask Ltd, Accra 2007) At p.123 279 While Ghana has had three “democratic” elections since 1993, these have often been marred by 
allegations of vote-rigging with periods of unrest and violence as results were anticipated.  280 European Union, 'Ghana-Final Report: Presidental and Parliamentary Elections 2008' (February 
2009) 281 SY Bimpong-Buta, The Role of the Supreme Court in the Development of the Constitutional Law in 
Ghana (Advanced Legal Publications, Accra 2007) At p.25. 
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Supremacy	  of	  the	  Constitution	  	  In	   South	   Africa,	   “supremacy	   of	   the	   constitution”	   and	   “rule	   of	   law”	   are	  foundational	  values	  of	  the	  constitution.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  specifically	  the	  principle	  of	  legality,	  has	  a	  justiciable	  status.282	  	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Ghana	  is	  directly	  enforceable	  by	  individuals.	  	  Under	  art.2(1)	  “a	  person”	  may	  seek	  a	  declaration	  from	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  that	  “an	  enactment	  or	  anything	   contained	   in	   or	   done,	   under	   the	   authority	   of	   that	   or	   any	   other	  enactment”	  or	  “any	  act	  or	  omission	  of	  any	  person”	  is	  “inconsistent	  with,	  or	  is	  in	  contravention	  of	  a	  provision	  of”	  the	  Constitution.	  	  The	  question	  of	  who,	  or	  what	  kind	  of	  entity,	  qualifies	  as	  “a	  person”	  was	  dealt	  with	  fairly	  early	  on	  in	  the	  life	  of	  the	   constitution.	   	   All	   classes	   of	   “legal	   persons”	   including	   individuals	   and	  corporate	   bodies,	   may	   seek	   a	   declaration	   under	   art.2(1).283	   	   This	   has	   led	   to	   a	  series	   of	   cases	   in	   which	   individuals	   or	   groups	   have	   directly	   challenged	   the	  actions	  of	  state	  actors,	  including	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  	  	  The	   Constitution	   ostensibly	   provides	   an	   environment	   in	   which	   the	   citizens	   of	  Ghana	  engage	  with	  their	  constitution,	  their	  rights,	  and	  the	  State.	  	  Justice	  in	  Ghana	  “emanates	   from	   the	   people	   and	   shall	   be	   administered	   in	   the	   name	   of	   the	  Republic	  by	  the	  Judiciary”.284	   	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Ghana	  contains,	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  provisions	   on	   the	  Directive	  Principles	   of	   State	  policy,	   and	   this	   ties	   in	   precisely	  with	   issues	   of	   transformation.	   	   They	   are	   not	   a	   new	   feature	   of	   Ghanaian	  constitutions,	  having	  been	  first	   introduced	  in	  1979.	   	  The	  Directive	  Principles	  of	  State	  Policy	  are	  intended	  to	  	  	   “…	  guide	  all	  citizens,	  Parliament,	  the	  President,	  the	  Judiciary,	  the	  Council	  of	   State,	   the	   Cabinet,	   political	   parties	   and	   other	   bodies	   and	   persons	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  282 FI Michelman, 'The Rule of Law, Legality and the Supremacy of the Constitution'Constitutional 
Law of South Africa (2008) 283 New Patriotic Party v A-G (CIBA case) [1996-1997] SCGLR 729.  See also discussion in Bimpong-
Buta, The Role of the Supreme Court in the Development of the Constitutional Law in Ghana , p.484 ff. 284 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, art.125(1) 
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applying	  or	  interpreting	  this	  Constitution	  or	  any	  other	  law	  and	  in	  taking	  and	  implementing	  any	  policy	  decisions,	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  just	  and	  free	  society.”285	  	  	  	  In	   accordance	   with	   the	   Chapter	   6	   provisions	   of	   the	   Constitution	   “the	   State”	  undertakes	  to	  adequately	  provide	  for	  the	  people	  of	  Ghana	  and	  ensure	  a	  just	  and	  free	  society	  that	  recognises	  human	  dignity	  and	  abhors	  corruption	  and	  the	  abuse	  of	  power.	  These	  provisions	  are	  set	  out	  as	  a	  “guide”	  to	  all	  Ghanaians,	  although	  the	  State	  obligations	  are	  referred	  in	  terms	  of	  things	  that	  the	  State	  “shall”	  do.	  	  While	  this	  suggests	  a	  measure	  of	  certainty,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  long-­‐running	  debate	  about	  whether	   or	   not	   these	   principles	   are	   justiciable,286	   which	   now	   appears	   to	   have	  been	  resolved	  by	  the	  courts	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  limited	  form	  of	  justiciability.287	  	  This	  is	  considered	   to	   be	   a	   “revolutionary	   stance”	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	  departing	  from	  the	  traditional	  view	  that	  Directive	  Principles	  of	  State	  Policy	  were	  merely	  guidelines	  and	  therefore	  non-­‐justiciable.288	  	  	  As	  in	  previous	  constitutions	  of	   Ghana,	   the	  Directive	   Principles	   of	   State	   Policy	  were	   envisaged	   as	   guidelines	  which:	   “should	   not	   of	   and	   by	   themselves	   be	   legally	   enforceable	   by	   any	   Court”.	  	  However	   the	   courts	   were	   to	   “have	   regard”	   to	   them	   “in	   interpreting	   any	   laws	  based	  on	  them.”289	  These	  eight	  detailed	  sections	  of	  the	  Constitution	  are	  now	  seen	  as	   an	   “integral	   part	   of	   the	   Constitution”.290	   	   Whereas	   in	   the	   past	   provisions	  containing	   the	   Directive	   Principles	   of	   State	   Policy	   had,	   as	   a	   whole,	   been	  considered	  to	  be	  non-­‐justiciable	  in	  its	  entirety,	  following	  the	  case	  of	  NPP	  v	  A-­G291	  this	   changed.	   	   According	   to	   Justice	   Adade,	   this	   view	   was	   not	   “convincingly	  substantiated	  anywhere”.292	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  further	  refined	  their	  position	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  285 Ibid., s.34(1) 286 See K Quashigah, 'The Evolution of the Constitution of Ghana: The Jusrisprudence of the Courts' in 
UoG Faculty of Law (ed) Ghana Law Since Independence: History, Development and Prospects 
(Black Mask, Ltd, Accra 2007), p.133 287 NPP v Attorney General (31st December Case) [1993-94] 2 G.L.R. 35, per Adade JSC 288 Quashigah, 'The Evolution of the Constitution of Ghana: The Jusrisprudence of the Courts', p.132 289 Committee of Experts Report 1992, referred to in Ibid. 290 Ibid., p.132 291 NPP v A-G [1993-1994] 2 GLR 35  35 292 Ibid., at 66 
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the	   case	   of	   NPP	   v	   Attorney-­General	   (CIBA	   Case),	   moving	   more	   topwards	   the	  original	   position	   stated	   in	   the	   Constitution	   Committee’s	   Report.	   	   Directive	  Principles	  of	  State	  Policy	  are	  now	  justiciable	  “when	  they	  are	  read	  together	  or	  in	  conjunction	  with	  other	  enforceable	  parts	  of	  the	  Constitution”.293	  	  Otherwise,	  they	  “constitute	  a	  sort	  of	  barometer	  by	  which	  people	  can	  measure	  the	  performance	  of	  their	  government.”294	  	  	  	  More	   recently	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   has	   been	   more	   explicit	   about	   how	   these	  principles	   should	   be	   applied	   by	   the	   courts.	   Following	   the	   case	   of	  Ghana	   Lotto	  
Operators	   v	   National	   Lottery	   (2009),	   Chapter	   6,	   which	   to	   a	   large	   extent	  articulates	  socio-­‐economic	  rights	  and	  State	  obligations	  relating	   to	   them,	   is	  now	  to	   be	   interpreted	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   rebuttable	   presumption	   of	   justiciablity.295	   	   The	  interpretation	   of	   article	   34,	  which	   articulates	   the	   status	   and	   application	   of	   the	  Chapter	   as	   a	   whole:	   “should	   take	   into	   account”	   the	   “purpose	   of	   achieving	   an	  expansion	  of	  the	  range	  of	  enforceable	  human	  rights	  in	  Ghana.”296	  	  	  	   “A	  presumption	  of	  justiciability	  in	  respect	  of	  Ch	  6	  of	  the	  Constitution	  would	  strengthen	   the	   legal	   status	   of	   ESC	   human	   rights	   in	   the	   Ghanaian	  jurisdiction.	  Of	  course,	   there	  may	  be	  particular	  provisions	   in	  Ch	  6	   that	  do	  not	  lend	  themselves	  to	  enforcement	  by	  a	  court.	   	  The	  very	  nature	  of	  such	  a	  particular	   provision	   would	   rebut	   the	   presumption	   of	   justiciability	   in	  relation	  to	  it.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  demonstration	  that	  a	  particular	  provision	  does	  not	  lend	  itself	  to	  enforcement	  by	  courts,	  however,	  the	  enforcement	  by	  this	  court	  of	   the	  obligations	   imposed	   in	  Ch	  6	  should	  be	   insisted	  upon	  and	  would	  be	  a	  way	  of	  deepening	  our	  democracy	  and	  the	  liberty	  under	  law	  that	  it	  entails	  ...”297	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  293 NPP v Attorney-General (CIBA Case) [1996-1997] SCGLR 729   294 Ibid., at 745 295 Ghana Lotto Operators v National Lottery [2009] 3 LRC   296 Ibid., per Date-Bah JSC 297 Ibid.  
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“However,	   it	   should	   be	   recognised	   that	   the	   enforceability	   of	   economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  rights	  need	  not	  be	  implemented	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  political	   and	   civil	   rights	   embodied	   in	   Ch	   5.	   	   This	   court	   will	   need	   to	   be	  flexible	  and	  imaginative	  in	  determining	  how	  the	  provisions	  of	  Ch	  6	  are	  to	  be	  enforceable.”298	  	  This	  means	   that	   there	   is	  a	  general	  unifying	  national	  philosophy,	  a	  set	  of	  values	  intended	   to	   bind	   the	   Ghanaian	   society	   and	   inform	   the	   policies,	   legislation	   and	  practices	  of	  the	  government	  and	  all	  State	  actors.	   	  This	  means	  that	  the	  judiciary,	  as	  a	  public	  service	  is	  also	  bound	  by	  these	  provisions,	  and,	  for	  example,	  has	  a	  duty	  to	   “promote	   just	   and	   reasonable	   access	   by	   all	   citizens	   to	   public	   facilities	   and	  services	   in	   accordance	   with	   law”299;	   “actively	   promote	   the	   integration	   of	   the	  peoples	   of	  Ghana	   and	  prohibit	   discrimination	   and	  prejudice	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	  place	  of	  origin,	  circumstances	  of	  birth,	  ethnic	  origin,	  gender	  or	  religion,	  creed	  or	  other	   beliefs”,300	   and,	   an	   issue	   which	   may	   affect	   judicial	   appointments,	   “take	  appropriate	   measures	   to…achieve	   reasonable	   regional	   and	   gender	   balance	   in	  recruitment	  and	  appointment	  to	  public	  offices”.301	  	  
Applicability	   of	   the	   Constitution	   and	   possible	   limits	   on	   administrative	   decision-­‐
making	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  	  In	  the	  South	  African	  Constitution,	  the	  founding	  values	  of	  the	  Constitution	  set	  out	  in	   s.1	   guide	   the	   application	   of	   the	   Constitution	   as	   a	  whole.	   	   The	   Bill	   of	   Rights,	  which	   includes	  the	  right	  to	   just	  administrative	  action	  (s.33),	  applies	  to	  “all	   law,	  and	   binds	   the	   legislature,	   the	   executive,	   the	   judiciary	   and	   all	   organs	   of	   state.”	  (s.8(1)).	   	   In	   President	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	   South	   Africa	   v	   South	   African	   Rugby	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  298 Ibid.  299 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana , art.35(3) 300 Ibid., art.35(5) 301 Ibid., art.35(6)(b). Cf. Constitution of South Africa, s.196, “Basic principles and values governing 
public administration”  
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Football	   Union	   (SARFU	   3),302	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   set	   out	   the	   test	   for	  “administrative	  action”:	  	   “…the	   test	   for	   determining	   whether	   conduct	   constitutes	   ‘administrative	  action’	  is	  not	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  action	  concerned	  is	  performed	  by	  a	  member	   of	   the	   executive	   arm	   of	   government.	  What	  matters	   is	   not	   so	  much	   the	   functionary	   as	   the	   function.	   The	   question	   is	  whether	   the	   task	  itself	  is	  administrative	  or	  not.	  It	  may	  well	  be,	  as	  contemplated	  in	  Fedsure,	  that	   some	   acts	   of	   a	   legislature	   may	   constitute	   ‘administrative	   action’.	  Similarly,	  judicial	  officers	  may,	  from	  time	  to	  time,	  carry	  out	  administrative	  tasks.	  The	   focus	  of	   the	  enquiry	  as	   to	  whether	   conduct	   is	   ‘administrative	  action’	   is	   not	   on	   the	   arm	   of	   government	   to	   which	   the	   relevant	   actor	  belongs,	  but	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  power	  he	  or	  she	  is	  exercising.”	  	  Interestingly,	   however,	   certain	   exclusions	   apply	  under	  PAJA.	   Chapter	  10	  of	   the	  South	  African	  Constitution,	  relating	  to	  Public	  Administration,	  applies	  to:	  	  	   “(a)	  administration	  in	  every	  sphere	  of	  government;	  (b)	  organs	  of	  state;	  and	  (c)	  public	  enterprises.”303	  	  However,	   it	   does	   contain	   specific	   exclusions.	   In	   relation	   to	   the	   judiciary,	   PAJA	  excludes	   the	   “judicial	   functions	   of	   a	   judicial	   officer”	   decisions	   by	   the	   Judicial	  Service	   Commission	   regarding	   the	   nomination,	   selection	   or	   appointment	   of	  Judges.304	  
	  Throughout	   Ghana’s	   history	   the	   curbing	   of	   public	   power	   has	   been	   a	   major	  problem.	   	  The	  Fourth	  Republic	  Constitution	  aims	  to	  direct	  the	  courts	  in	  judicial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  302 [1999] ZACC 11; 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC); 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) at para.141. 303	  Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (CCT 59/2004) 
[2005] ZACC 14; 2006 (8) BCLR 872 (CC); 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) (30 September 2005) for 
discussion of the application of PAJA.  304 Promotion of Administration of Justice Act, NO.3 of 2000, ss 1(ee) and 1(gg) 
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review	  of	  administrative	  action	  by	  articulating	  limits	  on	  discretionary	  power	  in	  Article	  296:	  	  	   “Where	   in	   this	   Constitution	   or	   in	   any	   other	   law	   discretionary	   power	   is	  vested	  in	  any	  person	  or	  authority	  -­‐	  (a)	  that	  discretionary	  power	  shall	  be	  deemed	  to	  imply	  a	  duty	  to	  be	  fair	  and	  candid;	  (b)	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  discretionary	  power	  shall	  not	  be	  arbitrary,	  capricious	  or	  biased	  whether	  by	  resentment,	  prejudice	  or	  personal	  dislike	  and	  shall	  be	  in	  accordance	  with	  due	  process	  of	  law;	  and	  (c)	  where	   the	  person	  or	  authority	   is	  not	  a	   judge	  or	  other	   judicial	  officer,	   there	   shall	   be	   published	   by	   constitutional	   instrument	   or	  statutory	   instrument,	   regulations	   that	   are	   not	   inconsistent	   with	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Constitution	  or	  that	  other	  law	  to	  govern	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  discretionary	  power.”	  	  In	   South	   Africa,	   the	   emphasis	   in	   FC	   s.33	   and	   PAJA,	   is	   on	   lawfulness,	  reasonableness	   and	   procedural	   fairness.	   	   Discretion	   is	   to	   some	   extent	  constrained	  by	  a	  duty	  to	  give	  reasons	  (FC	  s.33(2)).	  	  In	  Ghana,	  the	  emphasis	  is	  on	  fairness	  and	  a	  duty	  to	  be	  “candid”,	  and	  on	  the	  need	  for	  discretion	  to	  be	  exercised	  lawfully	  and	  with	  integrity	  (i.e.	  not	  arbitrary,	  or	  capricious	  etc.).305	  	  Furthermore,	  non-­‐judicial	   discretion	   is	   constrained	   by	   the	   requirement	   that	   regulations	   are	  published	  to	  establish	  how	  any	  discretion	  will	  be	  exercised.	  This	  is	  an	  interesting	  point	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  The	  provision	  states	  that	  “where	  the	  person	  or	  authority	   is	  not	   a	   judge	  or	   judicial	  officer”,	   regulations	  are	   to	  be	  published	  outlining	   the	   exercise	  of	   their	  discretion.	  Unlike	   South	  Africa,	  where	  the	   application	   of	   the	   provisions	   on	   just	   administrative	   action	   is	   to	   be	  determined	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  “nature	  of	  the	  power	  being	  exercised”306,	  under	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  305 See KB Mensah, 'Legal Control of Discretionary Powers in Ghana: Lessons from English 
Administrative Law Theory' (1998) 14 Afrika Focus 119 306 See Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (CCT 59/2004) 
[2005] ZACC 14; 2006 (8) BCLR 872 (CC); 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) (30 September 2005). Although, 
note that exclusions do apply. 
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the	   Constitution	   of	   Ghana,	   the	   distinction	   is	   made	   with	   reference	   to	   the	  functionary	  (judge/judicial	  officer	  versus	  non-­‐judge/judicial	  officer),	  rather	  than	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  power.	  	  This	  could	  have	  consequences	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Chief	   Justices	   exercises	   her	   powers,	   and	   could	   explain	  why	   in	   a	   system	  which	  appears	  to	  uphold	  the	  value	  of	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  (c.f.	  the	  directive	  principles	   of	   state	   policy),	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   not	   obliged	   to	   give	   reasons	   for	  decisions	  which	   can	   adversely	   affect	   judges	   (see	   discussion	   below	  of	   the	   Chief	  Justice’s	  power	  to	  move	  judges	  to	  new	  locations	  and	  courts,	   frequently	  without	  giving	  reasons).	  	  	  	  However,	   the	  directive	  principles	  of	  state	  policy	  would	  nevertheless	  apply,	  and	  would	  potentially	  constrain	  the	  discretionary	  actions	  and	  decisions	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	   by	   requiring	   that	   he	   or	   she	   act	   in	   accordance	  with	   those	   provisions.307	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   provisions	   of	   Chapter	   5,	   on	   Fundamental	   Human	   Rights	   and	  Freedoms,	  must	   be	   upheld	   by	   “the	   Executive,	   Legislature	   and	   Judiciary	   and	   all	  other	  organs	  of	  government	  and	  its	  agencies	  and,	  where	  applicable	  to	  them,	  by	  all	  natural	  and	  legal	  persons	  in	  Ghana,	  and	  shall	  be	  enforceable	  by	  the	  Courts	  as	  provided	  for	  in	  this	  Constitution.”308	  	  	  A	  further	  constraint	  on	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  provided	   in	   art.191	   of	   the	   Constitution.	   	   In	   Ghana,	   the	   judiciary	   is	   a	   “Public	  Service”	  and	  as	  such,	   it	   is	  regulated	  by	   the	  constitutional	  provisions	   in	  Chapter	  14	  relating	  to	  “The	  Public	  Services”.	  	  Article	  191	  provides	  that:	  	  	  	   “A	  member	  of	  the	  public	  services	  shall	  not	  be	  -­‐	  (a)	   victimized	   or	   discriminated	   against	   for	   having	   discharged	  his	  duties	  faithfully	  in	  accordance	  with	  this	  Constitution;	  or	  (b)	   dismissed	   or	   removed	   from	   office	   or	   reduced	   in	   rank	   or	  otherwise	  punished	  without	  just	  cause.”	  	  Again,	  this	  provision	  appears	  to	  address	  the	  kinds	  of	  situations	  discussed	  below	  where	   an	   individual	   judge	   is	   sent	   to	   a	   distant	   and	   remote	   location	   without	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  307 Constitution of Ghana, Chapter 6 308 Constitution of Ghana, art.12 
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knowing	   why.	   	   The	   potential	   for	   the	   individual	   to	   assume	   the	   worst	   and	   to	  assume	  that	  he	  or	  she	  is	  being	  punished	  (for	  example	  for	  a	  particular	  decision),	  is	  inevitable.309	  	  Without	  clear	  guidelines	  on	  the	  procedures	  used	  in	  the	  application	  of	   this	   particular	   discretion,	   the	   appearance	   of	   bias	   or	   victimization	   is	   still	  possible,	  even	  though	  the	  decision	  is	  completely	  legitimate.	  	  	  	  The	   Constitution	   ostensibly	   provides	   an	   environment	   in	   which	   the	   citizens	   of	  Ghana	  engage	  with	  their	  constitution,	  their	  rights,	  and	  the	  State.	  	  Justice	  in	  Ghana	  “emanates	   from	   the	   people	   and	   shall	   be	   administered	   in	   the	   name	   of	   the	  Republic	  by	  the	  Judiciary”.310	  	  	  	  What	  the	  law	  is,	  and	  how	  it	  has	  changed,	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  discover	  in	  Kenya.	  	  While	  increasingly,	   commercial	   cases	   and	   some	   kinds	   of	   legislation	   are	   becoming	  available	  through	  online	  subscription	  services,	  other	  materials	  are	  not	  so	  easy	  to	  find.	  	  	  The	  most	  common	  way	  in	  which	  lawyers	  find	  out	  what	  the	  law	  is,	  and	  how	  judges	   have	   decided,	   is	   to	   know	   a	   few	   judges,	   know	   their	   clerks,	   and	   to	   ask	  regularly	   what	   cases	   are	   listed	   before	   them.	   	   	   The	   clerks	   then	   inform	   ‘their’	  lawyers	  what	  they	  know.	  As	  for	  legislation,	  this	  is	  virtually	  impossible	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  unless	   you	  have	   contacts	   in	   a	   law	   firm.	   	   Law	   firms	   tend	   to	   employ	   junior	  staff	  whose	  function	  is	  to	  regularly	  visit	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Government	  Printer	  to	   collect	   Gazette	  Notices	   as	   they	   are	   printed.	   	   	   They	   are	   rarely	   advertised,	   so	  without	   knowing	  what	   to	   expect	   you	   cannot	   easily	   find	  out	  what	  has	   changed.	  	  Finding	   legislation	  and	  keeping	  up	  with	  amendments	   is	  getting	  easier	  with	   the	  development	   of	   the	   new	   online	   law	   project	   being	   piloted	   through	   the	  Incorporated	  Council	  of	  Law	  Reporting	   for	  England	  and	  Wales	  and	   the	  Kenyan	  Judiciary.	  	  Some	  laws,	  it	  seems,	  are	  ‘confidential’,	  despite	  being	  public.311	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  309 This perception is supported by evidence from anonymous interviews.  310 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, art.125(1) 311 This is all anecdotal information that I have discovered through my own experiences in the 
past. 
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There	  are	  no	  stenographers	  in	  court.	  	  Statute	  provides	  that	  oral	  evidence	  is	  to	  be	  recorded	   in	   long	  hand	  by	   the	   trial	  Magistrate	  or	   Judge	  who	   is	   to	   take	  notes	   ‘in	  narrative	  form’,312	  and	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  get	  hold	  of	  copies	  of	  judgments	  unless	  you	  know	  the	  judge	  or	  judge’s	  clerk.	  	  
Separation	  of	  Powers	  The	   doctrine	   of	   the	   separation	   of	   powers	   is	   a	   theory	   that	   sets	   out	   the	  relationships	  between	  the	  institutions	  of	  state.	  	  The	  doctrine	  “enjoys	  a	  position	  of	  almost	   unparalleled	   global	   repute	   as	   a	   foundational	   tenet	   of	   liberal	  democracy”.313	   In	   it’s	   pure	   form,	   the	   doctrine	   of	   the	   separation	   of	   powers	   is	   a	  normative	   theory	   that	   requires	   strict	   separation	   of	   the	   three	   branches	   of	   the	  state	   and	   delineation	   between	   the	   functions	   of	   each	   organ	   of	   government.314	  	  	  Montesquieu’s	  account	  is	  said	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  earliest,	  and	  clearest	  accounts	  of	  the	  doctrine:	  	  	   “When	   the	   legislative	   and	   executive	   powers	   are	   united	   in	   the	   same	  person,	  or	  in	  the	  same	  body	  of	  magistrates,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  liberty...	  there	  is	  no	  liberty	  if	  the	  powers	  of	  judging	  is	  not	  separated	  from	  the	  legislative	  and	  executive...	  there	  would	  be	  an	  end	  to	  everything,	   if	  the	  same	  man	  or	  the	  same	  body...	  were	  to	  exercise	  those	  three	  powers.”315	  	  Montesquieu’s	   concern	   was	   the	   safeguarding	   of	   individual	   liberty	   against	  arbitrary	   power,	   although	   there	   is	   much	   debate	   over	   whether	   the	   purpose	   of	  separation	   of	   powers	   is	   to	   protect	   individual	   liberty	   or	   enhance	   efficiency.316	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  312 This was found to be the case across the court system, Report of the Sub-Committee on 
Ethics and Governance, November 2005, para 2.2.8, at p 29 313 E Carolan, The New Separation of Powers: a Theory for the Modern State (OUP, 2009), p.1 314 See N Barber, 'Prelude to the Separation of Powers' (2001) 60 Cambridge Law Journal 59; MJC 
Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967); E Barendt, 'Separatinon of Powers and 
Constitutional Government' [1995] Public Law 599 315 Montesqieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1914) 316See, for example, discussion in Barber, 'Prelude to the Separation of Powers'  
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Whether	  in	  it’s	  pure	  form	  or	  in	  a	  “partial”	  version,317	  concepts	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  will	  contain	  five	  main	  elements	  to	  some	  degree:	  	  	   (i) The	  government	   is	  divided	  into	  three	  branches:	   legislature,	  executive	  and	  judiciary;	  	  (ii) Each	   of	   the	   branches	   has	   a	   corresponding	   identifiable	   function:	  legislative,	  executive	  and	  judicial;	  	  (iii) That	  each	  branch	  of	  government	  is	  confined	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  its	  own	  
function	  and	  does	  not	  encroach	  up	  on	  the	  functions	  of	  others;	  	  (iv) The	   persons	   who	   compose	   these	   agencies	   be	   distinct	   and	   that	   no	  individual	  is	  allowed	  to	  be	  a	  member	  of	  more	  than	  one	  branch;	  	  (v) Each	  branch	  will	  be	  a	  check	  on	  the	  others.318	  	  In	   practice	   it	   is	   almost	   impossible	   to	   create	   a	   system	   that	   replicates	   the	  separation	   of	   powers	   in	   its	   purest	   form.	   	   However,	   there	   are	   many	   different	  interpretations	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  powers,	  and	  Barber	  argues	  that	  “the	  essence”	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  is	  “the	  meeting	  of	  form	  and	  function;	  the	  matching	  of	  tasks	   to	   those	   bodies	   best	   suited	   to	   execute	   them.”319	   He	   argues	   that	   the	  separation	  of	  powers	  is	  a	  	  	   “…distinctively	  constitutional	  tool.	  	  It	  addresses	  itself	  to	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  constitution;	  it	  enjoins	  them	  to	  match	  function	  to	  form	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  realise	  the	  goals	  set	  for	  the	  state	  by	  political	  theory.	  Having	  decided	  that	  a	  particular	   goal	   ought	   to	   be	   striven	   for	   in	   a	   society,	   the	  doctrine	   focuses	  our	  attention	  on	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  may	  be	  achieved.”320	  	  Each	  nation	  will	  have	  a	  slightly	  different	  form	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  powers,	  but	  as	  the	   Latimer	   House	   Principles	   demonstrate,	   it	   is	   widely	   agreed,	   in	   the	  Commonwealth	   at	   least,	   that	   institutions	   and	   functions	   ought	   to	   be	   separated,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  317 See discussion in Ibid. 318 Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, p.13 319 Barber, 'Prelude to the Separation of Powers', p.59 320 Ibid., p.71 
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that	   institutions	   ought	   to	   cooperate	   and	   respect	   each	   other,	   and	   that	   effective	  checks	  and	  accountability	  mechanisms	  ought	  to	  be	  in	  place.	  	  	  
South	  Africa	  In	   October	   2008	   the	   School	   of	   Law	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Witwatersrand	   in	  Johannesburg,	   South	   Africa,	   hosted	   a	   symposium	   about	   “Judges	   and	   the	  World”.321	   	  It	  was	  a	  celebration	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Judge	  Edwin	  Cameron	  as	  he	  was	  appointed	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  South	  Africa	  and	  much	  of	  the	  focus	  was	  on	  transformation	  of	  the	  judiciary	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  Included	  in	  the	  same	  issue	  of	  the	   South	   African	   Journal	   on	   Human	   Rights	   is	   the	   text	   of	   the	   Oliver	   Schreiner	  Memorial	  Lecture	  given	  by	  Deputy	  Chief	  Justice	  Moseneke	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  separation	   of	   powers.322	   	   Moseneke	   DCJ,	   referring	   to	   the	   First	   Certification	  judgment	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   in	   1996,323	   explained	   that	   the	   courts	   of	  South	   Africa	   have	   “carved	   out	   a	   carte	   blanche	   for	   the	   development	   of	   a	  distinctively	  South	  African	  design	  of	  separation	  of	  powers”	  and	  that	  this	  design	  “must	   find	   the	   careful	   equilibrium	   that	   is	   imposed	   on	   our	   constitutional	  arrangements	   by	   our	  peculiar	   history.”324	   Former	  Chief	   Justice	   of	   South	  Africa,	  Arthur	   Chaskalson,	   writing	   in	   the	   preface	   to	   the	   special	   issue,	   adds	   that:	   “the	  careful	   equilibrium…includes	   [the	   courts]	   not	   only	   asserting	   their	   authority	  fearlessly,	   but	   observing	   its	   limits,	   and	   being	   sensitive	   to	   the	   role	   of	   other	  branches	  of	  government.”325	  	  Objections	  made	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  on	  the	  text	  relating	  to	  the	  separation	  of	   powers	   and	   the	   appointment	   of	   judges	   in	   respect	   of	   the	   certification	   of	   the	  “New	  Text”	   of	   the	   final	   constitution	   in	   1996	  were	   rejected	  by	   the	  Court	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  321 McLean and Pieterse (eds), Special Issue: Focus on the Judiciary  322 D Moseneke, 'Oliver Schreiner Memorial Lecture: Separation of Powers, Democratic Ethos and 
Judicial Function' 24 South African Journal on Human Rights 341 323 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 324 Moseneke, 'Oliver Schreiner Memorial Lecture: Separation of Powers, Democratic Ethos and 
Judicial Function', at p.349 325 A Chaskalson, 'Preface to Special Issue: Focus on the Judiciary' 24 South African Journal on 
Human Rights x, at p.ix. 
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Certification	  Judgement.	  	  One	  objection	  was	  that	  certain	  provisions	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	   executive	   and	   the	   legislature	   did	   not	   comply	  with	   Constitutional	   Principle	  (CP)	  VI	  requiring	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  between	  the	  executive,	  the	  legislature	  and	  the	  judiciary.326	  	  The	  Court’s	  response	  was	  that:	  	   “What	  CP	  VI	  requires	  is	  that	  there	  be	  a	  separation	  of	  powers	  between	  the	  legislature,	  executive	  and	  judiciary.	  	  It	  does	  not	  prescribe	  what	  form	  that	  separation	  should	   take…	  the	  CPs	  must	  not	  be	   interpreted	  with	   technical	  rigidity.”327	  	  This	   idea	   of	   flexibility	   is	   borne	   out	   in	   the	   later	   jurisprudence	   of	   the	   Court,	   in	  which	   the	   separation	   of	   powers	   is	   said	   to	   be	   identifiable	   through	   inferences	  drawn	   from	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   Constitution,	   rather	   than	   an	   express	  entrenchment	  of	  the	  principle.328	  	  
Ghana	  The	  complex	  political	  history	  of	  Ghana	  underpins	  the	  history	  and	  development	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  in	  Ghana.	  	  Professor	  Quashigah	  paints	  a	  vivid	  picture	  of	  the	  radical	  effect	  of	  the	  1992	  Constitution	  on	  the	  judiciary:	  	  	   “With	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  1992	  Constitution,	  the	  Judiciary,	  like	  birds	  out	  of	  a	  cage,	   regained	   its	   wings	   that	   were	   clipped	   during	   the	   period	   of	   the	  various	  military	  regimes.	  	  This	  rediscovery	  found	  expression	  in	  a	  number	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  326 Constitution of thr Republic of South Africa 1993(Interim Constitution), Sch.4: “There shall be a 
separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and 
balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.” 327 Certification Judgment, para.113 328 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v the President of South Africa, 
Constitutional Court Case CCT 27/00.  Compare this to Kenya, where there is also implied separation 
of powers, but without certain necessary features, such as the judicial powers being vested in the 
judiciary.  
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of	   judicial	   pronouncements	   that	   have	   the	   capacity	   to	   enhance	   the	  democratic	  principles	  upon	  which	  the	  constitution	  was	  based.”329	  	  Yet	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   appears	   to	   have	   a	   different	   view	   of	   this	   fundamental	  democratic	  principle:	  	  	   “Separation	   of	   powers	   is	   a	   salutary	   principle...	   The	   sovereign	   people	   of	  Ghana	  can	  expressly	  or	  by	  implication	  reject	  any	  aspect	  or	  implication	  of	  the	  doctrine...[it]...cannot	  and	  must	  not	  enslave	  the	  people	  to	  a	  particular	  constitutional	   arrangement	   because	   of	   its	   application	   or	   success	  elsewhere	  or	  its	  compelling	  philosophical	  appeal	  to	  political	  scientists.”330	  	  	  
Kenya	  In	  Kenya,	  by	  contrast,	  there	  are	  no	  clearly	  directive	  principles	  of	  state	  policy,	  or	  articulated	   founding	   principles	   of	   the	   constitution.	   	   Separation	   of	   powers	   and	  judicial	   independence	  are	  often	  seen	  as	  being	  implied	  from	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  constitution.	  And	  while	   this	   has	   also	   been	   the	   approach	   of	   the	   courts	   in	   South	  Africa	   there	   is	   very	   little	   for	   the	  Kenyan	   courts	   to	   go	   on	   in	   the	  Constitution	  of	  Kenya.	   The	   judicial	   powers	   are	   not	   specifically	   vested	   in	   the	   judiciary,	   and	  fundamental	  provisions	  of	   the	   constitution	  which	  would	  appear	   to	   safeguard	  a	  constitutional	   structure	   based	   on	   separation	   of	   powers	   have,	   in	   the	   past,	   been	  altered	   and	   even	   repealed	   with	   apparent	   abandon	   by	   a	   Parliament	   which	   is	  dominated	  by	  the	  executive.	  	  In	  Kenya	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  is	  complicated	  by	  a	  strong	  distrust	  among	   public	   officials,	   public	   servants	   and	   the	   organs	   of	   government.	  	  	  Politicians	   freely	  express	   their	  dissatisfaction	  and	   lack	  of	   trust	   in	   the	   judiciary,	  and	   the	   judiciary,	   through	   the	  Chief	   Justice,	   occasionally	   retaliates	   through	   the	  media	   and	   through	   the	   way	   it	   uses	   various	   powers	   available	   to	   it,	   like	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  329 Quashigah, 'The Constitution as Evolved by the Jusriprudence of the Courts of Ghana' At p.126 330	  Asare	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  Attorney-­General	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  SCGLR	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contempt	   of	   court,	   to	   try	   and	  maintain	   a	   hold	   on	   its	   fragile	   dignity.	   The	   Chief	  Justice,	  speaking	  in	  2007,	  made	  the	  point	  in	  this	  way:	  	  	   “The	  promotion	  of	   the	   rule	  of	   law	  and	   the	  due	  administration	  of	   justice	  require	   the	   concerted	   effort	   of	   the	   three	   institutions	   of	   the	   government	  acting...with	   mutual	   respect	   between	   the	   institutions...	   Where	   however,	  the	   administration	   of	   the	   law	   is	   threatened	   by	   disrespectful	   conduct	  towards	  the	  Judiciary	  by	  members	  of	  the	  executive	  and	  the	  legislature,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  that	  the	  contempt	  of	  court	  be	  punished	  to	  uphold	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  as	  defender	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.”331	  	  This	  overt	  bickering	  and	  continued	   taunting	  of	   the	   judiciary	  has	   left	   the	  public	  with	  a	  very	  dim	  view	  of	   the	   judiciary	   indeed,	  and	  means	  that	  people	  have	  very	  little	  faith	  in	  the	  legal	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  	  Some	  members	  of	  the	  legislature	  have	  had	  some	  interesting	  views	  on	  the	  value	  of	   the	   judiciary.	   	   Following	   the	   highly	   controversial	   investigation	   into	   and	  suspension	   of	   23	   judges	   and	   80	  magistrates	   in	   2003,	   the	   judge	  who	   had	   been	  responsible	   for	   that	   investigation	  was	  appointed	  to	  serve	  as	   the	  director	  of	   the	  Kenya	   Anti-­‐Corruption	   Authority	   in	   2004.332	   	   His	   nomination	   for	   the	   post	  was	  discussed	  in	  Parliament,	  and	  the	  discussion	  revealed	  an	  unusual	  understanding	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   relationship	  between	  Parliament	  and	   the	   judiciary.	   	  As	   the	  then	  Assistant	  Minister	   in	   the	  Office	  of	   the	  President	   said	   to	  his	  parliamentary	  colleagues	  during	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  serving	  judge	  to	  head	  the	  Kenya	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Commission:	  “The	  role	  of	  Parliament	  is	  to	  change	  any	  law	  which	   the	   Judiciary	  establishes”333	  and	   “Parliament	  can	  annul	  a	  decision	  of	   the	  Judiciary	   by	   passing	   a	   law	   against	   it.”334	   	   This	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   slight	   over-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  331	  Chief Justice E Gicheru of Kenya, speaking in 2007	  332 This was also highly controversial and resulted in a court declaring it to be unconstitutional.  See 
Gachiengo (2000) 333 Kenya Hansard, July 29, 2004, p.3096 (Professor Kibwana) 334 Kenya Hansard, July 29, 2004, p.3097 (Professor Kibwana) 
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emphasis	   of	   the	   accepted	   sovereignty	   of	   Parliament	   to	   amend	   the	   law	   in	  response	  to	  judicial	  decisions.	  	  	  A	  further	  problem	  is	  that	  some	  judges	  too	  appear	  to	  have	  very	  little	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary,	  or	  its	  ability	  to	  adapt	  and	  change.335	  	  This	  is	  in	  part	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  resources,	  and	  some	  would	  say,	  in	  part	  due	  to	  a	  culture	  of	  self-­‐interest	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  professionalism:	  	  	   “The	  politicization	  of	   the	  upper	   judiciary	   in	   the	  1980s	  and	  90s,	   coupled	  with	   declining	   professional	   standards	   of	   the	   magistracy	   and	   rampant	  corruption	   had	   rendered	   the	   judiciary	   seriously	   incapable	   of	   playing	   its	  constitutional	   function.	   	   This	   problem	  was	   exacerbated	   by	   judges	   filing	  cases	   in	   their	  own	  courts	   to	   injunct	  discussions	   relating	   to	   the	   future	  of	  the	  judiciary...”336	  	  
Judicial	  Independence	  	  In	   South	   Africa,	   judicial	   independence	   is	   implicit	   in	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   is	   a	  foundational	  value	  of	  the	  Constitution.337	  Judicial	  independence	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  much	  discussed,338	  and,	  some	  would	  say,	  very	  fragile,	  or	  even	  in	  peril.	  	  The	  South	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  335 Interview 336	  G.	  Muigai,	  “Transitional	  Provisions	  and	  Constitutional	  Continuity”	  2008	  337 Michelman, 'The Rule of Law, Legality and the Supremacy of the Constitution'.  See also Van 
Rooyen and Others v S and others 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC), para.17 338 For case law on the subject see for example: Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others [2008] ZACC 19; 2009 (1) SA 287 (CC); Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the 
National Assembly and Others [2006] ZACC 11; 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC); 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC); 
President of the Republic of South African and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and 
Others [1999] ZACC 11; 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC); 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC); Ex parte Chairperson of 
the Constitutional Assembly: in re certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 [1996] ZACC 26; 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC); South 
African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v the President of South Africa, Constitutional Court 
Case CCT 27/00 – separation of powers is based on inferences drawn from the structure of the 
Constitution, rather than an express entrenchment of the principle. Cf Kenya.  
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African	   Constitution	   ostensibly	   provides	   for	   the	  most	   robust	   protection	   of	   the	  independence	  of	  judges	  of	  any	  constitution	  in	  Africa.	  	  Yet	  some	  of	  the	  words	  and	  actions	   of	   government,	   political	   parties,	   and	   even	   the	   odd	   judge,	   over	   the	   past	  decade	  have	  put	  that	  protection	  at	  risk.	  	  Under	  s.165	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  South	  Africa	   judicial	   authority	   is	   “vested	   in	   the	   courts”339	   and	   the	   courts	   are	  “independent	  and	  subject	  only	  to	  the	  Constitution	  and	  the	  law,	  which	  they	  must	  apply	  impartially	  and	  without	  fear,	  favour	  or	  prejudice.”340	  This	  independence	  is	  protected	   by	   two	  measures.	   	   The	   first	   states	   that	   “no	   person	   or	   organ	   of	   state	  may	  interfere	  with	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  courts”341	  and	  the	  second	  places	  a	  duty	  on	  organs	  of	  state	  “through	  legislative	  and	  other	  measures”	  to	  “assist	  and	  protect	  the	   courts	   to	   ensure	   the	   independence,	   impartiality,	   dignity,	   accessibility	   and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  courts.”342	  	  Finally,	  it	  is	  explicitly	  provided	  that	  “an	  order	  or	  decision	   of	   a	   court	   binds	   all	   persons	   to	  whom	   and	   organs	   of	   state	   to	  which	   it	  applies.”343	  	  	  	  While	  the	  content	  of	  s.165	  is	  now	  largely	  uncontroversial	  (although	  some	  would	  argue	  that	  it	  has	  almost	  been	  compromised	  on	  several	  occasions),344	  the	  content	  of	   other	   provisions	   relating	   to	   the	   judiciary	   that	   may	   impact	   on	   the	   overall	  independence	  of	  judges	  has	  not	  been	  immune	  from	  criticism.	  	  Provisions	  on	  the	  appointment	   of	   judges,345	   the	   role	   of	   acting	   judges,346	   terms	   of	   office	   and	  remuneration,347	   removal	   from	   office348	   and	   the	   constitution	   of	   the	   Judicial	  Service	  Commission,349	  have	  all	  contributed	  to	  disagreements	  over	  the	  extent	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  339 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa , s.165(1) 340 Ibid., s.165(2) 341 Ibid., s.165(3) 342 Ibid., s.165(4) 343 Ibid., s.165(5) 344 See, for example, debates about the Justice College and the development of the judicial training 
curriculum. 345 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa , s.174 346 Ibid., s.175 347 Ibid., 176 348 Ibid., s.177 349 Ibid., s.178 
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the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  and	  many	  of	  these	  concerns	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  laid	   to	   rest.	   	   The	   South	   African	   Constitution	   “not	   only	   recognises	   the	  independence	   and	   impartiality	   of	   [the]	   courts	   but	   also	   provides	   important	  institutional	   protection	   for	   courts.	   	   The	   problem	   is	   how	   to	   achieve	   this	  independence	  in	  practical	  terms.”350	  	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Ghana	  sets	  out	  the	  full	  extent	  of	  the	  Judiciary’s	  independence	  from	   the	   other	   branches	   of	   government	   –	   both	   in	   ideological	   terms	   and	   in	  practical	   terms.	   	   	   According	   to	   the	   Constitution,	   the	   Judiciary	   “shall	   be	  independent	   and	   subject	   only	   to	   [the]	   Constitution.”351	   	   And,	   as	   “the	   judicial	  power	  of	  Ghana”	  is	  vested	  in	  the	  Judiciary,	  “neither	  the	  President	  nor	  Parliament	  nor	  any	  organ	  or	  agency	  of	   the	  President	  or	  Parliament	   shall	  have	  or	  be	  given	  final	   judicial	   power.”352	   	   The	   Constitution	   of	   Ghana	   goes	   further	   than	   merely	  vesting	  judicial	  authority	  in	  the	  Judiciary.	   	  Under	  the	  Constitution,	  the	  Judiciary	  has	   sole	   responsibility	  not	  only	   for	   its	  use	  of	   judicial	  power,	  but	   it	   also	   retains	  administrative	   authority	   over	   the	   courts	   too,	  with	   the	  Chief	   Justice,	   as	  Head	  of	  the	   Judiciary,	   having	   “responsibility	   for	   the	   “administration	   and	   supervision	   of	  the	   Courts.”353	   	   Under	   Art.127(1)	   of	   the	   Constitution,	   the	   Judicial	   Service	   of	  Ghana	   has	   complete	   control	   over	   all	   of	   its	   functions,	   both	   judicial	   and	  administrative:	  	  	   “In	   the	  exercise	  of	   the	   judicial	  power	  of	  Ghana,	   the	   Judiciary,	   in	  both	   its	  judicial	   and	   administrative	   functions,	   including	   financial	   administration,	  is	  subject	  only	  to	  this	  Constitution	  and	  shall	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  control	  or	  direction	  of	  any	  person	  or	  authority.”	  	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  a	  specific	  duty	  placed	  on	  all	  others	  not	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  judicial	  function	  of	  any	  judicial	  officer:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  350 Justice Sandile Ngcobo, 'The Delivery of Justice: Agenda for Change' (2003) 120 The South African 
Law Journal 688, p.696 351 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana , art.125(1) 352 Ibid., art.125(2) 353 Ibid., art.125(3) 
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   “Neither	   the	   President	   nor	   Parliament	   nor	   any	   person	   acting	   under	   the	  authority	  of	  the	  President	  or	  Parliament	  nor	  any	  other	  person	  whatsoever	  shall	  interfere	  with	  Judges	  or	  judicial	  officers	  or	  other	  persons	  exercising	  judicial	  power,	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  judicial	  functions;”354	  	  There	  is	  also	  a	  duty	  placed	  on	  all	  “organs	  and	  agencies	  of	  the	  State”	  to:	  	   “…	   accord	   to	   the	   courts	   such	   assistance	   as	   the	   courts	   may	   reasonably	  require	   to	   protect	   the	   independence,	   dignity	   and	   effectiveness	   of	   the	  courts,	  subject	  to	  [the]	  Constitution.”355	  	  The	   traditional	   structural	   protections	   of	   judicial	   independence	   are	   all	  constitutionally	  safeguarded	  in	  Ghana.	  	  	  	  Both	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ghana	  have	  provisions	  in	  their	  constitutions	  that	  protect	  judicial	   independence.	   	   Kenya,	   by	   contrast,	   does	  not,	   and	  nor	   is	   judicial	   power	  specifically	   vested	   in	   the	   courts.	   	   This	   puts	   the	   judiciary	   as	   an	   institution	   in	   a	  precarious	  poison,	   a	   position	   that	   has	   been	   tested	   recently	   by	   the	  debate	   over	  how	  to	  deal	  with	   the	  perpetrators	  of	  election	  violence	  and	  how	  to	  reconstitute	  the	   Electoral	   Commission	   –	   the	   VP	   has	   backed	   proposal	   to	   set	   up	   an	  “independent	   tribunal”	   which	   would,	   if	   the	   proposals	   were	   carried	   out,	  effectively	  circumvent	  the	  court	  system.	  	  	  	  	  In	  2002	  a	  panel	  of	  Commonwealth	  judges	  was	  invited	  to	  investigate	  the	  state	  of	  judicial	  independence	  in	  the	  Kenya	  Judiciary.	  	  They	  reported	  that	  ‘The	  air	  is	  full	  of	   allegations	   of	   corruption,	   incompetence	   and	   inefficiency’,356	   and	   that	   ‘public	  confidence	   in	   the	   independence	   and	   impartiality	   of	   the	   judiciary	   has	   virtually	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  354 Ibid. Art.127(2) 355 Ibid. Art.127(2) 356 Report of the Advisory Panel of Eminent Commonwealth Judicial Experts (CKRC 2002), 
p.15  
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collapsed.’357	   	   Indeed,	   at	   the	   time	   the	   strength	   of	   public	   feeling	   about	   this	  was	  clearly	  articulated	  in	  the	  popular	  slogan	  ‘Why	  hire	  a	  lawyer	  when	  you	  can	  buy	  a	  judge?’	  	  Judicial	   independence	   in	   Kenya	   is	   compromised	   not	   only	   by	   deep-­‐rooted	  corruption,	  but	  also	  by	  other	  features	  of	  the	  system.	  	  There	  is	  no	  clear	  statement	  in	   the	   Constitution	   that	   the	   judiciary	   is,	   and	   should	   be	   independent.	   	   Nor	   is	  judicial	   power	   expressly	   vested	   exclusively	   in	   the	   judiciary,	  whereas	   executive	  power	   is	   expressly	   vested	   in	   the	   President,358	   as	   head	   of	   the	   executive,	   and	  legislative	   power	   is	   expressly	   vested	   in	   Parliament.359	   The	   International	  Commission	   of	   Jurists	   (ICJ)	   found	   that	   there	   is	   a	   commonly	   held	   belief	   among	  legal	   practitioners	   in	   Kenya	   that	   the	   silence	   of	   the	   Constitution	   on	   this	   issue	  undermines	   the	   judiciary,	   that	   there	   is	   no	   way	   to	   prevent	   executive	  interferences,	  and	  that	  ‘judicial	  power	  is	  hostage	  to	  parliamentary	  whim’.360	  	  The	   judicial	   appointments	   processes	   pose	   another	   problem	   for	   judicial	  independence	   in	   Kenya.	   	   The	   Judicial	   Service	   Commission	   is	   responsible	   for	  advising	   the	   President	   as	   regards	   the	   appointment	   of	   judges,361	   and	   for	  appointing	  magistrates.	  	  It	  comprises	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  Chairman,	  the	  Attorney	  General,	   two	   judges	   appointed	   by	   the	   President,	   and	   the	   Chairman	   of	   Public	  Service	   Commission.362	   	   The	   Chief	   Justice,	   the	   Attorney	   General	   and	   the	  Chairman	   of	   the	   Public	   Service	   Commission	   are	   all	   Presidential	   appointees.	  Further,	  the	  appointment	  procedures	  and	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  are	  all	  very	  secretive	   and	   there	   is	   virtually	   no	  way	   of	   determining	   the	   basis	   for	   particular	  appointments.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  357 Report of the Advisory Panel of Eminent Commonwealth Judicial Experts (CKRC 2002), 
p.18 358 Constitution of Kenya s 23(1) 359 Constitution of Kenya s 30 360 Strengthening Judicial Reforms in Kenya Volume II: The Role of the Judiciary in a 
Patronage System, ICJ (Kenya), p 6 361 Constitution of Kenya, s 61 362 Constitution of Kenya, s 68 
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  In	  2005	  the	  ICJ	  conducted	  a	  survey	   in	  which	  63%	  of	  respondents	  believed	  that	  the	   Chief	   Justice	   should	   no	   longer	   be	   head	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Service	   Commission.	  	  68%	  believed	   that	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  not	   independent,	   and	  60%	  believed	   that	  there	  are	  inadequate	  checks	  and	  balances	  in	  place	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  	  
Just	  and	  Honest	  Government	  	  “Just	   and	  honest	   government”	   is	   one	  of	   the	   fundamental	   political	   values	  of	   the	  Commonwealth	   that	   heads	   of	   government	   have	   pledged	   to	   uphold	   and	  implement.	   	   It	   points	   to	   the	   endemic	   problems	   that	   so	   many	   developing	  countries	   have	   had	   with	   corruption	   at	   all	   levels	   of	   government,	   and	   seeks	   to	  improve	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  and	  to	  engender	  a	  more	  open	  approach	  to	   government.	   	   South	   Africa,	   Ghana	   and	   Kenya	   have	   all	   had	   considerable	  problems	  with	  secretive	  governments,	  often	  with	  devastating	  consequences	   for	  portions	  of	  the	  population,	  and	  with	  corruption.	  	  	  	  The	   new	   constitutional	   order	   in	   South	   Africa	   is	   founded	   on	   principles	   of	  openness,	  justice	  and	  accountability.	  	  The	  South	  African	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  specifically	  contains	   a	   right	   of	   access	   to	   information.363	   	   And	   the	   Promotion	   of	   Access	   to	  Information	   Act	   of	   2000	   gives	   effect	   to	   that	   right.	   	   The	   Constitution	   of	   Ghana	  similarly	  contains	  a	  provision	  on	  the	  right	  of	  access	  to	  information,	  although	  it	  is	  a	   qualified	   right,	   and	   no	   enabling	   legislation	   has	   yet	   been	   passed.364	   	   The	  Constitution	   of	   Kenya	   (1963,	   as	   amended	   to	   2008)	   contains	   no	   freedom	   of	  information	  provisions,	  and	  a	  controversial	  freedom	  of	  information	  bill	  that	  was	  initially	   proposed	   in	   2005	   never	   got	   through	   parliament.	   	   The	   consequence	   of	  this,	   and	   the	   highly	   controversial	   Media	   Act	   of	   2007	   and	   the	   Kenya	  Communications	   (Amendment)	   Act	   of	   2008	   (the	   promulgation	   of	  which	   led	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  363 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s.32 364 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, art.21. See also “Audit of Key Legislation in Ghana for 
Information Access Opportunities”, a paper commissioned by the Commonwealth Human Rights 
Initiative, 2009 
	   138	  
the	   arrest	   of	   several	   prominent	   journalists	   who	   protested	   against	   the	   powers	  given	   to	  ministers	   to	   censure	   and	   seize	   equipment	   from	  media	   groups)	   is	   that	  there	   is	   no	   culture	   of	   challenging	   authority,	   and	  no	   clear	   avenue	   for	   gathering	  information.	  	  This	  will	  have	  to	  change	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  new	  2010	  Constitution.	  	  	  
3.5	   Implementation	   of	   the	   “Fundamental	   Commonwealth	   Values”	   in	  
practice	  	  
The	  Judiciary	  and	  Transformation	  	  Former	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   South	   Africa,	   Arthur	   Chaskalson	   argues	   that	   in	  “discussing	   transformation	  of	   the	   judiciary	  we	  need	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  different	  forms	  that	  it	  must	  take	  in	  South	  Africa.”365	  	  	  He	  identifies	  three	  forms	  of	  transformation:	  	  	   “There	   is	   institutional	   transformation	   which	   involves	   the	   structure,	  functioning,	   and	   composition	   of	   the	   courts,	   attitudinal	   transformation	  which	  involves	  the	  way	  that	  judges	  see	  their	  role	  and	  perform	  their	  duties	  and	   transformation	   of	   the	   law	   itself	   to	   bring	   it	   into	   line	   with	   the	  constitutional	   requirement	   that	   all	   law	   must	   be	   consistent	   with	   the	  Constitution	   and	   be	   interpreted	   and	   developed	   so	   as	   to	   promote	   the	  spirit,	  purport	  and	  object	  of	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights.”366	  	  While	  Chakalson	  is	  primarily	  discussing	  the	  particular	  needs	  of	  South	  Africa	  he	  does	  allude	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  experiences	  of	  other	  nations	  may	  be	  of	  value	  in	  understanding	  the	  issue	  of	  transformation.	  And	  further,	  in	  his	  view	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  365 A Chaskalson, 'Preface to Special Issue: Focus on the Judiciary' 24 South African Journal on 
Human Rights x. 366 Ibid. Emphasis added.  
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“…a	   discussion	   of	   judges	   and	   transformation	   needs	   to	   be	   located	   in	   a	  much	   broader	   debate	   about	   their	   role	   in	   a	   new,	   evolving	   and	   at	   times	  fragile	  democracy:	  what	  should	  be	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	   the	   holders	   of	   political	   power;	  what	   limits	   are	   there	   to	   the	   powers	  that	  each	  has;	  and	  how	  should	  each	  exercise	  its	  respective	  powers.”367	  	  It	   is	  hoped	  that	  this	  thesis	  can	  contribute	  in	  some	  measure	  to	  the	  debate	  about	  the	   relationship	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	   holders	   of	   political	   power,	   the	  limits	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  each	  branch	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  judiciary	  exercises	  it’s	   powers.	   	   This	   is	   located	   in	   the	   debate	   about	   transformation	   and	   the	  implementation	   of	   the	   Latimer	   House	   Principles,	   drawing	   on	   lessons	   not	   only	  from	  South	  Africa,	  but	  from	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  as	  well.	  	  	  While	   Chaskalson	   identifies	   three	   forms	   of	   transformation,	   this	   thesis	   is	  essentially	   concerned	   with	   the	   first	   two:	   institutional	   transformation	   and	  attitudinal	   transformation.	   	  Of	   the	   three	  countries	   in	   this	   study,	  South	  Africa	   is	  the	  one	  with	  the	  most	  obvious,	  clear	  vision	  for	  transformation.	  	  However,	  this	  is	  not	   to	   say	   that	   Ghana	   and	   Kenya	   too	   are	   not	   engaged	   in	   a	   process	   of	  transformation	   –	   they	   are,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   as	   coherently	   articulated,	   and	   not	  necessarily	  stipulated	  by	  law	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  South	  African	  process	  is.	  	  	  	  
Judicial	  Independence,	  democracy	  and	  fairness	  	  The	  literature	  on	  judicial	  independence	  discussed	  above	  separates	  out	  aspects	  of	  the	   broad	   term	   “judicial	   independence”	   into	   the	   following:	   “party	   impartiality”	  (which	   is	   presented	   as	   a	   value	   in	   its	   own	   right	   in	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles);	  “power	  over	  outcomes”;	  “de	  jure”	  and	  “de	  facto”	  independence,	  terms	  which	  refer	  to	  visible	  legal	  safeguards	  and	  factual	  independence	  respectively.	  	  The	  Bangalore	  Principles	  differentiate	  between	  “impartiality”	  and	  “judicial	  independence”,	  with	  “judicial	   independence	   meaning	   both	   individual	   independence	   (freedom	   from	  influence	   or	   interference	   in	   decision	   making)	   and	   institutional	   or	   operational	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  367 Ibid. at p.ix. 
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independence.	   	  A	  Chief	  Justice,	   leading	  a	  judiciary,	  needs	  to	  be	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	   nuances	   of	   interacting	   with	   individual	   judges,	   and	   managing	   their	   work.	  	  Concerns	   about	   judicial	   independence	   were	   evident	   in	   the	   interviews	   with	  judges	  in	  all	  three	  countries.368	  	  	  In	  South	  Africa,	  the	  particular	  historical	  context	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  court	  meant	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  Chaskalson,	  the	  first	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Court	  (at	  first	  its	  President)	   had	   to	   “see	   to	   it	   that	   the	   court	   had	   a	   physical	   infrastructure,”	   and	  “establish	  a	  mode	  of	  work,	  a	  style.”	  	  The	  style	  and	  mode	  of	  work	  continues	  today,	  and	  has	  become	  part	  of	  the	  “ethos”	  of	  the	  court.	  	  In	  establishing	  a	  mode	  of	  work,	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  who	  himself	  is	  said	  to	  have	  been	  “used	  to	  democratic	  processes,	  discussing	   everything”	  was	  working	  with	   a	   diverse	   group	   of	   judges	  who	  were	  also	  “convinced	  democrats”,	  and	  this	  generated	  a	  collegial,	  democratic	  approach	  to	  managing	  and	  leading	  the	  court	  that	  has	  been	  embraced	  since	  the	  beginning.	  	  	  But	   importantly,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   “created	   the	   setting	   in	   which	   we	   could	   all	  function	  freely,	  together	  and	  individually.”	  	  The	  sense	  of	  collegiality,	  democratic	  process	   and	   collective	   decision-­‐making	   is	   an	   important	   feature	   of	   the	  Constitutional	  Court	  (see	  Chapter	  5	  for	  more	  details),	  and	  Chief	  Justice	  Langa	  is	  said	  to	  have	  a	  “very	  democratic	  leadership	  style”	  and	  the	  court	  in	  “an	  inclusive,	  democratic,	  collegial”	  way.	  However,	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  differs	  from	  other	  courts	   in	   the	   way	   it	   organizes	   itself,	   and	   this	   is	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Chief	  Justice,	  by	  virtue	  of	   the	  Constitutional	  Court	  Complementary	  Act	  1995,	  has	   the	  power	  to	  manage	  the	  court	  and	  its	  personnel,	  and	  determines	  the	  court’s	  budget	  in	   consultation	   with	   the	   Minister	   of	   Justice.369	   	   However,	   in	   South	   Africa,	   the	  judiciary	   is	   very	   fractured,	   and	   individual	   Judge	  Presidents	   are	   responsible	   for	  managing	  relations	  with	  the	  executive,	  but	  unlike	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  equivalent	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  Complementary	  Act.	  	  The	  process	   of	   	   “rationalizing”	   and	   transforming	   the	   judiciary	   means	   that	  arrangements	   for	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   courts	   are	   being	   reviewed	   –	   and	  government	   proposals	   have	   not	   been	   popular	   (this	   issue	   is	   discussed	   in	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  368 This section draws exclusively from interviews in each of the three countries.  369 See Chapter 5 below for more details.  
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detail	   in	   Chapter	   6).	   	   There	   are	   mixed	   views	   about	   the	   proposals	   to	   formally	  recognize	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  for	  example,	  because	  there	  are	  concerns	  about	  the	  Chief	   Justice	  becoming	  mired	  in	  the	  daily	  details	  of	  running	  the	   courts.	   	   However,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   judges	   are	   keen	   to	   retain	   their	   say	   in	  determining	  how	  the	  court	   functions	  and	  what	   they	  need	  to	  be	  able	   to	  do	  that.	  	  This	   ability	   to	   decide	   what	   resources	   are	   needed,	   and	   how	   to	   use	   them,	   is	  considered	   to	   be	   an	   important	   part	   of	   judicial	   independence	   (much	   like	  Cameron’s	  “power	  over	  outcome”	  and	  Feld	  and	  Voigt’s	  “de	  facto”	  independence).	  	  	  	  Current	   arrangements	   mean	   that	   the	   judiciary	   ends	   up	   “at	   the	   behest	   of	   the	  executive,	   at	   least	   in	   money”,	   which	   inevitably	   impacts	   on	   the	   operational	  independence	  of	  each	  court.	  	  	  But	   in	   South	  Africa,	   judges	  are	  not	   the	  only	  ones	   thinking	  about	   independence	  and	  the	  separation	  of	  powers.	  	  One	  consequence	  of	  the	  unique	  structure	  created	  by	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  Complementary	  Act	  is	  that	  court	  administrators,	  who	  are	  employed	  by	   the	  Department	  of	   Justice,	   are	   seconded	   to	   the	  Constitutional	  court	   and	   are	   “answerable	   to	   and	   mandated	   by”	   the	   Chief	   Justice.	   	   One	   court	  administrator	  finds	  themselves	  questioning	  that	  structure	  and	  asking	  themselves	  where	  their	  “loyalty	  lies”	  as	  an	  independently	  minded	  person,	  who	  is	  employed	  by	   the	  Department	   of	   Justice	   but	  works	   for	   the	   Chief	   Justice.	   It	   “becomes	   very	  complex”	  and	  performance	  evaluation	  (something	  that	  all	  Department	  of	  Justice	  employees	   go	   through)	   becomes	   “very	   awkward”	   as	   that	   task	   is	   shared	  by	   the	  Director	  General	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  In	  Ghana,	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  head	  of	  the	  Judiciary,	  and	  has	  responsibility	  for	  the	  administration	   and	   supervision	   of	   the	   Judiciary.	   	   Interview	   data	   shows	   that	  concerns	   about	   judicial	   independence	   relating	   to	   the	   working	   environment	   of	  judges	   focus	   around	   the	   potential	   for	   perceived	   influence	   by	   the	   Chief	   Justice	  when	  the	  Chief	   Justice	   transfers	   judges,	  either	   to	  other	  districts,	  without	  giving	  reasons,	  or	  from	  a	  higher	  court	  to	  a	  lower	  court	  (see	  Chapter	  5	  for	  more	  on	  this	  point).	  	  There	  were	  mixed	  views	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  powers	  have	  in	  fact	  been	  used	  as	  a	  form	  of	  “punishment”,	  but	  even	  if	  only	  one	  judge	  believes	  that	  to	  be	   the	   case,	   that	   represents	   an	   improper	   infringement	   on	   independence.	   	   The	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main	  concern	  about	  these	  powers	  however,	  is	  not	  so	  much	  that	  they	  exist	  (they	  are,	  apparently	  supposed	  to	  be	  addressing	  efficiency	  and	  personnel	  issues),	  but	  that	  they	  are	  or	  may	  be	  used	  at	  will,	  without	  clear	  processes	  in	  place	  to	  regulate	  them.	  	  This	  is	  contrasted	  with	  an	  acute	  awareness	  of	  how	  working	  practices	  can	  be	   used	   to	   enhance	   the	   independence	   of	   individual	   judges,	   especially	   on	  appellate	  courts.	  	  One	  way	  this	  is	  done	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  junior	  judges	  speak	  first	  in	   case	   conferences	   so	   that	   they	   are	   not	   intimidated,	   or	   overshadowed	   by	   the	  views	  of	  their	  more	  experienced	  colleagues.	  	  In	  Kenya,	  similar	  concerns	  were	  raised,	  again	  relating	  to	  the	  use	  of	  discretion	  by	  the	   Chief	   Justice	   in	   transferring	   judges,	   and	   cases,	   apparently	   with	   no	   clear	  guidelines	  on	  how	  or	  why	  this	  is	  done.	  	  Judges	  can	  be	  transferred	  with	  very	  little	  notice,	  which	   inevitably	   impacts	  on	   them	  personally	  and	  professionally	  –	  some	  judges	   never	   get	   to	   wind	   up	   their	   caseload	   before	   starting	   in	   another	   court.	  	  There	   is	   a	   strong	   sense	   in	   Kenyan	   interviews	   that	   these	   powers	   are,	   or	   have	  sometimes	  been	  used	  as	  a	  form	  of	  “punishment”,	  which	  is	  clearly	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  independence	  of	  judges.	  	  	  	  	  
3.6	  Conclusion	  	  	  The	   courts	   on	   South	   Africa,	   Ghana	   and	   Kenya	   are	   under	   intense	   pressure	   to	  perform	   	   -­‐	   to	   be	   the	   legitimate	   arbiters	   of	   political	   disputes,	   to	   deliver	   justice	  efficiently,	   to	   develop	   relevant	   constitutional	   jurisprudence	   that	   reflects	   the	  needs	  and	  historical	  context	  of	  each	  society.	  	  In	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ghana,	  political	  values	   and	   constitutional	   principles	   are	   evolving	   as	   emerging	   constitutional	  orders	  take	  shape	  and	  constitutions	  are	  challenged	  and	  tested.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice,	  as	   head	   and	   leader	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   must	   engage	   judges	   and	   the	   judicial	  organization	   in	   expounding,	   affirming,	   and	   crucially	   for	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	  courts,	  applying	  these	  values	  and	  principles.	  	  	  	  While	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  move	  away	  from	  a	  strict	  view	  of	   judicial	   independence	  as	   being	   guaranteed	   or	   evidenced	   by	   formal	   legal	   safeguards,	   the	   effect	   of	   the	  legal	   framework	   that	   supports	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   should	   not	   be	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underestimated.	   	   In	   South	   Africa,	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   Complementary	   Act	  creates	   a	   unique	   environment	   for	   judges	   that	   they	   are	   reluctant	   to	   lose	   as	   the	  judiciary	  is	  restructured.	  	  In	  Ghana,	  the	  discretion	  afforded	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  relation	   to	   the	  management	  of	   judicial	  work	  and	   judicial	  personnel,	  potentially	  impacts	   the	   stability	   and	   sense	   of	   freedom	   from	   interference	   that	   individual	  judges	   should	   have.	   	   This	   is	   the	   same	   in	   Kenya	   too.	   	   Discretion	   allows	   for	  flexibility,	   but	   there	   may	   be	   matters	   that	   require	   more	   open	   processes	   that	  ensure	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is,	  and	  is	  seen	  to	  be,	  applying	  values	  and	  principles	  in	  practice.	  The	  application	  of	  principles	  of	  fairness	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  values	  might	   contribute	   to	   defining	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   role	   and	   serve	   as	   evaluative	  standards	   of	   his	   conduct,	   will	   be	   explored	   in	  more	   detail	   in	   Chapter	   5,	   where	  empirical	  evidence	  is	  used	  to	  analyse	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	   leadership	  role.	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Chapter	  4	  –	  Institutional	  Context	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  	  	  
4.1	  Introduction	  	  	  A	  leader	  derives	  his	  or	  her	  power	  from	  a	  number	  of	  sources.	   	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  he	  or	  she	  will	  have	  very	  specific	  legal	  powers,	  as	  well	  as	  several	  less	  specific	  discretionary	  powers	  of	  a	  legal	  nature.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  other	  sources	  of	  power	   too,	  and	  this	  chapter	  considers	   the	  “social	  power”	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  institutional	  setting	  of	  the	  office,	  and	  its	  general	  standing.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  can	  act	  on	  his	  or	  her	  vision	  for	  the	  judiciary	  will	  to	  depend	   on	   the	   resources	   available	   to	   him	   or	   her	   –	   these	   may	   in	   turn	   be	  determined	  to	  some	  extent	  by	  the	  structures	  that	  support	  the	  office,	  and	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  a	  Chief	   Justice	  can	  operate	  and	  persuade	  others	   to	  engage	  with	   the	  judiciary.	  	  	  In	  Chapter	  1,	   Justice	  Langa’s	  (as	  he	  then	  was)	  assertion	  that	  the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  “of	   course	   leader”	   of	   the	   third	   arm	   of	   government	   highlighted	   the	   fact	   that	   in	  most	   African	   constitutions,	   and	   certainly	   in	   the	   South	   African	   and	   Kenyan	  constitutions,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  not	  specifically	  designated	  either	  head	  or	  leader	  of	   the	   Judiciary,	   and	   in	   South	   Africa,	   this	   status	   is	   said	   to	   be	   implicit	   in	   the	  constitution.	  	  	  In	  Ghana,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  specifically	  identified	  as	  the	  head	  of	   the	   judiciary,370	   but	   is	   not	   described	   as	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   judiciary,	  although	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  a	  broad	  discretion,	  and	  therefore	  scope	  to	  lead,	  in	  carrying	   out	   her	   responsibilities	   relating	   to	   the	   “administration”	   and	  “supervision”	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  role	  as	  leader	  of	  the	   judiciary	   is	   implicit	   in	   the	  constitution,	  his	  or	  her	  ability	   to	   lead,	  his	  or	  her	  power	  and	  influence,	  will	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  overall	  status	  of	  the	  office,	  and	  the	  resources	  available	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  managing,	  and	  leading,	  the	  judiciary	  as	  an	  organization.	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The	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter	   is	  the	  formal	  and	  informal	  arrangements	  for	  relations	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  others,	  and	  for	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  Relations	  between	  the	  Judiciary	  and	  the	  Executive	  are	  frequently	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  particular	  “model	  of	  court	  administration”	  that	  a	  country	  adopts,	  and	  the	  degree	  to	   which	   the	   Judiciary	   and	   the	   Executive	   respectively	   have	   power,	   or	   control,	  over	   the	  administration	  of	   the	   courts.	   	  Retention	  of	   control	  by	   the	  executive	   is	  usually	  presented	  as	  ensuring	  accountability,	  usually	  for	  the	  use	  of	  public	  funds.	  	  Exclusion	  of	   judges	  from	  administration	   is	  sometimes	  presented	  as	  a	  buffer	   for	  judicial	   independence.	   	   Ghana’s	   judiciary	   is	   quite	   unusual	   in	   its	   complete	  independence	   and	   status	   as	   a	   freestanding	   public	   service.	   	   The	   way	   that	   the	  relationship	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	   executive	   is	   defined	   has	  consequences	   for	   leadership	   by	   the	   Chief	   Justice.	   	   A	   distinction	   is	   commonly	  made	  between	   “judicial”	   and	   “administrative”	   functions	  but	   these	   concepts	   are	  quite	  fluid	  and	  frequently	  overlap.	  In	  all	  three	  countries	  it	  was	  hard	  to	  pin	  down	  a	  precise	  meaning	   for	   these	   ideas,	  even	   in	   the	  course	  of	  one	   interview.	   	  And	   in	  Ghana,	  where	   these	   ideas	  are	  best	  defined,	  and	  where	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  has	   the	  most	  control,	  suggestions	  that	  arrangements	  in	  Ghana	  may	  change,371	  mean	  that	  this	  dilemma	  is	  relevant	  to	  Ghana	  too.	  	  This	   chapter	   first	   introduces	   the	   literature	  on	   the	  complex	  concept	  of	   “power”,	  one	   of	   the	   “crucial	   variables”	   of	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   leadership	   process.	   	   This	  chapter	   concentrates	   on	   the	   organization	   of	   the	   office	   of	   Chief	   Justice	   and	   the	  issues	   that	   may	   or	   may	   not	   contribute	   to	   a	   Chief	   Justice’s	   broad	   social	   and	  political	  power.	  	  The	  next	  chapter	  (chapter	  5)	  will	  also	  explore	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  but	  it	  will	  concentrate	  on	  the	  legal	  powers	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  are	  exercised.	  	  	  	  	  Having	   considered	   the	   literature	   the	   next	   section	   sets	   out	   the	   institutional	  infrastructure	   surrounding	   the	   office	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice.	   	   It	   describes	   the	  institutional,	   constitutional	   and	   political	   background	   within	   which	   the	   Chief	  Justice	  must	  operate.	   	  An	  overview	  of	  the	  court	  system	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	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judiciary	  is	  relevant	  here	  because	  they	  affect	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  might	   interact	  with	   and	   relate	   to	   judges	   and	   others	   in	   the	   court	   system.	   	   This	  chapter	  also	  introduces	  the	  “Office	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice”	  in	  whatever	  form	  it	  exists	  in	   each	   country.	   	   In	   Ghana,	   for	   example,	   the	   Office	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   well	  established,	  a	  distinct	  entity	  with	  a	  well-­‐staffed	  secretariat.	  	  In	  Kenya,	  in	  contrast,	  the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   an	   office,	   but	   no	  distinct	   support	   system	   for	   the	  Office	   as	  such.	  	  In	  South	  Africa,	  there	  are	  moves	  towards	  a	  more	  formal	  recognition	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa,	  with	  specified	  tasks	  and	  support	  staff.	  	  	  In	  terms	  of	  how	  such	  arrangements	  could	  affect	   leadership,	   it	   is	  worth	  pausing	  for	   a	  moment	   to	   think	   about	   power.	   Power	   here	   refers	   to	   the	   broad	   notion	   of	  social	   power,	   and	   how	   understanding	   power	   as	   social	   power	   helps	   us	   to	  understand	   the	   potential	   breadth	   of	   a	   Chief	   Justice’s	   power.	   	   By	   virtue	   of	   the	  position	   a	   Chief	   Justice	   holds,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   expertise	   he	   or	   she	   brings	   to	   the	  position	  and	  the	  respect	  and	  admiration	  this	  generates,	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  could	  have	  considerable	   social	   power,	   enabling	  him	  or	  her	   to	   exert	   influence	   in	  ways	   that	  may	  not	  always	  be	  obvious	  at	   first	  sight.	   	  This	  kind	  of	   influence	   is	   infrequently	  talked	  about,	  and	  not	  always	  well	  understood.	  	  	  
Defining	  power	  	  Historically,	  power	  was	  conceptualized	  as	   force	  –	   the	  ability	   to	  exert	   force	  and	  cause	   a	   desired	   reaction.	   Our	   understanding	   of	   authority	   and	   social	   power	   is	  often	   traced	   back	   to	   Max	   Weber	   in	   his	   theories	   of	   social	   and	   economic	  organisation.372	  	  	  Weber	  defined	  power	  as	  “the	  probability	  that	  one	  actor	  within	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  372 See, M. Weber The Theory of Social and Economic Organisations, translated by T Parsons (New 
York, Free Press, 1947) and G Roth and C Wittich (eds) Economy and Society 2 vols. (University of 
California Press, 1978). Discussed in S.P. Turner and R.A. Factor ‘Max Weber’ in E. Craig (ed) 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Routledge, London, 1998); J. MacGregor Burns Leadership 
(Perennial, 1978); and in G.R Goethals and G.L.J. Sorenson (eds) The Quest for a General Theory of 
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a	   social	   relationship	   will	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	   carry	   out	   his	   own	   will	   despite	  resistance,	  regardless	  of	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  this	  probability	  rests.”373	  	  	  	  Questions	   about	   the	   meaning	   and	   extent	   of	   power	   in	   democracies	   have	   been	  asked	   and	   explored	   with	   passion	   and	  much	   disagreement	   for	   centuries.	   	   Like	  “leadership”,	   “power”	   is	   therefore	   a	   contested	   concept.	   	   The	   great	   “power	  debate”	   has	   tended	   to	   focus	   on	   conceptions	   of	   power	   as	   domination,	   and	   has	  tended	  to	  divide	  scholars	  into	  those	  who	  conceive	  of	  power	  simply	  as	  the	  visible	  exercise	   of	   power	   by	   one	   agent	   over	   another,	   and	   those	   who	   argue	   that	   an	  understanding	   of	   power	   must	   also	   include	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   power	   of	   non-­‐decision-­‐making	  -­‐	  the	  capacity	  to	  facilitate	  certain	  things,	  such	  as	  agenda-­‐setting.	  	  Added	   to	   this	   mix	   is	   a	   third	   aspect	   of	   power	   identified	   by	   Lukes	   in	   his	   1974	  critique	  of	  power	  studies.	  	  He	  argued	  that	  power	  is	  also	  manifest	  in	  one’s	  ability	  to	   alter	   beliefs	   of	   those	   over	  whom	   they	   have	   power	   so	   that	   they	   believe	   that	  their	  interests	  will	  be	  served	  by	  doing	  something	  that	  is	  in	  fact	  harmful	  to	  them	  or	  contrary	  to	  deeper	  interests.	  	  	  In	   his	   1978	   text	   on	   leadership	   Burns	   develops	   this	   understanding	   of	   power,	  arguing	  that	  while	  power	  is	  clearly	  a	  ‘relationship	  among	  persons’,374	  for	  Burns,	  Weber’s	   definition	   highlights	   the	   fact	   that	   ‘there	   is	   no	   certain	   relationship	  between	  what	  P	  (power	  holder)	  does	  and	  how	  R	  (power	  recipient)	  responds.’375	  	  This	   realisation	   distinguishes	   Burns’	   theory	   of	   power	   from	   others	   because	   it	  recognises	   the	   central	   role	   of	   purpose	   and	   intention	   in	   the	   process	   of	   power.	  	  Burns	  argues	  that	  earlier	   theories	  of	  power	   failed	  to	  account	   for	   the	   fact	   that	  a	  power	  recipient’s	  reaction	  to	  an	  exertion	  of	  power	  will	  depend	  not	  only	  on	  the	  power	   holder,	   but	   also	   on	   ‘the	   broader	   universe	   of	   power	   relationships’	   that	  affect	  the	  likely	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  power	  recipient	  will	  respond	  to	  the	  will	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  373 M. Weber The Theory of Social and Economic Organisations, translated by T Parsons (New York, 
Free Press, 1947), p. 152, quoted in Burns, Leadership (1978) at p.12 374 J.R. French ‘A formal theory of social power’ (1965) 63 Psychological Review 181-194, quoted in 
Leadership at p.12 375 Leadership, p.12 
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the	  power	  holder.	  Accepting	  this	  means	  that	  power	  should	  be	  seen	  not	  only	  as	  a	  relationship	  among	  persons,	  but	  importantly,	  as	  a	  ‘collective	  act’.376	  	  	  	  	  This	  approach	  describes	  power	  ‘not	  merely	  as	  an	  entity	  to	  be	  passed	  around	  like	  a	   baton	  or	   a	   hand	  grenade’,377	   but	   rather	   as	   a	   combination	  of	   the	  motives	   and	  resources	  of	  power	  holders,	  the	  motives	  and	  resources	  of	  power	  recipients	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  all	  these	  elements.	   	   	   	  Drawing	  on	  work	  by	  Dahl378	  and	  Lasswell	  and	  Kaplan379	  Burns	  reaches	  a	  definition	  of	  the	  fundamental	  process	  of	  power.	  	  	  Dahl	  breaks	  power	  down	  into	  three	  dimensions:	  its	  distribution—which	  is	  the	  concentration	  and	  dispersion	  of	  power	  among	  people	  of	  diverse	  influence	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  situations;	  its	  scope—referring	  to	  the	  activities	  it	  relates	  to	  and	  the	  extent	   to	   which	   power	   is	   generalised	   (affecting	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   activities)	   or	  specialised	  (affecting	  specific	  activities);	  and	  finally	  its	  domain—the	  number	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  recipients	  who	  are	  influenced	  by	  the	  power	  wielded	  over	  them	  as	  opposed	  to	  those	  who	  are	  not.380	  	  	  This	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  Laswell	  and	  Kaplan	  who	  describe	  power	  in	  terms	  of	  weight,	  scope	  and	  domain.	  	  	  Burns	  concludes	  that:	  	  	   ‘Whatever	   the	   dimensions	   or	   context,	   the	   fundamental	   process	   remains	  the	   same.	   	   Power	   wielders	   draw	   from	   their	   power	   bases	   resources	  relevant	   to	   their	   own	  motives	   and	   the	  motives	   and	   resources	   of	   others	  upon	  whom	   they	   exercise	   power.	   	   The	   power	   base	  may	   be	   narrow	   and	  weak,	   or	   it	  may	   consist	   of	   ample	   and	  multiple	   resources	   useful	   for	   vast	  and	  long-­‐term	  exercises	  of	  power,	  but	  the	  process	  is	  the	  same.’381	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in Leadership at p.16 380 R. A. Dahl ‘Power’ in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, Macmillan 
Free Press, 1968), vol. 12, p.407-408, quoted in Burns, Leadership (1978) at p. 16 381 Burns Leadership, p.17  
	   149	  
Debates	   about	   power	   have	   predominantly	   been	   confined	   to	   the	   realm	   of	  disagreements	  about	  the	  exercise	  of	  power,	  and	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  is	  further	  confined	   to	   disagreements	   about	   power	   as	   it	   relates	   to	   the	   “securing	   of	  compliance	   to	   domination”.	   Lukes	   now	   argues	   that	   power	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   its	  exercise,	  but	  instead,	  that	  “power	  is	  a	  dispositional	  concept,	  identifying	  an	  ability	  or	  capacity	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  exercised”382.	  	  Furthermore,	  he	  acknowledges	  a	   distinction	   between	   an	   understanding	   of	   power	   in	   terms	   of	   freedom,	   or	   the	  “power	  to”	  do	  certain	  things,	  and	  power	  in	  terms	  of	  domination,	  or	  “power	  over”	  others.	  	  	  Critiquing	  his	  own	  1974	  account	  of	  power	  (and	  by	  extension	  those	  with	  whom	  he	  engaged	  in	  the	  debate)	  Lukes	  points	  out	  that	  his	  work	  Power,	  a	  Radical	  View	  (1974):	  	  	   “…	  offers	  a	  very	  partial	  and	  one-­‐sided	  view	  of	  the	  topic.	  	  For	  one	  thing,	  it	  focuses	   entirely	   on	   the	   exercise	  of	   power,	   and	   for	   another,	   it	   deals	   only	  with	  asymmetric	  power	  –	  the	  power	  of	  some	  over	  others	  –	  and,	  moreover,	  only	  a	  sub-­‐type	  of	  this,	  namely	  the	  securing	  of	  compliance	  to	  domination.	  	  Furthermore,	   it	   treats	   only	   of	   binary	   relations	   between	   actors	   who	   are	  assumed	  to	  have	  unitary	  interests.	  	  Plainly	  a	  fuller	  account	  must	  obviously	  relax	   these	   simplifying	  assumptions	  and	  address	  power	  among	  multiple	  actors	  with	  divergent	  interests.”383	  	  In	  his	  more	  refined	  view,	  therefore:	  	  	   “…	   a	   better	   definition	   of	   power	   in	   social	   life	   …	   is	   in	   terms	   of	   agents’	  abilities	   to	  bring	  about	  significant	  effects,	  specifically	  by	   furthering	  their	  own	  interests	  and/or	  affecting	  the	  interests	  of	  others,	  whether	  positively	  or	  negatively.”384	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  This	   broader	   understanding	   of	   power	   raises	   the	   question:	   why	   do	   we	   need	   a	  concept	   of	   power,	   and	   what	   do	   we	   need	   the	   concept	   for?	   	   Lukes	   builds	   on	   a	  philosophical	   analysis	   developed	   by	  Morriss,	   who	   argued	   that	   there	   are	   three	  contexts	   in	   which	   power	   is	   talked	   about	   and	   a	   concept	   needed.	   	   These	   are:	  practical,	  moral	  and	  evaluative.385	  	  	  In	   practical	   terms,	   “we	   need	   to	   know	   our	   own	   powers	   and	   those	   of	   others	   in	  order	  to	  find	  our	  way	  round	  a	  world	  populated	  by	  human	  agents,	  individual	  and	  collective,	  of	  whose	  powers	  we	  need	  to	  be	  apprised	  if	  we	  are	  to	  have	  a	  chance	  of	  surviving	   and	   flourishing.”386	   	   The	   moral	   context	   of	   power	   relates	   to	  responsibility	  –	  “the	  powerful	  are	  those	  whom	  we	  judge	  or	  can	  hold	  responsible	  for	   significant	   outcomes.”	   	   The	   evaluative	   context	   of	   power	   refers	   to	   social	  systems	   –	   the	   evaluation	   of	   “the	   distribution	   and	   extent	   of	   power	   within	   a	  society”.	  	  Lukes	  argues	  that:	  	   “power	   should	   not	   be	   conceived	  narrowly	   as	   requiring	   intention,	   actual	  foresight	  and	  positive	  actions	  (as	  opposed	  to	  failing	  to	  act):	  the	  power	  of	  the	   powerful	   consists	   in	   their	   being	   capable	   of	   and	   responsible	   for	  affecting	   (negatively	   or	   positively)	   the	   (subjective	   and/or	   objective)	  interests	  of	  others.”387	  	  Burns’	  power	  variable	  is	  located	  in	  both	  the	  moral	  and	  evaluative	  contexts	  of	  the	  understanding	  of	  power,	  and	  represents	  one	  aspect	  of	  Lukes’	  broad	  definition	  of	  power.	   	   Leadership	   ethics	   is	   clearly	   located	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   a	   moral	  understanding	   if	   power	   and	   leadership.	   	   And	   a	   theory	   of	   transformational	  leadership	  urges	  that	  processes	  of	  leadership	  draw	  on	  practical	  powers	  (clearly	  delineated	   and	   understood	   in	   practical	   terms)	   to	   articulate	   powers	   in	   moral	  terms	  and	  thus	  evaluate	  social	  systems	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  ethical	  values.	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  The	   arrangements	   for	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   relations	   between	   the	   Judiciary	   and	   the	  executive	  will	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  the	  overall	  power	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  and	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  the	  way	  that	  the	  boundaries	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  executive	  are	  delineated	  will	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  leadership	  in	  the	  Judiciary	  too.	  	  	  
4.2	  Models	  of	  Court	  Administration	  	  	  This	   chapter	   establishes	   some	   of	   the	   context	   of	   a	   Chief	   Justice’s	   power	   –	   the	  institutional	  framework	  within	  which	  he	  or	  she	  must	  work.	   	  Understanding	  the	  institutional	  framework	  contributes	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	   Chief	   Justice,	   which	   is	   further	   analysed	   in	   the	   next	   chapter.	   	   However,	   in	  order	   to	  understand	   the	   institutional	   framework	   fully,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  have	  a	  sense	   of	   the	   way	   in	   which,	   in	   formal	   terms,	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  judiciary	   and	   others	   is	   organized.	   	   This	   framework	   is	   usually	   discussed	   and	  studied	   with	   reference	   to	   scholarship	   on	   “models	   of	   court	   administration”	   –	  models	  that	  have	  influenced	  the	  formal	  arrangements	  for	  relations	  between	  the	  judiciary,	   and	   most	   significantly	   the	   executive	   in	   the	   Commonwealth	  considerably.	   	   	   This	   chapter	   therefore	   focuses	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   broad	   inter-­‐institutional	   arrangements	   for	   “court	   administrations”	   and	   is	   the	   first	   point	   at	  which	   the	   thorny	   distinction	   between	   “judicial”	   and	   “administrative”	   functions	  becomes	  evident.	  	  
	  
A	  comparative	  view	  of	  models	  of	  court	  administration	  	  	   “In	   this	   century	   judicial	   leaders	   have	   recognized	   that	   the	   courts	   cannot	  truly	  claim	  to	  be	  a	  coequal	  third	  branch	  of	  government	  unless	  they	  have	  the	   ability	   and	   the	   authority	   to	   manage	   their	   internal	   operations.	   This	  realization	  has	  not	  occurred	  overnight,	  nor	  has	  it	  occurred	  evenly	  across	  the	  courts.	   It	  has	  been	  a	  gradual	  awakening	  to	  the	  reality	  that	  the	  small,	  uncomplicated	  court	  systems	  of	  the	  past	  have	  become	  more	  complex	  and	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now	  require	  sophisticated	  management,	  a	  quantum	  leap	  in	  funding,	  and	  a	  more	  highly	  trained	  support	  staff.”388	  	  This	   is	   a	   reference	   to	   the	   state	   of	   court	   administration	   in	   the	   United	   States,	  where	  a	  century	  of	  concerns	  about	  the	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  courts	  have	  lead	  to	  a	  particular	  approach	  to	  court	  administration.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  a	  clear-­‐cut,	  uncontroversial	  statement.	  	  	  The	   question	   of	   how	   to	   organise	   the	   practical	   arrangements	   that	   govern	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  courts	  and,	  in	  the	  main,	  the	  executive,	  does	  not	  have	  an	  easy	   answer.	   	   Governments	   wish	   to	   retain	   control	   over	   scarce	   resources	   and	  demonstrate	  lines	  of	  accountability	  to	  the	  electorate,	  while	  judges	  wish	  to	  attain	  more	  institutional	  and	  financial	  autonomy	  in	  the	  name	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  	  Various	   models	   of	   court	   administration	   attempt	   to	   provide	   solutions	   to	   this	  problem,	   but	   there	   is	   little	   agreement	   on	   which	   is	   the	   “best	   model”,	   and	   the	  possibilities	   range	   from	   considerable	   executive	   involvement	   in	   the	  administration	  and	  financial	  management	  of	  the	  courts	  (as	  in	  Kenya),	  to	  almost-­‐complete	  autonomy	  of	   the	   judiciary	  as	  an	   independent	  public	   institution	   (as	   in	  Ghana),	   with	   variations	   in	   between	   (as	   in	   South	   Africa,	   where	   the	   senior	  judiciary	   and	   the	   magistracy	   are	   each	   administered	   differently).	   Other	  jurisdictions	  have	  taken	  rather	  different	  approaches,	  influenced	  in	  no	  small	  part	  by	  their	  particular	  political	  systems	  and	  constitutional	  traditions.	  	  	  	  	  In	   very	   general	   terms,	   there	   was	   historically	   a	   difference	   of	   approach	   to	   the	  administration	  and	  management	  of	  the	  courts	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  in	  Europe.	  	  	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  development	  of	  court	  administration	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  as	  early	  as	  1900,	  with	  significant	  changes	  emerging	  in	  the	  forty	  years	  between	  1940	  and	   1980	   when	   “American	   courts	   started	   a	   period	   of	   innovation	   and	  improvement	   that	  dramatically	  changed	   the	  way	  courts	  were	  managed	  and	   led	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  388 RW Tobin, An Overview of Court Administration in the United States (National Centre for State 
Courts, 1997), p.7 
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to	  an	  administrative	  infrastructure	  staffed	  by	  professional	  managers.”389	  In	  most	  European	  countries,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  tradition	  was	  that	  “judicial	  institutions	  are	  entirely	   left	   to	   the	   judicial	  professions.	   	   Judicial	  organisations	  are	  ruled	  by	   law,	  judges	   and	   public	   prosecutors	   are	   the	   professionals”	   meaning	   that	   in	   the	  decision-­‐making	   process,	   the	   “juridicial	   perspective	   prevails	   over	   the	  organisational	   one”.390	   	   Things	   began	   to	   change,	   however,	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	  when	  “pressures	  for	  change	  grew	  to	  a	  sufficient	  extent	  for	  governments	  to	  start	  taking	   some	   action	   –	   often,	   but	   not	   always,	   inspired	   by	   the	   American	  example.”391	  	  A	  common	  incentive	  for	  change	  in	  court	  administration	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  need	  to	  deal	  with,	  and	  manage,	  the	  increasing	  complexity	  of	  the	  courts	  as	  they	  expand	  to	  accommodate	   increasing	   use	   of	   the	   courts,	   the	   so-­‐called	   “litigation	   explosion”.	  	  	  As	   courts	   become	   more	   complex,	   and	   insularity	   becomes	   less	   acceptable,	  systems	   need	   to	   be	   in	   place	   to	   provide	   certainty,	   accountability	   and	   even	  transparency.	   	   This	   requires	   a	   balancing	   of	   judicial	   values	   versus	  management	  and	   efficiency.392	   The	   need	   for	   improved	   case-­‐flow	  management,	   for	   example,	  requires	   specific	   systems	   and	   organization	   structure	   that	   the	   judiciary	  traditionally	   did	   not	   necessarily	   have.	   	   There	   can,	   however,	   be	   a	   considerable	  difference	  of	  opinion	  between	  governments	  and	  the	  courts	  as	  to	  how	  to	  address	  issues	   of	   court	   administration,	   with	   governments	   pursuing	   managerial	  approaches	   and	   calling	   from	   greater	   efficiency,	   and	   judges	   and	   judiciaries	  maintaining	   that	   judicial	   independence	   precludes	   such	   an	   approach	   because	  having	   professional	   managers	   in	   the	   system	   might	   infringe	   judicial	  independence.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  389 Tobin, An Overview of Court Administration in the United States, p.18 390 PM Langbroek and M Fabri, 'Developing a Public Administration Perspective on Judicial Systems 
in Europe' in M Fabri and PM Langbroek (eds), The Cahllenge of Change for Judicial Systems: 
developing a Public Administration Perspective (IOS Press, 2000), p.2 391 Ibid., p.2 392 Ibid., p.21 
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Models	   of	   court	   administration	   are	   generally	   roughly	   divided	   into	   three	  categories	  (with	  several	  variations	  in	  each	  category,	  depending	  on	  how	  they	  are	  described).	   Following	   Millar	   and	   Baar,	   three	   points	   along	   a	   continuum	   along	  which	   twelve	  models	   can	  be	  charted	  are:	   the	  executive-­‐centred	  approach,	  with	  high	   levels	   of	   executive	   direction	   of	   court	   administration	   and	   low	   levels	   of	  judicial	   control;	   “transitional”	   models,	   in	   which	   the	  majority	   of	   administrative	  responsibilities	   are	   given	   to	   an	   executive	   department	   in	   a	  ministry,	   but	   either	  some	  tasks	  are	  designated	   to	   judges,	  or	   there	   is	  some	  consultation	  with	   judges	  on	   particular	   matters;	   and	   the	   judge	   controlled	   models,	   with	   lower	   levels	   of	  executive	  direction	  of	  court	  administration	  and	  high	  levels	  of	   judicial	  control	  of	  court	  administration,	  or	  even	  self-­‐sufficient	  courts	  (see	  table	  below).393	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  393 These “models” are outlined in: PS Millar and C Baar, Judicial Administration in Canada (Queens 
University Press, 1981), at p.56 
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Table	  1	  Adaptation	  of	  Millar	  and	  Baar	  "Models	  of	  Court	  Administration"394	  
	  In	   the	   1980s	   and	   early	   1990s	   countries	   in	   the	   Commonwealth	   began	   to	   re-­‐evaluate	   the	   traditional	   executive-­‐centred	   model	   that	   was	   so	   entrenched	   in	  systems	  that	  followed	  the	  English	  common	  law	  tradition.	   	  In	  1980,	  for	  example,	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  gained	  administrative	  independence	  under	  the	  High	  Court	   of	   Australia	   Act	   1979.395	   	   This	   provided	   for	   a	   judge-­‐controlled	  model	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  394 Adapted from PS Miller and C Baar, Judicial Administration in Canada (Queens University Press, 
1981), p.56 395 C Doogan and P Durack, 'Administration of Court' in M Coper, T Blackshield and G Williams 
(eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (Oxford Reference Online, Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 
1. Administration by a central non-legal 
executive department 
2. Administration fragmented among 
executive departments 
3. Courts administered as part of the law 
enforcement responsibilities of the law-
centred executive department (i.e. 
attorney-general or ministry of justice 
4. Courts administered by a division or 
branch of the law-centred executive 
department 
5. Administration by executive department(s) 














6. Most administrative responsibilities 
belong to the law-centred executive 
department, but specified responsibilities 
are designated for judges 
7. Administration by a separate office or 
cabinet department with regular judicial 











8. Administration is the responsibility of 
judges who direct an office or department 
that reports to Parliament through the 
Attorney-General 
9. Administration by a separate cabinet 
department headed by a judge 
10. Administration is the responsibility of 
judges who direct an office or department 
responsible to the legislature through a 
minister, but not subject to executive 
management controls 
11. Administration is the responsibility of 
judges who direct an office or department 



































































12. The judiciary operates on a self-sufficient 
basis in which individual judges generate 
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administration	   in	   which	   the	   power	   to	   administer	   the	   court	   is	   vested	   in	   “the	  justices”	   or	   “a	   majority	   of	   them”.396	   	   At	   that	   time,	   the	   state	   courts	   were	  administered	   in	   various	   ways,	   including	   the	   variations	   on	   the	   traditional	  executive	  model	   such	   as	   what	   was	   termed	   a	   “separate	   executive	   department”	  model.397	   	   At	   the	   start	   of	   the	   1990s	   the	   Australian	   Institute	   of	   Judicial	  Administration	   commissioned	   the	   study	   Governing	   Australia’s	   Courts398	   that	  sought	   to	  provide	   an	   empirical	   answer	   to	   the	  question	   “who	   runs	   the	   courts?”	  and	  to	  assist	  in	  part,	  in	  answering	  the	  question	  “who	  should	  run	  the	  courts?”	  This	  question,	  as	  the	  authors	  put	  it,	  was	  “an	  issue	  increasingly	  exercising	  the	  minds	  of	  the	   Australian	   judiciary	   and	   governments.”399	   Their	   recommendation,	   which	  they	   were	   at	   pains	   to	   point	   out,	   was	   “more	   suggestive	   and	   cautionary	   than	  definitive	   or	   prescriptive”	   was	   that	   their	   “findings	   lean	   heavily	   towards	   a	  judicially	  autonomous	  model.”400	  	  In	  Canada,	  Millar	  and	  Baar	  wrote	  their	   influential	  study,	   Judicial	  Administration	  
in	  Canada,	  as	  early	  as	  1981,	  but	  the	  momentum	  for	  change	  came	  in	  2003,	  when	  the	   Judicial	  Council	  appointed	  a	  Sub-­‐Committee	  on	  Alternative	  Models	  of	  Court	  Administration.	   	   	   The	   Sub-­‐Committee	   was	   charged	   with	   the	   task	   of	   analyzing	  various	  models	  of	  court	  administration	  with	  a	  view	  to	  making	  recommendations	  for	   change.	   	   An	   analysis	   of	   the	   current	   executive	  model	   as	   against	   alternatives	  produced	   the	   recommendation	   that	   in	   the	   Canadian	   context,	   a	   combination	   of	  what	   they	   termed	   the	   “limited-­‐autonomy”	   model	   and	   the	   “independent	  commission”	  model	  would	  be	  best.401	  	  Sallmann	  has	  since	  found	  that	  in	  Australia,	  “‘self-­‐administration’	   of	   courts	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important,	   if	   not	   the	   most	  important,	   means	   of	   achieving	   the	   highest	   level	   of	   operational	   efficiency	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  396 High Court of Australia Act 1979, s.46 397 TW Church and PA Salmann, Governing Australia's Courts (Australian Institute of Judicial 
Administration, 1991) 398 Ibid. 399 Ibid., p.65 400 Ibid., p.65 401 Alternative Models of Court Administration, (2006) 
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courts”.402	  	  Australian	  judiciaries	  have	  been	  experimenting	  with	  models	  of	  court	  administration,	   including	   the	   “autonomous	   collegiate	   model”	   which	   was	  operated	   in	   the	   Federal	   High	   Court	   since	   1993.	   	   In	   conversation	   with	   judges	  Sallmann	  argues	  that	  “it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  genuinely	  independent	   and	   autonomous	   branch	   of	   government	   if	   it	   is	   substantially	  dependent	  upon	  the	  executive	  branch	  not	  only	  for	  its	  funding	  but	  also	  for	  many	  features	  of	  its	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  functions	  and	  operations.”403	  	   “The	  only	  example	  we	  have	  of	  a	  judicially	  autonomous	  systemic	  system	  is	  South	  Australia,	  where,	  since	  1993,	  the	  court	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  has	  been	  governed	  by	  a	  State	  Courts	  Administrative	  Council	  consisting	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	   the	  Chief	   Judge	  and	   the	  Chief	  Magistrate	  and	  associate	  members	  from	  each	  of	  the	  three	  principal	  courts.”404	  	  And,	  he	  writes:	  	  	   “We	   simply	   cannot	   get	   away	   from	   the	   point,	  made	   so	   strongly	   to	   us	   in	  discussions	   with	   Federal	   judges	   and	   senior	   Federal	   officials,	   that	   “self-­‐administration”	   is	   the	   golden	   key	   to	   operational	   effectiveness	   and	  accountability.”405	  	  
What	  is	  “court	  administration”?	  Research	   on	   court	   administration	   in	   the	   Commonwealth	   is	   mostly	   directed	   at	  understanding	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   courts	   and	   the	   executive,	   and	  between	   judges	   and	   court	   administrators,	   in	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   courts.	  	  The	   research	   classifies	   practices	   into	   “models	   of	   court	   administration”,	   some	  advocating	  a	  best	  practice	  based	  on	  wide	  consultation	  with	  practitioners,406	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  402 P Sallmann, 'Extract on Courts' Governance from Going to Court, A Discussion Paper on Civil 
Justice in Victoria' (18th AIJA Annual Conference 2000)  403 Ibid.  404 Ibid. , p.5 405 Ibid. p.10 406 Alternative Models of Court Administration 
	   158	  
others	   simply	   describing	  what	   they	   see,	   not	   wanting	   to	   prescribe	   a	   particular	  model	  in	  recognition	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  court	  management	  and	  the	  differences	  that	   context	   and	   need	   can	   make.407	   	   Historically	   in	   the	   Commonwealth,	   some	  form	  of	  the	  “transitional	  model”	  of	  court	  administration	  was	  the	  norm	  (see	  table	  of	  models	  of	  court	  administration),	  where	  some	  tasks	  were	  designated	  to	  judges,	  but	  where	  policy-­‐making	  for	  the	  courts	  and	  operational	  decision-­‐making	  for	  the	  management	   of	   the	   courts	   rested	   with	   a	   specific	   department	   of	   government;	  usually	   a	  ministry	   of	   justice,	   or	   the	   Attorney-­‐General’s	   office.	   	   The	   trend	   now,	  however,	   is	   to	   move	   away	   from	   an	   executive	   model	   towards	   more	   judicial	  involvement	  in	  policy-­‐making	  and	  the	  determination	  of	  budgetary	  needs.408	  	  	  
	  Millar	   and	   Baar	   approach	   the	   question	   of	   court	   administration	   from	   the	  perspective	   of	   organization	   theory	   and	   the	   place	   of	   bureaucracy,	   or	  “routinization”	   of	   routine	   tasks,	   in	   court	   administration.	   	   	   They	   point	   out	   that	  while	  organizational	  and	  efficiency	  goals	  are	  relevant,	  when	  varied	  goals	  interact	  and	  compete	  a	  phenomenon	  known	  as	  “goal	  drift”	  can	  occur.	  	  This	  happens	  “with	  the	  pursuit	   of	   efficiency	   for	   efficiency’s	   sake”	   and	   it	   is	   important	   to	   remember	  that	   given	   the	   distinctive	   nature	   of	   the	   court	   organization,	   and	   its	   broad	   goals	  relating	  to	  justice:	  	  	   “The	  goal	   is	  not	   efficiency;	  however,	   inefficiency	   can	  obstruct	   the	   larger	  goals	  of	  the	  court.	  	  The	  central	  aspiration	  is	  efficiency	  consonant	  with	  the	  preservation	   of	   justice	   and	   such	   other	   goals	   as	   the	   court	   and	   the	   legal	  system	  may	  define.”409	  	  However,	   efficiency	   remains	   one	   of	   the	   main	   goals,	   as	   are	   measures	   for	  “effective”	   court	   administration.	   	   For	   example,	   in	   2009	   a	   group	   of	   experts	   and	  national	   court	   authorities	   formed	   the	   International	   Consortium	   for	   Court	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  407 Church and Salmann, Governing Australia's Courts  408 See, for a recent example, the changes made in the UK: Her Majesty's Court Service Framework 
Document, (2008), p.28 409 Millar and Baar, Judicial Administration in Canada  
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Excellence.410	   The	   objective	   of	   this	   consortium	   is	   to	   “take	   necessary	   steps	   to	  achieve	  court	  excellence”.	  	  To	  achieve	  their	  goal	  they	  developed	  the	  International	  Framework	   for	   Court	   Excellence	   (IFCE),	   which	   is	   a	   framework	   of	   “values,	  concepts	   and	   tools	   by	   which	   courts	   worldwide	   can	   voluntarily	   improve	   the	  quality	  of	  justice	  and	  court	  administration	  they	  deliver.”411	  The	  members	  of	  the	  Consortium	   and	   contributors	   to	   the	   framework	   represent	   the	   United	   States,	  Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand,	   Singapore,	   Europe,	   and	   the	   World	   Bank.412	   This	  resource	   is	  a	  tool	   for	  court	   leaders	  and	  court	  administrators	  to	  use	  as	  a	  way	  of	  assessing	   their	   own	   management	   structures	   and	   planning	   their	   approach	   to	  achieving	  “court	  excellence”.413	  	  	  	  The	  court	  excellence	  approach	  emphasises	  the	  “court	  customer”	  and	  the	  need	  for	  the	  court,	  and	  court	  leaders,	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  public	  and	  provide	  a	  service.	  	  “It	  is	   important	   for	   the	   courts	   to	   not	   only	   publicise	   the	   values	  which	   guide	   court	  performance,	  but	  also	   to	  ensure	   those	  values	  are	  built	   into	   their	  processes	  and	  practices.”414	  	  The	  IFCE	  represents	  a	  trend	  in	  judiciaries	  around	  the	  world	  for	  offering	  “judicial	  leadership”	   training	   programmes	   and	   emphasizing	   “leadership	   development”.	  	  Leadership	   development	   is	   defined	   as	   “expanding	   the	   collective	   capacity	   of	  organizational	   members	   to	   engage	   effectively	   in	   leadership	   roles	   and	  processes.”415	  This	   is	  a	  process	   is	  well	   advanced	   in	   the	  USA.	   	  This	   is	  perhaps	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  410 See www.courtexcellence.com  411 IFCE, p.4 412 USA: The National Centre for State Courts (NSC) and the Federal Judicial Centre; Australia and 
New Zealand: The Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration; Singapore: the Subordinate Courts 
of Singapore and Spring Singapore; Europe: the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 
(CEPEJ); and the World Bank. 413 Note that in the IFCE leadership is explained as an area of court excellence connected to specific 
values including: impartiality, independence of decision-making, competence, integrity, and 
transparency.   414 IFCE 415 D. V. Day ‘Leadership Development: a review in context’ (2001) 11 Leadership Quarterly 581, at 
p.582 
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consequence	  of	  the	  success	  of	  the	  National	  Center	  for	  State	  Courts	  (NCSC),	  which	  with	   the	   support	   of	   Chief	   Justice	   Warren	   Burger	   in	   1971,	   was	   set	   up	   with	   a	  mission	  to	  “improve	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	  through	  leadership	  and	  service	  to	  state	  courts.”416	  In	  1987,	  NCSC	  held	  a	  symposium	  on	  “Judicial	  Administration	  Research”.	   	   Geoff	   Gallas,	   who	   was	   at	   the	   time	   the	   Director	   of	   Research	   and	  Special	   Services	   for	   the	   NCSC,	   produced	   a	   paper	   on	   “Judicial	   Leadership	  Excellence:	   a	   research	   prospectus”	   in	   which	   he	   outlined	   his	   views	   on	   how	   to	  “build	   an	   empirically	   based,	   reliable	   understanding	   of	   judicial	   leadership	  excellence”	  starting	  with	  state	  trial	  court	  leaders	  and	  leadership	  teams	  that	  have	  been	   successful	   in	   either	   of	   two	   ways:	   (a)	   “consistently	   maintaining	   case	  processing	  times,	  thus	  preventing	  excessive	  delay”;	  or	  (b)	  “significantly	  reducing	  delay”.417	   	   In	   the	   editorial	   to	   the	   special	   issue	   of	   the	   Justice	   System	   Journal	  Thomas	  Church	  Jnr.	  noted	  that	  Gallas’s	  proposals	  constituted	  a	  “promising	  first	  step	  towards	  looking	  systematically	  at	  that	  amorphous	  concept	  of	  leadership	  in	  courts.”418	  	  	  	  In	  1995,	  the	  symposium	  was	  dedicated	  entirely	  to	  leadership.	  	  Ingo	  Keilitz,	  then	  Vice	  President	  of	  the	  NCSC,	  and	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Institute	  for	  Court	  Management	  (the	   education	   division	   of	   the	   NCSC)	   noted	   that	   “Successful	   organizations—including	   court	   organizations	   who	   have	   an	   especially	   difficult	   task	   of	  transcending	  a	   traditional	  culture	  that	   favours	  precedence	  over	   innovation	  and	  future	  consequences—must	   jump	  ahead	  of	   the	  curve,	  anticipate	  the	  future,	  and	  set	  directions	  into	  unfamiliar	  territory.”419	  	  	  	  The	   National	   Association	   for	   Court	   Management	   has	   taken	   this	   message	  seriously	  and	  developed	  “Core	  Competency	  Curriculum	  Guidelines”	  outlining	  ten	  “core	   competencies”	   for	  presiding	   and	   supervising	   judges,	   court	  managers	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  416 NCSC Strategic Plan 2002-2008 (Revised April 2004), at p.4 417 G. Gallas, ‘Judicial Leadership Excellence: a research prospectus’ (1987) 12 Justice System Journal 
39 418 T. Church Jnr., ‘From the Editor’, (1987) 12 Justice System Journal 3, at p.6 419 I. Keilitz ‘The Development of Tomorrow’s Leaders in Judicial Administration’ (1995) 17 The 
Justice System Journal 323, at p.324 
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court	  administrative	  staff.420	   	  These	  guidelines	  evolved	   from	  a	  survey	  of	  NACM	  members,	   the	   results	   of	  which	   indicated	   that	  more	  needed	   to	   be	  done	   to	   offer	  programmes	   to	   court	  managers	   that	  were	   “reflective	   of	   the	   full	   range	   of	   court	  manager	   responsibilities”.421	   	   Following	   a	   long	   process	   of	   research	   and	  consultation	  across	  the	  US	  judiciary,	  90	  court	  administrators,	  court	  management	  faculty	   and	   researchers	   developed	   the	   Ten	   Core	   Competencies	   in	   2003.	  	  Leadership	  features	  strongly	  in	  these	  guidelines.	  	  They	  are	  structured	  around	  the	  purposes	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  courts	  on	  the	  presumption	  that	  “court	  leader	  competency	  is	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end”,	  and	  that	  courts	  do	  not	  exist	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	   managed	   or	   lead,	   but	   rather	   that	   effective	   management	   and	   leadership	   of	  courts	  is	  a	  means	  of	  enabling	  the	  court	  system	  to	  fulfil	  its	  role	  in	  society.	  	  Courts	  must	   be	   “managed	  well	   so	   that	   judges	   and	   others	   acting	   in	   their	   stead	   and	   in	  their	   shadows	   can	   do	   justice”.422	   	   	   The	   ten	   core	   competencies	   are	   as	   follows:	  Purposes	   and	   responsibilities	   of	   the	   courts,	   caseflow	  management,	   leadership,	  visioning	   and	   strategic	   planning,	   essential	   component,	   courts	   community	  communication,	   resources,	   budget	   and	   finance,	   human	   resource	   management,	  education,	  training	  and	  development,	  informational	  technology	  management	  	  Millar	   and	  Baar	   identified	   eleven	  models	   of	   court	   administration	   that	   could	  be	  considered	   in	   the	   three	   categories	  along	  a	   continuum	  representing	   the	   level	  of	  relative	   levels	   of	   executive	   or	   judicial	   control	   of	   court	   administration.	   	   In	  
Alternative	   Models	   of	   Court	   Administration	   the	   Canadian	   Judicial	   Council	   Sub-­‐Committee	   on	   Models	   of	   Court	   Administration	   took	   “models”	   here	   to	   mean	  “organizational	   frameworks	  which	  prescribe	   the	  way	   in	  which	  decisions	  would	  be	   made	   that	   determine	   court	   administration	   policies	   and	   operational	  practices.”423	   	   The	   prevailing	   concern	   of	   the	   literature	   is	   to	   establish	   who,	   or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  420 An overview of the development of these guidelines can be found on the NACM website: 
www.nacmnet.org 421  ‘Introduction and Overview’, Core Competency Curriculum Guidelines, available on 
www.nacmnet.org 422 ‘Purposes and Responsibilities of Courts’, Core Competency Curriculum Guidelines 
(NACM/PDAC 7/3/2003), at p.1 423 Alternative Models of Court Administration, p.1 
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what	  body,	  carries	  out,	  controls	  and	  sets	  the	  goals	  for	  court	  administration.	   	  As	  will	  be	  seen	   in	  Chapter	  6,	  deciding	  what	  exactly	  constitutes	   “administration”	   is	  not	  always	  easy.	   	  Therefore,	  establishing	  who	  does,	  or	  should	  run	  the	  courts,	   is	  not	   always	   clear-­‐cut	   either,	   with	   a	   mix	   of	   shared	   responsibilities	   that	   can	  sometimes	  cause	  unease	  and	  confusion	   in	   those	  who	  are	   responsible	  both	   to	  a	  judge	   and	   to	   an	   executive	   line	  manager.424	  And	  goal	   setting	   is	   one	  of	   the	  main	  functions	   of	   a	   leader,	   but	   the	   literature	   on	   court	   administration	   rarely	  acknowledges	   the	   problems	   of	   fragmented	   leadership,	   or	   the	   need	   for	   clear	  processes	  of	  shared	  leadership.	  	  	  
Judicial	  Reform	  and	  Court	  Administration	  	  	  Judicial	   reform	   is	   usually	   part	   of	   a	   wider	   rule	   of	   law	   reform	   programme,	   and	  where	  donor	  funding	  plays	  a	  large	  part	  in	  the	  process	  judicial	  reform	  is	  usually	  supported	  by	  donors	  as	  part	  of	   their	  efforts	  to	  make	   legal	  systems	  in	  emerging	  economies	  more	  “market	  friendly”.425	  	  In	  South	  Africa	  “judicial	  reform”	  is	  part	  of	  the	   wider	   transformation	   process	   and	   involves	   institutional	   and	   attitudinal	  transformation,	   and	   transformation	   of	   the	   law.426	   	   The	   “rationalisation”	   and	  unification	  project	  being	  undertaken	  by	  the	  DOJCD	  is	  all	  part	  of	  this	  process,	  and	  it	  encompasses	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  In	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  judicial	  reform	  is	  largely	  supported	  by	   international	  donors.	   	   Judicial	   reform	  programmes	  of	   this	  kind	   “typically”	   consist	   of	   “measures	   to	   improve	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   judicial	  branch…	  and	  related	  entities.”427	  	  The	  aim	  of	  these	  programmes	  is	  to:	  	  	   (a) Strengthen	  the	  judicial	  branch,	  which	  includes	  addressing	  and	  reforming	  process	   of	   selection,	   appointments	   and	   discipline,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  administration	  of	  funding	  of	  the	  courts;	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  424 Interview, discussed in relation to judicial independence in Chapter 3. 425 RE Messick, 'Judicial Reform and Economic Development a Survey of the Issues' (1999) 14 The 
World Bank Research Observer 117 426 Chaskalson, 'Preface to Special Issue: Focus on the Judiciary'  427 Messick, 'Judicial Reform and Economic Development a Survey of the Issues', p.4 
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(b) Speed	   up	   the	   processing	   of	   case,	   which	   involves	   training	   in	   case	  management	  and	  the	  improvement	  of	  processes	  for	  filing	  suits;	  	  (c) Increase	   access	   to	   dispute	   resolution,	   with	   some	   emphasis	   on	   creating	  opportunities	  for	  alternative	  dispute	  resolution;	  	  (d) Professionalize	  the	  bench	  and	  the	  bar,	  which	  involves	  training.428	  	  As	   was	   stated	   in	   Chapter	   1,	   at	   the	   outset	   of	   this	   research	   project	   it	   was	  anticipated	   that	   questions	   about	   who	   drives	   reform,	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice	   in	   initiating	   reform	   might	   be	   central	   to	   the	   study,	   however,	   questions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  leading	  reform	  tended	  to	  be	  deflected,	  and	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  get	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  the	  actual	  drivers	  of	  reform.	  	  In	  South	  Africa,	  the	  government	  is	  in	  engaged	  in	  reform	  and	  transformation	  following	  the	  end	  of	  apartheid,	   and	   this	   is	   the	   key	   driver	   of	   change.	   	   In	   Ghana	   and	   Kenya,	   it	   is	  apparent	  that	  much	  of	  the	  reform	  is	  supported	  by	  international	  donors,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  who	  initiates	  these	  relationships.	  	  	  
4.3	  Current	  Practices	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  	  The	  practices	  of	  court	  administration	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  don’t	  fit	  easily	   into	   any	   one	   of	   Millar	   and	   Baar’s	   models	   of	   court	   administration.	   Each	  country	   has	   features	   of	   two	   different	   models	   represented	   by	   Millar	   and	   Baar.	  	  South	   Africa	   has	   three	   systems	   of	   court	   administration:	   administrative	  arrangements	   for	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   differ	   from	   administrative	  arrangements	   for	   the	   other	   superior	   courts,	   and	   administrative	   arrangements	  for	  the	  Magistrates’	  Courts	  differ	  too,	  with	  the	  Magistrates’	  Commission	  playing	  a	  role	   on	   advising	   the	   Minister	   of	   Justice	   and	   Constitutional	   Development	   on	  matters	  relating	  to	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  Magistrates’	  Courts.	  	  Arrangements	  for	  the	  Magistrates’	  Courts	  and	  the	  Superior	  Courts	  fall	  within	  Millar	  and	  Baar’s	  category	  of	  “transitional	  models”	  with	  very	  close	  involvement	  of	  the	  Department	  for	  Justice	  and	  Constitutional	  Development	  (DJOCD)	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  courts	   (numbers	   6	   and	   7	   on	   the	   continuum).	   	   The	   Constitutional	   Court,	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  428 Ibid., p.5 
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contrast,	   follows	   a	   “judge-­‐controlled”	   model,	   regulated	   by	   the	   Constitutional	  Court	  Complementary	  Act	  1995,	  with	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  the	  decision-­‐maker	  in	  relation	   to	   budget	   and	   administration	   of	   the	   court	   (the	   Chief	   Justice	   appoints	  court	   personnel,	   although	   they	   are	   paid	   through	   the	   DJOCD,	   and	   their	  performance	   is	   evaluated	   by	   the	  DOJCD).	   	   	   Ghana’s	   judiciary	   operates	   under	   a	  “judge-­‐controlled”	   model,	   with	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   as	   head	   of	   the	   judiciary	   with	  responsibility	   for	   judges	   and	   judicial	   support	   staff,	   as	   well	   as	   for	   funding	  (number	  11),	  but	  while	  the	  Judiciary	   in	  Ghana	  gets	  most	  of	   its	   funding	  through	  the	   Consolidated	   Fund	   approved	   by	   Parliament,	   it	   also	   retains	   a	   percentage	   of	  the	  revenue	  it	  generates	  (number	  12).	  	  Kenya’s	  judiciary	  also	  operates	  a	  “judge-­‐controlled”	   model,	   with	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   as	   head	   of	   the	   Judiciary	   taking	   on	  administrative	   responsibilities	   for	   the	   superior	   courts,	   and	   the	  Registrar	  of	   the	  High	   Court,	   who	   is	   usually	   appointed	   from	   the	   Magistracy,	   taking	   on	   the	  administration	  of	  the	  Magistrates	  Courts	  and	  oversight	  of	  all	  the	  court	  registries	  (who	  manage	   the	  cases	  of	  all	   the	  courts)	  and	  court	  personnel,	  who	  are	  all	   civil	  servants	  and	  are	  not	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  judiciary	  or	  as	  part	  of	  a	  separate	  agency	  of	  the	  Ministry	  responsible	  for	  justice.429	   	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  number	  10	  on	  the	  continuum,	  although	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  understanding	  that	  as	  far	  as	  resources	  and	  funding	   go,	   the	   Treasury	   Department	   has	   the	   final	   say.430	   	   	   The	   judiciary	   also	  generates	  it’s	  own	  revenue	  (number	  12).431	  	  However,	  as	  shown	  below,	  there	  are	  concerns	   about	   the	   independence	   of	   both	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   and	   the	   Registrar,	  which	   calls	   into	   question	   who	   actually	   “controls”	   the	   administration	   of	   the	  courts.	  	  	  	  	  Thinking	  about	  court	  administration	  in	  terms	  of	  (a)	  the	  way	  in	  which	  decisions	  are	  made	  that	  determine	  court	  administration	  policies	  and	  operational	  practices	  (see	  Alternative	  Models	  of	  Court	  Administration	   above),	  and	  (b)	  dependency	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  429 See for example: Kenya Judiciary, 'Reprort of the Sub-Committee on Ethics and Governance in the 
Judiciary' (2005), which outlines how recommendations that court staff should be more independent 
have not be put into effect.  430 Interviews, and see also K Kinyanjui, How Our Courts Work: the Administrative Practice of the 
Kenyan Courts (Transafrica Press, 2000) 431 Kenya Judiciary, 'Reprort of the Sub-Committee on Ethics and Governance in the Judiciary'  
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funding	   and	   features	   of	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   functions	   and	   operations	   (see	   Sallmann,	  above),	   these	   approaches	   lead	   to	   questions	   about	   leadership:	   if	   one	   of	   the	  functions	  of	  a	  leader	  is	  to	  set	  goals	  and	  establish	  priorities	  for	  the	  organization,	  how	   is	   a	   leader	   who	   doesn’t	   have	   these	   powers	   actually	   to	   lead?	   This	   raises	  questions	   about	   the	   power	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   –	   his	   or	   her	   ability,	   as	   Lukes	  defines	  power,	   to	  be	  “capable	  of	  and	  responsible	   for…	  affecting	   the	   interests	  of	  others.”	  	  	  This	  section	  outlines	  some	  key	  features	  of	  court	  administration	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  those	  processes.	   	  It	  begins	  first	  with	   an	   overview	  of	  what	   constitutes	   “the	   Judiciary”	   in	   each	   country,	   and	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  outline	  practices	  in	  court	  administration,	  funding	  practices,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  other	  key	  individuals	  and	  bodies.	  	  	  
Table	  2:	  Formal	  court	  structures	  and	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  
 Formal court structure Office of the Chief Justice 
South Africa 
• Constitutional Court (whether 
should be apex court under 
discussion) 
• Supreme Court of Appeal  
• High Courts and Tribunals  
• Magistrates Courts  
• Traditional Courts (integration is 
underway) 
• 205 judges of the superior courts; 
1,1734 permanent magistrates; 196 
contract magistrates. 
• No unified judiciary - 
“rationalisation” process to integrate 
and unify is underway 
• CJ is head of Constitutional Court 
and of Judiciary 
• Small secretariat to support CJ 
• Individual Judge Presidents 
responsible for administration of 
own courts, and setting priorities 
with Court Manager, who is 
responsible for budgeting and 
resources 
• Separate Magistracy  
Ghana  
• Supreme Court  
• Court of Appeal  
• High Court and Regional Tribunals 
• Lower courts and tribunals 
established by Parliament 
• Traditional courts (soon to be 
integrated via judicial review) 
• Approximately 300 judges and 
magistrates, and hundreds of judicial 
support staff 
• Chief Justice is Head of the 
Judiciary, responsible for 
administration (including budgets 
and funding) and supervision of the 
judiciary and the management and 
administration of all court service 
staff 
• Supported by a Judicial Secretary 
and a secretariat 
• Selected senior judges hold 
delegated authority for the 
administration and supervision of 
courts in the regions 
Kenya  
• Court of Appeal (limited 
jurisdiction)  
• High Court (final jurisdiction on 
constitutional matters through ad-
hoc constitutional court) and  
• CJ is Head of the entire Judiciary 
• Has primary responsibility for the 
administration of the superior courts, 
and Registrar of the High Court 
takes on primary responsibility for 
	   166	  
• Kadhi Courts (Sharia law on certain 
issues, integrated at appellate level) 
• Magistrates Courts 
• 353 judges and magistrates  
administration of Magistrates 
• CJ is supported by the Registrar of 
the High Court who is usually a 
magistrate, but who is answerable to 
the Treasury as the Chief 
Accounting Officer for the Judiciary 	  
The	  Judiciary,	  the	  court	  system	  and	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  The	  table	  above	  sets	  out	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  court	  structures	  in	  each	  country	  and	  the	   practices	   surrounding	   the	   Office	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice.	   	   It	   may	   seem	   odd	   to	  pause	   here	   to	   consider	   what	   we	   mean	   by	   “the	   Judiciary”,	   however,	   although	  South	  Africa,	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  all	  approximately	  based	  their	  judicial	  systems	  on	  the	   English	   common	   law	   system,	   the	   particular	   historical	   and	   institutional	  context	  of	  each	  country	  has	  had	  a	  bearing	  on	  which	  bodies,	  and	  which	  officials,	  are	  included	  in	  the	  “Judiciary”.	  	  In	  very	  broad	  terms	  administration	  of	  justice,	  or	  more	  precisely	  adjudication	  between	  parties,	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ghana	  at	  least,	  is	   not	   the	   sole	   preserve	   of	   “The	   Judiciary”.	   	   In	   South	   Africa,	   the	   judiciary	   is	  divided	  between	   the	  Superior	  Courts	   and	   the	  Magistracy.	   	  This	  means	   that	   the	  Chief	  Justice,	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Judiciary,	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  senior	  judiciary,	  but	  not	  for	  the	  Magistracy.	  	  	  Under	  the	  Magistrates’	  Courts	  Act	  1993,	  the	  Magistrates’	  Commission	   advises	   the	   Minister	   on	   matters	   relating	   to	   training,	   conduct,	  discipline	   and	   administration.	   This	   is	   a	   source	   of	   contention	   in	   South	   Africa,	  especially	   as	   the	  dream	  of	   “rationalization”	   and	   “unification”	  of	   the	   judiciary	   is	  not	   yet	   realized.	   	   Furthermore,	   traditional	   courts	   in	   South	   Africa	   do	   not	   fall	  within	   the	   remit	   of	   the	   formal	   court	   system	   and	  will	   always	   be	   “distinct	   from	  courts	   referred	   to	   in	   s.166	   of	   the	   Constitution”	   (with	   all	   the	   protection	   that	  guarantees).	   	   However,	   there	   will	   be	   the	   option	   to	   appeal	   to	   the	   Magistrates’	  Courts,	  or	  for	  a	  procedural	  review	  in	  the	  Magistrates	  Court.432	  	  And,	  furthermore,	  the	   Traditional	   Courts	   will	   be	   regulated	   by	   the	   Minister	   of	   Justice	   and	  Constitutional	  Affairs	  not	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  	  	  In	   Ghana,	   although	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   and	   the	   Judiciary	   are	   responsible	   for	   “the	  administration	  of	  justice”,	  chieftancy	  matters	  come	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  system	   of	   national	   and	   regional	   Houses	   of	   Chiefs,	   and	   the	   National	   House	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  432 Traditional Courts Bill 2008 
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Chiefs	  at	  its	  apex.433	  	  The	  Judicial	  Committee	  of	  the	  National	  House	  of	  Chiefs	  does	  not	   fall	   within	   the	   bounds	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   headship	   of	   the	   judiciary,	  although	   under	   the	   Chieftancy	   Act	   2008	   there	   is	   provision	   for	   appeal	   from	  decisions	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Committee	   of	   the	   National	   House	   of	   Chiefs	   to	   the	  Supreme	  Court.434	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  Kenya,	  where	  customary	  laws	  are	  dealt	  with	  in	  the	  formal	  justice	  system,	  which	  also	  includes	  the	  Kadhi	  court	  system	  to	  deal	  with	  Sharia	  law.	  	  	  	  The	  definition	  of	  the	  “Judiciary”	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  overall	  reach	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  but	  so	  does	  the	  appellate	  structure	  of	  the	  court	  system,	  because	  in	  Ghana	  and	   Kenya,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   a	  member	   of	   all	   the	   Superior	  courts.	  	  	  
South	  Africa	  In	  South	  Africa,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  a	  dual	  role:	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa,	  and	  Chief	   Justice	  of	   the	  Constitutional	  Court.	   	  These	  two	  roles	  are	  largely	  kept	  separate.	  	  The	  emphasis	  appears	  to	  be	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  and	  this	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  although	  South	  Africa	  is	  not	  a	  federal	  state,	  the	  court	  systems	  of	  each	  province	  are	  fairly	  independent	  of	  each	  other,	  and	  the	  system	  is	  not	  unified.	   	  The	  Judge	  Presidents	  of	  the	  provincial	  courts	  all	  receive	  budgetary	  allocations	  directly	  from	  the	  Justice	  Ministry,	   for	   example.	   And	   the	   Magistracy	   is	   completely	   separated	   from	   the	  Judiciary	   (higher	   level	   judicial	   officers).	   	   The	   remuneration,	   appointment	   and	  removal	   procedures	   are	   different	   for	   the	   two	   levels,	   and	   this	   means	   that	   the	  judiciary	  of	  South	  Africa	  is	  not	  a	  single	  organization,	  although	  it	  does	  now	  have	  one	  head,	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  “Rationalization”	  and	  unification	  of	  the	  South	  Africa	  judiciary	   is	   underway,	   but	   it	  will	   be	   a	   long	   process.	   	  Whether	   or	   not	   the	   Chief	  Justice	  can	  incorporate	  some	  of	  the	  practices	  used	  in	   leading	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  into	  leading	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  433 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, Chapter 22, and Chieftancy Act 2008 434 Chieftancy Act 2008, s.24 
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Kenya	  The	   Constitution	   of	   Kenya	   establishes	   the	   High	   Court	   of	   Kenya	   (s.60)	   and	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  (s.64(1)).	  	  Under	  ss	  65	  and	  66	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  Parliament	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  establish	  subordinate	  courts	  that	  are	  ‘subject	  to’	  the	  Constitution	  and	  have	   ‘such	   jurisdiction	  and	  powers	  as	  may	  be	   conferred	  on	   it	   by	  any	   law.’	  	  There	   are	   two	   kinds	   of	   lower	   courts	   in	   Kenya:	   the	   Magistrates’	   Courts,	  established	   by	   the	   Magistrates’	   Courts	   Act	   and	   the	   Kadhis’	   Courts	   (Islamic	  courts)	  established	  by	  the	  Kadhis	  Courts	  Act.	   	  The	  general	  rules	  of	  evidence	  do	  not	  apply	   in	   the	  Kadhis’	  Courts.	   	  They	  have	   their	  own	  rules	  under	   Islamic	   law.	  	  The	  Kadhis’	  Courts	  have	  jurisdiction	  in	  determining	  questions	  relating	  to	  Muslim	  law,	  as	  do	  the	  High	  Court	  and	  other	  subordinate	  courts.435	  	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  the	  most	  senior	  judge	  in	  Kenya,	  and	  is	  a	  member	  of	  both	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	   the	  High	  Court.	   	  There	  are	  eleven	   judges	  of	  appeal,436	  and	  when	  the	  court	  sits,	   the	  bench	  is	  composed	  of	  no	  less	  than	  three	  judges,	  unless	  the	   application	   is	   for	   an	   extension	   of	   time437	   or	   a	   summary	   dismissal	   of	   an	  appeal,	  in	  which	  case	  a	  single	  judge	  may	  sit.438	  	  In	  practice,	  three	  judges	  usually	  sit	  on	  a	  case,	  and	  cases	  are	  decided	  by	  majority	  opinion.439	  	  	  	  There	  can	  be	  up	   to	   fifty	  High	  Court	   judges	   in	  office	  at	  any	   time.440	   	   In	   the	  High	  Court,	  when	   hearing	   a	   case	   as	   a	   court	   of	   first	   instance,	   one	   judge	  will	   sit,	   and	  when	  hearing	  a	  civil	  appeal	   from	  a	  subordinate	  court,	  one	   judge	  will	  sit,	  unless	  the	  Chief	   Justice	  directs	   that	   two	   judges	  hear	   an	  appeal.	   	   Two	   judges	  will	   hear	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  435 Kadhis’ Courts Act, s.5 436 Judicature Act, Chapter 8, Revised Edition 1988 (1983), s.7(2) as amended by Gazette 
Notice No 10, Statute Law (Repeals and Miscellaneous Amendments), 1997 437 Kuloba, R, Courts of Justice in Kenya, 1997 (OUP, East Africa), 25.  This is the 
explanation given by Richard Kuloba, who at the time of writing this book was a High Court 
judge. It is not clear what the legal basis of this is. 438 Appellate Jurisdiction Act, s 5(3)(i) 439 Ibid, s 5(3)(ii) 440 Judicature Act, Chapter 8, Revised Edition 1988 (1983), s 7(1) as amended by Gazette 
Notice No 10, Statute Law (Repeals and Miscellaneous Amendments), 1997 
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criminal	  appeals,	  unless	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  directs	  that	  a	  particular	  appeal	  is	  to	  be	  heard	  by	  only	  one	  judge.	   	  If	  the	  Court	  is	  divided,	  the	  appeal	  will	  be	  re-­‐heard	  by	  three	  judges.441	  	  	  	  When	  hearing	  a	  constitutional	  reference,	  the	  High	  Court	  will	  be	  composed	  of	  no	  less	  than	  three	  judges	  appointed	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  	  	  In	  any	  civil	  case	  in	  which	  a	  point	  of	  customary	  law	  arises	  the	  court	  may	  make	  use	  of	  one	  or	  more	  competent	  assessors.	   	  Where	  a	  case	  is	  on	  appeal	  from	  a	  Kadhis’	  Court	  a	  single	  High	  Court	  judge	  will	  sit	  with	  the	  Chief	  Kadhi,	  or	  two	  other	  Kadhis	  who	  serve	  as	  assessors.	  	  	  	  	  There	   are	   nine	   ‘classes’	   of	   subordinate	   courts.	   	   The	   first	   five	   are	   ‘resident	  magistrates’	   courts’	   which	   have	   country-­‐wide	   territorial	   jurisdiction	   in	   Kenya,	  the	  sixth	  is	  the	  Islamic	  Court,	  and	  the	  last	  three	  are	  ‘district	  magistrates’	  courts’	  (divided	   into	   first,	   second	   and	   third	   class	   courts)	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   which	   is	  limited	  to	  specific	  judicial	  districts	  designated	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  	  	  	  
Ghana	  The	  courts	  of	  Ghana	  consist	  of	  two	  levels	  of	  courts.	  	  The	  superior	  courts	  are	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  and	  the	  High	  Court	  and	  regional	  tribunals.442	  	  The	   lower	  courts	   consist	  of	   the	   circuit	   courts	  and	   tribunals,	   the	  district	   courts,	  the	  juvenile	  courts,	  the	  National	  House	  of	  Chiefs	  and	  traditional	  councils,	  and	  any	  other	   lower	   court	   that	   Parliament	   establishes.443	   	   The	   Courts	   Act	   (Act	   459)	   of	  1993,	   as	   amended	   by	   The	   Courts	   (Amendment)	   Act	   (Act	   620)	   of	   2002,	   adds	  detail	   to	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   Constitution	   relating	   to	   the	   Judiciary.444	   	   The	  Judiciary	  of	  Ghana	  is	  unified	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  both	  the	  Superior	  Courts	  and	  the	  Lower	   Courts	   are	   part	   of	   the	   Judiciary	   as	   a	   whole,	   and	   all	   the	   administrative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  441 Kuloba, p.30. It is not clear what the legal basis of this is.   It does not appear to be 
covered by the High Court (Practice and Procedure) Rules that were issued under s.10 of the 
Judicature Act, although any references to hearings in the High Court are to ‘the judge’. 442 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, Article 126(1)(a) 443 Ibid. Article 126(1)(a) 444 Ibid. Chapter 11 (Arts 125-162) 
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support	   staff	   are	   also	   part	   of	   the	   Judiciary,	  which	   is	   one	   of	   the	   public	   services	  prescribed	  in	  the	  Constitution.445	  	  	  	  
Court	  Administration	  	  
Table	   3	   Overview	   of	   Court	   Administration	   in	   South	   Africa,	   Ghana	   and	  
Kenya	  









Budget determined by 
CJ (and Director of the 
Court) and after 
consultation with the 
minister, is presented 
to Parliament by the 
minister. 
Daily management and 
administration is 
carried out by Director 
of the court, the 
Registrar and closely 
overseen by 
committees chaired by 
judges, and in 
consultation with CJ 
and DCJ 
All administrative 
support staff report to 
and are answerable to 
the Chief Justice.  The 
budget is determined 
by the Chief Justice in 
consultation with the 
Minister and presented 
to Parliament by the 
Minister 




court services in the 
DOCJD is the chief 
accounting officer and 
delegates 
responsibilities to court 




The Head of Court, 
Head of Prosecution 
and Court Manager of 
each court are jointly 
responsible for the 
performance of the 




The Court Manager is 
the accounting officer 
for each court, 
reporting to regional 
and provincial court 
managers who exercise 
the delegated authority 
of the Director 
General.   
Ghana  
 
Funding is charged 
from the Consolidated 
Fund and the Chief 
Justice has final 
responsibility for the 
management of court 
funds without 
interference from any 
other person or 
authority, save for 
audits by the Auditor-
General.  Funds are 
voted on by 
Parliament. Some 
revenue generated by 
the judiciary is retained 
for the judiciary 
The Chief Justice is 
responsible for the 
administration of the 
courts, and works with 
the Judicial Secretary 
and Deputy Judicial 
Secretaries.  The Chief 
Justice’s authority is 
delegated to senior 
Supervising Judges in 
the regions, who work 
with regional 
registrars.   
The Chief Justice is 
head of the Judiciary 
and all administrators 
report to the Chief 
Justice. Funding is 
approved by 
Parliament and subject 
to auditing. The 
Judiciary retains a 
percentage of the 
revenue it generates 
Kenya  
 
Funding is determined 
by the Treasury 
Department and the 
Judiciary has to request 
funding as one 
The Chief Justice 
manages the Superior 
courts and the 
Registrar of the High 
Court tends to manage 
The Registrar of the 
High Court is the Chief 
Accounting officer for 
the judiciary and while 
the Registrar is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  445 Ibid. Art.190(1) 
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“department” in the 
justice, law and order 
sector.  The Registrar 
of the High Court  
draws up the budget in 
consultation with the 
Chief Justice 
the Magistrates Courts. 
Judicial support staff 
are civil servants.   
answerable to the 
Chief Justice for the 
smooth running of the 
courts, he or she is 
ultimately answerable 
to the Treasury in 
financial matters.  
Magistrates in charge 
of individual stations 
manage the collection 
of court fees etc – the 
Judiciary generates its 
own revenue as well as 
receiving finding 
through the treasury.  	  Ghana,	  with	   a	  US-­‐like	   constitutional	   system	  has	   a	  unified,	   independent	   Judicial	  Service,	  which	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  responsible	  for	  with	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  assistance	  of	   the	   Judicial	   Secretary	   and	   the	   assistance	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Council.	   	   In	   South	  Africa,	   reforms	   mean	   that	   the	   courts	   will	   eventually	   all	   be	   managed	   by	   an	  independent	   agency	   of	   the	   Department	   of	   Justice	   and	   Constitutional	  Development,	   although	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   is	   somewhat	   different,	   with	  much	  more	   involvement	   in	  administrative	  decision-­‐making	  by	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  and	  the	  other	  Justices.	  	  And	  while	  the	  judicial	  involvement	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  is	  not	  formalised	  in	  the	  way	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  of	   Australia,	   in	   practice	   all	   justices	   are	   involved	   in	   the	   administration	   of	   the	  court,	  and	  they	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  work	  together	  with	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Court	  and	  court	  administrators	  in	  managing	  the	  court.446	  In	  contrast	  to	  South	  Africa,	  in	  Kenya,	   there	   is	   very	   little	   judicial	   involvement,	   and	   the	   Registrar	   of	   the	   High	  Court	   essentially	   acts	   as	   the	   link	   between	   the	   Ministry	   responsible	   and	   the	  Judiciary	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis	   (the	   relevant	  ministry	   is	   the	  Ministry	  of	   Justice	  and	   Constitutional	   Affairs,	   although	   the	   Attorney-­‐General’s	   Office	   is	   also	  frequently	  kept	  apprised	  of	  certain	  issues).447	  	  	  
South	  Africa	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  446 Interviews.  447 Interview.  
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In	  South	  Africa	  until	  1995	  there	  were	  eleven	  Departments	  of	  Justice,	  one	  in	  each	  of	  the	  independent	  and	  self-­‐governing	  states.	  The	  present,	  single	  Department	  of	  Justice	   and	   Constitutional	   Development	   (DOJCD)	   is	   an	   amalgamation	   of	   those	  departments	   and	   this	   change	   is	   part	   of	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   nation	   as	   a	  whole,	  and	  the	  Department’s	  Re	  Aga	  Boswa	  project.448	  The	  DOJCD	  bears	  overall	  responsibility	  for	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  court	  service,	  and	  indeed,	  the	  “court	  system”	   is	   the	   considered	   to	   be	   the	   “core	   business	   of	   the	   Department”.449	  Although	  the	  Department	  does	  also	  provide	  “all	   legal	  services	  to	   the	  State”,	   the	  state	  attorneys’	  offices	  and	  all	  the	  state	  law	  advisors.450	  With	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Magistrates’	  Commission	  in	  1993,	  the	  Magistracy	  was	  “de-­‐linked”	  from	  the	  executive,	   and	   the	   process	   of	   decentralizing	   court	  management	   and	   devolving	  administrative	   decisions	   to	   the	   court	   level	   began.	   	   At	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  reorganization	  process	  was	  a	  separation	  of	  judicial	  and	  administrative	  functions	  so	  that	  judges	  are	  not	  burdened	  with	  administrative	  duties	  that	  dedicated	  court	  administrators	  could	  do.	  	  This	  is	  intended	  to	  increase	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency	  in	  the	  court	  system.451	  	  Another	  part	  of	  this	  project	  is	  the	  “rationalization”	  of	  the	  High	   Courts	   and	   the	   Superior	   Courts	   into	   a	   “single	   judiciary”	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	  fragmented	   collection	   of	   provincial	   High	   Courts	   and	   Superior	   Courts.	   	   This	  process	   has	   thrown	   up	   disagreements	   about	   how	   best	   to	   unify	   the	   judiciary	  (note	  that	  the	  magistracy	  is	  not	  always	  included	  in	  this	  category)	  and	  how	  best	  to	   organize	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   courts.	   	   The	   Superior	   Courts	   Bill,	   first	  introduced	  in	  2003	  is,	  in	  2010,	  still	  not	  yet	  law,	  with	  the	  latest	  draft	  having	  been	  approved	  by	  the	  Cabinet	  5	  May	  2010	  for	  reintroduction	  to	  Parliament.452	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  448 DOJCD Project Re Aga Boswa: the New Court Management Model Designed to Enhance Court 
Efficiency, 2005, p.iv   449 Advocate Johnny De Lange, MP, Deputy Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development, 
Budget Speech, National Council of Provinces, Parliament, June 19, 2004.  450 Justice Vision 2000, p.8 451 Advocate Johnny De Lange, MP, Deputy Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development, 
Budget Speech, National Council of Provinces, Parliament, June 29, 2004. 452 Parliamentary Monitoring Group “Bills Approved by Cabinet to be Introduced Shortly to 
Parliament [as of 15 June 2010]” available at http://www.pmg.org.za/node/22082   
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The	   Justice	   Vision	   2000,	   published	   in	   1997,	   sets	   out	   the	   DOJCD’s	   strategy	   for	  transforming	  the	  justice	  system,	  implementing	  the	  values	  of	  the	  Constitution	  and	  meeting	  the	  needs	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  new	  constitutional	  democracy.	  	  The	  process	  of	   “rationalizing”	   the	   justice	   system	   and	   the	   courts	   has	   not	   been	   simple.	   	   The	  Justice	  Vision	  2000	   identifies	   the	  “business	  of	   the	  Department”	  as	   including	  “at	  least”	  the	  “provision	  of	  policy,	  and	  in	  most	  cases,	  also	  administrative	  services	  for	  the	  national	  courts	  and	  tribunals”	  as	  well	  as	  the	  provision	  of	  “administrative	  and	  court	  supporting	  structures”	  which	  include	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission,	  the	  Rules	  Board,	  the	  Magistrates’	  Commission,	  the	  Board	  of	  Sheriffs	  and	  the	  Justices	  of	  the	  Peace.	   	  Part	  of	  the	  Re	  Aga	  Boswa	  project	   is	  to	  reorganize	  the	  fragmented	  court	   system,	   and	   in	   doing	   this,	   the	   Department	   has	   made	   some	   proposals	  relating	   to	   administration	   and	   funding	   of	   the	   courts	   that	   have	   not	   been	   well	  received.	  	  	   	  Both	  the	  Ministry’s	  Re	  Aga	  Boswa	  initiative,	  and	  the	  Superior	  Court	  Bills,	  include	  plans	  to	  “enhance	  the	  administrative	  capacity	  of	   the	  Office	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice.”	  But	  at	   the	   time	  or	  writing	  neither	  has	   come	   to	   fruition	  because	  of	   the	   standoff	  over	   the	  content	  of	   the	  bills	  and	   final	  arrangements	   for	   the	  organization	  of	   the	  courts.453	   	  While	   the	  rationalisation	  of	   the	  South	  African	   judiciary	   is	  underway,	  the	   Constitutional	   Court	   arrangements	   provide	   an	   unusual	   insight	   into	   how	  things	   could	   be,	   if	   the	   executive	   agrees.	   	   The	   Constitutional	   Court,	   which	   was	  established	  in	  1994,	  is	  now,	  thanks	  in	  large	  part,454	  it	  seems,	  to	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  first	   President	   of	   the	   Court	   (later	   to	   be	   named	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   the	  Constitutional	  Court	  and	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa),	  a	   firmly	  independent,	  highly	  respected	  court	  with	  unprecedented	  involvement	  in	  its	  own	  management.	  	  This	   was	   achieved	   as	   a	   result	   of	   two	   things:	   sections	   14	   and	   15	   of	   the	  Constitutional	   Court	   Complementary	   Act	   1995,	   which	   provided	   that	   the	   Chief	  Justice	   is	   consulted	   on	   administrative	   matters	   in	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	  (personnel,	   budget,	   administration);	   and	   a	   generous	   endowment	   by	   the	  Norwegian	   Government	   to	   the	   Court,	   which	   is	   now	   administered	   by	   the	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Constitutional	   Court	   Trust.	   	   	   	   This	   section	   considers	   the	   conflicts	   and	   tensions	  that	   each	   judiciary	   has	   experienced	   in	   relation	   to	   funding.	   And	   in	   the	   case	   of	  South	  Africa	  this	  discussion	  is	  led	  by	  a	  case	  study	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  its	  administration	  compares	  to	  other	  courts	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  
	  The	   Constitutional	   Court	   Complementary	   Act	   1995	   (CCCA)	   is	   intended	   to	  “regulate	   matters	   incidental	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Constitutional	  Court…and	  to	  provide	   for	  matters	  connected	  therewith.”	   	   It	   is	  possible	   that	   the	  approach	  taken	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  in	  1996	  was	  intended	  to	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  pilot	   for	   the	   future	   rationalization	   and	   reform	   of	   other	   courts	   in	   South	   Africa.	  	  However,	  this	  process	  has	  proved	  to	  be	  very	  controversial	  and	  the	  details	  of	  the	  reforms	  relating	  the	  financing	  and	  administration	  of	  the	  courts	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  finalized	  (see	  discussion	  of	  the	  Superior	  Courts	  Bills	  below).	  	  	  
	  The	   CCCA	   provides	   for	   various	   aspects	   of	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   court	   such	   as	  court	  records,	  location	  of	  hearings	  and	  witnesses.	  	  But	  the	  important	  sections	  in	  the	   present	   discussion	   relate	   to	   the	   “appointment	   of	   officers	   and	   staff	   of	   the	  court”	  (s.14)	  and	  “finances	  and	  accountability”.	  	  	  	  The	  text	  of	  the	  act	  reads:	  	  	   14.	  Appointment	  of	  officers	  and	  staff	  of	  Court	  	  (1)	  The	  Minister	  shall,	  subject	  to	  the	  laws	  governing	  the	  public	  service,	  on	  the	  request	  of	  and	   in	  consultation	  with	   the	  Chief	   Justice,	  appoint	   for	   the	  Court	   a	   registrar,	   assistant	   registrars	   and	   other	   officers	   and	   staff	  whenever	   they	  may	  be	   required	   for	   the	   administration	   of	   justice	   or	   the	  execution	  of	  the	  powers	  and	  authorities	  of	  the	  Court.	  	  (2)	  (a)	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  may,	  in	  consultation	  with	  the	  Minister,	  from	  time	  to	   time	   appoint	   for	   the	   Court	   one	   or	   more	   persons	   to	   undertake	   such	  research	  or	  perform	  such	  other	  duties	  as	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Court	  may	  determine.	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  (b)	   The	   remuneration	   and	   other	   terms	   and	   conditions	   of	   service	   of	   a	  person	  appointed	  in	  terms	  of	  paragraph	  (a)	  shall	  be	  as	  determined,	  either	  generally	  or	  in	  any	  specific	  case,	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  consultation	  with	  the	  accounting	  officer	  referred	  to	  in	  section	  15	  (3).	  	  (3)	   Whenever	   by	   reason	   of	   absence	   or	   incapacity	   the	   registrar	   or	   an	  assistant	  registrar	  is	  unable	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  functions	  of	  his	  or	  her	  office,	  or	  his	  or	  her	  office	  becomes	  vacant,	   the	  Minister	  may	  after	   consultation	  with	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  authorise	  any	  other	  competent	  officer	  of	  the	  public	  service	   to	   act	   in	   the	   place	   of	   the	   absent	   or	   incapacitated	   officer	   during	  such	  absence	  or	  incapacity	  or	  to	  act	  in	  the	  vacant	  office	  until	  the	  vacancy	  is	  filled.	  	  (4)	  Any	  officer	  in	  the	  public	  service	  appointed	  under	  subsection	  (1)	  may	  simultaneously	   hold	   more	   than	   one	   of	   the	   offices	   mentioned	   in	   that	  subsection.	  	  (5)	  The	  Minister	  may	  delegate	   to	  an	  officer	   in	   the	  Department	  of	   Justice	  any	  of	  the	  powers	  vested	  in	  him	  or	  her	  by	  this	  section.	  	  15.	  Finances	  and	  accountability	  	  (1)	  Expenditure	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  administration	  and	  functioning	  of	  the	  Court	  shall	  be	  defrayed	  from	  moneys	  appropriated	  by	  Parliament.	  	  (2)	  Requests	  for	  the	  funds	  needed	  for	  the	  administration	  and	  functioning	  of	  the	  Court,	  as	  determined	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  after	  consultation	  with	  the	  Minister,	  shall	  be	  addressed	  to	  Parliament	  by	  the	  Minister	  in	  the	  manner	  prescribed	  for	  the	  budgetary	  processes	  of	  departments	  of	  state.	  	  (3)	  The	  Director-­‐General:	  Justice	  or	  an	  officer	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice	  designated	  by	  him	  or	  her	  for	  such	  purpose	  shall,	  subject	  to	  the	  Exchequer	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  (a)	  be	  charged	  with	   the	  responsibility	  of	  accounting	   for	  money	  received	  or	  paid	  out	  for	  or	  on	  account	  of	  the	  administration	  and	  functioning	  of	  the	  Court;	  and	  	  (b)	  cause	  the	  necessary	  accounting	  and	  other	  related	  records	  to	  be	  kept,	  which	  records	  shall	  be	  audited	  by	  the	  Auditor-­‐General.	  	  As	   a	   judge	   explained,	   the	   Office	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   in	   South	   Africa,	   it	   is	   “an	  evolving	  institution”.455	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  has	  the	   same	   support	   as	   other	   Justices	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court.	   	   But	   the	   Chief	  Justice	   also	   has	   a	   role	   as	   head	   of	   the	   South	  African	   judiciary,	   and	   in	   this	   he	   is	  supported	   by	   the	   Deputy	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   South	   Africa.	   	   The	   emphasis	   in	   the	  constitution	  on	  the	  “Chief	  Justice	  of	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  Deputy	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  South	  Africa”	  was	  intended	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  both	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	   the	  Deputy	  Chief	   Justice	  would	  go	  beyond	  “just	  being	   the	  head	  of	  a	  court”	  and	  would	  “go	  much	  wider	  than	  that”.456	  	  This	  connotes	  a	  new	  structure,	  in	   which	   there	   would	   be	   a	   single	   judiciary	   “under	   vertical	   sway	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice”.457	   	   Apparently	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   concerned	   about	   the	   burdens	   of	  extending	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  office	  to	  such	  an	  extent,	  was	  not	  in	  favour	  of	  “exalting	  the	  office	  of	  Chief	  Justice”	  in	  the	  way	  suggested	  in	  the	  proposed	  legislation.	  	  	  In	   the	   Constitutional	   Court,	   the	   budget	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   in	  consultation	  with	  the	  Minister.458	  	  In	  practice	  this	  means	  that	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Court,	   a	   senior	  official	   employed	  by	   the	  Department	  of	   Justice	  but	   seconded	   to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  prepares	  the	  budget	  for	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  to	  approve.459	  	  The	   Director	   of	   the	   Court,	   who	   is	   “answerable	   to	   and	  mandated	   by”	   the	   Chief	  Justice,	  drafts	  the	  budget	  after	  doing	  a	  needs	  assessment,	  which	  is	  submitted	  to	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the	   judges	  requesting	  their	   input.	   	  Following	  the	  needs	  assessment,	  a	  proposed	  budget	   is	   presented	   to	   the	   ministry	   and	   discussed	   as	   part	   of	   the	   process	   of	  “consulting	  the	  ministry”	  and	  then	  that	  is	  put	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  who	  speaks	  to	  the	  Minister	  if	  necessary.	  	  The	  budget	  is	  then	  presented	  to	  Parliament.	  It	  is	  very	  unusual	   for	   court	   administrators	   to	   engage	   so	   directly	  with	   judges,	   but	   in	   the	  Constitutional	  Court	  there	  are	  several	  committees,	  chaired	  by	  judges,	  each	  with	  a	  responsibility	   for	   a	   different	   aspect	   of	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   court.460	   	   The	  Director	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  explained	  that	  this	  “synergises	  the	  linkages	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  administration.”461	  	  	  The	  full	  rationalisation	  and	  unification	  of	  the	  judiciary	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  achieved,	  but	  “over	  time,	  notionally,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  would	  be	  able	  to	  issue	  guidelines	  and	  lead	  in	  relation	  to,	  certainly	  the	  superior	  courts,	  and	  so	  too	  all	  other	  courts.”462	  	  The	   Chief	   Justice,	   as	  Head	   of	   the	   Judiciary	   also	   presides	   over	   a	  meeting	   of	   the	  Heads	  of	  Courts.	  	  All	  courts	  have	  local	  heads,	  and	  they	  meet	  from	  time	  to	  time	  to	  discuss	  matters	  of	  mutual	  interest.	  	  These	  meetings	  tend	  to	  occur	  about	  “once	  a	  quarter”.463	   	  A	  head	  of	  Court	  who	   is	  an	   important	   figure	   in	   the	  court	  structure,	  would	  be	  left	  alone	  to	  do	  what	  has	  to	  be	  done.	  	  But	  “informal	  chats	  happen	  all	  the	  time…	  a	  gentle	  method	  of	  accountability.”464	  	  	  The	   new	   Judicial	   Services	  Amendment	  Act	   2008	  will	   allow	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   to	  issue	  guidelines	  on	  ethics	  and	  conduct.	  	  Through	  this	  legislation	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  can	   have	   a	   greater	   role	   in	   issuing	   guidance	   across	   the	   court	   system,	   and,	   for	  example,	  keeping	  track	  of	  certain	  statistics	  about	  the	  courts.	  	  At	  present	  the	  Chief	  Justice	   does	   not	   issue	   guidance	   of	   any	   sort	   (this	   was	   not	   possible	   before	   the	  Judicial	  Services	  Amendment	  Act	  2008),	  but	  some	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  power	  to	  issue	   some	   kinds	   of	   guidance	   relating	   to	   effective	   the	   administration	   of	   the	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courts	   is	   necessary	   “provided	   that	   it	   never	   descends	   to	   being	   super-­‐administration”.465	  	  	  	  The	  Office	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  would	  be	  the	  means	  by	  which	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  would	  be	  able	   to	   implement	   certain	  administrative	  powers,	   a	   little	   like	  a	   “CEO	  of	   a	   large	  corporation”	   making	   sure	   that	   the	   correct	   processes	   are	   in	   place.	   	   And	   these	  processes	  “should	  be	  transparent.”	  	  South	  Africa	  as	  a	  nation	  values	  transparency	  very	  highly,	  and	  very	  few	  public	   functions	  are	   immune	  to	  scrutiny.	   	   Individuals	  have	  a	  constitutional	  right	  to	  demand	  access	  to	  information.	  	  	  
Ghana	  The	  judiciary	  in	  Ghana	  is	  unified,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  both	  the	  administrative	  staff	  and	  the	  judges	  fall	  within	  the	  remit	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  head	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  oversees	  all	  practical,	  administrative	  aspects	  of	  the	  running	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  and	  also	  supervises	  judges.	  	  	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Ghana	  sets	  out	  the	  full	   extent	   of	   the	   Judiciary’s	   independence	   from	   the	   other	   branches	   of	  government	   –	   both	   in	   ideological	   terms	   and	   in	   practical	   terms.	   	   An	   interesting	  feature	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Ghana	  is	  that	   is	  contains,	   in	  Chapter	  6,	  provisions	  on	  the	  Directive	  Principles	  of	  State	  policy,	  and	  this	  ties	  in	  precisely	  with	  issues	  of	  transformation.	   	   They	   are	   not	   a	   new	   feature	   of	   Ghanaian	   constitutions,	   having	  been	   first	   introduced	   in	  1979.	   	  However,	   there	  has	  been	  a	   long-­‐running	  debate	  about	  whether	  or	  not	   these	  principles	  are	   justiciable,466	  which	  now	  appears	   to	  have	  been	  resolved	  by	  the	  courts	  in	  favour	  of	  justiciability.467	  	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  head	  of	  the	  entire	  Judiciary,	  and	  this	  means	  that:	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“The	   Chief	   Justice	   shall,	   subject	   to	   this	   Constitution,	   be	   the	  Head	   of	   the	  Judiciary	  and	  shall	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  administration	  and	  supervision	  of	  the	  Judiciary.”468	  	  Under	  Art.127(1)	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  of	  Ghana	  has	  complete	  control	  over	  all	  of	  its	  functions,	  both	  judicial	  and	  administrative:	  	  	   “In	   the	  exercise	  of	   the	   judicial	  power	  of	  Ghana,	   the	   Judiciary,	   in	  both	   its	  judicial	   and	   administrative	   functions,	   including	   financial	   administration,	  is	  subject	  only	  to	  this	  Constitution	  and	  shall	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  control	  or	  direction	  of	  any	  person	  or	  authority.”	  	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  a	  specific	  duty	  placed	  on	  all	  others	  not	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  judicial	  function	  of	  any	  judicial	  officer:	  	  	   “Neither	   the	   President	   nor	   Parliament	   nor	   any	   person	   acting	   under	   the	  authority	  of	  the	  President	  or	  Parliament	  nor	  any	  other	  person	  whatsoever	  shall	  interfere	  with	  Judges	  or	  judicial	  officers	  or	  other	  persons	  exercising	  judicial	  power,	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  judicial	  functions;”469	  	  There	  is	  also	  a	  duty	  placed	  on	  all	  “organs	  and	  agencies	  of	  the	  State”	  to:	  	   “accord	   to	   the	   courts	   such	   assistance	   as	   the	   courts	   may	   reasonably	  require	   to	   protect	   the	   independence,	   dignity	   and	   effectiveness	   of	   the	  courts,	  subject	  to	  this	  Constitution.”470	  	  The	  Chief	   Justice	   of	   Ghana	  has	   complex	   and	  multi-­‐faceted	   job	   as	   the	   head	   of	   a	  vast	  organization.	   	  The	  Chief	   Justice	  has	   to	  balance	  her	   role	  as	   the	  most	   senior	  judge	  who	  is	  “responsible	  for	  the	  …	  supervision	  of	  the	  judiciary”	  with	  her	  role	  as	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the	   head	   of	   a	   complex	   public	   institution	   and	   the	   responsibility	   for	   the	  “administration	  of	  the	  judiciary”.	  	  	  	  In	   Ghana	   the	   judiciary	   (and	   therefore	   the	   Chief	   Justice)	   has	   complete	   control	  over	   all	   of	   its	   “judicial	   and	   administrative	   functions,	   including	   financial	  administration”.471	   In	  the	  exercise	  of	   its	   judicial	  power,	  and	   in	  “both	   its	   judicial	  and	  administrative	  functions”	  the	  judiciary	  is	  “subject	  only”	  to	  the	  Constitution,	  and	   “shall	   not	   be	   subject	   to	   the	   control	   or	   direction	   of	   any	   person	   or	  authority.”472	   	  Under	   the	  Constitution	  all	  of	   the	  “administrative	  expenses	  of	   the	  courts”,	  which	  include	  salaries	  and	  pensions	  are	  charged	  from	  the	  Consolidated	  Fund.473	   	   And	   the	   judiciary’s	   control	   over	   the	   financial	   administration	   of	   the	  courts	  extends	  to	  “the	  operation	  of	  banking	  facilities	  by	  the	  Judiciary	  without	  the	  interference	  of	  any	  person	  or	  authority,	  other	  than	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  audit	  by	  the	  Auditor-­‐General”.474	  	  	  Funds	   are	   released	   to	   the	   judiciary	   in	   quarterly	   instalments	   from	   the	  consolidated	   fund	   once	   the	   budget	   has	   been	   voted	   on	   by	   Parliament.475	  Interviews	   with	   court	   administrators	   in	   Ghana	   indicate	   that	   the	   Chief	   Justice	  works	  with	  the	  Judicial	  Secretary	  to	  prepare	  the	  budget	  and	  request	  funding	  for	  the	   courts	   and	   all	   budget	   requests	   are	  directed	   to	   the	   Judicial	   Secretary	   in	   the	  first	   instance	   and	   approved	   by	   the	   Chief	   Justice.	   The	   Judicial	   Secretary	   is	  essentially	   the	   managing	   Director	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Service,	   working	   with	   two	  Deputy	  Judicial	  Secretaries	  and	  several	  Directors,	  including	  a	  Director	  of	  Finance	  and	  Estates.	  	  Although	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  clearly	  has	  considerable	  control	  over	  the	  budgeting	  and	  financial	  administration	  of	  the	  courts,	  it	  nevertheless	  relies	  on	  Parliament	  to	  decide	  how	  much	   to	  give	   to	   the	  courts	   in	   total.	   	  On	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis,	   funding	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  471 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, s.127(1) 472 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, s.127(1) 473 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, s.127(4) 474 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, s.127(7) 475 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, s.127(6) 
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requests	   go	   through	   the	   office	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Secretary,	   and	   while	   all	   budget	  requests	  made	  to	  the	  ministry	  and	  Parliament,	  are	  approved	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  much	   of	   the	   work	   and	   negotiating	   with	   the	   ministry	   is	   done	   by	   the	   Judicial	  Secretary	   and	   his	   staff.	   	   However,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   does	   intervene	   sometimes,	  and	   will	   write	   to	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Finance,	   especially	   if	   there	   is	   a	   delay	   in	   the	  release	   of	   funds.	   	   There	   has	   also	   been	   at	   least	   one	   occasion	   where	   the	   Chief	  Justice	   has	   felt	   compelled	   to	   write	   to	   the	   President	   in	   order	   to	   speed	   up	   the	  release	  of	  funds	  to	  the	  Judiciary.476	  	  
	  However,	   the	   need	   for	   increased	   funding	   continues,	   and	   this	   resulted	   in	   an	  innovative	   compromise	   in	   around	   2000.	   	   The	   Judicial	   Service	   persuaded	   the	  Government	  to	  allow	  it	  to	  retain	  15%	  of	  all	  revenue	  generated	  from	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  –	  thus	  providing	  an	  internal	  source	  of	  revenue.	  	  The	  Judiciary	  (Retention	  of	  Revenue)	  Act	   2003	   specifically	   authorizes	   the	   Judiciary	   to	   retain	   15%	  of	   its	  internally	  generated	  revenue,	  and	  sets	  out	   the	  requisite	  accounting	  procedures	  that	   the	   Judiciary	   must	   follow.	   However,	   more	   recently,	   15%	   is	   no	   longer	  sufficient,	   and	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   once	   again	   requesting	   more	   funds,	   and	  appealing	  to	  the	  President	  for	  assistance	  to	  support	  these	  measures.477	  	  In	   Ghana	   the	   unification	   of	   the	   judiciary	   proper	  with	   the	   judicial	   support	   staff	  means	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Judiciary,	  and	  bearing	  responsibility	  for	   the	   administration	   of	   justice,	   is	   expected	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  management	   of	   the	   courts	   and	   continue	   to	   serve	   as	   the	   country’s	  most	   senior	  judge.	   	   This	   is	   a	   great	   cause	   for	   concern	   for	   the	  present	  Chief	   Justice,	  who	  has	  plans	  to	  propose	  changes	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	   the	  constitution	  that	  bind	  her	  on	  this	  point.	  	  However,	  building	  on	  the	  vision	  of	  her	  predecessor,	  she	  has	  delegated	  the	  supervisory	  role	  to	  Justices	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  some	  of	  whom	  now	  act	  as	  supervisors	  to	  the	  more	  junior	  judges	  –	  acting	  informally	  to	  offer	  advice,	  and	  in	  a	  more	  formal	  capacity	  proactively	  monitoring	  performance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  476 Interview 477 Judicial Service of Ghana News “Judicial Council Calls on President”, 21 June, 2010, available at 
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and	   standards	   through	   spot	   checks	   on	   the	   quality	   of	   judgements,	   for	   example.	  	  While	   this	   may	   enhance	   the	   quality	   of	   case	   law	   generally,	   it	   bears	   immense	  potential	  for	  abuse.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kenya	  	  Kenya,	  in	  comparison	  to	  Ghana	  and	  South	  Africa,	  has	  the	  smallest	  judiciary,	  and	  the	  least	  resources.	  	  Like	  South	  Africa,	  however,	  Magistrates	  are	  not	  treated	  the	  same	  as	  judges,	  although	  they	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  as	  whole.	  	  Kenya	   does	   not	   have	   a	   Supreme	   Court,	   and	   nor	   does	   it	   have	   a	   Constitutional	  Court.	   	   The	   Chief	   Justice	   is	  member	   of	   both	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   and	   the	   High	  Court.	   While	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   Kenya	   has	   overall	   responsibility	   for	   the	  administration	  and	  functioning	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  much	  of	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  work	  is	  delegated	  to	  the	  Registrar	  of	  the	  High	  Court.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  also	  relatively	  recently	  created	  divisions	  of	  the	  High	  Court,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  managed	  by	  a	  Duty	  Judge.	   	   However,	   the	   length	   of	   time	   a	   Duty	   Judge	   remains	   in	   each	   division	   is	  flexible	   and	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  moves	   people	   around	  often.	   	  Manpower,	   physical	  resources	   and	   financial	   resources	   are	   scarce	   in	   the	  Kenyan	   Judiciary.	   	   And	   the	  Chief	  Justice	  remains	  at	  somewhat	  of	  a	  distance	  from	  both	  judges	  (refusing	  to	  see	  them	  in	  person)	  and	  administrative	  staff	  (leaving	  much	  of	  their	  management	  to	  the	  Registrar).	  	  Chief	  Justice	  does	  have	  numerous	  powers	  contained	  in	  legislation	  and	  subordinate	  legislation	  and	  he	  chairs	  most	  of	  the	  committees	  that	  have	  been	  set	  up	  in	  the	  judiciary	  to	  deal	  with	  all	  kinds	  of	  things,	  from	  discipline,	  to	  reform	  to	   law	  reporting.	   	  So	  there	   is	  an	  apparently	  controlling	  Chief	   Justice	  who	   is	  not	  always	  in	  evidence.	  	  	  	  The	  Office	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  Kenya,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  is	  recognised,	  is	  severely	  compromised	  by	  a	  complete	  lack	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  it.	  	  In	  2005,	  68%	  of	  the	  judicial	   officers,	   lawyers,	   legal	   academics	   and	   members	   of	   the	   public	   who	  responded	   to	   a	   survey	   conducted	   by	   the	   Kenya	   section	   of	   the	   International	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Commission	  of	  Jurists	  felt	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  Kenya	  was	  not	  independent.478	  	  	  	  This	  was	  a	   survey	  carried	  out	  by	  a	   civil	   society	  group	   lobbying	   for	   change	  and	  reform	  in	  the	   judiciary.	   	  The	  findings	  are	  a	  result	  of	  a	  qualitative	  survey	  of	  365	  judicial	   officers,	   lawyers,	   legal	   academics	   and	   civil	   society	   practitioners	   in	  Nairobi,	  coupled	  with	  responses	  to	  a	  qualitative	  survey	  of	  further	  judicial	  officers	  and	  lawyers	  in	  four	  additional	  districts.	  	  The	  responses	  to	  this	  survey	  raise	  some	  urgent	  questions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  office	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  Kenya.	  	  	  	  On	  the	  face	  of	   it,	   there	  is	  apparently	  enormous	  potential	   for	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  Kenya	  to	  be	  extremely	  influential	  in	  many	  ways.	  And	  questions	  or	  doubts	  about	  his	   independence	   and	   integrity	   (especially	   when	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   directly	  appointed	   by	   the	   President)	   have	   considerable	   ramifications.	   	   As	   the	   ICJ	  concluded:	  	  	   “These	  unfettered	  powers	  have	  resulted	   in	   the	  office	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  being	  a	  political	  office	  whose	  appointment	   is	  dependent	  on	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  incumbent	  Head	  of	  State.	  	  	   Over	  the	  years,	  political	  nepotism	  and	  regional	  factors	  have	  become	  key	  factors	  for	  	   consideration	   when	  appointing	   Chief	   Justices.	   	  Many	   commentators	   perceived	   this	   to	   be	   the	  genesis	  of	  the	  problems	  affecting	  the	  Judiciary	  today,	  for	  it	  is	  at	  this	  point	  that	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  is	  severely	  compromised.	  	  The	  end	  result	  of	  this	  has	  been	  widespread	  corruption,	  inefficiency,	  inaccessibility,	  and	  basically	  a	  malfunctioning	  Judiciary.”479	  	  	  Respondents	  to	  this	  survey	  appear	  to	  be	  divided	  fairly	  equally	  between	  the	  view	  that	   the	   current	   powers	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   “severely	   undermine	   the	  independence	   of	   the	   Judiciary”	   (43%)	   and	   the	   view	   that	   these	   powers	   do	   not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  478 International Commission of Jurists, Strengthening Judicial Reforms in Kenya: 
Administrative Reforms (Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Nairobi 
2005), p.15 479 Ibid., p.15 
	   184	  
undermine	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  (44%).480	  	  And	  although	  it	  is	  clear	  that	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   “undermines	   personal	   independence	   of	   most	   judicial	  officers”481	   and	   that	   his	   “immense	   powers	   have	   made	   the	   office	   dictatorial	  towards	   judicial	   officers”482	   the	   respondents	   do	   not	   agree	   on	   the	   cause	   of	   this	  influence	  on	  other	  judges:	  is	  it	  the	  person	  in	  office	  or	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  office?	  	  	  It	  is	   very	   clear,	   however,	   that	   the	   respondents	   are	   in	   broad	   agreement	   that	   the	  powers	   and	   duties	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   are	   far-­‐reaching	   and	   affect	   both	   the	  professional	  and	  personal	  lives	  of	  judicial	  officers	  in	  Kenya,	  that	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  appointment	   procedure	   for	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   susceptible	   to	  influence	   from	   the	  President	   and	  Government	   of	   the	   day,	   and	   that	   the	   current	  system	  for	  appointing	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  affects	  the	  administrative	  structure	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  (74%).	  	  There	  is	  also	  broad	  agreement	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  should	  take	  some	   kind	   of	   leadership	   role,	   although	   whether	   this	   should	   extend	   beyond	   a	  narrow	   view	   of	   judicial	   leadership	   in	   terms	   of	   decision-­‐making	   and	   the	  development	   of	   legal	   jurisprudence	   to	   administrative	   leadership	   is	   not	   agreed,	  nor	   explored	   in	   depth.	   	   However,	   the	   views	   of	   the	   68%	  who	   thought	   that	   the	  office	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  “does	  not	  adequately	  facilitate	  judicial	  reforms	  in	  Kenya”483	  would	   seem	   to	   suggest	   that	   some	   form	   of	   broad	   leadership	   is	   necessary,	  especially	  as	  one	  of	  the	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  office	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  it	  stands	  today	  is	   said	   to	   be	   its	   “failure	   to	   provide	   leadership	   in	   the	   national	   reform	   agenda.”	  	  The	   question	   of	   the	   accountability	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   of	   great	   concern,	  especially	  given	  the	  view	  that	  he	  and	  his	  office	  are	  susceptible	  to	  abuse.484	  	  	  This	   survey	   is	   useful	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   suggests	   that	   there	   are	   very	   deep	  concerns	  about	  the	  office	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  Kenya	  and	  the	  effect	  that	  has	  on	  the	  functioning	   and	   independence	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   likelihood	   of	  achieving	   effective	   reforms	   to	   address	   corruption,	   inefficiency,	   ineptitude	   and	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lack	  of	  integrity	  in	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  It	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  time	  is	  ripe	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  issue	  –	  there	  is	  a	  new	  willingness	  to	  engage	  with	  this	  very	  difficult	  and	  sensitive	  issue.	  	  	  	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  Kenya	  is	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Kenyan	  judiciary;	  is	  the	  only	  person	  with	   the	   power	   to	   constitute	   an	   ad-­‐hoc	   constitutional	   court	   when	   a	  constitutional	  reference	  is	  made;	  is	  a	  judge	  on	  both	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	  the	  High	   Court	   and	   enjoys	   several	   far-­‐reaching	   discretionary	   powers	   which	   affect	  both	   individual	   judges	   and	   their	   working	   environment,	   and	   the	   working	  practices	  of	  the	  courts	   in	  general.	   	  For	  example,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  decides	  which	  particular	   courts	   individual	   judges	   sit	   in,	   the	   cases	   they	   hear,	   the	   conferences	  they	  attend	  and	  what	  they	  can	  or	  cannot	  speak	  about	  publicly;	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  also	  sets	  the	  rules	  of	  practice	  and	  procedure	  for	  the	  High	  Court	  and	  subordinate	  courts,	  which	  powers,	  according	  to	  some	  respondents,	   the	  current	  Chief	   Justice	  exercises	  “exclusively	  with	  very	  minimal	  or	  no	  consultations	  and	  involvement	  of	  key	  players,	  often	  leading	  to	  manipulation	  and	  intimidation.”485	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  the	  Chair	  of	  the	  five-­‐member	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission	  which	  is	  responsible	  for	  making	   recommendations	   for	   judicial	   appointments,	   and	   the	  discipline	   and	  removal	   of	   all	   lower-­‐level	   judges;	   and	   is	   responsible	   for	   recommending	   to	   the	  President	   that	   a	   judge	  of	   the	  High	  Court	   or	  Court	   of	  Appeal	   be	   suspended	  and	  investigated	  by	  a	  special	  constitutional	  tribunal	  where	  he	  determines	  that	  either	  the	  conduct	  or	  ability	  of	  an	  individual	  judge	  warrants	  it.	  	  	  
Shared	  leadership	  or	  divided	  leadership?	  	  The	  role	  of	  Deputies,	  Judicial	  Secretaries	  
and	  Registrars	  	  Of	   the	   three	   countries	   in	   this	   study,	   South	   Africa	   is	   the	   only	   one	   in	  which	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   works	   with	   a	   Deputy	   Chief	   Justice.	   	   In	   Ghana,	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	  work	   is	   supported	  by	   the	   Judicial	   secretary,	  which	   is	   distinct	   from	   the	   various	  registrars	   of	   the	   courts,	   although	   the	   Judicial	   Secretary	   is	   in	   constant	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communication	  with	  the	  Registrars.486	  	  In	  Kenya,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  Registrar	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  appears	  to	  take	  on	  the	  supporting	  role	  that	  the	  Judicial	  Secretary	  has	  in	  Ghana.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  clear	  variations	  in	  the	  role	  in	  the	  three	  countries.	  	  	  In	   South	   Africa	   the	   Deputy	   Chief	   Justice	   carries	   out	   all	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	  functions	   in	  his	  absence.487	   	  The	  practice	  of	  consulting	   the	  Deputy	  Chief	   Justice	  on	  these	  matters	  (and	  indeed	  of	  consulting	  all	  Justices	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  judicial	  and	  administrative	   matters	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   Constitutional	   Court)	   is	   seen	   as	   a	  “product	  of	   the	  ethos	  of	   the	  Court…which	   is	   to	  do	   things	  collectively”488	   rather	  than	   a	   strict	   procedural	   rule.	   	   	   The	   Constitution	   makes	   plain	   that	   the	  Constitutional	  Court	   is	  made	  up	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   and	  nine	   Justices,	   and	   that	  collective	  quality	  is	  imposed	  constitutionally,	  and	  “it	  becomes	  easy,	  therefore,	  to	  extend	   it	   to	   other	   areas.”489	   	   The	   Deputy	   Chief	   Justice	   works	   with	   the	   Chief	  Justice,	   and	  represents	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  when	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  not	  available.	  	  One	  issue	  that	  arises	  from	  interviews	  about	  the	  relative	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  Deputy	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  that	  there	  is	  not	  a	  clear	  shared	  role	  –	  and	  there	  is	  sometimes	  an	  overlap	   in	  responsibilities	  that	  means	  that	   there	  can	  be	  a	   lack	  of	  clarity	   for	   those	  working	  with	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   and	  Deputy	  Chief	   Justice	   about	  whom	  they	  should	  consult	  on	  particular	  issues.490	  	  	  	  In	  Ghana	  the	  Judicial	  Secretary	  as	  the	  “second	  in	  command”	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  and	   manages	   the	   hierarchy	   of	   administrators,	   and	   the	   role	   is	   very	   clearly	  defined.491	  	  	  	  In	  Kenya,	  The	  Registrar	  has	  some	  judicial	  powers,	  equivalent	  to	  that	  of	  a	  Senior	  Resident	  Magistrate.	  	  	  The	  main	  function	  of	  the	  Registrar	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  is	  to	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act	   as	   the	   Chief	   Accounting	  Officer	   for	   the	   Judiciary.492	   	   However,	   other	   duties	  include	  the	  overall	  administration	  of	  the	  courts,	  which	  encompasses	  everything	  for	   simple	   resources	   to	   transferring	  magistrates	   to	  meet	   the	  needs	  of	  different	  court	   “stations”,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  management	   and	   discipline	   of	   personnel.	   	   The	  Registrar	   would	   be	   the	   first	   to	   identify	   a	   disciplinary	   issue	   relating	   to	   a	  magistrate	  and	  would	  have	  the	  responsibility	  of	  bringing	  that	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  to	  be	  addressed	  by	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission.493	  	  Yet,	  the	  Registrar	  is	  also	  the	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission,	  although	  this	  is	  not	  a	  formally	  recognised	  role.494	  	  In	  South	  Africa,	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  recognised	  as	   the	  head	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  and	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ghana	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  also	  seen	  as	  the	  leader	   of	   the	   judiciary	   and	   is	   expected	   to	   lead	   in	   particular	  ways	   (see	   further	  discussion	  on	  this	  in	  Chapter	  5).	  	  	  In	  Kenya,	  however,	  interviews	  suggest	  a	  deep	  disappointment	   in	   the	   inability	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   to	   lead	   (although	   there	   is	   a	  clear	   expectation	   that	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   should	   lead	   in	   some	   way),	   and	   the	  interview	  data	  in	  the	  present	  study	  is	  supported	  by	  a	  survey	  by	  the	  International	  Commission	  of	   Jurists	   in	  which	  the	  Chief	   Justice’s	   leadership	  and	  independence	  was	  called	  into	  question.495	  	   	  One	  possible	  reason	  why	  there	  is	  little	  satisfaction	  in	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  leadership	  is	  that	  there	  are	  not	  clear	  leadership	  structures	  in	  the	  Kenyan	  Judiciary.	  	  Instead,	  leadership	  is	  divided	  between	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  Registrar	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  –	  it	   is	  divided	  rather	  than	  shared.	   	  And	  this	  division	   in	   the	  administrative	  structure	  of	   the	  court	   causes	  concerns	  especially	  when	  neither	  office	  is	  seen	  as	  independent.496	  	  The	  office	  of	  the	  Registrar	  is	  said	  to	  be	  “as	  powerful	  as	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice”,	  yet	  the	  Registrar	  is	  described	  as	  acting	  effectively	  as	  a	  Permanent	  Secretary,	  and	  one	  of	   the	  major	  sources	  of	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interference	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Registrar	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice.497	  	  Another	  significant	  source	  of	  interference	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  	  	  
4.4	  Practical	  Arrangements	  Governing	  Relations	  Between	  the	  Branches	  	  	  
Relations	  with	  the	  Executive	  and	  Parliament	  	  	  Historically	   in	   many	   Commonwealth	   African	   countries	   responsibilities	   for	  “justice”	   and	   state	   legal	   advice	   were	   merged	   into	   one	   ministry	   –	   that	   of	   the	  Attorney-­‐General’s	   office.	   	   However,	   more	   recently	   the	   trend	   has	   been	   to	  separate	  the	  two	  portfolios.	   	  In	  Ghana,	  however,	  this	  has	  not	  happened,	  and	  the	  ministry	   responsible	   for	   justice	   is	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Justice	   and	   the	   Office	   of	   the	  Attorney	   General.	   And	   in	   South	   Africa	   the	   Department	   of	   Justice	   and	  Constitutional	  Development	  provides	  all	  legal	  services	  to	  the	  State.	  	  	  	  Yet	  there	  is	  a	   major	   difference	   between	   the	   way	   that	   the	   Kenya	   Ministry	   of	   Justice	   and	  Constitutional	   Affairs	   (or	   the	   Attorney	   General’s	   Office	   until	   2003),	   and	   the	  Ghanaian	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  and	  Attorney	  General’s	  office	  relate	  to	  the	  judiciary:	  in	   Ghana	   the	   judiciary	   is	   solely	   responsible	   for	   its	   own	   administration,	   from	  personnel	   to	   estates	   to	   finance	   (the	   Judicial	   Service	   in	  Ghana	  manages	   its	   own	  bank	   accounts	   and	   budget);	  whereas	   in	   Kenya,	   the	  ministry	   of	   Justice	   is	  much	  more	   involved	   in	   the	   organization	   and	  management	   of	   the	   courts	   and	   funding	  arrangements	  for	  the	  courts	  in	  Kenya	  are	  complex	  and	  fraught.	  	  	  	  A	  further	  point	  of	  confusion	  lies	  in	  the	  question	  of	  which	  ministry	  is	  responsible	  for	   “Justice”,	   given	   the	   trend	   to	   divide	   responsibilities.	   	   	   In	   South	   Africa	   and	  Ghana	   this	   appears	   to	   be	   relatively	   clear,	   but	   in	   Kenya	   the	   question	   remains	  unresolved	   and	   accounts	   for	   considerable	   amounts	   of	   confusion	   and	   political	  wrangling.	  	  	  	  Since	  2003,	  the	  new	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  (and	  National	  Cohesion)	  has	  taken	   over	   responsibility	   for	   Justice	   and	   the	   Judiciary,	   however,	   the	   Attorney-­‐General’s	  office	  retains	  some	  powers	  and	  responsibilities	  and	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  lines	  are	  not	  clearly	  drawn.	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  The	  question	  of	  which	  ministry	  has	  overall	  responsibility,	   influence	  or	  possibly	  even	   control	   over	   the	   judiciary	   is	   not	   always	   clear-­‐cut.	   	   In	   Kenya,	   ministerial	  responsibility	  for	  justice	  and	  law	  and	  order	  has	  had	  a	  patchy	  history.	  In	  1964	  the	  Ministry	   of	   Justice	   and	   Constitutional	   Affairs	   was	   abolished	   (Tom	   Mboya	   had	  been	  the	  Minister)	  and	  the	  Attorney	  General’s	  office	  took	  over	  all	  of	  its	  functions.	  	  In	  1980	   some	  of	   the	   constitutional	   affairs	   functions	  were	   transferred	   to	   a	  new	  Ministry	   of	   Constitutional	   Affairs,	   which	   was	   soon	   renamed	   the	   Ministry	   of	  Constitutional	   and	   Home	   Affairs,	   with	   the	   Constitutional	   Affairs	   responsibility	  briefly	   being	   allocated	   to	   a	   re-­‐established	  Ministry	   of	   Constitutional	   Affairs	   in	  1982,	  before	  it	  was	  finally	  abolished	  and	  the	  Attorney	  General’s	  office	  took	  over	  again.	   The	  ministry	  was	   re-­‐created	   in	   2003	   following	   the	   election	   of	   President	  Kibaki,	   because	   it	   was	   considered	   necessary	   to	   address	   the	   “weak	   policy	  direction”,	  “poor	  sectoral	  co-­‐ordination”	  and	  “haphazard”	  reforms	  of	  the	  past.498	  	  In	   this	   shake-­‐up	   responsibility	   for	   law	   reform	   and	   the	   courts,	   among	   other	  things,	  was	   transferred	   from	  the	  office	  of	   the	  Attorney	  General	   (now	  called	   the	  State	  Law	  Office)	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  which	  has	  a	  vast	  portfolio.	  There	  are	  apparently	   still	   some	   tensions	   over	   this	   transition	   amongst	  ministers	   and	   civil	  servants.499	   Confusion	   is	   partly	   born	   out	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   legislative	   changes	  relating	   to	   the	   powers	   of	   these	   ministries	   did	   not	   follow	   the	   transfer	   of	  responsibilities.	   	   For	   example,	   under	   the	  Law	  Reform	  Commission	  Act	   (CAP	  3)	  1982,	   the	   Attorney-­‐General	   has	   the	   power	   to	   appoint	   the	   secretary	   to	   the	  Commission	   and	   to	   request	   and	   receive	   proposals	   for	   law	   reforms	   which	   are	  then	  disseminated	  by	  the	  Attorney	  General	  to	  other	  departments	  of	  government.	  	  These	   powers	   are	   augmented	   by	   the	   Attorney	   General’s	   “powers	   of	   revision”	  under	   the	   Revision	   of	   Laws	   Act	   (CAP	   1)	   1979.	   	   However,	   the	   Law	   Reform	  Commission	  is	  now	  listed	  as	  one	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice’s	  “functions”	  and	  is	  no	  longer	  exclusively	  within	  the	  remit	  of	  the	  State	  Law	  Office.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  Law	  Reform	  Commission	  still	  takes	  direction	  from	  the	  Attorney	  General	  (because	  statutes	   dictates	   this),	   but	   its	   financing	   and	   administration	   is	   now	   within	   the	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remit	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice.500	  	  This	  is	  just	  one	  example	  of	  how	  the	  transition	  created	   confusion	   and	   tensions.	   	   In	   relation	   to	   the	   judiciary,	   the	   Ministry	   of	  Justice’s	   function	   includes	   “policy	   of	   the	   administration	   of	   justice”	   and	  coordination	   of	   the	   Governance,	   Justice,	   Law	   and	   Order	   Sector	   Reform	  Programme,	   which	   includes	   the	   judiciary.	   	   A	   newsletter	   published	   by	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  in	  2008	  celebrating	  the	  fifth	  anniversary	  of	  the	  ministry	  sets	  out	  the	  challenges	  it	  faced:	  	  	   “The	  sector	   institutions	  have	  had	   little	  or	  no	  collaboration	  and	  hence	  no	  synergy	  has	  been	  generated	   in	  the	   institutions	  within	  the	  sector.	  Having	  no	   sectoral	   voice,	   the	   institutions	   had	   suffered	   serious	   neglect	   over	   the	  years	  in	  terms	  of	  policy	  development	  focus	  and	  budgetary	  provision.”501	  	  “There	  is	  also	  the	  handicap	  created	  by	  institutional	  incapacity	  as	  a	  result	  of	   decay	   of	   the	   legal	   and	   justice	   sector	   after	   decades	   of	   neglect	   of	   the	  sector	   institutions.	   Critical	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	   judiciary,	   the	   police,	  and	   the	   Attorney	   General’s	   office	   lack	   the	   capacity	   –	   both	   human	   and	  material	  -­‐	  to	  play	  their	  roles	  effectively…”502	  	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  separating	  out	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  a	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  has	   from	   those	   of	   the	   Attorney	   General’s	   office	   was	   to	   “de-­‐politicize”	   the	  Attorney	  General’s	  Office.	  	  	  	  	  Section	  16(1)	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Kenya	  2008503	  provides	  that	  “There	  shall	  be	  such	   offices	   of	  Minister	   of	   the	  Government	   of	   Kenya	   as	  may	   be	   established	   by	  Parliament	  or,	  subject	  to	  any	  provisions	  made	  by	  Parliament,	  by	  the	  President.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500 See KLRC website on “Institutional Relationships” - 
http://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=9&Itemid=29&limit=1&limitst
art=2 501 Ministry of Justice Newsletter, 2008 at p.1. Available at 
http://www.justice.go.ke/images/stories/newsletter2008-09.pdf 502 Ibid. 503 Constitution of Kenya 2008, s.16(1) 
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This,	   according	   to	   the	   Handbook	   on	   Governing	   Responsibility	   in	   Kenya,	   means	  that,	   “Cabinet	  Members	  are	  accountable	   to	  both	  the	  President	  and	  the	  National	  Assembly	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  their	  duties.”504	  	  Ministers	  are	  also	  “individually	  accountable	   for	   executing	   the	   responsibilities	   assigned	   to	   them	   by	   the	  President.”505	   	   Ministerial	   accountability	   to	   Parliament	   is	   interpreted	   to	   mean	  that	   Ministers	   should	   “work	   closely,	   consistently	   and	   in	   a	   well-­‐coordinated	  manner	  in	  liaison	  with	  the	  National	  Assembly”	  and	  that	  Ministers	  are	  expected	  to	  “participate	   in	   the	   approval	   of	   government	   policies	   before	   presentation	   to	   the	  National	  Assembly.”506	  	  The	  very	  act	  of	  participating	  in	  cabinet	  decision-­‐making	  means	  that	  they	  “own	  all	  Cabinet	  decisions	  and	  cannot	  disown	  them	  unless	  they	  resign	   from	  government”	   and	   they	   are	   expected	   to	   “observe	  Cabinet	   solidarity	  and	   confidentiality.”507	   	   The	   President	   “spells	   out	   the	   duties”	   of	   Ministers	  through	  Presidential	  Circulars,	   in	  addition	  to	  the	  powers	  vested	  in	  Ministers	  by	  law,	  which	   are	   “held	   in	   trust	   of	   the	   State.”508	   	  Ministers	   are	   responsible	   to	   the	  National	  Assembly	  “individually	  and	  for	  actions	  of	  subordinate	  staff	  and	  bodies	  falling	  under	  their	  ministry”.509	  	  The	   Handbook	   on	   Governing	   Responsibility	   sets	   out	   the	   responsibilities	   of	  Ministers	   in	   their	   interaction	   with	   the	   judiciary	   and	   with	   other	   agencies	   of	  government.	   It	   is	   interesting	   that	   the	  duty	  not	   to	   interfere	  with	   the	   judiciary	   is	  presented	   as	   a	   limitation	   on	   the	   Minister’s	   responsibilities	   to	   his	   or	   her	  constituents,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  ministerial	  responsibility:	  	   “As	   Members	   of	   Parliament,	   Ministers	   have	   responsibilities	   to	   their	  constituents.	   	   However,	   there	   are	   limitations	   on	   their	   ability	   to	   act	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  504 Office of the President, Handbook on Governing Responsibility, (Republic of Kenya, Nairobi 
2005), p.1 505 Ibid.  506 Ibid., p.2 507 Ibid. 508 Ibid. 509 Ibid. 
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behalf	  of	  constituents	  or	  others,	  including	  themselves,	  when	  dealing	  with	  certain	  government	  agencies.”510	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  presented	  as	  a	  direction	  from	  the	  President	  not	  to	  intervene	  in	  matters	  before	  the	  courts:	  	  	   “The	   President	   expects	   Ministers	   and	   their	   staff	   not	   to	   intervene,	   or	  appear	  to	  intervene,	  on	  behalf	  of	  anyone,	  including	  constituents,	  with	  the	  Judiciary	  concerning	  any	  matter	  pending	  before	  the	  courts.	  	  	  Ministers	  and	  their	  staff	  are	  also	  expected	  not	  to	  intervene,	  or	  appear	  to	  intervene,	   on	   behalf	   of	   anyone,	   including	   constituents,	   with	   judicial	  tribunals	   on	   any	   matter	   before	   them	   that	   requires	   a	   decision	   in	   their	  judicial	   capacity,	   unless	   otherwise	   authorized	   by	   law.	   Ministers	   are	  therefore	   responsible	   for	   ensuring	   that	   they	   and	   their	   staff	   understand	  and	   respect	   the	   need	   for	   non-­‐interference	   and	   an	   arm’s	   length	  relationship	  with	  these	  organizations	  should	  be	  maintained.”511	  	  Certain	   aspects	   of	   this	   direction	   to	  ministers	   by	   the	  President	   are	   noteworthy.	  	  First,	   this	   is	   a	   very	   limited	   constraint	   on	  Ministers.	  They	   are	   “expected”	  not	   to	  intervene	   in	   “any	  matter	   before	   the	   courts”.	   	   There	   is	   no	   duty	   or	   direction	   to	  respect	   the	   independence	  of	   judges	  and	   the	  courts	  per	  se.	   	  There	   is	  no	  duty	   to	  refrain	  from	  interfering	  with,	  or	  commenting	  on	  the	  business	  of	  the	  courts,	  or	  a	  direction	   to	   engage	   respectfully	   with	   issues	   relating	   to	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	  courts.	  Second,	   this	   is	   the	  only	  restraint	  on	  Ministers	   in	   their	  dealings	  with	   the	  courts	   as	   whole.	   	   Judicial	   power	   is	   not	   vested	   in	   the	   judiciary	   under	   the	  Constitution,	  and	  no	  duty	  to	  assist	  the	  judiciary	  or	  to	  maintain	  the	  independence	  of	   the	   judiciary	   exists.512	   The	   characterization	   of	   the	   expected	   relationship	  between	   Ministers	   and	   “judicial	   organizations”	   is	   interesting	   as	   it	   suggests	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  510 Ibid., p.3 511 Ibid. 512 Constitution of Kenya  
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distancing	   from	  the	   judiciary,	  rather	  than	  one	  of	  appropriate	  engagement.	   	  The	  judiciary	   is	   presented	   in	   rather	   disparaging	   terms,	   as	   a	   kind	   of	   special	   needs	  institution	   rather	   than	   an	   important	   institution	  with	   clear	   responsibilities	   that	  the	  government	  must	  really	  respect.	  	  	  In	   South	   Africa,	   all	   matters	   relating	   to	   the	   Judiciary	   must	   be	   prescribed	   by	  legislation,	  meaning	   that	   any	   changes	   to	   court	  divisions	  etc	  must	  be	  processed	  through	  legislation	  approved	  by	  Parliament.	   	  There	  is	  therefore	  a	  much	  greater	  need	  for	  the	  Judiciary	  in	  South	  Africa	  to	  be	  on	  good	  terms	  with	  Parliament	  than	  in	  the	  other	  two	  countries.	  	  On	  an	  informal	  level,	  the	  executive	  consults	  the	  Chief	  Justice	   on	   legislation	   that	   relates	   to	   the	   judiciary	   before	   presenting	   it	   to	  Parliament.513	  	  In	  Ghana,	  the	  Judicial	  Council,	  which	  is	  a	  “forum	  for	  consideration	  and	  discussion	  of	  matters	  relating	  to	  the	  discharge	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  and	  thereby	  assist	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  his	  duties	  with	  a	  view	  to	  ensuring	  efficiency	  and	  effective	  realization	  of	  justice”,514	  proposes	  and	  considers	  reforms	  of	  the	  judiciary	  with	  a	  view	  to	  presenting	  them	  to	  the	  executive	  and	  Parliament.	  In	  this	  way,	  judicial	  reforms	  in	  Ghana	  are	  judiciary-­‐lead.	  	  	  
The	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission	  and	  Judicial	  Council	  	  While	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  focus	  on	  the	  thorny	  issue	  of	  judicial	  appointments	  (a	  rich	  topic	  for	  another	  study	  altogether),	  the	  issue	  of	  appointments	  is	  relevant	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  two	  ways.	  	  The	  first	  way	  is	  through	  the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   role	   as	   Chair	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Service	   Commission	   (in	   South	  Africa	  and	  Kenya)	  and	  the	  Judicial	  Council	  (in	  Ghana),	   the	  body	  responsible	   for	  making	   recommendations	   for	   judicial	   appointments.	   	   	   The	   other	  way	   in	  which	  this	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  particularly	  in	  Ghana,	  is	  due	  to	  the	  practices	   involved	   in	   being	   “noticed”	   for	   judicial	   promotions.	   	   In	   Ghana	   this	   is	  done	  through	  a	  system	  of	  supervision	  and	  recommendations	  (discussed	  in	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  513 Interview. 514 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana , art.154(1)(b) 
	   194	  
detail	  in	  chapter	  5).	  	  In	  South	  Africa	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission	  is	  the	  body	  responsible	   for	   investigating	  whether	   or	   not	   a	   judge	   should	   be	   removed	   from	  office.515	  	  The	  Magistrates’	  Commission	  investigates	  in	  relation	  to	  Magistrates.	  	  In	  Ghana	  where	   there	   is	   a	   case	   for	   the	   removal	   of	   a	   judge	   the	   Chief	   Justice	  must	  appoint	   a	   three-­‐person	   committee	   of	   Supreme	   Committee	   of	   Supreme	   Court	  Justices	  or	  Chairs	  of	  Regional	  Tribunals	  to	  investigate.516	  	  But	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  responsible	   for	   the	  removal	  of	  members	  of	  regional	   tribunals	   (on	   the	  advice	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Council)	  and	  judicial	  officers	  (upon	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  majority	  vote	  of	  all	  members	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Council).517	   	   In	   Kenya,	   judges	   are	   removed	   by	   the	  President.	   	  First	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  to	  make	  a	  representation	  that	  the	  conduct	  of	   the	   judge	   in	   question	   ought	   to	   be	   investigated,	   whereupon	   the	   President	  appoints	   a	   constitutional	   tribunal	   to	   investigate	   the	   matter	   and	   make	   its	  recommendation	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  judge	  should	  be	  removed.518	  	  In	  each	  of	   the	   three	   countries	   the	   appointments	   process	   for	   Chief	   Justices	   is	   different	  from	  the	  process	  for	  appointing	  other	  judges.	  	  	  
Table	  4	  Judicial	  Appointments	  
 Appointment of CJ Appointment of other 
superior court judges 




President appoints the CJ 
and the Deputy CJ after 
consulting the JSC and the 
leaders of the parties 
represented in the National 
Assembly 
(Same process for 
appointment of President 
and Deputy President of 
Supreme Court of Appeals)  
(SA Constitution s.174(3)) 
Constitutional Court: 
President appoints after 
consulting the CJ and 
leaders of parties 
represented in the National 
Assembly. JSC provides list 
of nominees with three more 
names than there are 
vacancies. President 
appoints from that list, but 
must advise if any nominees 
are unacceptable, and give 
reasons.  JSC then 
supplements list, and 
President must appoint from 
that list 
(SA Constitution, s. 174(4) 
Other judges: 
President must appoint on 
Minister appoints 
Magistrates after 
consultation with the 
Magistrates’ Commission  
(SA Constitution, s. 174(7) 
and Magistrates’ Courts Act, 
No. 90 of 1993, s.10) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  515 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s.177 516 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana  517 Ibid., ss 147-152 518 Constitution of Kenya 1963, s.62 
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the advice of the JSC 
(SA Constitution, s.174(6)) 
Ghana  President appoints the CJ 
after consultation with the 
Council of State and upon 
approval of Parliament 
(Constitution of Ghana, 
s.144(1)) 
Supreme Court: 
Appointed by the President 
on the advice of the Judicial 
Council, after consultation 
with the Council of State 
and with the approval of 
Parliament (Constitution of 
Ghana, s.144(2)) 
Other Superior Courts: 
President appoints on the 
advice of the Judicial 
Council (Constitution of 
Ghana, s.144(2) 
Power to appoint other 
judicial officers is, “subject 
to the approval of the 
President, vested in the 
Chief Justice on the advice 
of the Judicial Council, 
(Constitution of Ghana, 
s.148 
Kenya  President appoints the CJ  
(Constitution of Kenya 
s.61(1)) 
Puisne judges are appointed 
by the President “acting in 
accordance with the advice 
of the Judicial Service 
Commission” (Constitution 
of Kenya, s. 61(2) 
Appointed by the Judicial 
Service Commission 
(Constitution of Kenya, 
s.69). 
	  The	  Chief	   Justice	  has	  considerable	   involvement	   in	  the	  appointment	  of	   judges	  in	  all	  three	  countries	  because	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  chairs	  the	  body	  responsible	  for	  the	  appointment	   of	   judges.	   	   However,	   the	   appointments	   processes	   are	   not	   very	  transparent.	   	   In	   South	   Africa,	   interviews	   for	   the	   appointment	   of	   judges	   of	   the	  Constitutional	   Court	   were	   published,	   but	   other	   than	   that,	   the	   process,	   and	  especially	   the	   internal	   working	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Service	   Commission	   is	   not	   well	  known.	   	   Chairmanship	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Service	   Commission	   (JSC)	   or	   the	   Judicial	  Council	   (JC)	   potentially	   provides	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   with	   an	   opportunity	   to	  influence	   the	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   of	   the	   JSC	   and	   JC	   through	   the	   kind	   of	  task	   and	   social	   leadership	   identified	   in	   studies	   of	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice	   in	   the	  US	   Supreme	  Court.	   	  However,	   there	   is	   no	   research	   to	  date	   about	  those	  processes,	  and	  information	  could	  not	  be	  gleaned	  about	  this	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  	  	  	  The	   Judicial	   Service	   Commissions	   in	   South	   Africa	   is	   also	   responsible	   for	   the	  removal	   of	   judges	   –	   and	   again	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   as	   chair	   potentially	   has	  considerable	  power	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  In	  South	  Africa	  a	  judge	  may	  be	  removed	  from	  office	   if	   the	   Judicial	   Service	   Commission	   finds	   that	   the	   judge	   “suffers	   from	   an	  incapacity,	   is	   grossly	   incompetent	   or	   is	   guilty	   of	   gross	   misconduct”	   and	   “the	  National	   Assembly	   calls	   for	   the	   judge	   to	   be	   removed	   by	   a	   two-­‐thirds	  majority	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vote”.519	   In	  Kenya,	   the	  President	  plays	  a	  major	  role	   in	   the	  removal	  of	   judges.	  A	  judge	  may	  be	  removed	  for	  inability	  to	  perform	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  office	  or	  for	  misbehaviour.	   	   The	   Chief	   Justice	   must	   then	   make	   a	   representation	   to	   the	  President	   that	   a	   judge	   ought	   to	   be	   removed,	   the	   President	   must	   appoint	   a	  tribunal	  to	  investigate,	  and	  the	  President	  must	  act	  on	  the	  recommendation	  of	  the	  tribunal.520	   	   In	   Ghana,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   a	   significant	   role	   to	   play	   in	   the	  removal	   of	   judges	   because	   where	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   determines	   that	   there	   is	   a	  prima	   facie	   case	   for	   the	   removal	   of	   a	   judge,	   she	  must	   appoint	   a	   committee	   of	  three	   Justice	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   or	   Chairmen	   of	   a	   Regional	   Tribunal	   to	  investigate.	   	  The	  tribunal	  makes	  a	  recommendation	  to	   the	  Chief	   Justice,	  who	   in	  turn	   makes	   a	   recommendation	   to	   the	   President	   that	   the	   judge	   should	   be	  removed.521	  	  	  Judicial	   appointments	   are	   one	   aspect	   of	   judicial	   accountability,	   as	   are	   the	  processes	  of	   removal.	   	  Where	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  has	  considerable	  power	   in	  both	  processes,	   it	   becomes	   important	   to	   understand	   the	   processes	   used	   in	   the	  appointment	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  The	  processes	  for	  appointment	  of	  Chief	  Justices	  in	   both	   South	  Africa	   and	  Ghana	   each	   contain	   safeguards	   to	   protect	   against	   the	  President	  appointing	  in	  his	  own	  interests,	  but	  with	  the	  involvement	  of	  members	  of	   the	   national	   assembly	   in	   each	   case,	   the	   appointment	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	  necessarily	  a	  political	   issue,	  and	  will	  be	   influenced	  by	  the	   level	  of	  power	  of	   the	  President	  and	  the	  ruling	  party.	  	  In	  Kenya,	  there	  are	  no	  safeguards,	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  simply	  appointed	  by	  the	  President.	  	  The	  process	  for	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  might	  also	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  actual	  or	  perceived	  independence	  of	   the	   Chief	   Justice.	   	   In	   South	   Africa	   the	   process	   for	   the	   removal	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice	  is	  the	  same	  as	  for	  the	  removal	  of	  other	  judges	  under	  s.177.	  	  In	  Ghana	  the	  Chief	   Justice	  may	  be	  removed	  by	  the	  President	  under	  a	  similar	  process	  used	   in	  the	  removal	  of	  judges,	  except	  that	  the	  President,	  acting	  in	  consultation	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  519 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s.177(1) 520 Constitution of Kenya (1963), s.62 521 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana  
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Council	   of	   State,	   appoints	   the	   tribunal	   to	   investigate	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice.522	  	  	  	  	  In	  Kenya	  the	  appointment	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  by	  the	  President	  has	  always	  been	  a	  very	   secretive	   process,	   with	   little	   general	   information	   available	   to	   the	   public	  about	  how	  nominations	  are	  made	  and	  how	  the	  decision	  is	  taken.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  past,	   it	   appears	   that	   in	   general	   the	   President	   followed	   the	   practice	   of	   simply	  appointing	  the	  most	  senior	  judge	  –	  whoever	  was	  next	  in	  line.523	  	  This	  apparently	  changed	  with	  the	  appointment	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  Chesoni	  in	  1997,	  who	  at	  the	  time,	  was	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Electoral	   Commission,	   having	   formerly	   been	   a	   Court	   of	  Appeal	   judge	   who	   left	   the	   bench	   in	   ambiguous	   circumstances.524	   	   He	   died	   in	  1999,	  and	  was	  replaced	  by	  a	  non-­‐judge:	  Chief	  Justice	  Chunga,	  formerly	  Director	  for	  Public	  Prosecutions.525	  Chief	  Justice	  Chunga	  “had	  to	  struggle	  with	  the	  burden	  of	  rejection	  that	  he	  faced	  from	  senior	  people	  in	  the	  Judiciary,	  especially	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  He	  was	  an	  outsider	  and	  they	  felt	  that	  his	  appointment	  over	  them	  was	  an	  insult.”	  But	  again,	   illustrating	  the	  leeway	  for	  personal	  style	  in	  the	  leadership	  of	   the	   judiciary,	   Chief	   Justice	   Chunga	   is	   said	   to	   have	   been	   “feared	   by	  many	   of	  those	   he	   interacted	   with”	   which	   was	   “a	   reputation	   that	   he	   enjoyed	   and	  cultivated”.526	  	  	  	  In	   Ghana,	   concerns	   were	   raised	   in	   interviews	   about	   the	   lack	   of	   accountability	  around	   the	   office	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   and	   highly	   political	   nature	   of	   the	  appointment	  process.527	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  522 Ibid., s.146(6) 523 Interview 524 Interview. 525 “African Chief Justices since 1968: the Track Record”, Nairobi Law Monthly, January 13, 2011 
(available at: http://nairobilawmonthly.com/index/content.asp?contentId=113&isId=4&ar=1) 526 Ibid. 527 Interviews 
	   198	  
4.5	  Conclusion	  Burns’	   conception	   of	   power,	   seen	   as	   “causation”	   which	   empowers	   “other	  humans”	   and	   is	   “the	   empowering	   of	   values	   in	   bringing	   about	   comprehensive	  change”528	   recognizes	   the	   potential	   of	   power,	   and	   influence,	   to	   be	   affected	   by	  more	  than	  just	  resources,	  as	  Jennifer	  Widner	  found	  in	  her	  study	  of	  former	  Chief	  Justice	  Nyalali	  of	  Tanzania.	   	  However,	  as	  the	  literature	  on	  power	  demonstrates,	  the	  bases	  of	  power,	  and	  the	  sources	  available	  to	  a	  power	  holder	  (or	  leader)	  will	  affect	   his	   or	   her	   social	   power.	   	   In	   the	   judiciary,	   one	   way	   on	   which	   the	   Chief	  Justice’s	  power	   is	  defined	  or	   identified	   is	  with	   reference	   to	   the	  demarcation	  of	  areas	  of	  daily	  activities	  which	  are	  subject	  to	  “executive	  control”	  or	  are	  under	  the	  remit	  of	   an	  administrative	  agency,	   and	   those	  activities	   that	  are	  within	   “judicial	  control”,	  and	   therefore	  within	   the	  remit	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice.	   	  These	  boundaries	  therefore	  matter	  in	  determining	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  leadership	  role.	  	  	  If	   models	   of	   court	   administration	   are	   “organizational	   frameworks	   which	  prescribe	   the	   way	   in	   which	   decisions	   would	   be	   made	   that	   determine	   court	  administration	  policies	  and	  operational	  practices”529	  then	  such	  models	  must	  take	  account	   of	   the	   leadership	   role	   of	   Chief	   Justice	   in	   determining	   judicial	  administration	  policies	   and	  operational	  practices.	   In	  Ghana,	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  responsible	   for	   these	   areas,	   in	   South	  Africa	   and	  Kenya	   the	   boundaries	   are	   not	  quite	  so	  clear,	  but	  as	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6,	  these	  boundaries	  matter,	  and	   judges	  have	  a	  view	  about	  who	  should	   lead	  such	  decisions,	  and	  about	  what	  level	  of	  involvement	  they	  would	  like.	  	  	  	  In	  each	  of	  the	  three	  countries	  the	  Chief	  Justices	  have	  varying	  degrees	  of	  control	  over	   court	   administration,	   which	   has	   consequences	   for	   the	   potential	   scope	   of	  their	   leadership.	   	   For	   the	   time	  being,	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  of	   South	  Africa	  has	  very	  little	   control	   or	   power	   over	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   courts	   generally,	   and	  therefore	   has	   to	   lead	   in	   ways	   that	   do	   not	   depend	   on	   control	   –	   the	   kinds	   of	  qualities	   that	   are	   consonant	   with	   transformational	   leadership	   are	   all	   that	   are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  528 Burns, ‘Afterword’, p.237 529 Alternative Models of Court Administration, p.1 
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available	   to	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   in	   South	   Africa:	   ethical	   conduct	   emulated	   by	  followers,	   nurturing	   the	   admiration,	   trust	   and	   respect	   of	   colleagues;	   providing	  intellectual	   stimulation	   and	   leadership,	   framing	   and	   reframing	   problems	   and	  showing	  individual	  consideration	  for	  others.530	  	  	  	  As	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  following	  chapter,	  in	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya,	  however,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  considerable	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  powers	  and	  when	  this	  is	  considered	  in	  the	   context	   of	   an	   office	  with	   little	   external	   accountability,	  methods	   of	   internal	  accountability,	  such	  as	  processes	  of	  leadership,	  become	  even	  more	  important.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  530 See text on transformational leadership in organizations, in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter	  5	  –	  Mapping	  Leadership	  Roles	  and	  Powers	  of	  the	  
Chief	  Justice	  	  
5.1	  Introduction	  	  This	  chapter	  addresses	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  understand	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  –	  the	  various	  areas	  in	  which	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  can	  and	  does	  lead,	  the	  processes	  of	   leadership,	   and	  how	   the	   leadership	   role	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  being	   shaped	   by	   the	   expectations	   of	   those	   around	   him	   or	   her.	   It	   also	  demonstrates,	  especially	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ghana,	  how	  this	  role	  evolves	  –	  how	  the	   activities	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   can	   shape	   the	   role	   and	   the	   expectations	  surrounding	  the	  role.	  And	  finally,	  this	  chapter	  also	  highlights	  how	  practice	  does	  not	   always	   slot	   easy	   into	   convenient	   distinctions	   –	   a	   striking	   feature	   of	   the	  interview	  data	  on	  the	  “judicial	  leadership	  role”	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  compared	  to	   the	   “administrative	   leadership	   role”	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   (especially	   in	   South	  Africa)	  was	   that	   the	   judicial	   leadership	   role	   involves	   a	   considerable	   amount	  of	  administrative	   oversight,	   of	   both	   judges	   and	   court	   administrators,	   and	  separating	   the	   two	   is	   difficult	   in	   practice,	   even	   though	   both	   judges	   and	   court	  administrators	  try	  to	  maintain	  the	  distinction	  when	  describing	  their	  activities.	  	  In	  Ghana,	   issues	   that	   in	   South	   Africa	   fall	   into	   the	   category	   of	   “judicial	   matters”,	  come	  under	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  responsibilities	  for	  “supervision”	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  and	   this	   ranges	   from	   matters	   relating	   to	   judicial	   conduct	   and	   discipline	   to	  efficiency	  and	  performance	  monitoring	  (which	  is	  described	  as	  an	  intrinsic	  part	  of	  judicial	  career	  trajectory).	   	  This	  chapter	  describes	  the	  four	  main	  areas	  in	  which	  the	   Chief	   Justice	   leads:	   judicial	   leadership	   of	   a	   court;	   leadership	   relating	   to	  “judicial	  matters”;	  “administrative”	  leadership;	  and	  leadership	  as	  representative	  of	  the	  Judiciary.	  	  	  	  Power	   is	   one	   of	   the	   “relevant	   crucial	   variables”	   of	   Burns’	   dynamics	   of	   the	  leadership	  process.	   	  Power	  also	  relates	   to	   influence,	  and	  according	   to	  Danelski,	  influence	  is	  affected	  by	  “expectations,	  values	  and	  attitudes”	  of	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  judges	  he	  or	  she	  is	  leading.	  	  Expectations	  are	  affected	  by	  actions,	  and	  actions	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can	  help	  to	  define	  and	  redefine	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  Chapter	  3	  considered	  the	  constitutional	  principles	  and	  values	  that	  might	  inform	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  (and	  the	  understanding	  of	  that	  role	  by	  fellow	  judges).	  	  This	  chapter	   focuses	  on	  the	  specific	  powers	  designated	  to	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  and	  Chief	  Justice’s	  potential	  to	  influence	  more	  broadly,	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  powers	  that	  might	  affect	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  leadership	  beyond	  the	  role	  relating	  to	  leadership	  of	   judicial	   decision-­‐making.	   	   The	   Chief	   Justice’s	   potential	   to	   influence	   and	   lead	  can	   be	   seen	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   role	   as	   leader	   of	   a	   court	   and	   as	  representative	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  But	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  may	  also	  lead	  and	  influence	  through	   the	   use	   of	   his	   or	   her	   discretionary	   powers	   and	   administrative	  leadership;	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  judicial	  matters	  (appointments,	  conduct,	  discipline,	  performance).	   In	   Kenya	   and	   Ghana,	   there	   were	   concerns	   about	   the	   political	  nature	   of	   the	   office	   of	   Chief	   Justice,	   and	   this	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   affect	  perceptions	  about	   the	  Chief	   Justice’s	  power	  and	  use	  of	  discretionary	  powers	   in	  relation	   to	   court	   administration,	   conduct,	   discipline,	   and	   appointments.	   	   	   In	  considering	  the	  power,	  discretion	  and	  practices	  of	  Chief	  Justices	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Kenya	   and	   Ghana,	   an	   idea	   emerges	   of	   the	   way	   in	   which	   leadership	   ethics	   -­‐	  expectations	   the	   surrounding	   the	   processes	   applied	   by	   Chief	   Justices	   –	   might	  from	  a	  kind	  of	  “soft	  judicial	  accountability”	  not	  only	  of	  judges,	  but	  importantly	  of	  Chief	  Justices	  too.	  	  	  
Leadership	  roles	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  	  This	  section	  sets	  out	  the	  multiple	  leadership	  roles	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  Analysis	  of	  the	  interviews	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  indicate	  several	  areas	  in	  which	  the	   Chief	   Justice	   can,	   and	   does,	   lead.	   	   Interviews	   generated	   evidence	   of	  leadership	   in	   two	  ways.	   	  One	  way	  was	  that	  some	  descriptions,	  perceptions	  and	  expectations	   about	   the	   activities	   and	   practices	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   when	  analysed,	  corresponded	  to	  descriptions	  of	  aspects	  of	  leadership,	  even	  though	  not	  necessarily	   described	   by	   the	   interviewees	   as	   leadership.	   	   Additionally,	  interviewees	  were	  asked,	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  interview,	  about	  the	  leadership	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role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  (in	  early	  interviews	  this	  was	  in	  the	  context	  of	  reform)531	  and	   many	   gave	   quite	   structured,	   thoughtful	   answers	   about	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	  leadership	   role	   (which	   focused	   on	   areas	   other	   than	   reform),	   confirming	   that	  there	   is	   a	   leadership	   role	   for	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   some	   kind	   (and	   that	   their	  accounts	   of	   practices	   and	   activities	   could	   be	   seen	   in	   leadership	   terms).	  	  Descriptions	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice’s	   leadership	   role	   address	   the	   same	   issues,	   but	  apply	  the	  terminology	  slightly	  differently,	  not	  only	  from	  country	  to	  country,	  but	  also	  within	   each	   country,	   and	   sometimes	   in	   the	   course	   of	   a	   conversation	  with	  one	  individual.	  	  	  	  The	  main	  leadership	  roles	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  are:	  Chief	  Justice’s	  role	  as	  head,	  and	  leader	   of	   a	   court	   (the	   Constitutional	   Court	   in	   South	   Africa,	   and	   the	   Supreme	  Court	  in	  Ghana,	  and	  nominally,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  Kenya);	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  leadership	   of	   “judicial	   matters”,	   which	   relates	   to	   appointments,	   conduct,	  discipline,	   professional	   standards	   and	   in	   Ghana	   refers	   also	   to	   efficiency	   and	  performance	  (which	  feeds	  into	  appointments);	  administrative	  leadership,	  which	  is	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  “judicial	  leadership”	  when	  it	  is	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  court	  of	  which	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  the	  presiding	  judge,	  and	  also	  seems	  to	  encompass	  some	  kind	  of	  strategic	   leadership	  (in	  Ghana	  the	  Chief	  Justice	   is	   described	   as	   the	   “CEO”	   of	   the	   judiciary);532	   and	   finally,	   the	   Chief	  Justice’s	  role	  as	  leader	  of	  the	  Judiciary,	  that	  is,	  the	  representative,	  even	  defender,	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  “link”	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  others.	  	  In	  Kenya,	  there	  is	  evidently	  considerable	  frustration	  because	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  “doesn’t	  lead”,	  and	  even	   though	   one	   judge	   felt	   that	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   “shouldn’t	   lead”,	   “because	  everyone	  is	  independent”,	  when	  talking	  about	  priorities	  for	  changing	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  the	  same	  judge	  emphasized	  that	  “the	  Chief	  Justice	  needs	  to	  be	  motivated”,	   and	   be	   “someone	   who’s	   exhibited	   leadership	   qualities”.	   	   So,	   even	  though	   the	   roles	   and	   expectations	   surrounding	   the	   roles	   are	   better	   defined	   in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ghana,	  there	  is	  an	  expectation	  of	  some	  leadership	  by	  the	  Chief	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  531 See account of the progress of this research and the refining of the research questions in Chapter 1.  532 A term used by judges interviewed in Ghana, and which was echoed by one judge in South Africa 
in connection with the anticipated “unification” of the judiciary.  
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Justice	   in	   Kenya	   (and	   the	   interviews	   suggest	   that	   this	   is	   mainly	   in	   relation	  leadership	  on	  the	  bench,	  and	  administrative	  leadership).	  	  	  	  In	   relation	   to	   the	   intellectual	   leadership	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   and	   the	  leadership	   of	   the	   court,	   comparisons	   in	   this	   chapter	   focus	   on	   experiences	   in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ghana.	  	  This	  is	  because	  in	  Kenya	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  does	  not	  hear	  cases	  frequently	  and	  therefore	  does	  not	  exercise	  his	  potential	  role	  as	  intellectual	  leader	  or	   leader	  of	   any	  one	   court.	   	   In	   relation	   to	   the	   administrative	   leadership	  role	  of	  Chief	  Justices,	  the	  comparison	  is	  dominated	  by	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya,	  and	  this	  is	  because	  in	  South	  Africa,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  very	  few	  administrative	  powers	  that	  related	  to	  the	  South	  African	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  
Sources	  of	  legal	  powers	  The	   sources	   of	   a	   Chief	   Justice’s	   legal	   powers	   are	   not	   always	   obvious,	   and	   not	  always	   unambiguous.	   	   The	   Constitution	   of	   Ghana,	   for	   example,	   is	   the	   most	  prescriptive	   of	   the	   three	   constitutions	   in	   this	   study,	   providing	   that	   the	   Chief	  Justice	   is	   “responsible	   for	   the	   administration	   and	   supervision	   of	   the	   Judiciary”.	  	  	  This	  places	  a	  clear	  duty	  on	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  to	  carry	  out	  administrative	  functions	  relating	   to	   the	  organization	  of	   the	  courts,	  and	  supervisory	   functions	  relating	   to	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  courts’	  role.	   	   	   	  How	  this	   is	  done	  is	  essentially	   left	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	   	  Furthermore,	  the	  Judiciary	  is	  clearly	  intended	  to	  be	   independent,	   but	   subject	   to	   the	   constitution,	   and	  as	  will	   be	   explained,	  must	  implement	   the	  Directive	  Principles	  of	  State	  Policy	  which	  set	  out	   in	   some	  detail	  how	   the	   State,	   and	   institutions	   of	   government,	   must	   organize	   themselves	   and	  work	  towards	  democratic	  governance.	  	  	  	  The	  use	  of	   the	  term	  “supervision”	   is	  unusual,	  and	  has	   in	  the	  past	  unfortunately	  been	   interpreted	   by	   some	   incumbents	   of	   the	   Office	   of	   Chief	   Justice	   to	   mean	  “control”	   –	   anecdotal	   evidence	   suggests	   therefore,	   that	   while	   the	   Judiciary	   is	  independent	   in	   practical	   terms,	   and	   accountable	   too,	   the	   independence	   and	  professional	  freedom	  of	  individual	  judges	  can	  be	  at	  risk.	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The	  Constitution	  is	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  power,	  although,	  of	  course,	   the	   formal	   constitutional	   power	   is	   given	   depth	   and	   meaning	   by	   a	  multitude	   of	   legislative	   powers	   and	   informal	   powers	   too.	   	   In	   South	   Africa,	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   was	   head	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Appeals,	   now	   since	   2001,	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	   head	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court.	   	   The	   government	   is	   in	   the	  process	  of	  streamlining	  and	  “rationalization”	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  The	  Constitution	  of	  South	  Africa	  simply	  states	  that:	  	  	  “The	   Constitutional	   Court	   consists	   of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	  
South	  Africa,	  the	  Deputy	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  nine	  other	  judges.”533	  	  	  The	   Constitution	   of	   Ghana	   is	   much	   more	   prescriptive	   and	   sets	   out	   the	   broad	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice:	  	  	  	  	   “The	   Chief	   Justice	   shall,	   subject	   to	   this	   Constitution,	   be	   the	  Head	   of	   the	  Judiciary	  and	  shall	  be	  responsible	   for	   the	  administration	  and	  supervision	  of	  the	  Judiciary.”	  534	  
	  In	  Kenya,	  the	  1963	  Constitution	  simply	  states	  that:	  	  	   “The	  judges	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  shall	  be	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  such	  number	  not	   being	   less	   than	   eleven,	   of	   other	   judges…as	   may	   be	   prescribed	   by	  Parliament.”535	  	  	  In	   each	   of	   the	   three	   countries	   the	   constitutional	   provisions	   relating	   to	   the	  judiciary	  are	  supplemented	  by	  detailed	  legislation	  made	  by	  parliament.	  In	  South	  Africa,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  often	  consulted	  on	  legislation	  or	  policies	  relating	  to	  the	  judiciary	   proposed	   by	   the	   Department	   of	   Justice	   and	   Constitutional	  Development.	   	   In	   Ghana	   the	   Judicial	   Council	   (headed	   by	   the	   CJ)	   performs	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  533 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa , s.167(1) 534 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, art.125(4) 535 Constitution of Kenya 1963, s.60(2) 
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oversight	  function	  for	  the	  overall	  administration	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  any	  matters	  relating	   to	   the	   judiciary,	   so	   it	   too	  can	  make	   representations	  about	   forthcoming	  legislation.536	   In	   Kenya	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   both	   the	  executive	  and	   legislature	   is	  more	  complex,	   and	  marred	  by	  a	   lack	  of	   clarity	  and	  failed	   communication.	   	   In	   Ghana	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   have	   been	  questioned	  and	  explicitly	  challenged	  in	  the	  courts	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions;	   in	  South	  Africa,	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  each	  of	  the	  Justices	  of	  the	  Constitutional	   Court	  were	   recently	   named	   respondents	   in	   a	   challenge	   by	   a	  judge	  who	  questioned	  a	  complaint	  of	  gross	  misconduct	  made	  against	  him	  to	  the	  Judicial	   Services	   Commission	   by	   the	   judges	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court;	   and	   in	  Kenya	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  have	  also	  been	  challenged	  in	  the	  courts,	  and	  most	  recently	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  himself	  is	  being	  challenged,	  with	  a	  petition	  for	  his	   removal	   for	   “incompetence”	   being	   prepared	   for	   presentation	   to	   the	  President.537	  	  	  	  
5.2	  Leadership	  of	  a	  court	  	  There	  are	  two	  aspects	  to	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  court	  for	  the	  Chief	  Justice:	  one	  is	  as	  the	  “intellectual	  leader”	  of	  the	  court,	  and	  this	  is	  emphasized	  most	  emphatically	  in	   South	   Africa	   where	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   expected	   to	   guide	   the	   court	   as	   it	  navigates	  complex	  issues,	  and	  in	  Ghana,	  where	  as	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  herself	  puts	  it,	  she	  seeks	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  court	  “sees	  to	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  constitution”.	  The	  other	   is	  as	   the	  presiding	   judge	  of	   the	  court	  –	   leading	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  “judicial	  function”	  of	  that	  particular	  court.538	  	  	  	  	  Before	  looking	  at	  the	  processes	  followed	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  countries	  it	  is	  worth	  pausing	   to	   consider	   the	   literature	   on	   this	   issue.	   	   The	   Chief	   Justice’s	   ability	   to	  influence	  has	  generated	  much	  literature	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  in	  Canada	  too.	  	  The	  focus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  536 Interview. 537 L Limo “Are Justice Evans Gicheru’s days as CJ numbered?” The Standard, October 15, 2008 538 The distinction between the “judicial” and the “administrative” function will be considered in more 
detail in Chapter 6.  However, there is considerable confusion surrounding the use of the term 
“administrative” which is used to refer to several different issues.  
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of	  this	  scholarship	  is	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  and	  the	  potential	  impact	  a	  Chief	   Justice’s	   influence	   can	   have	   on	   ideas	   about	   judicial	   independence	   and	  politics	   in	   Supreme	   Court	   decisions.	   	   As	   will	   be	   see	   in	   the	   account	   of	   the	  interview	  data	  on	  this	  issue,	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ghana	  judges	  are	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  independence,	  and	  try	  to	  adhere	  to	  practices	  which	  are	  intended	   to	   insulate	   individual	   judges	   from	   potential	   influence	   from	   their	  colleagues	   (in	   Kenya	   this	   issue	   did	   not	   arise	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	  mostly	  because	  he	  does	  not	  tend	  to	  hear	  cases,	  even	  though	  he	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  the	  presiding	   judge	  of	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal).539	   	  While	   this	   issue	   is	  discussed	   in	  this	  study	  because	   it	  was	  something	  that	   judges	  highlighted,	   this	  study	   is	  not	  a	  study	   about	   influence	   in	  decision-­‐making	  on	   appellate	   courts	   –	   this	   is	   just	   one	  area	  in	  which	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  seen	  to	  lead.	  	  	  	  
Literature	  on	  Chief	  Justices	  as	  leader	  of	  the	  bench	  Judicial	  leadership	  is	  a	  relatively	  unexplored	  issue.	  	  	  Much	  of	  the	  research	  to	  date	  has	   been	  done	   in	   the	  United	   States,	   and	   relates	   to	   either	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   or	   judicial	   leadership	   of	  individual	   judges	   in	   lower	  courts.	   	   Studies	  and	  discussions	  of	   the	   leadership	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  ‘task	  leadership’	  functions	  available	  to	  the	  Chief	   Justice,	   namely	   the	   scheduling	   of	   oral	   arguments	   and	   opinion	  assignment,540	   and	   leadership	   styles	   of	   individual	   Chief	   Justices.541	   Judicial	  leadership	   referring	   to	   individual	   judges	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   leadership	  exercised	  by	  judges	  who	  have	  maintained	  case	  processing	  times	  and	  prevented	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  539 Interviews. 540 WF Murphy, 'Marshalling the Court: Leadership, Bargaining and the Judicial Process ' 29 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 640; Danelski, 'The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional 
Process of the Supreme Court'; GE White, 'The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth-
Century Legacy ' 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1463 541 RJ Steamer, Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court (1986) 
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or	   significantly	   reduced	   delay,542	   or	   with	   the	   potential	   for	   a	   judge	   to	   exercise	  leadership	  in	  reform	  efforts	  on	  specific	  issues.543	  	  	  There	   has	   been	   some	   research	   on	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   over	   the	  court’s	  decision	  making	  through	  opinion	  assignment	  and	  agenda-­‐setting.544	  	  	  In	  a	  recent	  study	  of	  the	  2004	  term	  in	  which	  Chief	  Justice	  Rehnquist	  fell	  ill	  and	  Justice	  Stevens	  took	  up	  the	  role	  of	  Acting	  Chief	  Justice,	  Cross	  and	  Lindquist	  analysed	  the	  difference	   in	  court	   cohesion	   (achieving	  unanimity	  or	   consensus)	  and	  outcomes	  (changes	  in	  the	  ideological	  direction	  of	  the	  court)	  between	  the	  two	  leaders.	  	  They	  found,	   in	   this	   ‘natural,	   if	   brief,	   experiment’,545	   that	   ‘no	   confident	   conclusions	  could	  be	  reached	  about	  the	  change	  in	  Chief	  Justice	  on	  Court	  cohesion’,546	  but	  that	  the	   ‘presiding	   Chief	   Justice	   may	   have	   considerable	   influence	   on	   outcomes.’547	  	  While	  this	  suggests	  a	  continued	  focus	  on	  task	  leadership	  directed	  at	  the	  Justices	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  influence	  and	  leadership	   opportunities	   for	   the	  US	   Chief	   Justice	  might	   be	   expanding.	   	   	   Resnik	  and	  Dilg	  assert	   that	  changes	   in	   the	   ‘infrastructure	  of	   “administrative”	   functions	  permits	   a	   profoundly	   new	   set	   of	   opportunities	   for	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   to	   shape	  American	  law	  through	  methods	  less	  visible	  to	  law	  professors	  and	  the	  public	  than	  opinion	   assignment.’548	   	   The	   same	   can	   be	   said	   of	   the	   three	   countries	   under	  consideration	  here.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  542 G Gallas, 'Judicial Leadership Excellence ' 12 The Justice System Journal 39; Saari, 'Comments on 
Judicial Leadership Excellence '  543 Wice, Court Reform and Judicial Leadership: Judge George Nicola and the New Jersey Justice 
System  544 See, e.g. SL Haynie, 'Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court ' 54 Journal of Politics 
1158 545 FB Cross and S Lindquist, 'The Decisional Significance of the Chief Justice ' 154 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1665, at 1682 546 Ibid., at p.1683 547 Ibid., at p.1685 548 J Resnik and L Dilg, 'Responding to a Democracit Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the Term of the 
Chief Justice of the United States ' 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1575, at p.1598 
	   208	  
Both	  Danelski’s	  analysis	  of	  Chief	   Justice	  influence,	  and	  McCormick’s	  typology	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  leadership	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  judicial	  leadership	  of	  the	  court	   by	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   –	   these	   studies	   relate	   to	   the	   potential	   for	   the	   Chief	  Justice	  to	  influence	  outcomes	  in	  the	  court	  through	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  manage	  the	  business	  of	  the	  court	  and	  conduct	  case	  conferences.	  	  We	  have	  also	  seen	  that	  in	  Canada,	  McCormick	  has	  developed	  a	  typology	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  leadership	  that	  he	  applied	  to	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada.549	  	  Again	  the	  opportunity	  for	  leadership	  in	  the	  Canadian	  Supreme	  Court	  is	  found	  to	  evolve	  out	  of	  the	  decisional	  processes	  that	  the	  Court	  adopts.	  	  McCormick	  asks	  of	  the	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice:	   “how	   important,	   and	   important	   how?”550	   	   Judicial	  leadership,	  he	  argues,	  “does	  not	  look	  like	  a	  command,	  at	  least	  not	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  course	  and	  not	  in	  ways	  that	  can	  easily	  be	  measured,	  and	  most	  certainly	  not	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  decisions	  around	  which	  the	  study	  of	  the	  Court	  must	  be	  organized;	  the	  judicial	  hierarchy	  is	  not	  like	  the	  military	  hierarchy,	  or	  even	  the	  bureaucratic	  hierarchy.”551	  	  While	  acknowledging	  that	  Chief	  Justice	  leadership	  extends	  beyond	  the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   and	   delivery	   of	   decisions,	   McCormick	   focuses	   on	  delivery	   of	   decisions	   because	   “it	   seems	   obvious	   that	   the	   most	   important	   and	  lasting	   dimension	   of	   judicial	   impact,	   and	   therefore	   of	   Chief	   Justice	   leadership,	  revolves	   around	   the	   delivery	   of	   decisions	   that	   carry	   the	   weight	   of	   the	   court.”	  	  And	  while	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   influence	  might	   be	  most	   immediately	   felt	   by	   the	  judges	  with	  whom	  he	  or	   she	   is	  deciding	  a	   case,	   intellectual	   leadership	   through	  the	  delivery	  of	  decisions	  that	  are	  authoritative	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  judiciary	   too	   (see	   discussion	   below	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	  intellectual	   leadership).	   	  McCormick’s	  study	  produces	  an	  “empirically	  grounded	  typology	   with	   which	   to	   characterize	   the	   eight	   Chief	   Justices	   who	   have	   served	  since	  1949.”552	   	  The	   typology	   is	  based	  on	   two	  dimensions	  of	   leadership,	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  549 McCormick, 'Assessing Leadership on the Supreme Court of Canada ' ; McCormick, 'Follow the 
Leader: Judicial Power and Judicial Leadership on the Laskin Court, 1973-1984'  McCormick, 
'Assessing Leadership on the Supreme Court of Canada ' ;McCormick, 'The Choral Court: Separate 
Concurrence and the McLachlin Court 2000-2004'  550McCormick, 'Assessing Leadership on the Supreme Court of Canada ' p.410 551 Ibid. 552 Ibid.p.411 
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are	   combined	   to	   make	   a	   matrix	   of	   four	   possible	   combinations.	   	   	   The	   first	  dimension	  is	  “decision-­‐delivering”	  leadership.	  	  	  When	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  exercise	  this	  kind	   of	   leadership	   when	   they	   are	   “dominating	   their	   Court	   in	   forming	   legal	  doctrine	   in	   a	   broad	   sweep	   of	   the	   areas	   of	   law”.	   	   The	   second	   dimension	   is	  “consensual”	   leadership,	   and	   Chief	   Justices	   exercise	   this	   kind	   of	   leadership	   by	  “contributing	   by	   example	   and	   argument	   to	   a	   more	   unified	   Court	   organization	  around	  coherent	  statements	  of	  doctrine.”553	  	  McCormick	   then	   identifies	   four	   kinds	   of	   leadership	   that	   are	   derived	   from	   a	  combination	   of	   either	   high	   and/or	   low	   levels	   of	   decisional	   and	   consensual	  leadership.	   	   	   Persuasive	   leadership,	  which	   consists	   of	   high	   decision	   leadership	  and	  high	  consensual	   leadership	   is	   characterized	  by	  a	  Chief	   Justice	  who	   “visibly	  dominates”	  the	  Court	  in	  terms	  of	  “delivering	  a	  higher	  proportion	  of	  the	  decisions	  than	   any	   other	   justice…from	   within	   a	   majority,	   bringing	   so	   many	   of	   his	  colleagues	  ‘on	  side’	  as	  to	  part	  of	  the	  decision-­‐rendering	  coalition	  more	  often	  than	  anyone	   else.”	   	   It	   also	   involves	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   in	   disagreeing	   less	   often,	   or	   to	  “add	   touches	   to	   the	   decisions	   of	   colleagues,	   in	   order	   to	   enhance	   the	   Court’s	  ability	   to	   speak	   as	   a	   unified	   institution.”554	   If	   a	   Chief	   Justice	   exercises	  independent	   leadership,	  which	   consists	   of	   high	   decisional	   leadership	  with	   low	  consensual	   leadership,	  he	  or	  she	  “frequently”	  delivers	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  court,	  but	  is	  also	  often	  opposed	  to	  other	  Justices	  so	  delivers	  dissents	  too	  “undermining	  the	   solidarity	  of	   the	  Court	   and	   clarity	  of	   legal	   doctrine	  produced	  by	   it.”	   	  When	  such	  a	  Chief	   Justice	  considers	  colleagues	  to	  be	  wrong	  he	  or	  she	  will	  say	  so	   in	  a	  dissent.	   	   	  Accommodative	  leadership	  combines	  high	  consensual	  leadership	  with	  low	  decisional	  leadership.	  	  Here	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  not	  seen	  to	  dominate	  the	  Court	  and	   others	   lead	   the	   delivery	   of	   decisions	   but	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   influences	   “the	  collaborative	  process	  of	  delivering	  the	  majority	  decision,	  and	  he	  contributes	  both	  directly	  and	  by	  example	  to	  the	  unified	  authority	  of	  the	  court.”	  And	  finally,	  figure-­‐head	   leadership	   consists	   of	   low	   decisional	   leadership	   and	   low	   consensual	  leadership.	   	   With	   this	   form	   of	   leadership	   the	   “low	   proportion	   of	   delivered	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decisions	   precludes	   a	   visible	   leadership	   in	   the	   development	   of	   jurisprudence,	  and	   a	   high	   frequency	   of	   differing	   opinions…undercuts	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   less	  visible	   (persuasive	   and	   behind	   the	   scenes)	   role	  while	   transparently	   displaying	  the	   divided	  Court	   to	   the	   public.”555	   	  None	   of	   the	   eight	   Chief	   Justices	   of	   Canada	  were	  found	  to	  be	  simple	  “figure-­‐head”	  leaders.	  	  Two	  were	  accommodative,	  three	  were	   independent	  and	  three	  were	  persuasive,	  but	  because	  of	   the	  way	   in	  which	  the	   Chief	   Justiceship	   of	   the	   Canadian	   Supreme	   Court	   tends	   to	   be	   alternated	  between	  the	  most	  senior	  Quebec	  judge,	  and	  the	  most	  senior	  of	  the	  other	  judges	  means	  that	  “continuity	  and	  stability	  in	  leadership”	  tends	  to	  be	  undermined,	  and	  the	   leadership	  styles	  alter	  with	  each	  new	  Chief	   Justice.	   	  McCormick	  writes	   that	  the	  Chief	  Justiceship	  should	  no	  longer	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  “kind	  of	  prize	  for	  longevity”,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  “expectations	  that	  now	  surround	  the	  Chief	  Justiceship	  make	  it	  perhaps	   less	   appropriate	   as	   the	   cornerstone	   to	   a	   judicial	   career,	   and	   more	   a	  matter	   for	   the	  vigorous	  centre	  of	  such	  a	  career.”556	   	  McCormick	  points	  out	   that	  this	   study	   simply	   identifies	   leadership	   performance,	   it	   does	   not	   identify	   what	  causes	   a	   Chief	   Justice	   to	   perform	   in	   a	   particular	   way:	   “it	   is	   an	   open	   question	  whether	  the	  Court	  causes	  the	  Chief,	  or	  the	  Chief	  causes	  the	  Court.”557	  However,	  he	   concludes	   that:	   “the	   evolution	   of	   any	   institution	   reflects	   a	   combination	   of	  structure,	  personality	  and	  circumstance.”558	  	  In	  Australia,	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  the	  judicial	  decision	  making	  process	  so	  often	  used	  in	  studies	  of	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  now	  been	  applied	  in	  a	  study	  of	  dissent	  rates	   in	   the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  between	  1903	  and	  1975	  by	  Russell	  Smyth.559	   	   	  The	   findings	  of	   this	   study	  go	  some	  way	   to	  supporting	   the	  notion	  of	  “US	  exceptionalism”	  that	  is	  often	  debated	  in	  comparative	  politics.560	  	  However,	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  555 Ibid.p.426 556 Ibid.p.427 557 Ibid.p.428 558 Ibid.p.429 559 R Smyth, 'Explaining Historical Dissent Rates in the High Court of Australia ' 41 Commonwealth & 
Comparative Politics 83 560 Ibid., at p.108 
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does	   not	   discount	   the	   usefulness	   of	   US	   examples	   completely.	   	   One	   of	   the	  hypotheses	  that	  the	  Australian	  study	  tests	  is	  that:	  	  	   “Variations	   in	   dissent	   rates	   reflect	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   chief	   justice	   to	  establish	   consensual	   norms	   and	   exercise	   effective	   judicial	   leadership.	  	  Dissent	   rates	  will	  be	  higher	  under	  chief	   justices	  who	  were	   ineffective	  at	  attaining	  consensus	  among	  the	  puisne	  judges.”561	  	  On	   this	   point	   the	   findings	   relating	   to	   one	   chief	   justice,	   Latham	   CJ,	   were	  statistically	   significant	   and	   Smyth	   concludes	   that	   Chief	   Justice	   Latham	   was	  ‘successful	   at	   reducing	   the	   dissent	   rate	   during	   his	   tenure	   as	   chief	   justice’,	   and	  that	  this	  was	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  achieving	  consensus	  on	  the	  court.562	  	  This	  study	  also	  tested	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  background	  of	  the	  judges	  to	  affect	  their	  decision-­‐making,	   and	   found	   that	   unlike	   in	   the	   US	   Supreme	   Court,	   the	   make-­‐up	   and	  background	  of	   the	   judges	   of	   the	   court	   is	   less	   likely	   to	   affect	   dissent	   rates	   than	  research	   suggests	   it	   will	   in	   the	   US.	   	   The	   difference,	   he	   reasons,	   is	   that	   the	  Australian	  High	  Court	  is	  not	  as	  politicised	  as	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  so	  in	   ‘these	  circumstances,	  while	   still	   acknowledging	   that	   value	   systems	   still	   play	   a	   role	   in	  case	   outcomes,	   one	   would	   expect	   that	   party	   political	   affiliation	   would	   be	   less	  important	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  than	  in	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court.’563	  	  Smyth	  suggests	  that	  the	  final	  appellate	  courts	  of	  other	  common	  law	  countries	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  ‘much	  closer	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  on	  this	  issue’,	  but	  acknowledges	  that	  further	  research	  is	  needed	  before	  clear	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn.564	  	  So	  what	  does	  this	  mean?	  	  Put	  simply,	  the	  approach	  to	  the	  leadership	  and	  influence	  of	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  over	   consensus	   and	   dissent	   in	   the	   US	   Supreme	   Court	   must	   be	   treated	   with	  caution	  when	   applied	   to	   other	   common	   law	   jurisdictions,	   but	  may	   have	   some	  insights	  to	  offer.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  561 Ibid., at p.91 562 Ibid., at p.102 563 Ibid. 564 Ibid. 
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Intellectual	  Leadership	  	  Intellectual	   leadership	  of	   the	  court	  goes	  hand	   in	  hand	  with	   the	  practicalities	  of	  the	   administrative	   leadership	   of	   the	   court.	   	   This	   aspect	   of	   leading	   the	   court	  ranges	   from	   the	  assignment	  of	  opinions	   to	   individual	   judges,	   to	   the	  chairing	  of	  case	  conferences	  and	  case	  management	  in	  each	  case	  (task	  and	  social	  leadership).	  	  It	   is	   worth	   looking	   in	   some	   detail	   at	   the	   practices	   in	   South	   Africa	   and	   Ghana	  because	  this	  is	  where	  similarities	  with	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  experience	  emerge,	  and	   where	   the	   literature	   on	   judicial	   leadership,	   with	   its	   focus	   on	   the	   Chief	  Justice’s	  influence	  on	  collective	  decision-­‐making,	  is	  most	  relevant.	  	  	   “One	   does	   not	   have	   as	   much	   time	   as	   one	   would	   want	   to	   in	   the	  performance	  of,	  I	  think,	  the	  more	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  role	  which	   is	  being	  head	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Court,	   so	   that	   the	   court	   sees	   to	   the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  constitution.”565	  	  Chief	  Justice	  Woods	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  believing	  that	  her	  “core	  function	  as	  a	  judge”566	  is	  a	  fundamentally	  important	  aspect	  of	  her	  role	  as	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  In	  fact,	  judges	  in	  Ghana,	  South	  Africa	  and	  Kenya	  generally	  agree	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  role	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Supreme	  or	  Constitutional	  Court	  is	  of	  primary	  importance.	  	  There	  is	  a	  clear	  expectation	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  should	  be	  the	  “intellectual	  leader”	  of	  the	  court,	   meaning	   that	   he	   or	   she	   must	   “apply	   [his]	   mind	   to	   the	   issues	   and	   give	  guidance	   and	   leadership	   on	   a	   jurisprudential	   level”	   and	   that	   “he	   also	   has	   to	  adjudicate	   on	   the	   most	   challenging	   and	   difficult	   cases”.567	   The	   Chief	   Justice	   is	  expected	  by	   judges	   to	  hear	   the	   “important	   cases”568	  –	   the	   cases	  where	   there	   is	  “significant	   complexity”,	   or	   where	   “the	   challenges	   are	  more	   than	   ordinary”569.	  	  These	   “more	   than	   ordinary”	   challenges	   are	   most	   likely	   to	   appear	   in	   highly	  political	  cases,	  or	  in	  highly	  complex	  “landmark”	  cases.	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  There	   is	   no	   Supreme	   or	   Constitutional	   Court	   in	   Kenya	   under	   the	   1963	  Constitution.	   	   The	   High	   Court	   has	   “unlimited	   original	   jurisdiction	   in	   civil	   and	  criminal	   matters”570,	   which	   includes	   constitutional	   matters.	   	   The	   relationship	  between	   the	  High	  Court	  and	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  with	   respect	   to	   constitutional	  matters	   is	   somewhat	   ambiguous,	   as	   the	   appellate	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Court	   of	  Appeal	   is	  confined	  to	  “such	   jurisdiction	  and	  powers	   in	  relation	  to	  appeals	   from	  the	  High	  Court	  as	  may	  be	  conferred	  on	   it	  by	   law”.571	   In	   terms	  of	   constitutional	  issues,	  s.84(7)	  specifically	  provides	  for	  the	  appellate	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	   over	   decisions	   of	   the	   High	   Court	   relating	   to	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	  “protective	   provisions”	   of	   the	   Bill	   of	   Rights	   contained	   in	   ss	   70-­‐83	   of	   the	  constitution.	   	   An	   appeal	   against	   a	   decision	   of	   the	   High	   Court	   in	   relation	   to	   a	  decision	   about	   the	   application	   of	   ss	   70-­‐83	   exists	   “as	   of	   right”.	   	   However,	   this	  limited	  constitutional	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  excludes	  questions	  such	  as	  those	  about	  the	  validity	  of	  elections,	  for	  example.	  	  These	  will	  be	  determined	  in	  the	  High	  Court,	  either	  by	  an	  individual	  judge	  exercising	  the	  original	  jurisdiction	  of	   the	   court,	   or	   by	   a	   number	   of	   High	   Court	   judges	   hearing	   a	   “constitutional	  reference”	  under	  s.67	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  	  	  The	  High	   Court	   becomes	   a	   “constitutional	   court”	   under	   s.67(3)	  whenever	   it	   is	  “determining	   a	   matter	   in	   connection	   with	   a	   reference	   to	   it”,	   made	   by	   a	  subordinate	   court	   under	   s.67(1)	   and	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   Constitution	   of	  Kenya	   (Supervisory	   Jurisdiction	   and	   Protection	   of	   Fundamental	   Rights	   and	  Freedoms	  of	  the	  Individual)	  High	  Court	  Practice	  and	  Procedure	  Rules	  2006	  (the	  “2006	  Supervisory	  Rules”).572	   	  Usually,	  the	  High	  Court	  consists	  of	  a	  single	  judge	  hearing	   a	   case	   in	   open	   court	   or	   dealing	   with	   particular	   matters	   in	   Chambers.	  	  When	   determining	   issues	   under	   a	   constitutional	   reference,	   however,	   the	   high	  court	   “shall	   be	   composed	   of	   an	   uneven	   number	   of	   judges,	   not	   being	   less	   than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  570 Constitution of Kenya, 1963, s.60 571 Constitution of Kenya, 1963, s.64 572 Legal Notice No.6, Kenya Gazette Supplement No.7 (February 17, 2006). NB check for 2009 
update.  Note that these rules are issued by the Chief Justice – a point which will be considered in more 
detail shortly.  
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three.”573	  In	  practice	  this	  means	  that	  a	  bench	  hearing	  a	  constitutional	  reference	  is	   rarely	   composed	   of	   more	   than	   three	   judges.574	   	   Constitutional	   matters	  may	  also	  be	  decided	  by	  a	  single	  judge,	  usually	  arising	  as	  a	  preliminary	  matter	  before	  consideration	  of	  other	  issues	  under	  the	  High	  Court’s	  original	  jurisdiction.	  	  	  	  This	   arrangement	   has	   consequences	   for	   the	   particular	   leadership	   role	   of	   the	  Chief	  Justice	  being	  considered	  here.	  	  	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  a	  member	  of	  both	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	   the	  High	  Court	   in	  Kenya.575	   	   	  This	  means	   that,	   in	  theory	  at	  least,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  could	  hear	  many,	  or	  even	  most,	  of	  the	  important	  constitutional	  matters,	   and	   could	   certainly	   hear	   the	   “difficult”	   cases,	   especially	  as,	   under	   the	   2006	   Supervisory	   Rules	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   the	   power	   to	  constitute	   the	  bench	  as	   required	  by	   s.67(3).576	  However,	   this	  does	  not	  happen,	  and	   judges	   lament	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   rarely	   hears	   cases,	   opting	  instead	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   administrative	   tasks	   involved	   in	   dealing	   with	   case	  assignments,	   case	   transfers	   and	   various	   motions	   that	   he	   has	   to	   determine.577	  	  Instead	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   created	   divisions	   of	   the	   High	   Court,	   including	   a	  Constitutional	  Division,	   each	   of	  which	   has	   a	   duty	   judge,	   and	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	  Constitutional	  Division,	  three	  judges	  who	  deal	  solely	  with	  constitutional	  matters.	  	  In	   effect,	   there	   is,	   therefore	   a	   standing	   “ad	   hoc”	   constitutional	   court,	   the	  composition	  of	  which	  is	  determined	  entirely	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  with	  additional	  “benches”	  being	  constituted	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  and	  when	  the	  need	  arises.578	  	  It	   is	  clear	  that	  this	  arrangement	  is	  a	  source	  of	  frustration	  for	  some	  judges,	  who	  feel	  that	  instead	  of	  being	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  many	  administrative	  tasks	  which	  he	  could	  perhaps	  delegate	  to	  the	  Registrar,	  he	  should	  “have	  the	  chance”	  to	  hear	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  573 Constitution of Kenya 1963, s.67(3) 574 Interviews. 575 Constitution of Kenya, s.60(2) (“the judges of the High Court shall be the Chief Justice and such 
number… of other judges”); s.64(2) (“the judges of the Court of Appeal shall be the Chief Justice and 
such number… of other judges”). 576 2006 Supervisory Rules, r.10 577 Interview 578 Interview. 
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the	   important	   cases.579	   	   The	   intellectual	   and	   administrative	   leadership	   of	   the	  High	   Court	   constitutional	   bench	   and	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   therefore	   falls	   to	   the	  Duty	   Judge	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Division	   of	   the	   High	   Court	   and	   the	   Presiding	  Judge	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  	  	  In	  the	  past	  decade,	  constitutional	  issues	  have	  been	  widely	   reported	   in	   the	  media	   and	   followed	  with	   interest	   by	   the	   public.	   	   These	  cases	  “elicit	  a	  lot	  of	  interest”,	  but	  do	  not	  bear	  the	  mark	  of	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  leading	  the	   judiciary	   through	   turbulent	   times	   or	   guiding	   judges	   as	   Kenya	   develops	   its	  own	  constitutional	  jurisprudence.	  And	  even	  in	  Kenya	  it	  is	  thought	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  should	  have	  the	  chance	  to	  hear	  “important”	  or	  “precedent”	  cases.	  	  	  	  
The	  process	  of	  decision-­‐making	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  	  
South	  Africa	  In	   South	   Africa	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   presides	   over	   the	   Court,	   and	   the	   traditional	  model	  of	  seniority	  ranking	  is	  observed	  only	  in	  so	  much	  as	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  Deputy	  Chief	  Justice	  are	  the	  senior	  Justices,	  and	  the	  others	  are	  equal.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  decides	  on	  the	  seating	  plan	  for	  each	  term,	  on	  a	  rotation	  basis,	  seated	  from	  the	   centre	   outwards.	   Her	   meets	   council	   before	   every	   hearing,	   “as	   an	   act	   of	  courtesy”.	  	  	  The	   Chief	   Justice	   presides	   over	   deliberations,	   and	   his	   skill	   as	   “somebody	  who	  conducts	  meetings”	  would	  be	  evident	  in	  these	  deliberations,	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  “expected	  to	  facilitate	  thorough	  and	  proper	  discussion	  even-­‐handedly,	  and	  to	  ensure	   fairness.”580	   	   	   Opinions	   are	   assigned	   to	   individual	   judges	   before	   rather	  than	   after	   the	   hearing.	   	   	   The	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   always	   at	   liberty	   to	   write	   a	  concurrent	  opinion,	  or	  even	  a	  minority	  opinion,	  and	  as	  the	  intellectual	  leader	  of	  the	   court	   “he	   is	   likely	   to	  write	  more	   than	   the	   others”	   but	   as	   a	  member	   of	   the	  court	  he	  is	  “bound	  by	  the	  vote	  of	  the	  court”	  and	  his	  vote	  is	  “worth	  no	  more	  than	  that	  of	  any	  other	   judge	   in	  decision-­‐making.”	   	  And	   it	   is	   “not	  uncommon”	   for	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  579 Interview. 580 Interview  
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Chief	   Justice	   to	   be	   in	   the	   minority.581	   	   This	   process	   of	   deliberation	   may	   vary	  between	   Chief	   Justices.	   	   Chief	   Justice	   Chaskalson,	   for	   example	   is	   said	   to	   have	  worked	  very	  hard	  (“sometimes	  too	  much”)	  to	  achieve	  consensus	  by	  debating	  the	  issues	   as	  much	   as	   possible,	   and	   trying	   to	   understand	   the	   differences	   in	   views.	  	  His	  role	  was	  “much	  more	  active”.	  	  Chief	  Justice	  Langa,	  by	  contrast,	  “allows	  things	  to	   flow	  as	   they	   flow”.	   	  He	   is	   less	  directive,	   and	  he	  wouldn’t	   try	   to	   “facilitate	  an	  agreement”	  as	  much.	  	  Decisions	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  go	  through	  a	  rigorous	  process	  of	  drafting	  and	  consultation.	  	  The	  Court	  sits	  en	  banque,	  but	  one	  judge	  is	  selected,	  by	   the	  Chief	   Justice,	   to	  write	   the	   judgment	   for	  each	  case	  on	  a	   roughly	  rotational	   basis,	   so	   that	   each	   judge	   knows	   that	   approximately	   every	   eleventh	  case	  they	  will	  be	  writing	  the	  opinion	  (this	  varies	  somewhat	  if,	  say,	  the	  next	  judge	  in	  line	  has	  another	  decision	  to	  finish,	  or	  perhaps	  one	  particular	  judge	  has	  some	  specific	  expertise	   in	  the	  matter	   in	  question.582	   	  The	  Justices	  do	  not	  meet	  before	  the	  start	  of	  a	   case,	  but	  do	  meet	  on	  a	  weekly	  basis	  and	  have	   the	  opportunity	   to	  raise	  issues	  with	  particular	  decisions	  at	  that	  point,	  otherwise	  a	  thorough	  process	  of	  drafting,	  consultation	  and	  several	  readings	  of	  each	  draft	  is	  conducted	  by	  email.	  	  Dissents	  are	  “discouraged”	  until	  as	  far	  along	  in	  the	  process	  as	  possible,	  and	  if	  any	  individual	  justice	  finds	  him	  or	  herself	  unable	  to	  concur,	  they	  can	  then	  draft	  their	  dissenting	   opinion.	   	   The	   tradition	   of	   the	   court	   is	   to	   encourage	   consensus,	   and	  also	   to	   encourage	   open	   discussion.	   	   There	   is	   no	   specific	   hierarchy	   in	   place,	   or	  seniority	  rank	  in	  discussions.	  	  Each	  opinion	  of	  the	  court	  also	  goes	  through	  a	  very	  thorough	  fact	  checking	  process	  by	  the	  judges’	  clerks.	  	  In	  South	  Africa,	  the	  voting	  behaviour	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  Justices	  is	  followed	  closely	  and	  reported	  in	  the	   South	   African	   Journal	   on	   Human	   Rights	   the	   annual	   “Constitutional	   Court	  Statistics”.	  	  	  These	  are	  intended	  to	  be	  descriptive	  statistics	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  court	  for	  the	  year,	  and	  they	  do	  not	  draw	  specific	  conclusions	  about	  the	  presence	  or	  otherwise	  of	   influence	  or	   leadership	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	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Ghana	  As	   in	   South	   Africa,	   in	   Ghana,	   Supreme	   Court	   cases	   are	   discussed	   at	   case	  conferences,	  and	  opinion-­‐writing	   is	  assigned	  by	  the	  Chief	   Justice,	  essentially	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  whom	  she	  thinks	  is	  best	  suited	  to	  the	  task,	  perhaps	  informed	  by	  their	  expertise	  on	  a	  particular	  issue.583	  	  Discussions	  about	  a	  case	  are	  organised	  by	  the	  principle	  that	  the	  most	  junior	  judge	  must	  give	  his	  or	  her	  opinion	  first	  so	  that	  he	  or	   she	   is	   “not	   intimidated	   by	   their	   senior	   colleagues”.584	   	   	   	   This	   practice	   is	  followed	   in	   the	   Appeal	   Court	   too.	   	   The	   quorum	   for	   a	   hearing	   in	   the	   Supreme	  Court	  is	  five	  Justices.585	  	  This	  means	  that	  not	  all	  judges	  (the	  court	  consists	  of	  “the	  Chief	   Justice	  and	  nine	  other	   Justices”)	  sit	  all	   the	   time.	   	  The	  Chief	   Justice	  herself	  only	  manages	   to	   sit	   for	   two	   days	   of	   each	  week,	   and	   her	   administrative	   duties	  demand	  that	  she	  is	  available	  for	  administrative	  tasks	  for	  the	  other	  three	  days	  of	  the	  week.586	   	   In	  Ghana,	   the	  process	  of	  producing	   the	  decisions	  of	   the	  court	  has	  perhaps	   fewer	   stages,	  but	  does	  also	   involve	  discussion.	   	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Ghana	  does	  not	   sit	   en	  banque.	   	  Unlike	   in	  South	  Africa,	   in	  Ghana	   Justices	  of	   the	  Supreme	   Court	   will	   meet	   before	   the	   start	   of	   each	   case,	   and	   then	   again	  immediately	  at	   the	  end	  of	  each	  case	  the	   judges	  will	  meet	  to	  decide	  who	  should	  write	   the	   judgement,	   before	   individually	   making	   up	   their	   minds	   and	   coming	  together	  again	  to	  discuss	  the	  outcome	  and	  their	  reasons.	  	  Judges	  either	  volunteer	  to	  write	  the	  judgement	  in	  a	  particular	  case,	  or	  where	  there	  are	  no	  volunteers,	  the	  most	   senior	   judge	   on	   the	   panel	   will	   select	   someone	   to	   take	   on	   the	   task.	  	  Individual	   judges	   are	   encouraged	   to	   form	   their	   own	   opinions,	   but	   frequently	  their	   decisions	   are	   unanimous.	   	   The	   writing	   judge	   will	   draft	   the	   decision	   and	  distribute	   it	   to	   colleagues	  who	  may	   or	  may	   not	  wish	   to	  make	   amendments	   or	  suggestions.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  South	  Africa,	  the	  etiquette	  of	  seniority	  is	  observed.587	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Kenya	  In	  Kenya,	  there	  is	  no	  Constitutional	  Court,	  as	  such,	  nor	  is	  there	  a	  Supreme	  Court.	  	  There	  is	  a	  Constitutional	  Division	  of	  the	  High	  Court,	  which	  was	  established	  by	  the	  Chief	   Justice	   to	  deal	  with	  all	   constitutional	   references	  and	   judicial	   review.	   	   For	  constitutional	   references	   the	   division	   will	   sit	   as	   a	   panel	   of	   three,	   but	   judicial	  review	  cases	  are	  heard	  by	  an	  individual	  judge.	   	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  has	  limited	  jurisdiction	   over	   the	   High	   Court,	   and	   cannot	   review	   decisions	   of	   the	  “Constitutional	   Court”,	   i.e.	   an	   ad	   hoc	   panel	   of	   three	   High	   Court	   Judges	   of	   the	  Constitutional	   Division.	   	   	   As	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   hears	   cases	   only	   rarely,588	   the	  opportunities	   for	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   to	   influence	   the	   decision-­‐making	   of	   fellow-­‐judges	   is	   limited.	   	  And	   the	  opportunities	   to	   exercise	   intellectual	   leadership	   are	  very	  limited	  too.	  	  
5.3	  Leadership	  of	  judicial	  matters	  	  	  
Supervision	  and	  Efficiency	  	  
In Ghana, the Chief Justice is responsible both for the “administration and 
supervision” of the judiciary.  In a system where perceptions about the integrity of the 
judiciary are poor, The Chief Justice has to work hard to improve efficiency as well as 
maintaining judicial independence.  The current Chief Justice has introduced a 
delegated supervisory role for some Court of Appeal and Supreme Court judges to 
deal with issues of the competence and efficiency of High Court and other Judges.  
Senior judges with a supervisory role are given responsibility for a region, and are 
then expected to regularly keep track of and visit those courts.  Their supervision 
extends to reviewing, and in some cases rating, the judgements of their junior 
colleagues with a view to improving the quality of judgements.589  While the 
objective may be laudable, the process may be detrimental.  In a system where 
“supervision” has been used punitively to bring judges into line590 at the very least, 	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this kind of practice is likely to create some anxiety for individual judges.  However, 
the problem of competent opinion writing is a real issue.   
 
In Kenya, judgment-writing is also an issue.  And one initiative that the Chief Justice 
gave the go-ahead for was a service run by the National Council for Law Reporting, 
in which judges from anywhere in the country can email or dictate their judgements to 
a secretarial assistant in Nairobi and it is then put on an online database available to 
all judges.  This has apparently improved the quality of judgements considerably as 
judges now want to be included in this database and want to improve on their 
colleague’s efforts.  Previously there was no such repository for decisions (law 
reporting was very poor indeed), and there was very little knowledge by judges of 
what their colleagues were deciding, nor was there much incentive to produce quality 
decisions as no one would read them.  
 
Performance management and quality assurance is a difficult issue in the context of 
the judiciary and the need to refrain from impinging on judicial independence.  In 
Ghana senior judges effectively mark or grade the work of their more junior 
colleagues.  Whether or not this encourages or discourages them is unclear.  In Kenya, 
politicians and the public were so fed up with judges appearing to do little while 
protected by so-called judicial independence that proposals were made to institute 
performance contracts for judicial officers.  This is not uncommon in the 
administrative agencies (like the Court Business Unit in South Africa, or the civil and 
public services of Kenya and Ghana), but is unusual in relation to judges.  
Performance management in the Judiciary in Kenya is an issue that has created much 
debate, and little action.  Numerous committees have recommended that some form of 
performance management and evaluation be instituted in the judiciary. The precise 
nature of the proposed system is unclear, and it seems that the main problem with any 
existing system is that there is a failure to follow-up and evaluate the programme.591  
Judges submit “monthly returns” that are intended to indicate the case load of each 
judge, however, this has not produced good evaluative results as there is not 
associated monitoring and evaluation.  In 2005 the Judiciary Sub-Committee on 
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   220	  
Ethics and Governance recommended the establishment of a Judiciary Inspectorate 
Unit.592    	  
Appointments	  and	  Personnel	  	  In	  each	  of	  the	  three	  countries	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  appointment	  of	  judges,	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission	  or	  the	  Judicial	  Council.	  	  	  In	  Ghana,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  Chair	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Council,	  and	  also	  has	  the	  power	  to	  appoint	  officers	  and	  employees	  of	  the	  courts:	  	  
	   “The	   appointment	   of	   officers	   and	   employees	   of	   the	   Courts	   other	   than	  those	  expressly	  provided	  for	  by	  other	  provisions	  of	  this	  Constitution,	  shall	  be	  made	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  or	  other	  Justice	  or	  other	  officer	  of	  the	  Court	  as	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  may	  direct	  in	  writing.”593	  	  In	  South	  Africa	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  presides	  over	   the	   Judicial	  Service	  Commission,	  which	   is	   responsible	   for	   two	   “vital	   functions”	   which	   are	   appointments	   and	  discipline.	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  leads	  the	  judicial	  education	  effort	  and	  he	  would	  lead	  in	   relation	   law	   conferences	   and	   similar	   events.	   	   	   And,	   in	   Kenya	   too,	   the	   Chief	  Justice	  is	  the	  Chair	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission.	  	  	  	  And,	  as	  has	  been	  shown	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  in	  Ghana	  and	  in	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  South	   Africa,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   directly	   involved	   in	   the	   appointment	   of	   non-­‐judicial	  court	  personnel	  as	  well.	  	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  considerable	  powers	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission	  (in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Kenya)	  and	  the	  Judicial	  Council	  (in	  Ghana).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  592 Ibid., para.7.2.11 593 Constitution of Ghana, art.158(1) 
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Conduct	  and	  Discipline	  	  Corruption	  is	  a	  major	  problem	  in	  many	  African	  nations,	  and	  Kenya,	  South	  Africa	  and	   Ghana	   are	   not	   immune	   for	   either	   real,	   deep-­‐rooted	   corruption	   or	   the	  established	   perceptions	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   corruption.	   South	   Africa,	   perhaps	  because	  of	  the	  way	  that	  the	  new	  democratic	  post-­‐apartheid	  state	  has	  developed	  suffers	  less	  from	  this	  problem	  than	  Kenya	  and	  Ghana.	  	  	  Wider	  debates	  about	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  corruption	  often	  come	  across	  one	  major	  stumbling	   block:	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   courts	   and	   the	   apparent	   (or	   at	   least	  perceived)	  ability	  of	  powerful	  individuals	  to	  manipulate	  the	  courts,	  and	  the	  court	  processes	   to	   maintain	   their	   immunity	   from	   prosecutions.	   	   Changing	   this	  perception	   is	   largely	   down	   to	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   who	   must,	   through	   public	  outreach	  work	   and	   robust	   judicial	   reasoning,	  work	   hard	   to	   create	   trust	   in	   the	  courts.	  	  Where	  powerful	  individuals	  are	  seen	  to	  be	  “let-­‐off”	  by	  the	  courts,	  there	  is	  often	   very	   little	   inclination	   to	   examine	   the	   legal	   basis	   for	   decisions	   and	   a	  tendency	   to	   presume	   the	   worst.	   	   This	   is	   a	   constant	   uphill	   battle	   for	   judicial	  leaders	  in	  Africa.	  	  In	  Kenya,	  the	  challenge	  is	  enormous	  because	  compelling	  evidence	  was	  presented	  to	  an	  inquiry	  into	  corruption	  in	  the	  judiciary	  in	  2003,	  yet	  individual	  judges	  were	  restored	   to	   the	   bench.	   	   While	   the	   circumstances	   of	   each	   case	   may	   have	  warranted	   that,	   ordinary	  members	   of	   the	   public	   remain	   to	   be	   persuaded	   that	  everything	  that	  could	  be	  done	  was	  in	  fact	  done.	   	  Chapter	  6	  discusses	  this	   issue,	  and	  the	  conflicts	  it	  raised,	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  	  	  
5.4	  Administrative	  leadership	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice’s	  role	  as	  leader	  of	  the	  court	  also	  involves	  some	  administration,	  what	  one	  judge	  in	  South	  Africa	  described	  as	  “the	  administration	  of	  the	  case	  load	  of	  the	  judicial	  function”	  and	  in	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  South	  Africa	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  also	  the	  “judicial	  leader	  of	  the	  court”	  and	  “allocates	  cases	  to	  chambers	  for	   writing”.	   	   This	   is	   an	   administrative	   role,	   relating	   to	   the	   “judicial	   function”.	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While	   in	   South	   Africa	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   only	   responsible	   for	   this	   kind	   of	  administration	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  Constitutional	  Court,	   in	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya,	   the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  responsible	  for	  these	  matters	  across	  the	  judiciary.	  	  In	  Ghana,	  case	  assignment	   is	  part	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice’s	  administrative	  discretion	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  delegated	  much	  of	  the	  case	  allocation	  to	  a	  colleague	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	   although	  decisions	  about	  where	   in	   the	   country	   individual	   judges	   sit,	   are	  exclusive	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice.594	  There	  is	  a	  convention	  that	  every	  so	  often	  judges	  are	  moved.	  	  	  	  In	   Ghana	   and	  Kenya	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   considerable	   discretion,	   yet	   it	   is	   not	  clear	   how	   this	   discretion	   is	   or	   can	   be	   regulated.	   	   “Leadership	   ethics”	   –	   a	  framework	   for	   evaluating	   ethics	   and	   process	   in	   the	   judiciary,	   might	   serve	   the	  function	  of	  providing	   some	  accountability	   for	   the	  broad	  discretion	  of	   the	  Chief	  Justice.	  While	  headship	   (and	   leadership)	  of	   the	   judiciary	  by	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  said	   to	   be	   implied	   in	   the	   constitutional	   provisions	   relating	   to	   the	   office	   (see	  Chapter	  1),	  there	  are	  also	  several	  legal	  provisions	  relating	  to	  his	  or	  her	  express,	  implied,	   and	   delegated	   powers	   which	   form	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	  activities	  and	  determine	  the	  extent	  of	  a	  Chief	  Justice’s	  discretion.	  	  	  	  
Power	  and	  discretion	  in	  administrative	  leadership	  	  Morriss’s	   characterization	   of	   power	   (discussed	   in	   Chapter	   4)	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  practical,	   moral	   and	   evaluative	   contexts	   of	   power595	   enable	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	  powers	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   which	   takes	   account	   not	   only	   of	   the	   political	   and	  social	   contexts	   within	   which	   a	   Chief	   Justice	   must	   operate,	   but	   also	   the	   legal	  context	  and	  constraints	  within	  which	  a	  Chief	   Justice	  must	  operate.	   	   In	  practical	  terms,	  the	  most	  basic	  of	  a	  Chief	  Justice’s	  powers	  are	  his	  or	  her	  legal	  powers,	  any	  other	  form	  of	  power	  must,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  derive	  from	  those	  legal	  powers	  that	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  either	  has	  or	  delegates.	  	  So	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  must	  always,	  as	  a	  public	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  594 Interview.  595 P. Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis (2002), and see Lukes, 2005, p.65 ff 
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office	   holder,	   act	   intra	   vires	   his	   or	   her	   powers	   in	   a	   legal	   sense.	   	   And,	   as	   I	  will	  show,	  in	  Ghana	  especially,	  these	  powers	  are	  articulated	  and	  justiciable.596	  	  	  	  	  A	  Chief	   Justice’s	  powers	  are	  many	  and	  varied.	   	  Some	  powers	  are	  explicit	   in	   the	  constitution	   and	   laws	  of	   a	   country,	   but	   some	   are	   the	  product	   of	   the	  discretion	  implicitly	   afforded	   to	   Chief	   Justices	   as	   head	   of	   the	   judiciary.	   	   There	   is	   a	  distinction	   between	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   potential	   to	   influence	   and	   lead	   fellow	  judges	  who	  sit	  with	  him	  or	  her	  in	  the	  Supreme	  or	  Constitutional	  Court,	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  potential	  to	  influence	  and	  lead	  as	  head	  of	  a	  complex	  organization	  with	   very	   specific	   institutional	   demands.	   	   Scholarship	   on	   leadership	   by	   Chief	  Justices	   has	   tended	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   former	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   and	  not	   so	  much	   on	   the	   latter.	   	   This	   section	   aims	   to	   outline	   the	   breadth	   of	   leadership	  situations	   that	   a	   Chief	   Justice	   might	   encounter,	   and	   to	   examine	   the	   potential	  effect	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   a	   Chief	   Justice’s	   powers	   on	   leadership	   opportunities	   in	  these	  situations.	  	  Here	   we	   are	   considering	   administrative	   discretion,	   as	   opposed	   to	   judicial	  discretion.597	   	   The	   Chief	   Justice,	   as	   a	   judge,	   will	   have	   whatever	   discretion	   is	  available	   to	   the	  courts	   through	   legislation	  and	   the	  common	   law.	   	  However,	   the	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  a	  decision-­‐maker	  in	  an	  administrative	  context	  will	  have	  different	  kinds	   of	   discretion,	   also	   derived	   from	   law.	   	   But	   a	   key	   point	   about	   the	   Chief	  Justice’s	   administrative	   discretion	   is	   that	   unlike	   many	   other	   administrative	  decisions,	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   exercise	   of	   discretion	   in	   most	   cases	   is	   final	   and	  usually	   not	   reviewable.	   	   It	   becomes	   important,	   then,	   to	   have	   in	   place	   a	   clear	  understanding	   of	   fairness	   and	   what	   in	   South	   Africa	   is	   termed	   “just	  administration”.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  may,	  in	  some	  cases,	  be	  able	  to	  delegate	  his	  or	  discretionary	  powers.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  596 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana , s.2(1), See for example: Ghana Bar Association v A-G 
(Abban Case), [2003-2004] SCGLR 250 – individual right to petition SC to challenge the appointment 
of the Chief Justice. 597 In MI Vila, Facing Judicial Discretion: Legal Knowledge and Right Answers Revisited (Springer, 
2001) Vila gives an account of four uses of “judicial discretion”.  
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The	   nature	   of	   the	   discretion	   is	   important	   to	   understanding	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  power.	  And	  different	  approaches	  to	  discretion	  have	  been	  taken:	  	  	   “The	   contrasting	   approach	   of	   law	   and	   social	   sciences	   have	   both,	   however,	  tended	  to	  underplay	  various	   important	  sources	  of	   influence.	   	  Where	   lawyers	  have	   usually	   shown	   little	   concern	   for	   the	   actual	   behaviour	   of	   those	   who	  exercise	   legal	   discretion,	   social	   scientists	   have	   frequently	   been	   guilty	   of	  discounting	  the	  part	  played	  by	  legal	  rules	  in	  shaping	  discretion.”598	  	  Writing	   about	   discretion	   in	   English	   administrative	   law	   (and	   taking	   a	   lawyer’s	  view	  of	  it),	  Craig	  gives	  the	  following	  definition	  of	  discretion:	  	  	   “Discretion…[is]	   defined	   as	   existing	   where	   there	   is	   power	   to	   make	   choices	  between	  courses	  of	  action	  or	  where,	  even	  though	  the	  end	  is	  specified,	  a	  choice	  exists	  as	  to	  how	  that	  end	  should	  be	  reached.”599	  	  And	  there	  are	  “three	  principle	  ways	  in	  which	  such	  discretion	  can	  be	  controlled.”	  	  These	   are,	   by	   imposing	   “controls	   on	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   discretion	   has	   been	  exercised”;	  ensuring	  that	  there	  has	  been	  “no	  misuse	  of	  power”;	  and	  by	  developing	  principles	  to	  ensure	  that	  “the	  administrative	  authority	  does	  not	  misuse	  its	  power	  by	   acting	   irrationally”.600	   	   Galligan,	   in	   various	   authoritative	   texts,	   analyses	  discretion	   more	   fully.	   	   And	   one	   particular	   aspect	   of	   discretion	   is	   particularly	  relevant	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  because	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  are	  phrased,	  especially	  in	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya.	  	  	  	  Writing	   about	   justice	   and	   procedural	   fairness,	   Galligan	   identifies	   “families	   of	  processes”,	  which	  helps	  to	  highlight	  “certain	  prominent	  features”	  of	  processes.601	  	  Processes	  are	  classified	  according	  to	  whether	  their	  purpose	  is	  to:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  598 K Hawkins, The Uses of Discretion (OUP, 1992), p.19 599 P Craig, Administrative Law (6th edition edn Sweet and Maxwell, 2008), p.501 600 Ibid., pp 501-502, original emphasis.  601 DJ Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (OUP, 
1996), p.25 
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   (i) “apply	  authoritative	  legal	  standards	  (ii) decide	  as	  the	  official	  thinks	  best	  (iii) reach	  agreement	  between	  the	  parties	  (iv) to	  decide	  by	  voting	  (v) to	  decide	  by	  fiat	  or	  decree”	  	  Two	  further	  categories	  are	  processes	  involved	  in	  “investigation	  and	  inquiry”	  and	  “proceduralism	   and	   participation.”602	   	   The	   second	   category,	   the	   discretionary	  category	  of	  process	  in	  which	  an	  official	  decides	  as	  he	  or	  she	  things	  best,	  is	  what	  is	  relevant	   here.	   	   And	   the	   “mark	   of	   discretion	   in	   its	   strongest	   sense	   is	   that	   the	  decision-­‐maker	   has	   to	   determine	   for	   himself,	   to	   a	   significant	   degree,	  what	   the	  standards	   are	   to	   be.”	   	   And	   this	   is	   therefore	   distinct	   from	   decisions	  where	   the	  decision-­‐maker	  must	  apply	  authoritative	  legal	  standards	  because	  “the	  point	  may	  come	  where	   the	   standards	  are	   so	   indeterminate,	   and	  unspecific	   in	   their	   terms,	  that	   the	   process	   can	   hardly	   be	   described	   as	   based	   on	   the	   application	   of	  authoritative	  standards.”603	  	  
Power	  and	  discretion	  in	  Kenya	  In	   Kenya	   and	   Ghana,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   given	   wide	   and	   varied	   powers.	   For	  example,	   in	  Kenya,	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   “may make rules with respect to the practice 
and procedure of the High Court in relation to the jurisdiction and powers conferred 
on it.”604 Or in the case of the jurisdiction of Magistrates’ Courts, for example, “The	  Chief	  Justice	  may,	  by	  order,	  designate	  any	  two	  or	  more	  districts	  a	  joint	  district”	  and	   “may,	   by	  notice	   in	   the	  Gazette,	   extend	   the	   area	   of	   jurisdiction	   of	   a	   district	  magistrate's	   court,	   and	   the	   court	   shall	   then	   have	   jurisdiction	   throughout	   the	  extended	  area.”	   	   In	  Kenya,	   the	  Chief	   Justice’s	  powers	  are	  mostly	  directed	  to	  the	  overall	   administration	   of	   justice	   in	   general	   terms	   –	   from	   the	   making	   of	   rules	  relating	  to	  parental	  responsibility,	  guardianship	  and	  foster	  care	  placement	  under	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  602 Ibid., p.25 603 Ibid., p.26 604 Constitution of Kenya 1963 (As amended to 2008), s.65(3) 
	   226	  
the	   Children	  Act,605	   to	   rules	   relating	   to	   applications	   under	   the	   Sexual	  Offences	  Act,606	  to	  the	  setting	  of	  advocates’	  pay.607	  	  In	  some	  cases	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  given	  the	  option	  to	  make	  rules	  (“the	  Chief	  Justice	  may…),	  and	  in	  other	  cases	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  must	  make	  certain	  rules	  (“the	  Chief	  Justice	  shall…”).	  However,	  the	  content	  of	  these	  rules	  is	  left	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  save,	  in	  most	  cases,	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  usually	  intended	  to	  implement	  or	  give	  effect	  to	  a	  particular	  piece	  of	  legislation	  (see	  below	  for	  further	  discussion	  on	  delegated	  legislation).	  	   	  
Power	  and	  discretion	  in	  Ghana	  In	  Ghana,	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  powers	  are	  more	  closely	  tied	  to	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  courts	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	  more	  broadly).	  	  The	  body	  of	   laws	   that	   applies	   to	   the	   courts	   and	   the	   administration	  of	   justice	   in	  Ghana	   is	  quite	   comprehensive	   and	   the	   discretion	   afforded	   to	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   very	  much	   directed	   towards	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   courts.	   	   	   A	   further	   feature	   of	  several	  of	  the	  discretionary	  powers	  afforded	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  Ghana	  that	  is	  not	  present	  in	  Kenya,	  is	  the	  need	  for	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  to	  act	  “in	  accordance	  with	  the	   advice	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Council”	   and	   in	   some	   cases	  with	   the	   approval	   of	   the	  President.	  	  Article	  159	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Ghana,	  for	  example,	  provides	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  rules	  relating	  to	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  courts:	  	   “The	   Chief	   Justice	  may,	   acting	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   advice	   of	   the	   Judicial	  Council	  and	  with	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  President,	  by	  constitutional	  instrument,	  make	  regulations	  for	  the	  efficient	  performance	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  and	  the	  Judicial	  Council	  under	  this	  Chapter.”	  	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  other	  less	  constrained	  powers,	  such	  as	  the	  power	  to	  create	  divisions	  of	  the	  court:	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“The	   Chief	   Justice	  may	   create	   such	   divisions	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   as	   he	  considers	  necessary	  to	  sit	  in	  such	  places	  as	  he	  may	  determine.”608	  	  And:	  	  	   “There	  shall	  be	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  such	  divisions	  consisting	  of	  such	  number	  of	  Justices	  respectively	  as	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  may	  determine.”609	  	  Or,	  a	  power	  that	  directly	  affects	  parties	  to	  a	  case,	  the	  power	  to	  transfer	  cases:	  	  	   “Subject	   to	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   Constitution,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	  may	   by	  order	  under	  his	  hand	  transfer	  a	  case	  at	  any	  stage	  of	  the	  proceedings	  from	  
any	   Judge	   or	  Magistrate	   to	   any	   other	   Judge	   or	  Magistrate	   and	   from	  one	  court	  to	  another	  court	  of	  competent	  jurisdiction	  at	  any	  time	  or	  stage	  of	  the	  proceedings	   and	   either	   with	   or	   without	   an	   application	   from	   any	   of	   the	  parties	  to	  the	  proceedings.”610	  	  In	  South	  Africa	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  very	  little	  power	  or	  discretion	  in	  relation	  to	  the	   courts	   in	   general,	   although	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   considerable	   powers	   to	  manage	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  as	  head	  of	  that	  court	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	  	  	  
Administration	  and	  Management	  	  Much	   of	   the	   existing	   scholarship	   in	   the	   leadership	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	  focused	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  of	  Supreme	  Courts.	  	  However,	  there	  is	  now	   a	   broader	   recognition	   of	   the	   administrative	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   (see	  discussion	  above	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  US).611	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  608 Constitution of Ghana, art.136(4) 609 Constitution of Ghana, art.139(3) 610 Ghana, Courts Act 1993, s.104(1) (As amended by the Courts (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 
620), sch. to s.7) 611 See Ruger, ''Forward', Symposium: The Chief Justice and the Institutional Judiciary', for an 
introduction to the symposium; SL Haynie, 'Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court' 54 
	   228	  
	  In	   the	   Commonwealth	   England	   and	   Wales	   provides	   an	   example	   of	   the	  recognition	  of	  how	   leadership	   in	   the	   judiciary	  extends	  beyond	   the	  most	   senior	  courts.	  	  Under	  the	  Constitutional	  Reform	  Act	  2005,	  the	  UK	  now	  has	  perhaps	  the	  clearest	  statement	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  any	  Commonwealth	  country.	  	  As	  Lord	  Phillips	  explained	  in	  a	  lecture	  to	  the	  Judicial	  Studies	  Board	  in	  2007,	  some	  of	   the	   “more	   important	   aspects”	   of	   his	   role	   as	   the	   Lord	   Chief	   Justice	   are	  articulated	  in	  the	  act.	  	  	  The	  Lord	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  responsible	  for:	  	  	  
 
“representing the views of the judiciary of England and Wales to Parliament, 
to the Lord Chancellor and to Ministers of the Crown generally; for the 
maintenance of appropriate arrangements for the welfare, training and 
guidance of the judiciary of England and Wales within the resources made 
available by the Lord Chancellor; for the maintenance of appropriate 
arrangements for the deployment of the judiciary of England and Wales and 
the allocation of work within the courts.”612  	  This	   means	   that	   at	   a	   minimum,	   he	   has	   a	   political	   role	   as	   a	   representative	   of	  judges	   to	   the	   political	   branches,	   a	   pastoral	   role	   concerned	   with	   ensuring	   that	  judges	   are	   taken	   care	   of	   and	   well	   prepared	   for	   the	   job	   of	   judging,	   an	  administrative	   role	   of	   managing	   the	   court	   budget	   effectively,	   and	   a	   further	  administrative	   role	   of	   ensuring	   that	   the	   judiciary	   maintains	   the	   appropriate	  levels	   of	   personnel,	   and	   that	   court	   work	   is	   effectively	   allocated.	   	   The	  administrative	   role	  necessarily	   includes	   effective	   communication	  with	   those	   to	  whom	  he	  has	  had	  to	  delegate	  some	  of	  his	  tasks.	  	  Additionally,	  he	  continues	  to	  sit	  as	  a	  judge,	  and	  has	  to	  make	  time	  for	  the	  business	  of	  judging.	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This	   speech	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   here	   because	   it	   demonstrates	   a	   clear	  recognition	   of	   the	   need	   for	   judicial	   leadership,	   and	   for	   leadership	   by	   a	   Chief	  Justice.	   	   The	   Lord	   Chief	   Justice	   describes	   the	   way	   that	   the	   transfer	   of	  administrative	   duties	   has	   affected	   the	   “judicial	   family”.	   He	   describes	   the	  initiatives	   he	   has	   developed,	   and	   the	   process	   of	   the	   transition	   from	   the	   Lord	  Chancellor	   as	   head	   of	   the	   judiciary	   to	   the	   Lord	   Chief	   Justice	   as	   head	   of	   the	  judiciary.	   	   For	   example,	   early	   on,	   he	   and	   his	   senior	   colleagues	   enrolled	   on	   a	  “course	   on	   management	   and	   leadership”	   after	   which	   they	   consulted	   with	  individual	   tutors	   on	   how	   to	   improve	   the	   “organisation	   of	   our	   management	  tasks”.	   He	   describes	   the	   “teamwork	   involved	   in	   administrative	   duties”	   and	  initiatives	   such	   as	   the	   development	   of	   new	   leadership	   teams	   in	   courts	   for	  “simple,	  speedy,	  summary	  criminal	  justice”.	  	  Finally,	  he	  concludes	  that:	  	  	   “…during	   the	   past	   year	   we	   have	   made	   a	   good	   start	   in	   meeting	   the	  challenges	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  changes.	  This	  has	  been	  a	  team	  effort,	  both	  within	  the	  judicial	  family	  and	  within	  the	  Department…”	  	  In	  a	  speech	  to	  the	  Commonwealth	  Lawyers’	  Association	  in	  Kenya	  earlier	  in	  2007,	  Lord	  Phillips	  stated	  that	  “A	  judge	  should	  value	  his	  independence	  above	  gold.”613	  What	  the	  JSB	  speech	  shows	  is	  that	  while	  the	  Lord	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  need	  to	  foster	  the	  individual	  independence	  of	  judges,	  and	  therefore	  unwilling	  to	   impinge	   on	   that,	   he	   is	   also	   aware	   that	   judicial	   administration	   requires	  teamwork	   and	   leadership,	   and	   he	   is	   prepared	   to	   say	   so.	   	   This	   represents	   a	  marked	  shift	  in	  attitude	  towards	  judicial	  independence	  in	  the	  UK,	  and	  across	  the	  Commonwealth	  in	  general.	  	  	  	  	  
Administrative	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justices	  compared	  	  In	  Kenya,	   the	  main	  role	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  an	  administrative	  one.	   	  Unlike	   in	  South	  Africa	   and	  Ghana,	   in	  Kenya	   there	   is	   no	   Supreme	  Court	   or	   Constitutional	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Court.614	  	  As	  in	  Ghana,	  however,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  Kenya	  is	  a	  member	  of	  all	  the	  superior	  courts,	  and	  theoretically	  a	  Kenyan	  Chief	  Justice	  could	  spend	  much	  of	  his	  time	   hearing	   cases,	   issuing	   decisions	   at	   the	   highest	   level	   and	   leading	   fellow	  judges	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   law.	   	   However,	   the	   heavy	   administrative	  burden	  that	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  carries	  means	  that	   those	  duties	  could	  also	  occupy	  all	   of	   a	  Chief	   Justice’s	   time,	   and	   finding	   the	  balance	  between	   the	   two	  has	  been	  problematic.	   	   In	   recent	   years	   the	   balance	   has	   been	   struck	   in	   favour	   of	  administration	   and	   against	   judging	   –	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   only	   infrequently	  heard	   substantive	   cases,	   and	   those	   have	   tended	   to	   be	   the	   occasional	  constitutional	  case.615	  	  Instead,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  been	  more	  of	  a	  behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	  figure,	  combining	  his	  duties	  relating	  to	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  judiciary	  with	  hearing	  technical	  procedural	  applications,	  usually	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  cases,	  or	   perhaps	   exercising	   his	   discretion	   under	   the	   several	   statutes	   that	   authorise	  him	  to	  determine	  particular	  procedural	  issues.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  been	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  overall	  administration	  of	  justice,	  than	  in	  the	  practice	  of	   sitting	  as	   the	  most	  senior	   judge.	   	   In	  a	  country	  where	   there	   is	  a	   strong	  belief	  that	  the	  office	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  a	  highly	  political	  office,616	  this	  is	  somewhat	  of	  a	  double-­‐edge	  sword	  because	  on	  one	  the	  hand,	  one	  might	  conclude	  that	  it	  is	  a	  good	  thing	  –	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  effectively	  removing	  himself	  from	  the	  bench	  for	  all	  but	  a	  few	   cases	   is	   not	   therefore	   in	   a	   position	   to	   influence	   the	   outcome	   of	   cases	   in	  general;	  alternatively	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  common	  perception,	  it	   is	   possible	   to	   conclude	   that	   in	   fact	   the	   very	   political	   nature	   of	   the	   office	  underpins	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  approach,	  putting	  himself	  as	  he	  does,	   in	  a	  position	  to	  influence	  cases	  by	  determining	  who	  hears	  them,	  moving	  them	  between	  courts	  where	   necessary,	   and	   potentially	   punishing	   judges	   by	   exercising	   his	   power	   to	  move	  them	  too.617	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  614 This will change.  Under the terms of the 2010 Constitution, a new Supreme Court must be in place 
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The	   broad	   discretionary	   powers	   afforded	   to	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   mean	   that	   the	  approach	   to	   the	   exercise	   of	   that	   discretion	   is	   generally	   a	   matter	   of	   personal	  choice	  and	  personal	  style,	  and	  this	  feature	  of	  the	  institutional	  legal	  framework	  of	  the	  office	  of	  Chief	   Justice	   in	  Kenya	   feeds	   into	  perceptions	  and	  beliefs	  about	   the	  political,	   but	   generally	   unaccountable,	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice.	   	   These	  perceptions	   were	   perhaps	   crystallized	   by	   the	   practice	   of	   appointing	   Chief	  Justices	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	  	  	  	  In	   Ghana	   the	   judiciary	   is	   unified	   and	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   effectively	   the	   most	  senior	   personnel	  manager	   in	   the	   judiciary.	   	   In	   South	   Africa,	   this	   role	   is	   left	   to	  each	  individual	  court	  leader.	  	  As	  head	  of	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  the	  support	  of	  a	  small	  secretariat	  –	  two	  individuals	  who	  assist	  him	  with	  his	  work	   as	   Chair	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Service	   Commission,	   and	  with	   his	   administrative	  duties	   relating	   to	   the	   judiciary	   as	   a	  whole,	   such	   as	   organising	   conferences	   and	  meetings	  with	   judges	  and	  other	   logistical	  arrangements.618	  The	  Chief	   Justice,	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  court,	  is	  very	  closely	  involved	  with	  the	  administration	  of	   the	   court	   and	  he	  works	   closely	  with	   the	  Director	  of	   the	  Court.619	   	   The	  Chief	  Justice	  approves	  all	  staff	  hired	  in	  his	  court	  –	  from	  drivers	  to	  the	  director	  of	  the	  Court,	   and	  must	   also	   approve	   the	   budget	   proposals	   before	   they	   are	   put	   to	   the	  Minister	  of	  Justice.	  	  	  	  
Allocation	  of	  judges	  In	   Ghana,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   responsible	   for	   allocating	   judges	   to	   particular	  courts,	   creating	   divisions	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   and	   High	   Court	   and	   creating	  divisions	  and	  regional	  courts	  and	  tribunals.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  a	  discretion	  to	  create	  divisions	  of	  the	  courts	  (see	  below),	  but	  also	  to	  dispatch	  judges	  to	  different	  courts.	  	  One	  issue	  that	  causes	  some	  concern	  amongst	  judges	  is	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  to	  request	  senior	  judges	  to	  sit	  in	  other	  courts,	  on	  one	  reading	  of	  this,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  effectively	  has	  the	  power	  either	  demote	  or	  promote	  any	  “other	  Justices	   of	   the	   Superior	   Court	   of	   Judicature	   as	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   may,	   for	   the	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determination	  of	  a	  particular	  cause	  or	  matter	  by	  writing	  signed	  by	  him,	  request	  to	  sit”	  either	   in	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal620	  or	  the	  High	  Court.621	  The	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  also	  a	  member	  of	  all	  courts.	  	  In	  South	  Africa,	  all	  matters	  relating	  to	  the	  Judiciary	  must	  be	  prescribed	  by	   legislation,	  meaning	   that	  any	  changes	   to	   court	  divisions	  etc	   must	   be	   processed	   through	   legislation	   approved	   by	   Parliament.	   	   There	   is	  therefore	   a	  much	   greater	   need	   for	   the	   Judiciary	   in	   South	  Africa	   to	   be	   on	   good	  terms	   with	   Parliament	   than	   in	   the	   other	   two	   countries.	   	   And	   the	   judiciary	  (through	  the	  Chief	  Justice)	  is	  consulted	  on	  proposed	  legislation	  that	  affects	  it.	  	  	  This	   topic	  will	  be	  considered	   in	  more	  detail	   in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  but	   it	   is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  in	  Ghana	  the	  judiciary	  is	  entirely	  responsible	  for	  its	  own	  budget	  and	  for	  requesting	   funds	   from	  the	  consolidated	   fund,	  while	   in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Kenya	  the	  judiciary	  is	  simply	  part	  of	  the	  justice	  sector	  and	  competes	  with	  other	  departments	  and	  agencies	  for	  funds.	  	  	  	  
Legislation	  	  It	  might	  seem	  odd	  to	  have	  a	  section	  dedicated	  to	  “legislation”	  in	  a	  chapter	  on	  the	  role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice.	   	   A	   first	   response	   would	   perhaps	   be	   that	   this	   would	  somehow	  impinge	  on	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  powers.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  that	   is	   the	   case	   (see	  Chapter	  6	   for	  more	  on	   the	   separation	  of	   powers),	   in	  both	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  afforded	  the	  discretion	   to	  make	  rules	  and	  create	  new	  courts,	  which	  some	  might	  see	  as	   legislating.	   	  This	   is	   the	  position	   in	  South	  Africa	  –	  Parliament	  is	  involved,	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  process,	  in	  all	  of	  these	  activities.	  	  	  	  In	   Ghana,	   however,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   the	   authority,	   under	   the	   constitution,	  make	   regulations	   for	   the	   “efficient	  performance	  of	   the	   functions	  of	   the	   Judicial	  Service	   and	   the	   Judicial	   Council”	   by	   constitutional	   instrument	   –	   a	   form	   of	  secondary	  or	  delegated	  legislation.622	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  In	  each	  of	  the	  three	  countries	  new	  inferior	  courts	  may	  be	  created	  by	  Parliament.	  	  In	  Ghana	  this	  may	  also	  be	  done	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  The	  power	  to	  create	  certain	  courts	  (e.g.	  juvenile	  courts)	  derives	  from	  particular	  statutes.	  	  However,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  also	  apparently	  retains	  the	  discretion,	  as	  head	  of	  the	   judiciary,	   to	  create	  courts	   without	   specific	   legislation,	   and	   this	   power	   has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	  contentious	   litigation,	   in	  which	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   ruled	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  Chief	  Justice.623	   A	   plaintiff	   challenged	   an	   unfavourable	   decision	   by	   challenging	   the	  constitutionality	   of	   the	   very	   court	   in	   which	   his	   case	   was	   heard.	   	   At	   first,	   the	  plaintiff	  was	  successful,	  and	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  ruled	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  acted	  unconstitutionally	   in	  establishing	  the	  “Fast-­‐Track	  High	  Court”,	  the	   defining	   feature	   of	   which	  was	   a	  modern,	   efficient	   (fast)	   case-­‐management	  system.624	  	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  court	  at	  first	  held	  that	  while	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  the	  power	   to	  administratively	  create	  divisions	  of	   the	  High	  Court,625	   this	  should	  be	   done	  with	   reference	   to	   Parliament,	   i.e.	   in	   conjunction	  with	   a	   constitutional	  instrument	  or	  legislative	  instrument.	  	  However,	  the	  Attorney-­‐General	  applied	  for	  a	  review	  of	  the	  majority	  decision,626	  and	  got	  a	  different	  answer:	  	  	   “There	  cannot	  be	  any	  doubt	  that	  the	  power	  and	  authority	  granted	  to	  the	  Chief	   Justice	   by	   and	   under	   article	   142(1)	   and	   (2)(c)	   regarding	   the	  establishment	   of	   regional	   tribunals,	   is	   in	   every	   respect	   the	   same	   power	  and	  authority	  that	  is	  to	  be	  exercised	  by	  him	  pursuant	  to	  article	  139(1)(c)	  and	   (3).	   It	   is	   unwarranted	   and	   erroneous	   to	   read	   into	   these	   specific	  provisions	  a	  legal	  requirement	  that	  to	  exercise	  the	  powers	  and	  authority	  granted	  by	   these	   specific	   provision	  of	   the	  Constitution,	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  623 Attorney-General (No.2) v Tsatsu Tsikata (No.2) [2001-2002] SCGLR 620.  See also Nartey v A-G 
and Justice Adade [1996-97] SCGLR 620 – retirement age of sitting Judge 
 624 Tsatsu Tsikata (No.1) v Attorney-General (No.1) [2001-2002] SCGLR 189 625 Constitution of Ghana, art.139(3) 626 Rule 54(a), Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (CI 161) – exceptional circumstances which have resulted 
in a miscarriage of justice. 
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must	  consult	  Parliament	  or	  must	   resort	   to	   the	  use	  of	  a	  constitutional	  or	  legislative	  instrument.”627	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  Ghana	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  issue	  constitutional	  instruments	  in	  a	   few	   particular	   circumstances.	   	   There	   are	   situations	   where	   such	   instruments	  need	   to	   be	   approved	   by	   the	   Judicial	   Council,	   and	   other	   situations	   where	   a	  constitutional	   instrument	   may	   be	   issued	   by	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   without	   the	  Council’s	  approval.	  	  	  Rules	  of	  Court	  are	  another	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  both	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya.	   	   The	   Chief	   Justice	   in	   Ghana	   is	   Chair	   of	   the	   Rules	   of	   Court	   Committee,	  which	  by	  constitutional	  instrument,	  makes	  “rules	  and	  regulations	  for	  regulating	  the	   practice	   and	   procedure	   of	   all	   courts	   in	   Ghana”.628	   Similarly	   in	   Kenya,	   the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  responsible	  for	  making	  the	  rules	  of	  court	  (and	  he	  generally	  does	  this	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  a	  committee)629,	  but	  unlike	  in	  Ghana	  where	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  responsibility	  as	  Chair	  of	  the	  Rules	  Committee,	  and	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  Committee	   is	  set	   in	   the	  Constitution,	   	   in	  Kenya,	   the	  power	   to	  make	  rules	   is	  granted	   to	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   in	   individual	   pieces	   of	   legislation,	   and	   the	   Chief	  Justice	   is	  then	  more	  or	   less	  given	  the	  option	  to	  make	  rules,	  as	   in	  the	  Judicature	  Act,	  for	  example:	  	  	   “The	  Chief	  Justice	  may	  make	  rules	  of	  court	  for	  regulating	  the	  practice	  and	  procedure	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  and,	  subject	  to	  any	  other	  written	  law,	  that	  of	  subordinate	  courts,	  and	  the	  power	  to	  make	  rules	  under	  this	  section	  shall	  include	  the	  power	  to	  prescribe	  fees	  and	  scales	  of	  remuneration.”630	  	  In	  South	  Africa,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  rules	  of	  court	  emanate	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice	   and	   Constitutional	   Development	   through	   the	   Rules	   Board	   for	   Courts	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  627 Attorney-General (No.2) v Tsatsu Tsikata (No.2) [2001-2002] SCGLR 620, per Lamptey JSC 628 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana , art.157 629 Interview 630 Kenya, Judicature Act, CAP 8, s.10 
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Law,631	  chaired	  by	  a	  Justice	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  Rules	  Board	  is	  to	  consider	  representations	  from	  “users	  of	  the	  rules”	  for	  amendments	  to	  the	  rules.	  	  	  
Power	  and	  accountability	  	  Returning,	   for	   a	  moment,	   to	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   leadership	  process,	   we	   can	   consider	   the	   processes	   and	   procedures	   of	   leadership	   in	   the	  judiciary	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  element	  of	  values.	  	  The	  term	  “values”,	  as	  it	  is	  used	  here,	  refers	  to	  two	  issues:	  the	  ethics	  of	  a	  leader’s	  goals;	  and	  the	  ethics,	  or	  fairness,	  of	  the	  actions	  and	  processes	  that	  a	  leader	  uses	  in	  achieving	  those	  goals.	  	  The	  values	  of	  a	  leader	  ought	  to	  match	  and	  enable	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  broader	  collective	  goals	  of	  the	  community	  that	  leader	  is	  serving.	  	  A	  Chief	  Justice	  will	  have	  to	  juggle	  and	  prioritize	  several	  goals	  and	  expectations.	  	  	  Chapter	  two	  set	  out	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  this	  thesis,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  the	   transformational	   leadership	   theory	  of	   James	  McGregor	  Burns	  and	  the	  work	  of	   the	  General	  Theory	  of	  Leadership	  Group.	   	  This	  chapter	  considers	   the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	   Justice	   from	   the	  viewpoint	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice’s	   function	  as	  head	  and	  leader	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  The	  diversity	  and	  scope	  of	  a	  Chief	  Justice’s	  powers	  means	  that	  there	  will	  inevitably	  be	  tensions	  and	  conflicts	  in	  his	  or	  use	  of	  time.	  	  As	  head	  of	   the	   judiciary,	   and	   leader,	   he	   or	   she	   will	   need	   to	   identify,	   articulate	   and	  prioritize	   the	  values	   that	   the	   judiciary	  uphold	  and	  that	   inform	  its	  overall	  goals.	  There	  are	  two	  aspects	  to	  this.	  	  One	  is	  the	  internal	  aspect	  –	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Chief	   Justice	   engages	  with	   the	   values	   and	   goals	   of	   his	   or	   her	   colleagues	   in	   the	  judiciary	   and	   incorporates	   those	   into	   institutional	   values	   and	   goals;	   and	   the	  external	  aspect	  –	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  values	  and	  principles	   that	   the	   judiciary	  embody	   are	   articulated	   and	   disseminated	   to	   the	   public,	   and	   accepted	   by	   them	  too.	   	   As	   Millar	   and	   Baar,	   pointed	   out,	   this	   is	   one	   of	   the	   keenest	   difficulties	   in	  determining	   the	  most	   appropriate	   arrangements	   for	   court	   administration	   (see	  Chapter	  4).	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Accountability	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  Compared	  	  	  Le	  Sueur	  sets	  out	  levels	  of	  judicial	  accountability:	  content,	  process,	  performance	  and	   probity	   accountability.632	   	   	   These	   levels	   of	   accountability	   are	   related	   to	  individual	   v	   collective	   accountability,	   and	   scrutiny	   through	   formal	   channels	   v	  through	   civil	   society.	   	   One	   of	   the	   issues	   surrounding	   the	   power	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice	   in	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	   is	   that	   there	   is	   very	   little	  of	   any	  accountability.	   	   In	  Ghana	   and	   Kenya	   court	   reporting	   and	   access	   to	   published	   decisions	   is	   not	  widespread	   (although	   in	  Kenya	  many	  decisions	   are	   now	  published	   online,	   and	  see	  also	   the	  discussion	  on	  performance	  where	  effort	  are	  being	  made	  to	  change	  this).	  	  Finding	  official	  statistics	  about	  the	  judiciary	  of	  Ghana	  is	  quite	  difficult,	  and	  the	   judiciary	  does	  not	   yet	  produce	   an	   annual	   report.	   	   The	  Kenyan	   Judiciary,	   in	  contrast,	  does,	  and	  now	  that	  two	  such	  reports	  have	  been	  issued,	  the	  full	  extent	  of	  institutional	   shortcomings	   are	   becoming	   clearer.	   	   The	   South	   African	   judiciary	  presents	   the	  most	   accessible	   forms	  of	   accountability	  because	   judicial	   decisions	  are	   published,	   there	   is	   information	   about	   the	   court	   system,	   and	   statistics	   and	  annual	   reports	  about	   the	  performance	  of	   the	   judiciary	  are	  available.	   	  However,	  the	  annual	  report	  is	  not	  produced	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  but	  is	  instead	  produced	  by	  the	  DOJCD.	  	  	  The	  courts	  themselves	  have,	  however,	  provided	  a	  means	  of	  direct	  accountability	  of	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   as	   in	   each	   country	   aspects	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   role	   have	  been	  challenged.	   	   In	  South	  Africa,	  the	  most	  recent	  challenge	  to	  the	  Chief	   Justice	  (and	   other	   judges	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court)	   was	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Langa	   and	  
Others	   v	   Hlophe633	   and	   Hlophe	   v	   Judicial	   Service	   Commission	   and	   Others634	   in	  which	  a	  Judge	  Hlophe,	  a	  Judge	  President,	  challenged	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  judges	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	   in	  which	  they	  made	  a	  complaint	  to	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission	  that	  Judge	  Hlophe	  had	  attempted	  to	  improperly	  influence	  the	  judges	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  632 Le Sueur, 'Developing Mechanisms for Judicial Accountability in the UK'  633	  Langa and Others v Hlophe (697/08) [2009] ZASCA 36; 2009 (4) SA 382 (SCA) 31 March 2009 634 Hlophe v Judicial Service Commission and Others (19006/09) [2009] ZAGPJHC 19 (1 June 2009) 
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of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court.	   	   Judge	   Hlophe	   alledged	   that	   the	   justices	   of	   the	  Constitutional	   Court	   acted	   unlawfully	   by	   referring	   a	   complaint	   to	   the	   JSC,	   and	  issuing	  a	  media	  statement,	  without	  first	  giving	  him	  the	  opportunity	  to	  be	  heard.	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  found	  that	  they	  did	  not	  act	  unlawfully,	  when	  the	  justices	   appealed	   a	   contrary	   decision	   of	   the	   High	   Court,	   which	   found	   that	  although	  they	  were	  not	  making	  a	  judicial	  decision	  at	  the	  time,	  they	  ought	  to	  have	  afforded	  him	  an	  opportunity	  to	  be	  heard	  before	  publicising	  their	  complaint.	  	  This	  case	  was	  another	  example	  of	  the	  ethos	  of	  collective	  action	  in	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	  The	  justices	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  acted	  as	  one	  collective	  in	  bringing	  the	  complaint.	  	  	  In	  Ghana	  two	  important	  cases	  raised	  the	  question	  of	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	   in	   carrying	   out	   different	   administrative	   duties.	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Tsatsu	  
Tsikata635	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  to	  set	  up	  a	  new	  “Fast	  Track”	  Court	  was	  challenged.	   	   Because	   the	   Judiciary	   is	   a	   Public	   Service	   and	   individuals	   have	   the	  right	   to	   challenge	   the	   actions	   of	   public	   authorities	   under	   s.2(1)	   of	   the	  Constitution,	   the	   activities	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   come	  under	   scrutiny	   –	   from	   the	  setting	  up	  of	   the	   fast	   track	  courts	   to	  questions	  about	  whether	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  has	   right	   to	   empanel	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   in	   a	   case	   challenging	   the	   process	   by	  which	  the	  President	  sought	  to	  investigate	  a	  complaint	  about	  the	  Chief	  Justice.636	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  had	  the	  right	  to	  empanel	  the	   Supreme	   Court	   was	   raised.	   	   In	   both	   cases	   the	   court	   found	   that	   the	   Chief	  Justice	  did	  have	   the	   right	   to	  empanel	   the	   court	  because	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  had	  a	  discretionary	   administrative	   power	   to	   do	   so,	   and	  was	   obliged	   to	   exercise	   that	  discretion	  under	  art.296(a)	  and	  (b)	  of	  the	  Constitution	  to	  be	  “fair	  and	  candid,	  not	  capricious	   or	   biased”.	   	   The	   empanelling	   of	   the	   court	   was	   an	   administrative	  function.	  	  	  These	  cases	  suggest	  that	  in	  exercising	  the	  administrative	  function	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  quite	  insulated.	  	  Even	  though	  the	  constitutional	  mechanism	  exists	  to	   challenge	   the	   functions	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   role	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  635 Attorney-General (No.2) v Tsatsu Tsikata (No.2) [2001-2002] SCGLR 620, and see discussion 
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shields	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  from	  accountability	  of	  administrative	  powers.	   	   In	  these	  circumstances	  internal	  forms	  of	  accountability	  and	  clarity	  around	  the	  processes	  and	  procedures	  used	  becomes	  even	  more	  important,	  but	  is	  not	  always	  evident	  or	  accessible.	  	  	  	  	  In	   Kenya	   the	   main	   challenges	   to	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   arise	   out	   of	   the	  “radical	   surgery”	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   and	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   role	   in	   initiating	   the	  constitutional	  tribunals	  to	  investigate	  allegations	  of	  corruption	  against	  judges.	  	  It	  was	  found	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Justice	  Amraphael	  Mbogholi	  Msagha	  v	  Chief	  Justice	  Of	  The	  
Republic	  Of	  Kenya	  &	  7	  Others	  that	  the	  initiation	  of	  Tribunals	  by	  the	  President	  was	  not	   unconstitutional,	   and	   that	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   was	   exercising	   his	   “ministerial	  capacity”	   as	   head	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   and	   was	   not	   bound	   by	   the	   rules	   of	   natural	  justice	   in	   the	  way	   in	  which	   he	   gathered	   and	  weighed	   evidence	   against	   judges,	  and	   the	   internal	   investigation	   that	   triggered	   the	   tribunal	   process	   could	   not	   be	  challenged.637	  	  This	  would	  appear	  to	  suggest	  an	  approach	  in	  Kenya	  that	  is	  similar	  to	   the	   approach	   in	   Ghana	   in	   which	   the	   administrative	   functions	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice	  are	  effectively	  shielded	  from	  scrutiny.	  	  However,	  the	  courts	  found	  in	  2009	  that	   the	   functions	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   can	   be	   challenged.	   	   A	   Magistrate	   was	  threatened	  with	  “retirement	  in	  the	  public	  interest”	  for	  allegedly	  participating	  in	  a	  	  strike.	   	  The	  court	   found	   that	   the	  process	   for	   retiring	  a	  magistrate	   in	   the	  public	  interest	   had	   not	   been	   followed	   “to	   the	   letter”	   and	   that	   the	   failure	   to	   do	   so	  rendered	  the	  “decision-­‐making	  process”	  and	  the	  “decision	   itself”	   fundamentally	  flawed.638	  	  This	  case	  demonstrates	  the	  emergence	  of	  judicial	  review	  in	  the	  Kenya,	  and	   highlights	   a	   trend	   towards	   increased	   expectations	   of	   the	   accountability	   of	  public	  officials,	  including	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  	  
5.5	  Representative	  Role	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There	  are	   two	  aspects	  of	   the	   representative	   role	  of	  Chief	   Justices.	   	  One	   is	   their	  role	  in	  representing	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  to	  the	  Executive	  and	  Parliament,	  especially	  on	  issues	  relating	  to	  resources,	  and	  defending	  judges	  and	  the	  judiciary	  when	  they	  come	  under	  attack.	  	  	  The	  other	  aspect	  of	  the	  role	  is	  one	  that	  relates	  to	  both	   accountability	   –	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   as	   visible	   leader,	   and	   to	   building	   public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary	  for	  explaining	  what	  the	  judiciary	  does,	  for	  example.	  	  	  	  In	  Ghana,	  while	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  will	  not	  always	  been	  the	  main	  point	  of	  contact	  between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	   executive	   on	   a	   daily	   basis	   (because	   court	  administrators,	  or	  the	  Judicial	  Secretary,	  for	  example,	  might	  do	  this),	  in	  political	  issues,	   protocol	   will	   require	   that	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   engaged	   in	   an	   issue.639	  Increasingly,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   as	   head	   of	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	   main	  representative	  of	   the	   judiciary,	  also	  has	  a	   level	  of	  political	  accountability	   to	   the	  government,	   the	   legislature	   and	   the	   public	   for	   the	   effective	   functioning	   of	   the	  courts,	  and	  the	  effective	  use	  of	  public	  resources.	  By	  communicating	  the	  needs	  of	  the	   judiciary	   and	   the	   administration	   of	   justice	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   plays	   an	  important	   role	   in	   initiating	  needed	  reforms,	   consulting	  on	   intended	  reforms	  or	  implementing	   changes.	   	   But	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   to	   exercise	   caution	   while	  engaging	  with	  the	  executive	  to	  ensure	  the	  effective	  functioning	  of	  the	  courts,	  and	  must	  be	  careful	  not	  to	  undermine	  the	   legitimacy	  and	  authority	  of	  the	  courts	  by	  being	   seen	   to	   be	   too	   close	   to	   the	   government	   or	   acting	   arbitrarily.	   	   The	   Chief	  Justice	  exercises	  a	  kind	  of	  legitimacy	  function,	  and	  where	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  official	  with	  little	  legitimacy,	  that	  can	  be	  very	  damaging	  to	  the	  courts.	  	  	  In	  South	  Africa,	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  managing	  relations	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  other	  branches,	  and	  his	  or	  her	  ability	  to	  minimise	  conflict	  and	  generate	  a	  sense	  of	  stability	  and	  trust	   in	  the	  courts	  as	  an	  institution	   has	   a	   profound	   effect	   on	   the	   public	   perceptions	   about	   the	   judiciary	  and	   the	   usefulness	   of	   the	   courts.	   	   Public	   dissatisfaction	   with	   the	   courts	   is	  frequently	   directed	   at	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   (see	  more	   on	   this	   aspect	   of	   the	   role	   in	  Chapter	  6).	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  In	  South	  Africa,	  through	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  the	  Judiciary	  is	  distinguished	  from	  the	  executive	   arm	   and	   the	   Legislative	   arm,	   and	   performs	   numerous	   public,	  ceremonial	   functions.	   	  He	   is	   the	   formal	   interface	  with	   the	  executive:	   it	   is	   “very	  rare	   that	   there	   is	   interface	  at	   any	   level	   except	   the	   top”	  and	  generally	   the	  Chief	  Justice	  “absorb[s]	  the	  rigours	  of	  dealing	  with	  usually	  power-­‐hungry	  executives”.	  And	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  Judiciary	  and	  the	  executive	  is	  a	  “vexed	  issue”.	  	  	  	   “In	   the	  past	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  had	  a	   far	   less	  public	   role	  and	   the	   judiciary	  had	  a	  far	  less	  public	  face.	  	  Now	  it	  is	  a	  very	  visible	  part	  of	  government.”	  	  	  The	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  Executive	  interact	  depends	  on	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	   	   “With	   all	   their	   weaknesses”	   the	   Executive	   “does	   not	   interfere	   with	  individual	   cases	  …	   the	  way	   cases	   are	   decided.	   	  What	   they	   try	   to	   do	   is	   impose	  themselves	  on	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  courts”	  and	  that	  compels	  the	  judiciary	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  Executive	  whenever	  they	  need	  anything.	   	  The	  Justice	  Budget	  is	  ring-­‐fenced	   for	   the	   courts,	   but	   is	   nevertheless	   managed	   by	   the	   Justice	  Department.	  The	  Chief	   Justice	   is	   the	  person	  who	  must	   go	   to	   the	  Executive	   and	  negotiate	  funding.	  	  And	  the	  courts	  “end	  up	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  executive”.640	  	  	  	  In	  Ghana,	  engaging	  appropriately	  with	  the	  government	  is	  seen	  by	  some	  as	  one	  of	  the	   biggest	   challenges	   for	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   ensuring	   that	   “the	   government	   [is]	  not	   seen	   to	   be	  manipulating	   the	   courts”	   but	   “at	   the	   same	   time	   you	   should	   be	  close	   enough	   to	   the	   government	   to	   get	   enough	   money	   to	   run	   the	  establishment.641”	  	  
Reform	  Chief	  Justices	  are	  involved	  in	  reform	  in	  several	  ways.	  	  In	  Ghana,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  obliged	  to	  be	  instrumental	  in	  proposing	  judicial	  reforms	  as	  Chair	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Council.	  South	  Africa	  the	  first	  CJ	  led	  negotiations	  for	  the	  new	  court.	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5.6	  Conclusion	  	  The	  Chief	  Justices	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  countries	  have	  considerable	  opportunities	  to	  lead,	  with	  the	  Chief	  Justices	  of	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  having	  extensive	  powers	  and	  discretion	  the	  way	   in	  which	  they	  exercise	   those	  powers	  can	  have	  an	   impact	  on	  judges.	   	   Where,	   for	   example,	   transfer	   powers	   are	   exercised	   apparently	  haphazardly,	   this	   causes	   concerns	   for	   individual	   judges.	   	  While	   a	   Chief	   Justice	  may	  not	  whish	  to	  give	  reasons	   for	  specific	   transfers,	  some	  form	  of	  process	  and	  objective	  policy	  about	  transfers	  would	  help	  to	  quell	  the	  fears	  of	  judges	  (whether	  well	  founded	  or	  not).	  	  	  	  Because	  the	  internal	  workings	  of	  the	  judiciary	  are	  largely	  shielded	  from	  scrutiny	  there	   is	   little	   obvious	   accountability	   of	   Chief	   Justices	   in	   exercising	   their	  leadership	   role.	   	   The	   table	   below	   sets	   out	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   the	   Chief	   Justice	  could	  lead	  and	  influence,	  and	  which	  incorporates	  some	  aspects	  of	  accountability.	  	  	  
Table	  5	  Opportunities	  for	  leadership	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  
 Opportunities to influence 
in small groups 
Opportunities to lead and 
influence in the judiciary 
more widely 
Opportunities to lead and 




• As head of the 
Constitutional Court (a 
role shared with the 
Deputy Chief Justice) in 
judicial decisions 
• As head of the 
Constitutional Court 
responsible for the 
administration and 
management of the court 
• Delegating 
administrative 
leadership to fellow 
judges in specific areas  
• As Chair of the judicial 




• Intellectual leadership of 
the Constitutional court, 
giving authoritative 
decisions to be relied up 
on by lower courts 
• As head of the 
Constitutional Court 
leading by example in 
court administration 
• Through the Office of 
the Chief Justice, to lead 
in inspiring 
professionalism and 
integrity and upholding 
the values of the 
Judiciary  
• Through the Office of 
the Chief Justice (before 
the Judicial Education 
Institute) to lead training 
and professional 
development of judges 
• With regular 
appearances in 
Parliament commenting 
on issues relating to the 
judiciary  
• Through contact with 
the media representing 
the needs of the 
judiciary and informing 
the public about the 
operations and functions 
of the judiciary 
• Through academic and 
international exchanges  
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Ghana • As head of the Supreme 
court  
• As Chair of the Judicial 
Council, responsible for 
advising on issues of 
reform, determining 
judicial careers and 
promotions 
• Intellectual leadership of 
the Supreme court, 
giving authoritative 
decisions to be relied up 
on by lower courts 
• Administrative 




leadership and the 
transfer of judges;  
• The creation of 
regulations to promote 
and evaluate efficiency 
• Creation of divisions of 
the court 
• Supervision and 
professional ethics  
• Through contact with 
the media representing 
the needs of the 
judiciary and informing 
the public about the 
operations and functions 
of the judiciary 
• Through academic and 
international exchanges  
Kenya  • As Chair of the Judicial 
Service Commission in 








leadership and the 
transfer of judges;  
• Creation of divisions of 
the court  
• Creation of regulations 
relating not only to the 
administration of the 
courts but also to the 
justice system more 
generally 
• Through contact with 
the media representing 
the needs of the 
judiciary and informing 
the public about the 
operations and functions 
of the judiciary 
• Through academic and 
international exchanges  
	  	  The	  role	  of	  a	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  extremely	  complex,	  and	   the	   leadership	  role	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  needs	   to	  be	  understood	  with	   reference	   to	   the	  values	  enshrined	   in	  the	   national	   constitution	   which	   his	   or	   her	   judges	   are	   expected	   to	   uphold	   (as	  shown	  in	  Chapter	  3);	  the	  general	  standing	  of	  the	  courts	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  government	  and	  the	  institutional	  arrangements	  which	  support	  the	  work	  of	  the	  judiciary	  (as	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  4	  and	  discussed	  further	   in	  Chapter	  6);	   the	   legal	   framework	  within	  which	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  must	  function,	  meaning	  both	  his	  or	  her	  express	  powers,	  and	  his	  or	  her	  implied	  powers	  and	  discretion;	  and	  his	  or	  her	  actions	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  colleagues	  and	  staff	  in	  the	  judiciary	  –	  how	  they	  are	  treated	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  their	  expectations	  shape	  the	  role	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  and	  the	  way	   in	  which	  the	  Chief	   Justice	  meets	  those	  expectations.	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However,	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   role	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   there	   cannot	   be	   a	  general	  approach	  to	  framing	  the	  role	  in	  the	  Commonwealth.	  	  Judicial	  ethics	  are	  at	  the	   heart	  what	   the	   judiciary	   stands	   for,	  must	   inform	   evaluative	   standards	   and	  processes	   used	   in	   the	   judiciary;	   similarly,	   constitutional	   principles	   and	   values	  like	   independence,	  accountability,	   certainty	  and	   fairness	  all	   come	   into	  play	   too.	  In	   this	  way,	   understanding	   the	   leadership	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   as	   that	   of	   a	  “good”	  (following	  Ciulla)	  or	  “authentic”	  	  (following	  Bass	  and	  Steidlemeir)	  leader,	  allows	   for	   expectations	   to	   be	   identified	   and	   articulated	   with	   reference	   to	   the	  broader	  context	  of	  the	  role,	  and	  for	  the	  very	  understanding	  of	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  to	  serve	  an	  accountability	  function.	  	  	  	  	  	  Where	  Chief	  Justices	  have	  such	  broad	  powers	  as	  they	  do	  in	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya,	  the	  dynamics	   of	   the	   leadership	   process,	   and	   active	   transformational	   leadership,	   in	  which	   ethics	   is	   central	   and	   the	   engagement	   of	  members	   of	   the	   organization	   in	  shared	   goals	   is	   a	   major	   part	   of	   the	   leadership	   process,	   can	   create	   a	   form	   of	  internal	   “soft	   accountability”	   and	   it	   might	   be	   incumbent	   on	   the	   Chief	   Justice	  ensure	  that	  they	  actively	  engage	  with	  accountability	  as	  a	  “virtue”.	  	  In	  Kenya	  and	  Ghana	   much	   more	   needs	   to	   be	   done	   to	   institute	   simple	   external,	   explanatory	  accountability,	   and	   this	   will	   of	   course	   enhance	   the	   general	   standing	   of	   the	  judiciary.	   	   In	  Ghana	   and	  Kenya,	   Chief	   Justices	   have	  more	   opportunities	   to	   lead	  than	   Chief	   Justices	   in	   South	   Africa	   do,	   but	   they	   are	   also	   more	   shielded	   from	  scrutiny	  so	  there	  are	  more	  potential	  opportunities	  for	  “inauthentic”	  leadership.	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Chapter	  6	  –	  Relations	  between	  the	  Judiciary	  and	  the	  Other	  
Branches	  
6.1	  Introduction	  	  	  Conflict,	   Burns’	   theory	   tells	   us,	   is	   “another	   crucial	   aspect	   or	   element	   of	  leadership”.	  	  	  The	  leadership-­‐conflict	  relationship	  is	  complex	  –	  as	  conflict	  is	  both	  
interpersonal	   and	   intrapersonal.	   	   However,	   “strong	   leadership	   does	   not	   reject	  conflict	  –	  it	  thrives	  on	  it.”642	  	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  the	  leadership	  skills	  of	  Chief	  Justices	   in	   South	   Africa,	   Ghana	   and	   Kenya	   ought	   to	   be	   going	   from	   strength	   to	  strength,	  as	  there	  is	  plenty	  of	  conflict	  in	  these	  countries	  between	  politicians	  and	  the	  judiciary,	  and	  there	  is	  plenty	  of	  mistrust	  by	  the	  public	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  which	  creates	  an	  undercurrent	  of	  conflict	  that	  Chief	  Justices	  must	  address.	  	  	  Burns	  also	  emphasizes	   the	   need	   to	   embrace	   debate	   (a	   form	   of	   “conflict”)	   in	   democratic	  society,	  and	  there	  is	  the	  question	  of	  how	  best	  to	  resolve	  conflict	  in	  a	  democratic	  society:	   “Is	   progress	   toward	   the	   realisation	   of	   ‘higher’	   values	   achieved	   more	  surely	   and	   lastingly	   through	   consensual	   step-­‐by-­‐step	   ‘mutual	   satsificing,’	   or	  through	  confrontation,	  choosing	  of	  sides	  and	  hence	  clearly	  and	  even	  dramatically	  posed	   conflict?”643	   	   	   In	   South	   Africa	   and	   Kenya,	   and	   less	   so	   in	   Ghana,	   most	  consensual	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  efforts	  are	  overshadowed	  by	  frequent	  confrontation	  and	  the	   taking	  of	   sides,	  with	   the	  battle	   lines	  drawn	  between	   judges	  and	  politicians,	  and	   “debates”	   about	   the	   future	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   judicial	   independence	   and	   the	  appropriate	  boundaries	  between	   the	  courts	  and	   the	  executive	  are	  often	  played	  out	   very	  dramatically	   in	  Parliament	   and	   the	  media.	   	   The	  difficult	   balance	   for	   a	  Chief	   Justice	   is	   how	   to	   manage	   these	   tensions	   so	   that	   they	   remain	   “healthy”	  without	  undermining	  the	  effectiveness	  of,	  and	  public	  trust	  in,	  the	  judiciary.	  	  	  	  This	   chapter	   explores	   some	   of	   the	   challenges	   faced	   by	   Chief	   Justices,	   and	  highlights	  the	  visibly	  representative	  role	  they	  are	  increasingly	  expected	  to	  take.	  	  As	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  Chief	  Justices	  have	  a	  representative	  role	  in	  relating	  to	  the	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   245	  
other	   branches	   of	   government	   especially	   with	   reference	   to	   the	   budget	   and	  commenting	   on	   legislation.	   	   This	   chapter	   considers	   the	   role	   that	   Chief	   Justices	  have	   in	   both	   defending	   the	   judiciary	   when	   it	   comes	   under	   attack,	   and	   in	  accounting	  for	  the	  judiciary	  (attribution	  of	  leadership	  and	  blame,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	   1).	   	   Below	   are	   examples	   of	   events	   relating	   to	   the	   courts	   that	   have	  compelled	  Chief	   Justices	   to	   speak	  out,	   one	  way	  or	   another.	   	  While	   this	   chapter	  does	  not	  directly	  draw	  on	  interview	  data,	  the	  focus	  on	  these	  examples	  was	  to	  a	  degree	  directed	  by	  comments	  and	  suggestions	   from	  various	   interviewees	   in	  all	  three	  countries.	  	  In	   South	   Africa,	   the	   big	   disagreement	   is	   over	   control	   of	   the	   courts	   –	   not	   only	  financial	  control,	  but	  also	  “administrative”	  control.	   	  And	  this	  debate	  over	  where	  to	   set	   the	   boundaries	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   executive,	   which	   is	   centred	  around	   the	   government’s	   proposed	   Superior	   Courts	   Bill	   2003,	   remains	  unresolved.	   	   But	   there	   is	   also	   a	   general	   undercurrent	   of	   tension	   between	   the	  judiciary	  and	  politicians	  with	  occasional	  attacks	  on	  the	  judiciary	  being	  made	  by	  members	   of	   the	   legislature.	   	   The	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   emerged	   as	   the	   calming	  influence	  on	  many	  occasions.	  	  	  	  In	   Kenya,	   relations	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	   other	   branches	   are	   equally	  tense,	  and	  “debates”	  often	  crumble	  into	  outright	  bickering.	  	  	  Again,	  control	  is	  the	  sore	  point,	  but	  in	  Kenya	  questions	  about	  general	  administration	  and	  financing	  of	  the	   courts,	   and	   the	   appropriate	   boundaries	   between	   judges	   and	   non-­‐judicial	  administrators,	  have	  been	  eclipsed	  by	  the	  all-­‐out	  war	  declared	  on	  corruption	  in	  the	   judiciary	   in	   2003,	   and	   the	   subsequent	   fallout	   from	   the	   procedures	   used	   to	  excise	  “corrupt	  judges”	  from	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  The	  problem	  was	  one	  of	  control	   and	   the	   accountability	   of	   individual	   judges.	   Kenyan	   citizens	   formed	   a	  very	   dim	   view	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   performance	   in	   all	   of	   this,644	   as	   did	   some	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respondents believed that the Chief Justice was not independent.  See: Strengthening Judicial 
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Kenyan	   judges.645	   	   	   In	   Ghana,	   debates	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	   other	  branches,	   at	   least	   compared	   to	   South	   Africa	   and	   Ghana,	   appear	   to	   be	   more	  measured.	   	   Corruption,	   and	   poor	   perceptions	   about	   the	   independence	   of	   the	  judiciary,	   is	  a	  major	  issue	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  working	  to	  address.	   	  There	  is	  also	   an	   ongoing	   to-­‐and-­‐fro	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	   executive	   over	  resources.	  	  	  	  
6.2	  The	  tenor	  of	  disagreements	  	  	  Debates	   about	   the	   independence,	   and	   importantly,	   accountability,	   of	   judges	   in	  South	   Africa	   since	   the	   inception	   of	   the	   new	   constitutional	   order	   are	  characterised	  by	  episodes	  of	  considerable	  unease	  and	  apparent	  rifts	  between	  the	  government	   and	   the	   judiciary.	   Frayed	   tempers	   are	   then	   calmed	   and	   rifts	  smoothed	   over	   (often	   by	   the	   Chief	   Justice),	   only	   for	   tensions	   and	  misunderstandings	   to	   be	   exposed	   once	  more	   not	   long	   after.646	   	   	   The	   points	   of	  disagreement	   between	   the	   executive	   and	   the	   judiciary	   are	   both	   practical	  (questions	   about	  who	   gets	   to	   control	   the	  money	   and	   various	   other	   resources)	  and	   ideological	   (for	   example,	   questions	   about	  who	   gets	   to	  mould	   the	  minds	   of	  South	  Africa’s	  new	  judges	  in	  a	  transformed	  judiciary)647.	  	  	  These	  issues	  of	  course	  all	  go	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  key	  question	  of	  how	  independent	  judges	  are,	  and	  how	  independent	  judges	  are	  seen	  to	  be.	  	  In	   June	  2003,	   several	   Judges	  President	   took	   issue	  with	   comments	  made	  by	   the	  chair	  of	  the	  Justice	  Portfolio	  Committee	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly	  on	  the	  day	  that	  the	  Department’s	  Chief	  Financial	  Officer	  and	  the	  Court	  Services	  reported	  to	  the	  committee	   on	   the	   Justice	   Budget.	   	   There	   were	   several	   issues	   that	   the	   Chair,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  645 Interviews.  646 See materials on the National Judges’ Symposium 2003, Conference on the Justice Bills 2006, 
Polokwane statement 2007, Judges and the World, 2008, and the Superior Courts Bill progression 
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Johnny	  De	  Lange	  M.P.,	  raised	  in	  rather	  stark	  terms,648	  and	  both	  the	  content	  and	  tone	  of	  his	  comments	  were	  not	  well	  received	  by	  senior	  members	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  The	   Judges	   President	   issued	   a	   joint	   statement	   in	   response	   to	   his	   comments,	  which	  only	  added	   to	   tensions	  between	   the	   judiciary	  and	   the	  executive	  and	  had	  some	  surprising	  ramifications	  for	  the	  Chief	  Justice.649	  	  	  	  	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  Justice	  Committee’s	  meeting,	  on	  4	  June	  2003,	  was	  a	  review	  of	  the	  2002/2003	   budget	   and	   the	   2003/2004	   budget.	   	   This	   inevitably	   involved	  discussions	   around	   accounting	   practices	   (and	   therefore	   accountability)	   of	   the	  court	  services	  and	  salaries.	  	   	  Some	  of	  Mr	  De	  Lange’s	  most	  cutting	  remarks	  were	  about	   the	   competence	   of	   court	  managers	   in	   producing	   accounting	   information	  and	   about	   the	   working	   hours	   and	   performance,	   and	   therefore	   appropriate	  salaries,	   of	   judges.	   	  While	   the	   Chair	   did	   not	  mince	   his	  words	   in	   expressing	   his	  dissatisfaction	   over	  missing	   or	   delayed	   accounting	   reports	   from	   about	   50%	  of	  the	   courts	   (arguing	   that	   people	   should	   lose	   their	   jobs	   “in	   order	   for	   the	  Department	   to	   function	   properly”	   should	   the	   relevant	   information	   not	   be	  forthcoming),	  and	  was	  rather	  scathing	  about	   the	  salaries	  and	  perks	  that	   judges	  receive	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  he	  “ordered	  a	  report	  to	  be	  conducted	  to	  determine	  the	  actual	  salary	  of	  a	   judge”650,	   there	  also	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  considerable	  unease	  surrounding	   the	   issue	  of	   control	  of	   court	  budgets	  and	   the	  precise	   role	  of	   court	  managers,	  with	   the	  Chair	  holding	   the	  view	   that	   “along	  with	  decentralisation	  of	  funding	  should	  come	  control	  from	  the	  Department”	  (this	  is	  an	  ongoing	  issue,	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  below).	  	  	  	  Another	  major	  blow	  came	  from	  his	  comments	  about	   the	   average	   amount	   of	   time	   spent	   in	   court	   by	   High	   Court	   judges.	   	   In	  response	   to	   a	   presentation	   of	   criminal	   court	   statistics	   he	   commented	   that	   the	  three	  hours	  and	  thirty-­‐two	  minutes	  “average	  court	  time	  for	  the	  High	  Court”	  was	  “scandalous”	  and	  he	  ordered	  the	  Court	  Services	  Business	  Unit	  to	  “compile	  figures	  for	   each	   individual	   judge	   and	   magistrate”	   so	   that	   the	   Committee	   could	   be	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informed	  of	  which	   judges	  are	   in	   court	   for	   longest.	   	  He	  also	  asked	   the	  Business	  Unit	   to	   list	   the	   number	   of	   outstanding	   judgements	   for	   each	   judge,	   and	   the	  amount	  of	   time	  by	  which	   they	  were	  overdue.	   	  The	  question	  of	  Saturday	  courts	  was	   also	   raised	   by	   a	   member	   of	   the	   committee	   who	   was	   concerned	   that	   the	  practice	   of	   holding	   court	   session	  on	   Saturday	  often	   led	   to	   a	   reduction	   in	   court	  time	  during	  the	  week.	  	  Mr	  De	  Lange	  is	  reported	  to	  have	  said	  that	  “there	  should	  be	  a	  requirement	  stipulating	  that	  any	  court	  that	  holds	  session	  on	  a	  Saturday	  cannot	  sit	  unless	  they	  sit	  for	  four	  hours	  per	  day	  during	  the	  week,	  or	  some	  other	  amount	  of	   time	  determined	   to	  be	   fit	   by	   the	  Department.	   	   Personnel	   should	  not	   receive	  extra	  pay	  for	  working	  in	  Saturday	  when	  the	  work	  could	  have	  been	  done	  during	  the	  week.”	  	  	  	  Senior	  judges	  felt	  compelled	  to	  issue	  a	  statement	  in	  response	  to	  these	  comments	  because,	   in	   their	   view,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   failed	   to	   protect	   them	   from	   such	  utterances	   by	   politicians.	   	   According	   to	   one	   news	   report	   of	   the	   statement	   the	  Judges	  President	  considered	  Mr	  De	  Lange’s	  comments	  to	  be	  a	  “scurrilous	  attack	  on	   the	   independence,	   integrity	   and	   dignity	   of	   the	   judiciary”	   and	   they	   were	  particularly	  aggrieved	  because	   “while	  utterances	  by	   ill-­‐informed	  politicians	  are	  to	  be	  deprecated,	  we	  feel	  particularly	  distressed	  by	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  minister	  of	  justice,	  who	  either	  actively	  associated	  himself	  therewith	  or,	  if	  not,	  failed	  to	  take	  any	  steps	  to	  dissociate	  the	  government	  therefrom."651	   	  Chief	   Justice	  Chaskalson	  had	   a	   meeting	   with	   the	   Minister	   to	   discuss	   these	   concerns,	   and	   the	   Minister	  addressed	   them	   in	  his	  Budget	  Speech	   the	  next	  day.	   	  His	   comments	  did	   little	   to	  calm	  the	  waters.	  	  	  This	   particular	   row	   came	   at	   a	   time	   of	   considerable	   unrest	   in	   South	  Africa	   and	  was	   aggravated	   by	   the	   Justice	  Minister’s	   reaction	   to	  what	   he	   termed	   a	   “totally	  unexpected	  and	  unnecessary	  statement”	  by	  eight	  Judges	  President	  “attacking	  the	  Minister	   for	   remaining	  silent	  when	   judges,	   judicial	   independence	  and	  values	  of	  the	  constitution	  were	  allegedly	  under	  attack	  and	  being	  undermined	  by	  so-­‐called	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ill-­‐informed	  politicians.”652	   The	  Minister	   addressed	   the	   statement	  made	   by	   the	  judges	   and	   while	   he	   reiterated	   government	   commitment	   to	   upholding	   and	  protecting	   judicial	   independence,	  he	  encouraged	  open	  debate	  about	   the	   issues,	  arguing	  that	  “an	  informed	  and	  constructive	  public	  debate	  on	  the	  judiciary	  as	  an	  institution	  cannot	  by	  any	  stretch	  of	  the	  imagination	  be	  said	  to	  be	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  institution	  and	  its	  independence.”	  	  However,	  he	  went	  on:	  	  	   “What	   may	   certainly	   do	   our	   polity	   irreparable	   harm	   is	   a	   knee-­‐jerk	   overtly	  rightwing	   ideological	   reaction	   to	   the	  necessary	  debate.	  What	  we	  as	  a	  people	  must	   surely	   not	   countenance	   are	   occasional	   snide	   ideological	   and	   political	  attacks	   launched	   on	   the	   Executive	   by	   some	   judges	   cowering	   behind	   judicial	  independence.	  To	  us,	  and	  certainly	  to	  all	  intelligent	  and	  reasonable	  people,	  the	  much-­‐misused	   concept	   of	   judicial	   independence	   means	   only	   the	   following:	  that	  the	  integrity	  of	  this	  arm	  of	  the	  State	  must	  be	  guaranteed.	  By	  this	  we	  mean	  and	  expect	  that	  the	  judgments	  of	  the	  courts	  must	  be	  respected,	  that	  the	  orders	  of	   the	   courts	   must	   be	   enforced,	   that	   judges	   must	   be	   able	   to	   perform	   their	  judicial	   work	   without	   fear	   of	   adverse	   consequences	   flowing	   from	   their	  judgments	   and	   orders,	   and	   that	   not	   even	   a	   scintilla	   of	   a	   possibility	   of	   any	  reward	  for	  arriving	  at	  a	  particular	  result	  should	  be	  expected.”653	  	  The	  conflicts	  that	  engulf	  the	  Kenyan	  judiciary	  are	  similar	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  South	  African	   judiciary	   in	   so	   far	   as	   they	   relate	   to	   the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	   financing	   and	  administration	   of	   the	   courts.	   	   The	   funding	   arrangements	   for	   the	   courts	   are	  complex,	   and	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   and	   the	   Registrar	   of	   the	   High	   Court	   are	  continuously	   operating	   without	   sufficient	   resources.654	   	   Yet,	   where	   in	   South	  Africa	  there	  agreement	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  must	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  “judicial	  functions”	   of	   the	   courts,	   (which	   in	   South	   Africa	   encompasses	   the	   ethics	   and	  conduct	   of	   judges,	   see	   below),655	   this	   is	   not	   necessarily	   so	   in	   Kenya.	   	   	   Kenya’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  652 Dr Penual Maduna M.P, "Budget Vote Address" (The National Assembly 17 June, 2003)  653 Ibid. 654 Interview.  655 The question of who should managed judicial education and training in South Africa is also a 
contentious issue.  
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judges	   have	   been	   heavily	   criticised	   for	   inefficiency,	   incompetence,	   and	  corruption.	  	  Far	  from	  leaving	  these	  issues	  to	  be	  resolved	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  the	  government	  has	  put	  its	  full	  weight	  behind	  attacks	  on	  judges	  and	  carried	  out	  what	  was	  locally	  known	  as	  the	  “radical	  surgery”	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  not	  weathered	   this	  well	   –	  much	   of	   the	   public	  mistrust	   of	   the	   courts	   is	   sharply	  focused	   at	   him	   and	   this	   lack	   of	   trust	   in	   the	   courts	   has	   given	   politicians	  considerable	   mileage	   in	   their	   assertions	   of	   the	   need	   for	   complete	   change	   in	  government.	  	  	  
6.3	  Distinguishing	  between	  the	  “judicial”	  and	  “administrative”	  
functions	  	  Increasingly,	   Chief	   Justices	   face	   a	  major	   dilemma:	   how	  much	   time	   should	   they	  devote	   to	   their	   primary	   function	   of	   sitting	   as	   a	   judge	   in	   the	   highest	   court,	   and	  how	   much	   time	   should	   they	   give	   to	   the	   ever	   more	   demanding	   and	   time	  consuming	  administration	  of	  the	  courts?	  Chief	  Justices	  in	  the	  three	  countries	  in	  this	  study	  have	  each	  adopted	  different	  approaches.	   	  In	  South	  Africa,	  the	  current	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  building	  on	  the	  vision	  and	  pragmatism	  of	  his	  predecessor	  and	  is	  using	   his	   administrative	   powers	   and	   discretion	   to	   develop	   practical	   ways	   of	  managing	  the	  two	  tasks.656	  	  He	  involves	  his	  judicial	  colleagues	  in	  the	  running	  of	  the	  constitutional	  court	  (they	  would	  have	   it	  no	  other	  way),	  he	  delegates	  where	  appropriate,	   and	   maintains	   a	   small	   secretariat	   to	   assist	   with	   his	   many	  administrative	   duties.	   	   Similarly	   in	   Ghana,	   where	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	  constitutionally	  bound	  to	  be	  both	  judge	  and	  administrator,	  responsible	  not	  only	  for	  leading	  judges	  and	  magistrates,	  but	  the	  day	  to	  day	  organization	  of	  the	  courts	  and	  the	  administrative	  support	  staff	  too,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  making	  the	  most	  of	  the	   broad	   interpretation	   of	   her	   administrative	   duties	   and	   taking	   a	   practical	  approach.	   Any	   change	   to	   this	   organizational	   structure	   would	   require	   a	  constitutional	  amendment.	   	  Whereas	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ghana	  the	  emphasis	  is	  on	   accommodating	   the	   administrative	   role	   while	   making	   the	   judicial	   role	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  656 Note that at the time of writing there has been a change in the leadership of the South African 
Judiciary.  Chief Justice Langa retired in 2009, and this study covers the period up to 2009.  
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priority,	   in	   Kenya	   the	  wide	   discretion	   given	   to	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   and	   the	  many	  administrative	  acts	  which	  require	  his	  input	  have	  meant	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  favoured	  focusing	  on	  the	  micro-­‐management	  of	  the	  courts	  over	  sitting	  as	  a	  judge	  and	   producing	   high	   quality	   model	   judgements.	   	   This	   has	   lead	   to	   a	   sense	   of	  disillusionment	  in	  the	  legal	  and	  judicial	  fraternity,	  and	  suppressed	  any	  potential	  for	  vision	  and	  change.657	  	  The	  questions	  of	  whether	  a	   judiciary	   should	  have	   financial	   autonomy	  and	   if	   so	  how,	  are	  not	  easy	  answer.	  	  In	  some	  countries,	  like	  Kenya,	  the	  Judiciary	  is	  arguing	  to	   increase	   their	   financial	   autonomy	   and	   control	   over	   their	   budget,	   but	   this	  argument	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	   executive	   is	   taking	   place	   against	   a	  background	  of	  deep	  seated	  mistrust	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  strong	  perceptions	  that	  judges	   do	   not	   deserve	   to	   manage	   themselves	   because	   they	   are	   inefficient,	  corrupt	   and	   incompetent.	   	   In	   other	   countries,	   like	   Ghana,	   the	   financial	  independence	   of	   the	   judiciary	   is	   constitutionally	   guaranteed,	   but	   the	   practical	  implications	   of	   this,	   coupled	   with	   the	   autonomy	   and	   management	   of	   court	  service	   staff,	   appears	   to	   compromise	   the	   business	   of	   judging,	   at	   least	   with	  respect	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  can	  dedicate	  to	  judging.	  	  And	  in	   South	   Africa,	   disagreements	   rage	   between	   the	   judiciary,	   the	   executive	   and	  Parliament	   over	   who	   should	   have	   control	   of	   court	   budgets,	   with	   the	  Constitutional	   Court	   especially	   battling	   to	   maintain	   its	   hard-­‐fought-­‐for	  independence	   as	   set	   out	   in	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   Complimentary	   Act.	   	   The	  Chief	   Justice	  of	  South	  Africa	   is	  very	  much	  involved	  in	  the	  running	  and	  practical	  administration	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  (even	  to	  the	  point	  of	  vetting	  cleaning	  staff,	   for	  example),658	  yet	   is	  not	  as	  closely	  involved	  in	  the	  management	  of	  other	  courts.	   	   Judge	  Presidents	  of	  other	   courts	  are	   financially	  accountable	  directly	   to	  the	  Executive,	   so	   there	   is	  no	  cohesion	   in	   the	   financial	   status	  of	   the	   judiciary	  as	  whole.659	  	  These	  arrangements	  are	  all	  under	  review,	  but	  the	  judiciary	  is	  unwilling	  to	  give	  up	  the	  autonomy	  it	  has,	  and	  the	  executive	  is	  unwilling	  to	  unify	  the	  system	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  657 Interviews.  658 See Chapter 4. 659 Interviews. 
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until	   some	   concessions	   are	   made.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   some	   are	   nervous	   that	  burdening	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   with	   too	   many	   additional	   obligations	   will	   detract	  from	  his	  vital	  role	  as	  a	  judge	  and	  intellectual	  leader	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	  	  In	   South	  Africa	   a	  major,	   and	  ongoing,	   contentious	   issue	   is	   the	  question	  of	  who	  has	  administrative	  control	  of	  the	  courts.	  	  Speaking	  in	  2003	  Justice	  Ngcobo	  (as	  he	  then	  was),	  now	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  South	  Africa,	  argued	  that:	  “self-­‐administration	  of	   the	  courts	   is	  one	  of	   the	  most	   important,	   if	  not	   the	  most	   important	  means	  of	  achieving	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  operational	  efficiency	  of	  the	  courts	  and	  ultimately	  the	  delivery	  of	  justice.”660	  	  In	  his	  view,	  court	  administration,	  or	  court	  governance	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  “must	  top	  our	  agenda	  for	  change.”661	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  “control	  and	   administration	   of	   courts	   is	   therefore	   a	   key	   component	   of	   judicial	  independence.”662	  	  	  	  The	  past	   decade	  has	  brought	   considerable	   change,	   or	   at	   least	  much	  discussion	  about	  considerable	  change,	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya.	  	  For	  South	  Africa,	  it	  has	  been	  a	   time	   to	   reflect	  on	   the	   success	  of	   the	  new	  constitutional	  democracy,	  and	  some	  would	  say,	  the	  proposed	  changes	  relating	  to	  the	  judiciary	  have	  at	  times	  presented	  a	  sad	  and	  worrying	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  stated	  democratic	  principles	  of	   the	  Constitution.663	   	  The	   judiciary	  and	   the	   legal	  profession	  have	   fought	  hard	  against	  changes	  that,	  when	  first	   introduced	  in	  2003,	  would	  have	  placed	  control	  of	   judicial	   and	   financial	   administration	   squarely	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   executive,	  and	  not	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  or	  other	  court	  leaders.	  	  	  The	  Superior	  Courts	  Bill	  of	  2003,	  and	   the	   related	  Constitution	  Amendment	  Bill	  were	   part	   of	   the	   DOJCD’s	   efforts	   to	   “rationalise”	   the	   South	   African	   judiciary,	  specifically,	   the	   High	   Court	   system.	   The	   Superior	   Courts	   Bill	   was	   intended	   to	  “rectify”	  the	  “discrepancies	  and	  legacies”	  inherited	  from	  the	  old	  apartheid	  order,	  consolidating,	   or	   “rationalising”	   the	   former	   Supreme	  Court	   of	   South	  Africa	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  660 Justice Sandile Ngcobo, 'The Delivery of Justice: Agenda for Change', p.694 661 Ibid., p.694 662 Ibid., p.698 663 See Bizos, OSI 2005 
	   253	  
the	  High	  Courts	  of	  the	  former	  Independent	  Homelands	  into	  one	  court	  system.	  	  In	  2004	   the	   Deputy	   Minister	   for	   Justice	   and	   Constitutional	   Development	   was	  optimistic	   about	   the	   changes,	   saying	   in	   a	   speech	   to	   the	   National	   Council	   of	  Provinces	   that	   “Hopefully	   the	   Bill	   will	   be	   passed	   through	   Parliament	   this	  year.”664	  	  But	  the	  battle	  over	  control	  of	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  courts	  continues	  to	  rage	  on.	  	  	  	  
The	  Distinction	  Compared	  	  	  As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   5,	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   in	   South	  Africa	   set	   out	   the	  test	   for	   determining	   “administrative	   action”	   in	   the	   case	   of	   President	   of	   the	  
Republic	  of	  South	  Africa	  v	  South	  African	  Rugby	  Football	  Union	  (SARFU	  3).665	  The	  important	   question	   to	   ask	   is	  whether	   the	   “task	   itself	   is	   administrative	   or	   not”.	  	  And	  	   	  “judicial	   officers	  may,	   from	   time	   to	   time,	   carry	  out	   administrative	   tasks.	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  enquiry	  as	  to	  whether	  conduct	  is	   ‘administrative	  action’	  is	  not	  on	  the	  arm	  of	  government	  to	  which	  the	  relevant	  actor	  belongs,	  but	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  power	  he	  or	  she	  is	  exercising.”	  	  Against	   this	   background,	   the	   Superior	   Courts	   Bill	   2003	   (draft	   of	   19	   October	  2005)	   and	   the	   Constitution	   14th	   Amendment	   Bill	   2005	   set	   out	   to	   delineate	  between	   the	   “judicial	   administration	  of	   judicial	   functions	  of	   all	   courts”	   and	   the	  “administration	   of	   administrative	   functions	   of	   courts,	   including	   finances”.666	  	  This	   is	   a	   difficult	   distinction	   to	   make	   because	   the	   “judicial	   function”	   must	  inevitably	   involve	   some	   “administrative”	   tasks.	   	   The	   Superior	   Courts	   Bill	  envisages	   that	   the	  Chief	   Justice,	  as	   “head	  of	   the	   judicial	  authority”	  will	  exercise	  responsibility	   “over	   the	  establishment	  and	  monitoring	  of	  norms	  and	   standards	  for	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  judicial	  functions	  of	  all	  courts,	  other	  than	  the	  adjudication	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of	  any	  matter	  before	  a	  court	  of	  law”.667	  	  In	  attempting	  to	  “regulate	  responsibility	  in	   respect	   of	   the	   judicial	   and	   administrative	   functions	   of	   all	   courts”	   the	  Constitution	   14th	   Amendment	   Act	   2005	   appears	   to	   in	   fact	   reduce	   or	   limit	   the	  scope	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  leadership	  of	  the	  Judiciary.	  	  The	  General	  Council	  of	  the	  Bar	   argues	   that	   by	   designating	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   authority	   as	   being	   over	   the	  “judicial	  authority”	  the	  bill	  equates	  the	   judicial	  body	  with	  an	  independent	  body	  set	  up	  to	  fulfil	  some	  government	  purpose.668	  	  	  	  The	   distinction	   made	   in	   the	   Bill	   between	   the	   “	   administration	   of	   the	   judicial	  function”	   and	   the	   “administration	   of	   the	   administrative	   function”	   of	   the	   courts	  doesn’t	   correspond	   to	   the	   realities	   of	   what	   judges	   do,	   and	   the	   extent	   of	   their	  involvement	  in	  administrative	  tasks	  as	  they	  perform	  their	  judicial	  function.	  	  If	  we	  consider	   the	   example	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court,	   judges	   presently	   chair	  committees	  that	  between	  them	  organise	  the	  court.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  overall	  responsibility	   for	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   judicial	   function	   of	   the	   court	   –	   he	  allocates	   opinions	   to	   chambers,	   he	  manages	   the	   passage	   of	   a	   case	   through	   the	  court,	   and	  he	   chairs	  decision-­‐making	   conferences.	   	  However,	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  other	   aspects	   of	   the	  management	  of	   the	  Constitutional	   Court,	   the	  Chief	   Justice,	  thanks	   to	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   Complementary	   Act,	   oversees	   all	   aspects	   of	  the	   court’s	   business	   –	   from	   budget	   planning,	   to	   the	   hiring	   of	   auxiliary	   staff.669	  	  Yet,	  as	  a	  serving	   judge,	  who	  leads	  a	  bench	  that	  sits	  en	  banc,	   it	   is	   impossible	  for	  the	   Chief	   Justice	   to	   personally	   see	   to	   all	   the	   administrative	  matters	  within	   his	  responsibility.	   	   This	   difficulty	   is	   not,	   however,	   a	   reason	   to	   remove	   those	  responsibilities	  from	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  or	  to	  deny	  him	  oversight	  of	  these	  matters.	  	  As	   the	   practices	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   demonstrate,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   can	  quite	   viably	   and	   effectively	   delegate	   some	   responsibilities	   to	   his	   fellow	   judges.	  	  This	   way	   of	   working,	   where	   all	   relevant	   actors	   –	   judges,	   administrators,	   and	  clerks,	   are	   involved	   in	   all	   aspects	   of	   the	   court’s	   management,	   is	   viewed	   very	  favourably	  by	  those	  who	  work	  in	  the	  court,	  and	  is	  thought	  by	  some	  to	  “synergise	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linkages	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	   administration”.670	   	   However,	   where	  court	   administrative	   staff	   are	   essentially	   seconded	   to	   the	   judiciary	   from	   the	  Department	  of	  Justice	  and	  Constitutional	  Development	  so	  that	  they	  work	  for	  the	  Judiciary	  under	   the	  authority	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice,	   reporting	  directly	   to	  him,	  yet	  also	  reporting	  to	   the	  DOJCD,	   through,	   for	  example,	  performance	  evaluation,	   the	  boundaries	   may	   be	   blurred	   and	   it	   can	   be	   “awkward”.671	   How	   the	   Judiciary	  maintains	  the	  loyalties	  of	  the	  non-­‐judicial	  staff	  may	  well	  come	  down	  to	  the	  skill	  of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   in	   engaging	   and	   including	   people.	   	   And	   the	   administrative	  staff	  respond	  well	  to	  the	  “immense	  leadership	  direction”	  that	  they	  get	  “from	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  judges”,	  especially	  when	  they	  can	  see	  that	  the	  judges	  “have	  a	  passion”	  for	  being	  involved	  in	  the	  “upliftment”	  of	  the	  court.672	  	  So,	  while	  judges	  do	  not	  want	  to	  be	  distracted	  from	  their	  core	  judicial	  function	  of	  judging,	   they	  do	  wish	   to	  be	   involved	   in	   the	  associated	  activity	  of	  administering	  and	  managing	   their	   own	   court,	   and	   being	   involved	   in	   developing	   policies	   and	  strategies	   for	   their	   institution.673	   	   	   And	   as	   one	   court	   administrator	   argues,	   the	  practices	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court,	   and	   the	   engagement	   of	   judges	   in	  administrative	  tasks	  without	  impinging	  on	  their	  judicial	  function	  should	  “play	  an	  instrumental	   role	   to	   show	   other	   judicial	   communities	   that	   there	   is	   synergy”	  between	  the	  judges	  and	  court	  administrators.674	  	  	  
	  Non-­‐judicial	  court	  staff	  in	  Ghana	  do	  not	  have	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  lines	  of	  authority	  that	  their	  counterparts	  in	  South	  Africa	  do.	  	  They	  are	  all	  members	  of	  the	   Judicial	   Service,	   working	   under	   the	   authority	   and	   leadership	   of	   the	   Chief	  Justice.	   	  However,	  because	  the	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  responsible	   for	   the	  “supervision”	  and	   “administration”	   of	   the	   Judiciary,	   as	   well	   as	   being	   a	   full-­‐time	   Judge	   (and	  leader)	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   the	   extent	   of	   her	   responsibilities	   are	   vast.	   	   The	  Chief	   Justice	   distinguishes	   between	   court	   administration	   associated	   with	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maintaining	   and	   managing	   the	   courts	   –	   new	   buildings,	   facilities	   etc,	   from	   the	  management	   of	   the	   judicial	   function	   (managing	   cases)	   and	   the	   supervision	   of	  judges.	   	   The	   Chief	   Justice	   would	   ideally	   like	   to	   “divorce”	   the	   management	   of	  maintenance	  and	  facilities	  from	  her	  authority,	  and	  retain	  her	  authority	  over	  the	  other	  aspects	  of	  administration,	  as	  well,	  of	  course,	  as	  retaining	  her	  authority	  over	  the	   “supervision”	   of	   judges.675	   “Administration”	   involves	   dealing	   with	   the	  allocation	  of	  cases	   to	   judges,	  and	   judges	   to	  courts,	  as	  well	   the	   transfer	  of	  cases	  between	  courts.	  	  While	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  the	  express	  responsibility	  for	  these	  tasks,	  much	  like	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  South	  Africa,	  she	  has	  delegated	  some	  of	  these	  tasks	  to	  her	  colleagues	  on	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  	  So	  a	  Supreme	  Court	  judge	  assists	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  the	  assignment	  of	  cases	  below	  the	  level	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  but	  the	  Chief	   Justice	  exclusively	  decides	   in	  the	  allocation	  of	  judges	  to	  the	  various	  courts.676	  	  So,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  delegated	  aspects	  of	  her	  administrative	   responsibilities	   to	   fellow	   judges.	   And	   also	   like	   South	  Africa,	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  has	  drawn	  on	   the	   talents	  of	  her	   colleagues	  on	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  and	   tasked	   them	   with	   various	   committees	   that	   deal	   with	   aspects	   of	   the	  administration	   of	   the	   courts	   generally,	   like	   automation	   of	   the	   court	   records	  system	  and	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  Training	  Institute,	  for	  example.677	  	  	  And	  the	  Chief	  Justice	   has	   also	   engaged	  her	   fellow	   senior	   judges	   in	   the	   “supervision”	   of	   other	  judges	  by	  appointing	  regional	  supervisors	  to	  oversee	  the	  performance	  of	  judges	  in	   the	   regions.678	   	   There	   are	   also	   senior	   judges	   chairing	   committees	   that	   deal	  with	  discipline	  (another	  aspect	  of	  supervision),	  and	  all	  of	  these	  judges	  ultimately	  report	  to	  and	  communicate	  with	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  on	  these	  matters.	  	  	  	  But	   in	   taking	   on	   these	   delegated	   tasks,	   these	   judges	   are	   clearly	   involved	   in	  “administrative”	  tasks	  rather	  than	  “judicial”	  ones.	  	  And,	  as	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  this	  may	  have	  consequences	  for	  questions	  about	  accountability	  under	  art.296	  of	  the	   Constitution.	   	   	   	   Should	   Ghana	   decide	   to	   separate	   some	   aspects	   of	   the	  administration	  of	  the	  judiciary	  from	  the	  oversight	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  they	  would	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face	   similar	   difficulties	   of	   definition	   and	   delimitation	   as	   South	   Africa	   is	   facing	  now.	  	  
	  
The	  Distinction	  in	  Kenya	  	  	  In	   Kenya	   these	   distinctions	   are	   far	   less	   developed.	   	   And	   the	  “judicial”/”administrative”	   distinction	   is	   couched	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   distinction	  between	   the	   “judicial”	   function	   of	   judges	   and	   certain	   “ministerial	   acts”	   of	  registrars	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice.679	  	  Judges	  take	  on	  very	  few	  administrative	  tasks,	  only	  occasionally	   chairing	   committees	   that	  are	   related	   to	   the	  administration	  of	  the	  judicial	  function,	  i.e.	  discipline,	  and	  reform.680	  	  
6.4	  Disagreements	  about	  Ethics	  and	  Conduct	  	  	  
Disagreements	  over	  Conduct,	  Accountability	  and	  Removals	  
Judicial	  ethics	  and	  conduct	  Because	  many	  of	   these	  cases	   involve	   individuals	  who	  are	  either	   in	  government	  or	  were	  formerly	  in	  government,	  a	  reading	  of	  the	  cases	  involving	  the	  CJ	  suggests	  a	   circuitous	   accountability	   track	   –	   the	   courts	   are	   meant	   to	   prevent	   abuse	   of	  power,	  but	  in	  dealing	  with	  cases	  the	  very	  limits	  of	  their	  powers	  are	  challenged.	  	  	  	  The	   problems	   raised	   in	   section	   5.3	   highlight	   the	   difficulties	   of	   practically	  reconciling	  judicial	   independence	  and	  judicial	  accountability.	   	  Where	  the	  courts	  are	  being	  undermined	  by	  politicians,	  litigants	  and	  corruption,	  there	  is	  a	  real	  need	  to	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   accountable,	   but	   not	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   being	   appropriately	  independent.	  	  The	  balance	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  strike,	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  needs	  to	  be	  empowered	   to	   deal	   effectively	   with	   internal	   problems	   while	   defending	   the	  judiciary	  from	  external	  attack.	  	  Yet,	  where	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  too	  much	  power,	  he	  or	   she	   may	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   above	   the	   law,	   and	   therefore	   lacking	   in	   legitimacy.	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Similarly,	  where	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  too	  little	  power	  or	  presence	  he	  or	  she	  may	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  merely	  a	  figurehead	  or	  even	  a	  pawn	  of	  the	  regime.	  	  	  	  
Judicial	  reform	  and	  judicial	  discipline	  Judicial	  reform	  has	  been	  on	  the	  political	  agenda	  in	  Kenya	  since	  as	  early	  as	  1992,	  when	  the	  Kotut	  Committee	  reported	  on	  the	  Terms	  and	  Conditions	  of	  Service	  of	  the	   Judiciary	   and	  made	   several	   far-­‐reaching	   recommendations.	   	  Many	   of	   these	  recommendations,	   such	   as	   those	   on	   the	   development	   of	   court	   reporting	  procedures	  and	  the	  need	  for	  a	  supreme	  court	  have	  not	  been	  implemented	  yet.681	  	  However,	   in	   May	   1995	   a	   significant	   development	   occurred	   when	   the	   Judicial	  Service	   Staff	   Regulations	   were	   published	   by	   the	   committee	   responsible	   for	  implementing	   the	   report,	   and	   the	   President	   authorized	   the	   administrative	  independence	  of	   the	   judiciary	  by	  allowing	  the	   judiciary	  and	   its	  personnel	   to	  be	  extracted	   from	   the	   general	   civil	   service	   in	   relation	   to	   terms	   and	   conditions	   of	  service.682	  	  	  	  In	   1998	   the	   Kwach	   Committee	   was	   given	   a	   broader	   mandate	   to	   review	   the	  administration	  of	  Justice	  in	  Kenya.	  	  Again,	  it	  produced	  a	  very	  far	  reaching	  report.	  	  On	  the	  question	  of	  ‘judicial	  rectitude’	  the	  committee	  found	  that	  ‘judicial	  rectitude	  must	   be	   addressed	   with	   urgency’,	   recommending	   that	   a	   code	   of	   ethics	   be	  introduced,	   and	   that	   judicial	   officers	   declare	   their	   assets	   on	   appointment,	   and	  every	   three	   years	   thereafter.	   	   On	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   courts,	   the	  recommendations	  ranged	   from	  provisions	  on	   the	  physical	   security	  of	   judges	   to	  transfers	   and	   incentives	   such	   as	   housing,	   cars	   and	   entertainment	   allowances.	  	  There	  were	  also	  detailed	  recommendations	  on	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  courts,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  681 Findings of the Report of the Committee to Inquire into the Terms and Conditions of 
Service of the Judiciary Committee, 1991/1992, as described in the Report of the Sub-
Committee for Ethics and Governance of the Judiciary, November 2005, p 62 and Appendix 
V 682 This change was decreed by Gazette Notice No 3801 of 8 May 1995 
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facilities,	  access	  to	  legal	  materials	  by	  judges	  and	  the	  disposal	  of	  cases.683	  	  	  Some	  of	   these	   recommendations	   have	   had	   a	   significant	   impact.	   There	   is	   a	   now	   a	  Judicial	  Service	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  and	  Ethics	  which	  was	  established	  pursuant	  to	  s	  5(1)	   of	   the	   Public	   Officer	   Ethics	   Act	   2003.	   	   The	   code	   specifically	   requires	   that	  ‘every	  judicial	  officer’	  completes	  the	  declaration	  of	  assets	  and	  liabilities	  (Rule	  20)	  and	  any	  breach	  of	  the	  code	  means	  that	   ‘appropriate	  action’	  will	  be	  taken	  under	  the	  Public	  Officer	  Ethics	  Act	  2003,	   the	   Judicial	  Service	  Commission	  Regulations	  or	  the	  Constitution	  (Rule	  22).	  	  	  	  Interestingly,	   an	   earlier	   Code	   of	   Conduct	   for	   Judicial	   Officers	   in	   Kenya	   (1999)	  was	   one	   of	   those	   that	   were	   studied	   by	   the	   Judicial	   Group	   on	   Strengthening	  Judicial	   Integrity	   that	   drafted	   and	   adopted	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   of	   Judicial	  Conduct	  2001.684	  Chief	  Justice	  Evans	  Gicheru	  was	  later	  invited	  as	  a	  special	  guest	  to	  the	  Fourth	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Integrity	  Group	  to	  report	  on	  his	  experiences	  of	  disciplining	  judges	  in	  Kenya.685	  He	  reported	  that	  ‘it	  gave	  him	  no	  joy	  to	  institute	  disciplinary	  procedures	  against	  colleagues	  and	  old	   friends’	  but	  that	  such	  action	  “comes	  with	  the	  territory”	  of	  being	  Chief	  Justice.686	  	  	  By	  2003	  Mwai	  Kibaki	  was	  President,	  and	  one	  of	  his	  first	  tasks	  was	  to	  suspend	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  Bernard	  Chunga.	  	  He	  was	  heavily	  criticized	  for	  being	  corrupt	  while	  in	   office,	   and	   for	   having	   arranged	   for	   the	   torture	   of	   prisoners	  when	   he	  was	   a	  state	  prosecutor	  before	  becoming	  a	  judge.	  This	  was	  the	  first	  time	  a	  president	  had	  used	  the	  constitutional	  power	  to	  set	  up	  a	  tribunal	  to	  investigate	  the	  conduct	  of	  a	  judge.	  	  The	  process	  was	  not	  tested,	  however,	  because	  Mr	  Chunga	  resigned.	  	  	  	  The	   Acting	   Chief	   Justice,	   Evans	   Gicheru,	   then	   set	   up	   the	   Integrity	   and	   Anti-­‐Corruption	   Committee	   of	   the	   judiciary.	   	   This	  was	   an	   ad	   hoc	   committee	  with	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  683 Recommendations of the Committee on the Administration of Justice 1998, as described 
by the Sub-Committee for Ethics and Governance (note 1 above) in Appendix V 684 Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 2002, Explanatory note 2(i) 685 Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Judicial Integrity Group, Vienna 27-28 October 2005 686 Ibid, para.25 
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specific	   mandate	   to	   investigate	   the	   magnitude	   and	   level	   of	   corruption	   in	   the	  judiciary	  and	  to	  identify	  corrupt	  judges.	  	  The	  Committee	  began	  its	  work	  in	  April	  2003,	   and	   reported	   its	   findings	   in	   September	   2003.	   The	   committee	   heard	   oral	  representations	   in	   camera	   and	   accepted	   written	   submissions	   of	   allegations	   of	  corruption.	   	  In	  total	  925	  people	  from	  across	  the	  country	  came	  forward	  to	  make	  oral	   representations,	   and	   the	   committee	   received	   ‘hundreds’	   of	   written	  submissions.	  	  The	  final	  hearing	  was	  on	  29	  August	  2003,	  and	  the	  final	  report	  was	  completed	   on	   30	   September	   2003.	   	   	   It	   found	   that	   there	  was	   clear	   evidence	   of	  corruption	   and	   unethical	   conduct	   up	   to	   the	   highest	   levels	   in	   the	   judiciary.	   	   It	  identified	  as	  corrupt	  5	  out	  of	  9	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  judges,	  18	  out	  of	  36	  High	  Court	  judges,	  82	  out	  of	  254	  magistrates	  and	  43	  paralegal	  officers.	  	  
	  The	  investigation	  by	  the	  Ringera	  Committee	  was	  initially	  welcomed	  as	  a	  positive	  step	   towards	   understanding	   the	   causes	   of	   corruption	   in	   the	   judiciary	   and	  identifying	  realistic	  solutions	   to	   the	  problem.	   	  However,	   support	   for	   it	  was	   lost	  when	   the	   names	   of	   those	   judges	   who	   were	   identified	   by	   the	   committee	   were	  published	  in	  a	   ‘list	  of	  shame’	  in	  the	  national	  media	  before	  they	  were	  personally	  informed	  of	   the	  allegations	  against	   them.	   	  Further,	   following	   the	  publication	  of	  the	  list	  of	  names,	  Justice	  Evans	  Gicheru	  issued	  a	  statement	  that	  all	  those	  on	  the	  list	  had	  two	  weeks	  from	  6	  October	  2003	  to	  resign	  quietly,	  otherwise	  they	  would	  be	  suspended	  without	  pay	  and	  privileges	  before	  facing	  a	  tribunal	  to	  investigate	  their	  conduct.	   	  The	  end	  result	  was	   that	  six	  of	   the	  18	  named	  High	  Court	   judges,	  and	  two	  of	  the	  five	  named	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  judges	  decided	  not	  to	  resign.	  	  The	  rest	  ‘retired’,	   never	   having	   been	   fully	   informed	   of	   the	   allegations	   against	   them	   and	  never	  having	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  defend	  their	  cases	  or	  have	  the	  facts	  tested	  before	  a	  tribunal.	  	  This	  clearly	  goes	  against	  established	  principles	  of	  fairness,	  due	  process	   and	   the	   security	   of	   tenure	   of	   judges.	   	   Later	   in	   2003	   82	   magistrates	  implicated	  by	  the	  Ringera	  Committee	  were	  given	  less	  than	  two	  weeks	  to	  respond	  to	  allegations	  against	  them	  in	  writing	  to	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission	  to	  ‘show	  cause’	  as	  to	  why	  they	  should	  not	  be	  removed.	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Constitutional	  Tribunals	  	  Of	   further	   concern	   was	   the	   setting	   up	   of	   the	   tribunals.	   	   On	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  Ringera	   Report	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   recommended	   to	   the	   president	   that	   two	  tribunals	  be	  set	  up	  to	  investigate	  the	  conduct	  of	  judges	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	  judges	   of	   the	   High	   Court	   respectively.	   	   The	   president	   did	   so	   in	   October	   2003.	  	  However,	   for	  reasons	  which	  are	  not	  clear,	   in	  December	  2003	  the	   two	  tribunals	  were	   dissolved,	   the	   orders	   appointing	   the	   members	   were	   revoked,	   and	   new	  tribunals	  were	  constituted,	  each	  with	  a	  different	  bench.	   	  The	  two	  new	  tribunals	  were	   now	   mandated	   to	   look	   into	   the	   conduct	   of	   fewer	   judges.	   	   Whereas	   the	  original	   tribunal	   set	   up	   in	   October	   that	   was	   responsible	   for	   court	   of	   appeal	  judges	  was	  mandated	  to	  consider	  the	  conduct	  of	  five	  individuals,	  the	  December	  mandate	   covered	   only	   two.	   	   Similarly,	   the	   initial	   tribunal	   responsible	   for	   high	  court	   judges	   was	   due	   to	   investigate	   the	   conduct	   of	   17	   judges,	   whereas	   the	  reconstituted	  tribunal	  was	  mandated	  to	  investigate	  only	  five.	  	  	  	  The	  legality	  of	  the	  tribunals	  was	  challenged	  on	  several	  grounds	  by	  Lady	  Justice	  Nambuye.	   	   Her	   defence	   counsel	   argued	   not	   only	   that	   the	   procedures	   were	  contrary	  to	  due	  process,	  but	  that	  the	  appointment	  of	  the	  then	  Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions	  as	  Assisting	  Council	  to	  the	  Tribunal	  was	  unconstitutional,	  likely	  to	  result	   in	   bias	   and	   be	   unfair	   as	   he	   would	   to	   be	   responsible	   for	   any	   future	  prosecution,	  should	  that	  be	  recommended.687	  Its	  ruling	  on	  preliminary	  points	  of	  objection	   raises	   some	   concerns.	   The	   argument	   about	   the	   role	   of	   the	   DPP	  was	  rejected	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   he	  would	   not	   be	   presiding	   over	   the	   proceedings,	  would	  not	  participate	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  and	  was	  not	  a	  member	  of	  the	   Tribunal.688	   	   The	   tribunal	   ruled	   that	   ‘there	   was	   no	   breach	   of	   the	   relevant	  constitutional	  section	  or	  of	  rules	  of	  natural	   justice	  because	  the	  Subject	  was	  not	  given	   an	   opportunity	   to	   offer	   her	   explanation	   before	   the	   appointment	   of	   the	  Tribunal.’689	   	   It	   ruled	   that	   the	   Tribunal	   ‘has	   inherent	   powers	   to	   regulate	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  687 Notice of and Statement of Conceivable Objections and Ruling on Preliminary Points of 
Objection, Tribunal Matter No 1 of 2004 688 Ibid, p 41 689 Tribunal Matter No 1 of 2004, p 26 
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procedure,	   if	   the	   Constitution	   is	   silent	   on	   this	   issue’,	   but	   that	   it	   is	   not	   ‘an	  adjudicating	  body’	  and	  therefore	  does	  not	  need	  to	  conduct	   its	   inquiry	   in	  public	  (which	  a	  court	  or	  adjudicating	  body	  must	  do	  under	  s	  77	  of	  the	  Constitution).	  	  	  	  There	   are	   other	   concerns	   too,	   that	   put	   into	   question	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	  tribunals.	   	   Each	   tribunal	   was	   given	   ‘all	   powers	   necessary	   for	   the	   proper	  execution	  of	  its	  mandate’	  including	  the	  power	  to	  ‘regulate	  its	  own	  procedure’.690	  Each	   tribunal	   therefore	   issued	   its	   rules	   of	   procedure,	   which	   contain	   three	  provisions	  that	  are	  problematic.	  	  	  	  The	   first	   problem	  arises	  with	   the	   setting	   out	   of	   the	   ‘quorum	  necessary	   for	   the	  conduct	  of	  the	  hearings’.691	  The	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  provide	  that	  the	  quorum	  will	  be	   the	   Chairman	   and	   two	   other	  members.692	   This	   seems	   inconsistent	  with	   the	  principles	  of	  a	  fair	  hearing	  as	  each	  member	  of	  the	  Tribunal	  will	  not	  necessarily	  hear	  all	  of	  the	  evidence,	  but	  will	  be	  required	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  on	  the	  facts.	  	  The	  Constitution	  specifically	  provides	   that	   the	  Tribunal	   shall	   ‘consist	  of	   a	   chairman	  and	  four	  other	  members’.693	  	  Second,	   the	   Tribunals	   exist	   to	   determine	   whether	   or	   not	   there	   is	   sufficient	  evidence	   to	   make	   a	   recommendation	   to	   the	   President	   that	   a	   particular	   judge	  should	   be	   removed	   from	   office.	   	   Yet,	   the	   Rules	   of	   Procedure	   of	   each	   Tribunal	  provide	  that	  they	  are	  not	  ‘bound	  by	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Evidence	  Act’,	  but	  they	  are	  ‘guided	  by’	  the	  ‘ordinary	  rules	  of	  evidence	  and	  procedure,	  including	  the	  rules	  of	   natural	   justice	   and	   relevancy.’694	   	   This	   is	   a	   rather	   loose	  way	   of	   establishing	  evidentiary	  and	  procedural	  rules	  for	  such	  a	  tribunal,	  and	  does	  not	  indicate	  with	  any	  certainty	  how	  these	  tribunals	  should	  actually	  be	  conducted.	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  And	   finally,	  on	   the	   issue	  of	   certainty,	   the	  rules	  of	  procedure	  rather	  remarkably	  provide	  that	  the	  Tribunal	  ‘may,	  from	  time	  to	  time,	  by	  notice	  in	  the	  Gazette	  amend	  these	   rules.’695	   	   It	   is	   conceivable,	   therefore,	   that	   an	   individual	   defending	  his	   or	  her	  case	  will	  prepare	  a	  defense	  in	  line	  with	  one	  set	  of	  rules,	  only	  to	  find	  half-­‐way	  through	   that	   those	   rules	   have	   been	   changed,	   particular	   evidence	   is	   or	   is	   not	  considered	  relevant,	  or	  a	  Tribunal	  member	  who	  has	  been	  away	  for	  a	  number	  of	  days	  is	  suddenly	  back	  and	  unclear	  about	  the	  arguments,	  the	  facts	  or	  the	  direction	  the	   hearing	   is	   taking.	   	   There	   is	   huge	   potential	   here	   for	   unfair	   hearings,	  inconsistent	  outcomes	  and	  breach	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  natural	  justice.	  	  	  	  	  To	   date,	   proceedings	   against	   only	   two	   individuals	   have	   been	   completed.	   	   The	  tribunal	  investigating	  court	  of	  appeal	  judge	  Mr	  Justice	  Philip	  Waki	  began	  its	  work	  in	  April	  2004,	  several	  months	  later	  it	  determined	  that	  he	  should	  not	  be	  removed	  from	  office	  and	  he	  was	  subsequently	  reinstated.	  	  Proceedings	  against	  Mrs	  Justice	  Roslyn	   Nambuye	   also	   began	   in	   2004	   and	   she	   challenged	   the	   process	   through	  judicial	   review	  proceedings	   in	   the	  High	  Court.	   	   Justice	  Nambuye	  has	  now	  been	  reinstated.	   	   Proceedings	   against	   a	   second	  High	  Court	   Judge,	  Daniel	  Aganyanya,	  are	  ongoing.	   	  The	  remaining	  four	   judges	  simply	  have	  to	  wait	  until	   the	  tribunals	  get	  to	  them.	  	  	  As	   for	   the	   magistrates,	   they	   never	   had	   the	   luxury	   of	   ‘opting’	   for	   formal	  proceedings	  against	  them.	  	  By	  mid	  January	  2004	  the	  media	  was	  reporting	  that	  all	  the	   magistrates	   and	   paralegals	   that	   had	   been	   implicated	   had	   submitted	   their	  notices	   of	   just	   cause,	   and	   a	   few	  months	   later	   70	   of	   them	  were	   ‘retired’	   by	   the	  Judicial	  Service	  commission	  in	  ‘the	  public	  interest’.	  	  No	  formal	  public	  report	  was	  made	  of	  this,	  and	  when	  the	  Law	  Society	  of	  Kenya	  challenged	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission	  to	  give	  reasons	  for	  their	  decisions	  no	  answer	  was	  provided.	  	  	  Shortly	  after	  that,	  10	  magistrates	  were	  reinstated,	  and	  one	  of	  them	  was	  appointed	  as	  the	  Acting	  High	  Court	  Registrar.	   	  Again,	  no	   reasons	  were	  offered	  when	   the	   Judicial	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Service	  Commission	  was	  challenged	  by	  the	  Law	  Society	  to	  explain	  how	  they	  had	  been	  cleared	  of	  the	  charges.	  	  	  
	  In	  March	   2005	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   established	   the	   Sub-­‐Committee	   on	   Ethics	   and	  Governance	  which	  completed	  its	  review	  of	  the	  judiciary	  in	  November	  2005.	  	  	  The	  Committee	  found	  that	  there	  had	  been	  a	  ‘marked	  improvement	  in	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	   judiciary	   since	   September	   2003’.	   But	   it	   cautioned	   against	   criticism	   of	   the	  judiciary.	  	  The	  Committee	  was	  very	  clear.	  	  It	  specifically	  recommended	  that	  ‘firm	  and	   deliberate	   action	   should	   be	   taken	   to	   remove	   busy	   bodies	   from	   court	  precincts’.696	  	  In	  his	  press	  statement	  about	  the	  report	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  seemed	  to	  endorse	  this	  recommendation:	  	  	   …	  the	  Sub-­‐Committee	  has	  noted	  with	  regret	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  trend	  by	  persons	  critical	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  to	  continue	  to	  demean	  the	  institution	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  previous	  reports	  of	  corruption	  and	  unethical	  practices.	  	  The	  Committee	  has	  therefore	  called	  for	  remedial	  action	  to	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  this	  fashionable	  bashing	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  by	  ‘busy	  bodies’.697	  	  	  	  Although	   the	   committee	   seems	   keen	   to	   limit	   criticism	   and	   discussion	   of	   the	  judiciary,	   it	   does	   nevertheless	   make	   strong	   and	   clear	   recommendations	   that	  significant	   legal	   and	   institutional	   reform	   is	   required	   to	   change	   the	  disciplinary	  processes	   relating	   to	   both	   Judges	   and	   magistrates	   in	   Kenya.	   	   The	   document	  details	   specific	   proposals	   for	   reform	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Service	   Commission,	   the	  practices	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  the	  relevant	  provisions	  of	  the	  constitution	  and	  specific	  pieces	   of	   legislation	   that	   relate	   to	   the	   discipline	   of	  magistrates.	   	   This	   is	   a	   very	  positive	  move	  towards	  change.	  	  	  	  However,	   there	   is	   a	   long	   way	   to	   go.	   	   The	   Committee’s	   recommendation	   on	  ‘remedial	   action’	   against	   ‘busy	   bodies’	   contradicts	   the	   open	   tone	   and	   forward	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  696 Report of the Sub-Committee on Ethics and Governance, November 2005, p 35 697 Press statement by the Honourable Chief Justice on the Report of the Sub-Committee on 
Ethics and Governance, 13 January 2006 
	   265	  
looking	   nature	   of	   the	   report.	   	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   an	   insignificant	  recommendation.	  	  It	  must	  be	  seen	  in	  light	  of	  several	  disturbing	  factors.	  	  	  For	  one	  thing,	   the	   judiciary	  seems	  generally	  keen	  to	  exclude	  wide	  comment	  and	  debate	  about	   reform.	   	   The	   Judicial	   Service	   Code	   of	   Conduct	   and	   Ethics	   expressly	  prohibits	   ‘a	   judicial	   officer	   and	   any	  officer	   in	   the	   Judicial	   Service’	   from	  making	  public	   statements	   ‘on	  matters	  affecting	  Government	  programmes	  or	  policies	  of	  the	   Judicial	   Service	  without	   the	   specific	   authority	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice.’698	   	   This	  prohibition	  extends	  to	  both	  speaking	  and	  writing	  about	  these	  issues.	   	  The	  Code	  of	   Conduct	   is	   indented	   to	   be	   used	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   sanctioning	   of	   errant	  judges,	  and	  this	  rule	  carries	  its	  own	  sanction:	  	  	  Whilst	  it	  is	  not	  desired	  to	  interfere	  with	  a	  judicial	  officer’s	  liberty	  of	  free	  speech,	  any	   lack	   of	   discretion	   on	   his	   part	   likely	   to	   embarrass	   the	   Government	   or	   the	  Judicial	  Service	  may	  result	  in	  appropriate	  consequences.699	  	  So,	   while	   internationally,	   it	   is	   accepted	   practice	   to	   require	   propriety	   and	  discretion	  of	  a	  judge,	  it	  is	  completely	  contrary	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  free	  speech	  to	  prohibit	  a	  judge	  from	  speaking,	  writing	  or	  lecturing	  on	  the	  law,	  the	  legal	  system,	  the	   administration	   of	   justice	   and	   related	   matters.700	   	   But	   any	   engagement	   on	  those	   issues	   is	   bound	   to	   bring	   a	   judge	  within	   the	   realms	   of	   ‘matters	   affecting	  government	   programmes’	   and	   ‘policies	   of	   the	   judicial	   service’	   and	   such	  engagement	   would	   inevitably	   put	   Kenyan	   judges	   at	   risk	   of	   being	   subjected	   to	  ‘appropriate	  consequences’.	  	  	  	  The	   dangerous	   potential	   of	   this	   blanket	   ban	   should	   be	   considered	   in	   light	   of	  events	   in	   2004.	   	   	   When	   the	   names	   of	   the	   judges	   and	   magistrates	   who	   were	  implicated	  by	  the	  Ringera	  Commission	  were	  published	  in	  the	  press	  without	  prior	  notice	   having	   been	   given	   to	   the	   individuals	   concerned,	   the	   Kenya	  Magistrates’	  and	   Judges’	  Association	   (KMJA)	  objected	   to	   the	  way	   its	  members	  were	   treated.	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The	   Chief	   Justice’s	   response	   to	   their	   objections	   was	   to	   threaten	   to	   ban	   the	  KMJA.701	   	   It	  was	  perhaps	  only	   the	   very	  public	   nature	  of	   these	  protests	   and	  his	  response,	   as	   well	   as	   support	   for	   the	   KMJA	   by	   organizations	   such	   as	   the	  International	  Commission	  of	  Jurists	  (ICJ),	  which	  prevented	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  from	  acting	  on	  his	  threats.	   	  Interestingly,	  the	  ICJ	  survey	  mentioned	  earlier	  found	  that	  68%	   of	   its	   respondents	   believed	   that	   the	   office	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   does	   not	  adequately	  facilitate	  judicial	  reforms.	  	  	  The	   requirements	   of	   transparency	   and	   open	   participatory	   democratic	  government	  require	  that	  the	  judiciary	  engages	  with	  society	  in	  various	  ways,	  and	  one	   way	   in	   which	   this	   can	   be	   done	   is	   through	   communication.	   As	   the	   public	  figurehead	   of	   the	   judiciary	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   the	   task	   of	   communicating	  information	  about	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  way	  it	  works	  to	  the	  media	  and	  the	  public.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  also	  accountable	  to	  the	  public	  for	  the	  effective	  functioning	  of	  the	   judiciary	   in	   respect	   of	   its	   accessibility,	   use	   of	   resources	   and	   transparency.	  	  What	   is	  more,	  perceptions	  about	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	   judiciary	  will	  have	  an	  impact	   on	   the	   public’s	   belief	   in	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   judiciary	   is	   adequately	  fulfilling	  its	  role	  as	  a	  check	  against	  the	  government	  and	  abuses	  of	  power.	  	  	  In	  South	  Africa,	  when	  members	  of	   the	  executive	  or	  parliamentarians	  attack	  the	  judiciary,	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   as	   head	   of	   the	   Judiciary,	   tends	   to	   step	   in	   to	   soothe	  things.	   In	  Ghana,	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  works	  hard	   to	   represent	   the	   judiciary	   in	   the	  public,	  going	  around	   the	  country	  regularly	   to	  encourage	  people	   to	  engage	  with	  the	  judiciary	  and	  to	  understand	  it	  better.	   	  In	  Kenya,	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  response	  to	  criticisms	  of	  the	  judiciary	  has,	  on	  occasion,	  simply	  muddied	  the	  waters,	  mostly	  because	  his	  responses	  have	  been	  rather	  defensive	  and,	   in	  public	  statements,	  he	  has	  cast	  the	  judiciary	  as	  unwilling	  to	  engage	  or	  change.	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Leadership,	  trust	  and	  accountability	  	  African	  governments,	  and	  their	  people	  have	  over	  the	  past	  decade,	  embarked	  on	  major	  changes	   to	   their	  governance	  structures,	  and	  much	  of	   this	  has	  been	  done	  through	  constitutional	   reform.	   	  Either	  whole	   scale	   constitutional	   reforms,	  as	   in	  Kenya,	  or	   through	  a	  series	  of	  constitutional	  amendments	  designed	   to	  bring	  old	  constitutions	   in	   line	   with	   new	   “political	   dispensations”.	   	   While	   executive	  dominance	  has	  been	  a	  key	  target	  for	  change,702	  the	  courts,	  too	  have	  been	  under	  considerable	  scrutiny.	  	  However,	  one	  notable	  quality	  of	  many	  of	  these	  changes	  is	  the	  speed	  with	  they	  are	  effected,	  appearing	  to	  be	  rather	  rushed	  jobs,	  executed	  for	  political	  expediency	  rather	  than	  for	  the	  fundamental	  purpose	  of	  creating	  a	  stable	  new	  constitutional	  order.	  	  	  	  And,	   alongside	   the	   recognition	   that	   more	   robust	   checks	   and	   balances	   are	  necessary,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  courts	  is	  being	  re-­‐evaluated,	  and	  Chief	  Justices	  have	  to	  step	  out	  of	  their	  traditional	  role	  as	  figurehead	  of	  an	  often-­‐derided	  judiciary,	  and	  into	  the	  limelight	  as	  the	  accountable	  figure	  for	  the	  judges.	  	  While	  the	  low	  esteem	  for	   the	   courts	   in	   many	   African	   countries	   might	   not	   be	   shared	   in	   other	  Commonwealth	  jurisdictions,	  the	  realisation	  that	  the	  judiciary	  can	  be	  more	  open	  and	  accountable	   is	  shared,	  and	  all	  across	  the	  Commonwealth,	  Chief	   Justices	  are	  leading	   their	   judiciaries	   through	   changes	   that	   instil	   more	   openness	   about	   the	  judiciary,	  and	  put	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  into	  public	  view.	  	  	  The	  pace	  of	  change	  in	  many	  jurisdictions	   means	   that	   often	   there	   is	   little	   time	   for	   measured,	   considered	  debate	  about	  the	  import	  of	  these	  changes	  or	  about	  precisely	  what	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is,	  or	  should	  be	  despite	  considerable	  legislative	  changes	  that	  create	  yet	  more	  powers	  and	  duties	  for	  Chief	  Justices.	  	  The	  situation	   in	  Kenya	   is	  distinguished	  from	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ghana	  by	  a	  clear	  personalisation	  of	  politics	  and	  the	  public	  services	  generally.	  In	  Ghana,	  there	  is	  a	  general	  sense	  of	  duty	  and	  professionalism	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  that	  individuals	  see	  their	  role	   in	   the	   Judicial	  Service,	  and	  this	   is	  perhaps	   influenced	  not	  only	  by	   the	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country’s	  history,	  but	  also	  the	  sense	  of	  duty	  expressed	  in	  the	  Constitution:	  “The	  State	  shall	  cultivate	  among	  all	  Ghanaians	  respect	  for	  fundamental	  human	  rights	  and	   freedoms	   and	   the	   dignity	   of	   the	   human	   person”	   and	   “the	   State	   shall	   take	  appropriate	   measures”	   to	   “foster	   a	   spirit	   of	   loyalty	   to	   Ghana	   that	   overrides	  sectional,	   ethnic	   and	   other	   loyalties”.	   	   This	   sense	   of	   unity,	   and	   the	   ongoing	  project	   of	   establishing	   and	   maintaining	   unity	   and	   respect	   for	   diversity	   in	   the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  something	  that	  both	  Ghana	  and	  South	  Africa	  share,	  although	  they	  approach	  it	  slightly	  differently.	  	  Kenya,	  marred	  by	  deep	  tribal	  divisions	  and	  an	   increasing	   movement	   away	   from	   unifying	   principles	   (the	   latest	   Draft	  Constitution	   attempts	   to	   address	   this	   problem)	   experiences	   real	   problems	  associated	   with	   articulating	   national	   values,	   and	   this	   carries	   through	   into	   the	  judiciary	   and	   sense	   of	   confusion	   about	   what	   the	   judiciary	   is	   actually	   for,	   and	  more	  importantly,	  who	  the	  judiciary	  exists	  to	  serve.	  	  	  There	   is	   a	   clear	   sense	   that	   across	   the	   public	   sector,	   there	   is	   a	   severe,	   and	  dangerous	   lack	   of	   leadership	   in	   Kenya,	   and	   recent	   debates	   about	   the	   future	  frequently	   return	   to	   this	   question	   of	   leadership	   and	   the	   personalization	   of	  politics.	   	   The	   structure	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   and	   the	   extensive	   powers	   that	   are	  afforded	   to	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   essentially	   unchecked,	   only	   bolster	   this	   problem,	  and	  leave	  an	  apparently	  unaccountable	  Chief	  Justice	  to	  be	  seen	  either	  as	  a	  pawn	  of	  the	  government	  or	  as	  a	  public	  official	  who	  is	  beyond	  the	  law.	  	  	  	  
6.5	  Conclusion	  	  The	   requirements	   of	   transparency	   and	   open	   participatory	   democratic	  government	  require	  that	  the	  judiciary	  engages	  with	  society	  in	  various	  ways,	  and	  one	   way	   in	   which	   this	   can	   be	   done	   is	   through	   communication.	   As	   the	   public	  figurehead	   of	   the	   judiciary	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   the	   task	   of	   communicating	  information	  about	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  way	  it	  works	  to	  the	  media	  and	  the	  public.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  also	  accountable	  to	  the	  public	  for	  the	  effective	  functioning	  of	  the	   judiciary	   in	   respect	   of	   its	   accessibility,	   use	   of	   resources	   and	   transparency.	  	  What	   is	  more,	  perceptions	  about	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	   judiciary	  will	  have	  an	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impact	   on	   the	   public’s	   belief	   in	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   judiciary	   is	   adequately	  fulfilling	  its	  role	  as	  a	  check	  against	  the	  government	  and	  abuses	  of	  power.	  	  	  In	  South	  Africa,	  when	  members	  of	   the	  executive	  or	  parliamentarians	  attack	  the	  judiciary,	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   as	   head	   of	   the	   Judiciary,	   tends	   to	   step	   in	   to	   soothe	  things.	   In	  Ghana,	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  works	  hard	   to	   represent	   the	   judiciary	   in	   the	  public,	  going	  around	   the	  country	  regularly	   to	  encourage	  people	   to	  engage	  with	  the	  judiciary	  and	  to	  understand	  it	  better.	   	  In	  Kenya,	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  response	  to	  criticisms	  of	  the	  judiciary	  has,	  on	  occasion,	  simply	  muddied	  the	  waters,	  mostly	  because	  his	  responses	  have	  been	  rather	  defensive	  and,	   in	  public	  statements,	  he	  has	  cast	  the	  judiciary	  as	  unwilling	  to	  engage	  or	  change.	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Chapter	  7	  –	  Conclusion	  	  This	  study	  began	  with	  the	  account	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  given	  by	  Justice	  Langa	   (as	   he	   then	   was)	   in	   his	   interview	   for	   the	   post	   of	   Chief	   Justice.	   	   Justice	  Langa	  was	  categorical	  in	  his	  view	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  leader	  of	  the	  third	  arm	  of	  government,	  and	  indicated	  some	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  this	  leadership,	  as	  he	  saw	  it.	   	   	   He	   emphasized	   several	   features	   of	   the	   leadership	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	  starting	  first	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  drawing	  on	  the	  talents	  of	  others	  and	  being	  able	  to	  work	   with	   others	   to	   address	   the	   challenges	   facing	   the	   community;	   he	   also	  expressed	   the	   view	   that	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   should	   provide	   “stability”	   and	   “give	  leadership	  when	  there	  is	  a	  crisis”;	  and	  as	  leader	  of	  the	  third	  arm	  of	  government,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  would	  be	  “the	  link”	  between	  the	  Judiciary	  and	  the	  other	  arms	  of	  government.	   	   But	   these	   remarks,	   made	   by	   Justice	   Langa	   before	   taking	   office,	  before	   even	   being	   appointed,	   do	   not	   however,	   provide	   a	   full	   account	   of	   the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	   	  The	  evidence	  from	  South	  Africa,	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  much	  more	  to	  it.	  	  	  	  This	  study	  sought	  answers	  to	  three	  questions:	  	  	   (1) How	   do	   we	   understand	   the	   leadership	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   in	  Commonwealth	  Africa?	  (2) How	  is	  that	  role	  evolving?	  	  (3) What	   consequences	   does	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   “judicial”	   and	  “administrative”	  functions	  of	  the	  judiciary	  have	  for	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  
7.1	  The	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  Africa	  	  The	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  can	  be	  understood	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  activities	   and	   actions	   of	   a	   Chief	   Justice	   in	   carrying	   out	   his	   or	   her	   express	  functions	  and	  duties,	  in	  interpreting	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  or	  her	  discretion;	  and	  it	  can	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also	   be	   understood	  with	   reference	   to	   the	   expectations	   of	   others:	   judges,	   court	  administrators,	  politicians,	  and	  the	  public.	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  Danelski’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  Chief	  Justices	  on	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States	  leadership	  is	  expressed	  as:	  	  	   “influence:	   CJ	   influences	   J	   to	   do	   x	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   CJ	   performs	   some	  activity	  y	  as	  a	  result	  of	  which	  J	  chooses	  to	  do	  x.”703	  	  And	  influence:	  	  	   “implies	   more	   than	   surface	   activity	   and	   interaction,	   for	   frequently	  underlying	  these	  phenomena	  are	  expectations,	  values,	  and	  attitudes	  of	  CJ	  and	  J.”704	  	  	  	  Expectations,	  therefore,	  together	  with	  values	  and	  attitudes,	  are	  highly	  relevant	  to	  the	   potential	   for	   a	   Chief	   Justice	   to	   lead,	   and	   influence,	   fellow	   judges.	   	   Again	  recalling	   Danelski’s	   conception	   of	   expectations,	   they	   are	   shaped	   by	   both	   the	  activities	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  (and	  equally,	  by	  habitual	  inactivity):	  	  	   “…the	  expectations	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  Justices	  hold	  for	  themselves	  and	  each	  other	   affect	   their	   activity.	   	   Conversely	   activity	   affects	   expectations.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice,	  by	  his	  activity,	  can	  create	  new	  expectations	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  thereby	  redefine	  his	  role	  and	  even	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  Justices.”705	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  can	  alter	  expectations	  and	  contribute	  to	  the	  definition	  and	  re-­‐definition	  of	  his	  her	  role.	   	  This	  dynamic	  aspect	  of	  the	  shaping	  and	  re-­‐shaping	  of	  the	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   very	   clearly	   demonstrated	   in	   the	   Constitutional	  Court	  of	  South	  Africa	  where	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  actions	  –	  the	  tendency	  to	  turn	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  703 Danelski, 'The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court', 
pp.506-507 704 Ibid. 705 Ibid. 
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fellow	   judges	   in	   the	   management	   of	   the	   courts,	   the	   tendency	   to	   include	  representatives	   from	   all	   the	   relevant	   groups	   in	   the	   administrative	   decision-­‐making	  of	   the	  court	  by	   their	  presence	  on	  committees	  –	  has	   created	  a	   “culture”	  and	   an	   “ethos”	   in	   the	   court	   of	   collaboration,	   consultation	   and	   joint	   decision-­‐making.	   	   What	   Danelski’s	   analysis	   does	   not	   account	   for,	   however,	   is	   how	   the	  actions	  of	  one	  Chief	  Justice	  can	  affect	  the	  expectations	  and	  role	  of	  another.	  	  And	  this	  is	  important	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  courts	  if	  continuity	  is	  to	   be	   achieved.	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   of	   South	  Africa,	   judges	  would	  not	  take	  kindly	  to	  a	  Chief	  Justice	  who	  tried	  to	  change	  the	  emerging	  ethos	  of	  democratic	  administrative	  decision-­‐making	  in	  the	  court.	  	  	  The	  development	  of	  this	  ethos	  of	  collaboration	  may	  not	  be	  so	  easy	  to	  replicate	  beyond	  the	  confines	  of	  an	   individual	   court	  or	  be	  applied	   to	   the	  wider	   judiciary.	   	  However,	  building	  on	  the	   notion	   of	   defining	   and	   redefining	   expectations,	   a	   Chief	   Justice	   can	   develop	  	  transformational	   leadership	   processes	   that	   engage	   individuals	   in	   the	   collective	  goals	   of	   the	   judiciary.	   	   This	   can	   be	   done	   by	   identifying	   and	   setting	   goals,	  articulating	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  disseminating	  information	  about	  processes	  and	  procedures.	  	  The	  data	  gathered	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  suggests	  that	  there	  are	  four	  areas	  in	  which	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  may	  lead.	  	  The	  first	  is	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  a	  court,	  and	  in	  this	  capacity	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  expectation	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  should	  provide	  intellectual	   leadership	   and	   lead,	   through	   judgements,	   in	   hard	   and	   challenging	  cases.	  	  This	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  vital	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  and	  one	  that	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  undermined	  by	  other	  things.	  	  The	  second	  area	  in	  which	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  leads,	  and	  is	  expected	  to	  lead	  is	  in	  “judicial	  matters”.	   	  This	  means	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	   should	   lead	   in	   issues	   concerning	   appointments,	   conduct,	   discipline,	  performance,	  and	  efficiency.	  	  In	  relation	  to	  these	  issues	  the	  sense	  is	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  should	  provide	  strategic	   leadership	  –	  the	  outlining	  and	  implementing	  of	  policies	   and	   guidelines	   and	   adherence	   to	   codes	   of	   conduct	   –	   and	   the	  determination	  of	  ethical	  standards.	  	  The	  next	  category	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  leadership	  is	  administrative	   leadership.	   	  Chief	   Justices	  do	  lead	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  courts	   (in	  South	  Africa	   this	   is	   restricted	   to	  administration	  of	   the	  Constitutional	  Court)	   and	   where	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   doesn’t	   lead,	   as	   in	   Kenya	   this	   has	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consequences	   for	   the	   administration	   of	   justice	   generally	   and	   for	   the	   working	  environment	   of	   judges,	   with	   some	   perceived	   impact	   on	   judicial	   independence	  too.	  	  This	  area	  of	  leadership	  also	  involves	  the	  development	  of	  working	  practices	  and	  processes	  –	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  is	  an	  example	  of	  working	  practices	  that	  provide	  stability	  and	  foster	  collective	  decision-­‐making:	  each	  individual	  or	  group	  has	  a	  clearly	  defined	  role	  and	   they	  each	  draw	  on	   their	  skills	   in	  participating	   in	  the	   administration	   and	   management	   of	   the	   court.	   	   In	   contrast,	   in	   Ghana	   and	  Kenya,	   where	   some	   discretionary	   powers	   are	   used	   without	   explanation	   or	   a	  general	  guiding	  framework	  for	  their	  application	  (as	  in	  the	  transfer	  of	  judges,	  for	  example)	  this	  creates	  instability	  and	  could	  potentially	   impact	  on	  perceptions	  of	  independence.	   There	   is	   a	   sense	   that	   clearer	   processes	   and	   procedures	   are	  needed.	   	   And	   finally,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   expected	   to	   be	   the	   visible	   leader,	  representing	  and	  defending	  the	  judiciary	  when	  needed.	  	  	  	  	  
Balancing	  the	  roles	  
Intellectual	  Leadership	  	  The	  traditional	  “first	  among	  equals”	  view	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  as	  senior	  judge	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  complete	  picture	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  While	  the	  Chief	  Justice	   is	   clearly	   expected	   to	   be	   the	   intellectual	   leader	   of	   the	   final	   court	   in	   the	  land,	  guiding	  the	  court	  in	  the	  development	  of	  its	  jurisprudence,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  also	  expected	  to	  do	  more	  than	  that	  –	  intellectual	  leadership	  involves	  leading	  in	  difficult	   and	   challenging	   cases	   –	   essentially	   asserting	   the	   role	   of	   the	   court	   in	  determining	   hard	   cases.	   	   	   This	   idea	   that	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   should	   “lead	   the	  charge”706	   in	   challenging	  cases	   is	   shared	   in	  all	   three	  countries.	  And	   intellectual	  leadership	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   vital	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   that	   should	   not	   be	  compromised.	  	  	  In	   South	   Africa,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   head	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   (although	  initially,	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  was	  head	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Court).	   	   In	  Ghana,	   the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  head	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  (there	  is	  no	  separate	  constitutional	  court),	  and	   in	   Kenya	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   a	  member	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal,	   but	   rarely	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hears	   cases.	   	   In	   Ghana	   and	   Kenya	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   a	   member	   of	   all	   of	   the	  superior	  courts	  –	  the	  High	  Court,	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  Ghana;	  and	  the	  High	  Court	  and	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  Kenya.	  	  In	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ghana,	  the	  judicial	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   clear	   -­‐	   presiding	   judge	   of	   the	   Constitutional	  Court	   and	   Supreme	   Court	   respectively.	   The	   Chief	   Justice’s	   judicial	   role	   is	   to	  provide	   intellectual	   leadership	   to	   the	   court,	   and	   to	   manage	   the	   court	   as	   the	  presiding	  judge.	   	   	  Should	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  or	  Supreme	  Court	  be	  tied-­‐in	  with	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  as	  a	  whole?	  	  The	  answer	  appears	  to	  be	   yes	   because	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   expected	   to	   provide	   intellectual	   leadership	  through	  leadership	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  or	  Supreme	  Court.	  	  	  Chief	  Justices	  are	  in	  an	  almost	  impossible	  position.	  	  They	  are	  expected	  by	  fellow	  judges	   to	   lead	   the	   way	   in	   the	   development	   of	   jurisprudence,	   which	   requires	  dedication	   to	   the	   practice	   of	   judging	   –	   hearing	   cases,	   presiding	   over	   the	   court,	  leading	  deliberations.	  	  However,	  as	  head	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  they	  are	  also	  expected	  to	   carry	   out	   additional	   tasks	   that	   could	   potentially	   be	   delegated	   out,	   either	   to	  judges	  or	  to	  administrative	  support	  staff,	  but	  the	  decision	  as	  to	  who	  should	  take	  over	   these	   tasks	   is	   fraught	   with	   anxiety	   about	   the	   implications	   for	   the	  independence,	   and	   accountability,	   of	   the	   judiciary.	   	   At	   present,	   it	   seems	   Chief	  Justices	   are	   overwhelmed	   by	   the	   additional	   demands	   on	   them	   beyond	   their	  judicial	  role,	  and	  in	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya,	  where	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  no	  deputy,	  the	  judicial	  role	  is	  being	  undermined.	   	  In	  Ghana,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  feels	  she	  ought	  to	  hear	   cases	   more,	   in	   Kenya	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	   opted	   to	   focus	   on	   the	  management	  of	  the	  courts	  over	  intellectual	  leadership	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  	  
Administrative	  Leadership	  The	  experiences	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  all	  demonstrate	  that	  while	  the	  intellectual	  leadership	  of	  the	  court	  is	  essential	  (and	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  vital	  part	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  functions),	  it	  is	  not	  all	  that	  is	  expected	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  In	  Ghana	  and	  Kenya	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Judiciary,	  is	  also	  responsible	  for	  the	   administration	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   managing	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   details	   of	   court	  business	  as	  well	  as,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Ghana,	  the	  management	  of	  court	  facilities	  and	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resources,	  often	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  time	  on	  the	  bench.	  	  The	  administrative	  function	  of	  the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   facilitated	   by	   broad	   discretionary	   powers	   that	   in	   the	   past	  tended	  not	  to	  be	  delegated.	  South	  Africa	  stands	  out	  in	  this	  respect	  because	  of	  the	  fragmented	  nature	  of	  the	  court	  system	  –	  the	  administration	  of	  each	  court	  is	  left	  to	  individual	  heads	  of	  court,	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  	  	  The	   Chief	   Justice’s	   administrative	   role	   is	   complex.	   	   The	   distinction	   being	   hotly	  debated	   in	  South	  Africa	   is	  between	  the	  “administration	  of	   the	   judicial	   function”	  and	   the	   “administration	   of	   the	   administrative	   function”,	   with	   the	   Chief	   Justice	  having	   primary	   responsibility	   for	   the	   first,	   and	   the	   ministry	   of	   justice	   having	  primary	  responsibility	  (with	  the	  participation	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice)	  for	  the	  second.	  	  The	   judicial	   function	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   exercise	   of	   judicial	   authority,	   which	   is	  vested	   in	   the	   courts	   (rather	   than	   just	   the	   judiciary).	   	  The	  South	  African	  debate	  seeks	  to	  delineate	  the	  boundary	  between	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  role	  in	  determining	  and	  maintaining	  standards	  and	  practices	  in	  carrying	  out	  the	  judicial	  function	  and	  exercising	   judicial	   authority,	   as	   distinct	   from	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   courts,	  but	  this	  is	  a	  very	  difficult	  line	  to	  draw.	  	  	  	  The	  “judicial	  function”	  of	  any	  judge	  appears	  to	  be	  divided	  between	  the	  processes	  of	  case	  management,	  judging	  and	  arriving	  at	  decisions	  between	  parties,	  and	  the	  timely	  delivery	  of	  judgments.	  	  Extending	  this	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  as	  a	  judge	  he	  or	  she	   will	   preside	   over	   the	   case	   management,	   decision-­‐making	   and	   delivery	   of	  judgements	   in	   his	   or	   her	   court.	   	   As	   Chief	   Justice,	   he	   or	   she	   must	   surely	   also	  provide	   leadership	   in	   ensuring	   that	   all	   other	   judges	   carry	   out	   these	   functions	  efficiently	  and	  effectively	  -­‐	  a	  discrete	  administrative	  function	  that	  relates	  to	  the	  “administration	  of	  the	  judicial	  function”.	  	  	  In	  Ghana,	  judicial	  authority	  is	  vested	  in	  the	  judiciary	  (rather	  than	  the	  courts),	  and	  justice	  is	  to	  be	  “administered	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Republic	  by	  the	  Judiciary”,	  and	  the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	   administration	   and	   supervision	   of	   the	  judiciary.	   	   In	   Ghana	   a	   distinction	   is	   drawn	   between	   the	   “administration	   of	  justice”,	   which	   is	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   judiciary	   as	   a	   whole,	   and	   the	  administration	  and	  supervision	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  which	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	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Chief	   Justice.	   	   Administration	   here	   refers	   to	   both	   the	   administration	   of	   court	  business	   and	   the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  administration	  of	   the	   courts	   as	   a	  whole,	   including	  financial	   administration.	   	   The	   term	   “supervision”	   distinguishes	   a	   separate	   role	  for	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  to	  oversee	  performance	  and	  standards	  in	  the	  judiciary	  –	  here	  referred	  to	  as	  “judicial	  matters”.	  	  In	   Kenya,	   under	   the	   1963	   constitution	   the	   courts	   are	   not	   vested	   with	   judicial	  power,	  and	  nor	   is	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  vested	  with	  any	  specific	   “administrative”	  or	  “supervisory”	  role.	  	  It	  is	  simply	  stated	  that	  the	  “the	  judges	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  shall	  be	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   and”	   no	   less	   that	   eleven	   “other	   judges”.	   	   The	   Chief	   Justice	  derives	  all	  of	  his	  administrative	  powers	  from	  legislation.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Judicial	  matters	  	  But	   even	   a	   general	   notion	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   as	   the	   intellectual	   leader	   and	  administrator	  doesn’t	  provide	  a	  full	  account.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  also	  expected	  to	  provide	   professional	   leadership	   –	   presiding	   over	   the	   professional	   standards	   of	  the	   judiciary	   as	   chair	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Service	   Commission	   –	   overseeing	   and	  applying	   conduct	   and	   disciplinary	   standards,	   participating	   in	   appointments	  processes,	  and	  initiating	  proceedings	  for	  misconduct.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice’s	  role	  in	  this	   respect	   is	   to	   engender	   a	   sense	  of	   collegial	   loyalty	   to	   the	   institution	   and	   to	  motivate	  judges	  to	  act	  professionally	  and	  with	  integrity,	  ensuring	  the	  credibility	  of	   the	   judiciary	   and	   its	   status	   as	   a	   unique	   public	   service	   organisation	   with	  specific	   obligations	   to	   citizens.	   	   In	   Ghana	   this	   includes	   ensuring	   that	   judges	  perform	  competently	  and	  efficiently.	  	  
Visible	  leadership	  and	  representation	  The	  Chief	   Justice	  has	  another	   role	   too,	   and	   that	   is	   to	   represent	   and	  defend	   the	  judiciary.	   	   Historically,	   judges	   and	   Chief	   Justices	   have	   been	   encouraged	   to	  maintain	  some	  distance	  from	  public	  and	  political	  debates.	  However,	  especially	  in	  countries	  where	  the	  credibility	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  judiciary	  is	  at	  issue,	  and	  the	  judiciary	   frequently	   comes	   under	   attack	   from	   politicians,	   it	   falls	   to	   the	   Chief	  Justice	   to	   step	   in	   and	   defend	   his	   or	   her	   judges	   as	   well	   as	   promoting	   an	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understanding	  of	   the	  work	  of	   the	   judiciary.	   	  The	  Chief	   Justice	   is	  expected	   to	  be	  the	  visible,	  accountable	   leader	  of	   the	   third	  arm	  of	  government.	   	  Accountability,	  however,	   is	   a	   problem,	   and	   especially	   in	   Ghana	   and	   Kenya,	   more	   needs	   to	   be	  done	   to	   improve	   simple	   accountability	   mechanisms	   such	   as	   publishing	   of	  decisions	  and	  the	  publication	  of	  information	  about	  processes	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  	  	  
7.2	  How	  is	  this	  role	  evolving?	  	  	  First,	  there	  is	  a	  move	  away	  from	  designating	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  simply	  as	  “head”	  of	  the	   judiciary,	   towards	  designating	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   as	   “leader”	  of	   the	   judiciary.	  	  Leadership	   involves	   influence,	   direction,	   the	   setting	   of	   goals,	   evaluation	   and	  accountability.	   	   The	   infrastructure	   around	   the	   office	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	  changing.	  	  The	  old	  top-­‐down	  approach	  to	  the	  headship	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  with	  the	  Chief	   Justice	  alone	  at	   the	  apex	  of	   the	  organisation,	   is	   changing	  –	   in	   some	  cases	  through	   proposed	   legislation,	   and	   in	   other	   cases	   through	   the	   adoption	   of	  practices	  that	  appear	  to	  be	  evolving	  into	  an	  organizational	  culture	  and	  accepted	  mode	   of	   working.	   	   There	   is	   an	   emerging	   trend	   towards	   the	   formal	   sharing	   of	  leadership	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  between	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  others,	  like	  a	  deputy	   (as	   in	   South	   Africa),	   or	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Ghana,	   the	   judicial	   council.	   	   And	  delegation	   of	   certain	   tasks	   and	   leadership	   roles	   to	   other	   justices	   (as	   in	   both	  South	   Africa	   and	   Ghana)	   means	   that	   informally,	   judges	   are	   also	   involved	   in	  leadership	  to	  some	  extent	  too.	  	  	  Second,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   boundaries	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	  executive	  are	  set	  may	  have	   to	  change	   in	   light	  of	   the	   trend	   towards	  recognising	  the	   Chief	   Justice	   as	   leader	   of	   the	   judiciary	   rather	   than	   just	   the	   head	   (or	  figurehead)	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  head	  of	  the	  third	  arm	  of	  government,	  leader	  of	  the	  Judiciary.	  	  This	   distinguishes	   him	   or	   her,	   and	   the	   judiciary,	   from	   the	   executive	   and	   the	  legislature.	  	  But	  the	  precise	  boundaries	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  executive	  are	   often	   unclear,	   and	   come	   down	   to	   the	  way	   that	   the	   “judicial	   function”	   (the	  preserve	   of	   judges)	   is	   distinguished	   from	   the	   “administrative	   function”	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(sometimes	   carried	   out	   by	   judges,	   and	   sometimes	   carried	   out	   by	   court	  administrators	   who	   in	   South	   Africa	   and	   Kenya	   report	   to	   an	   executive	  department).	   	  This	   is	  not	   just	   semantics	  –	  how	  these	   terms	  are	  defined,	  and	   to	  whom	  these	  functions	  are	  assigned	  has	  practical	  implications	  for	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  running	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   and	   importantly,	   for	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	  leadership	  role.	   	  However,	  the	  meaning	  and	  application	  of	  these	  terms	  in	  South	  Africa,	   Ghana,	   and	   Kenya,	   is	   far	   from	   clear,	   which	   potentially	   undermines	   the	  Chief	  Justices	  leadership	  in	  certain	  areas.	  	  	  In	  South	  Africa	  the	  legislative	  proposals	  detailing	  this	  division	  have	  been	  debated	  for	  a	  decade	  without	  resolution.	  	  In	  Kenya,	  in	  the	  same	  decade,	  these	  distinctions	  have	  come	  to	  prominence	  as	   individuals	  challenge	  the	  administrative	  decisions	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice707	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  judges	  to	  delegate	  particular	  judicial	  tasks	  to	  registrars.708	  	  In	  Ghana,	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  as	  head	  of	  the	  judiciary	  is	  responsible	  for	   the	   “administration”	   and	   “supervision”	   of	   the	   Judiciary,	   judicial	   power	   is	  “vested	   in	   the	   Judiciary”	   and	   justice	   is	   to	   be	   “administered	   in	   the	   name	   of	   the	  Republic	   by	   the	   Judiciary”.	   	   The	   Constitution	   of	   Ghana	   therefore	   distinguishes	  between	  “judicial	  power”	  which	  is	  vested	  in	  individual	  judges,	  the	  administration	  of	   the	   Judiciary	   and	   the	   supervision	   of	   the	   Judiciary	   both	   of	   which	   are	   the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  and	  the	  administration	  of	  justice,	  which	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Judiciary.	  	  	  The	  Ghanaian	  approach	  represents	  more	  clearly	  the	  components	  of	  the	  judiciary	  than	  the	  simple	  “judicial”	  v	  “administrative”	  distinction	  can.	  	  Judges	  have	  judicial	  power,	   and	   together,	   as	   the	   Judiciary	   they	   use	   their	   judicial	   powers	   for	   the	  administration	  of	  justice,	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Judiciary,	  oversees	  both	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  Judiciary,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  the	  management	  of	  the	  organization,	   and	   supervises	   the	   Judiciary,	   which	   is	   to	   say	   she	   oversees	   the	  performance	  and	  professional	  standards	  of	  judges.	  	  However,	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  “administration”	   of	   the	   judiciary	   still	   presents	   a	   problem,	   even	   in	   Ghana.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  707 Msagha v Chief Justice   708 e.g. Herbert Asava & 10 Others Civ. Application No. 196 of 2000  ;Kola Chacha v Kenya 
Commercial Bank Civ. Application No. 342 of 2001  ;Oraro & Rachie v Co-Operative Bank of Kenya 
Civ. Application No., Nai. 358 of 1999   
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Administration	   refers	   to	   several	   things:	   the	   management	   of	   judges	   and	   the	  allocation	  of	   cases	  –	   case	   transfers	  between	  courts,	   the	  allocation	  of	   individual	  judges	  to	  hear	  cases,	  or	  to	  particular	  courts,	  which	  is	  primarily	  done	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	   It	   also	   refers	   to	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   management	   of	   the	   courts:	   buildings,	  auxiliary	   staff,	   transport.	   	   Administration	   can	   also	   refer	   to	   case	   management,	  which	   at	   one	   level,	   is	   handled	   by	   judges	   (directing	   lawyers,	   making	   orders	  relating	  to	  procedure	  and	  evidence	  etc),	  but	  at	  another	  level	  is	  handled	  by	  court	  staff,	   usually	   registrars,	   in	   terms	  of	   record-­‐keeping	   and	   the	   transfer	  of	   records	  between	  courts.	   	   	   In	  Ghana	  this	  broad	  term	  does	  not	  present	  any	  problem	  with	  respect	   to	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   judiciary	   as	   a	   whole	   because	   all	   of	   the	  associated	   functions	   and	   activities	   are	   carried	   out	   by	  members	   of	   the	   Judicial	  Service	   and	   they	   all	   fall	   under	   the	   headship	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice.709	   	   	   In	   South	  Africa	   and	   Kenya,	   however,	   it	   can	   affect	   the	   boundaries	   between	   judges	   and	  court	  personnel.	  	  	  	  In	   South	   Africa,	   where	   the	   Chief	   Justice	  was	   initially	   the	   head	   of	   the	   Supreme	  Court,	   and	   later	  became	  head	  of	   the	  Constitutional	  Court,	   the	  broader	   remit	  of	  the	   Chief	   Justice	   as	   head	   of	   the	   judiciary	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	   South	   Africa,	   is	  evolving.	   	   In	   Ghana,	  where	   the	   overstretched	   Chief	   Justice	   functions	  without	   a	  deputy	  there	  are	  suggestions	  that	  complete	  autonomy	  for	  the	  judiciary	  could	  be	  counterproductive,	   with	   excessive	   administrative	   burdens	   encroaching	   on	   the	  important	  judicial	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  This	  is	  borne	  out	  in	  Kenya,	  where	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  so	  heavily	  involved	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  administration	  of	  the	  courts	  and	   the	   administration	   of	   justice	   generally	   that	   judicial	   duties	   have	   virtually	  been	   abandoned.	   	   But	   Kenya	   too,	   has	   realised	   that	   these	   arrangements	   are	   no	  longer	  tenable,	  and	  the	  new	  Constitution	  of	  2010	  creates	  a	  different	  arrangement	  for	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   courts	   –	   with	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   as	   head	   of	   the	  judiciary,	  a	  Deputy	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  a	  Chief	  Registrar.710	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  709 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana , art.158 710 On the face of it, this looks quite progressive, but there is a danger that it is simply formalising the 
current arrangement.   
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Third,	   in	   Ghana	   and	   Kenya,	   there	   are	   indications	   of	   some	   frustration	  with	   the	  existing	  lack	  of	  transparency	  and	  clear	  procedures	  concerning	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  discretion	   in	   managing	   the	   allocation	   of	   judges	   to	   specific	   courts,	   and	   the	  allocation	  of	  cases	  to	  specific	  judges.	  	  The	  possibility	  of	  individual	  judges	  feeling	  that	   they	   are	   being	   unfairly	   treated,	   or	   even	   punished	   (as	   interviewees	   put	   it,	  although	  it	  was	  not	  always	  clear	  what	  for),	  when	  transferred	  from	  court	  to	  court	  without	  clear	  guidelines	  as	  to	  why,	  runs	  contrary	  to	  both	  judicial	  independence,	  and	   principles	   of	   fairness.	   As	   long	   as	   there	   is	   a	   chance	   that	   some	   judges	   do	  consider	  that	  punishment	  is	  a	  possible	  reason	  for	  some	  transfers	  (although	  other	  judges	   disagree)	   the	   judiciary	   is	   vulnerable	   to	   negative	   perceptions	   about	   the	  independence	  of	  judges	  and	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  coupled	  with	   the	   discretion	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   to	   transfer	   cases	   between	   judges	   and	  courts	  (a	  much	  used,	  and	  unchallenged	  power	  in	  Kenya),	  points	  to	  systems	  that	  fail	   to	   fully	   reinforce	   the	   principles	   of	   judicial	   independence,	   judicial	  accountability	  and	  fairness	  in	  practice.	   	  A	  Chief	  Justice	  can	  address	  these	  issues	  through	  his	  or	  her	  approach	  to	  leadership	  and	  the	  processes	  and	  practices	  that	  he	  or	  she	  adopts.	  	  	  	  
7.3	  The	  distinction	  between	  the	  judicial	  and	  administrative	  functions	  	  	  The	   distinction	   between	   the	   “judicial”	   and	   the	   “administrative”	   function	   has	  emerged	   as	   being	   significant	   in	   understanding	   not	   only	   ongoing	   disputes	  between	  the	  courts	  and	  the	  other	  branches	  (especially	  in	  South	  Africa),	  but	  it	  is	  also	   relevant	   to	   understanding	   the	   potential	   scope	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	  leadership	  –	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  discussions	  about	  this	  distinction	  are	  questions	  about	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  Chief	   Justice’s	  role:	  who	  exercises	  control	  over	  which	  function.	  	  The	   trend	   is	   to	   distinguish	   between	   “judicial”	   and	   “administrative”	   in	   order	   to	  delineate	  between	  those	  matters	  which	  fall	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  (i.e.	  the	   judicial	   functions)	   and	   those	   administrative	   matters	   which	   fall	   within	   the	  control	  of	  some	  non-­‐judicial	  body	  responsible	   for	  court	  administration	  because	  judges	  do	  not	  have	  an	  administrative	  role.	  	  	  	  The	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  (a)	  Chief	  Justices	  (who	  are	  also	  judges)	  clearly	  have	  several	  administrative	  duties,	  and	  (b)	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judges	   too	   carry	   out	   several	   administrative	   tasks	   that	   may	   not	   very	   easily	   be	  shoehorned	   into	   a	   definition	   of	   the	   “judicial	   function”.	   	   	   Thinking	   about	   this	  distinction	   in	   leadership	   terms	   instead,	   suggests	   that	   in	  matters	   relating	   to	   the	  judiciary,	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   i.e.	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   should	   lead	   the	  decision-­‐making	   –	   this	  may	  mean	   consulting	   or	   collaborating	  with	   others,	   but	  when	  seen	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  third	  arm	  of	  government,	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  articulate	   boundaries	   and	   relationships	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   others	   in	  terms	  of	  who	   leads	   decision-­‐making	  about	   the	  operation	  and	  of	   the	  courts	  and	  the	  judiciary.	  	  And	  just	  as	  it	  might	  seem	  odd	  to	  think	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  leading	  the	  process	  of	  decision-­‐making	  in	  either	  the	  cabinet	  or	  legislature,	  if	  might	  seem	  odd	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  would	  not	  lead	  decision-­‐making	  about	  the	  institution	  of	  which	  he	  or	  she	  is	  leader	  –	  the	  judiciary.	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  “judicial”	  and	  “administrative”	   loses	   its	   usefulness.	   	   However,	   the	   distinction	   is	   generally	  defended	  with	  reference	  to	  accountability	  –	  judicial	  independence	  makes	  it	  very	  difficult,	   perhaps	   even	   impossible	   to	   establish	   the	   requisite	   accountability.	  	  Again,	  leadership	  may	  provide	  a	  means	  of	  addressing	  this	  problem.	  	  Seen	  as	  the	  visible	   leader	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   becomes	   accountable.	   And	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   can	   be	   held	   to	   account	   with	   reference	   to	   the	   requirements	   of	  leadership	   in	   the	   judiciary	   –	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   if	  we	   understand	   leadership	   in	   the	  judiciary	   in	   a	   particular	   way,	   then	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   can	   be	   evaluated	   with	  reference	  to	  that	  understanding	  of	  the	  leadership	  process.	  	  	  	  	  At	   the	  heart	  of	   this	  evolution	   lie	  questions	  about	   leadership.	   	  Age-­‐old	  concerns	  about	   delineating	   the	   boundaries	   of	   control	   between	   the	   executive	   and	   the	  judiciary	  are	  now	  being	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  leadership.	  	  Who	  actually	  leads	  the	  judiciary?	  	  New	  and	  proposed	  legislation	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Kenya	  provides	  that	  the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   head	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   and	   therefore	   he	   or	   she	   “leads”	   the	  judiciary.	   A	   look	   at	   the	   accompanying	   proposals	   for	   the	   practicalities	   of	   this	  arrangement	  however,	  suggests	  that	  this	  approach	  might	  be	  a	  particularly	  canny	  way	  for	  the	  executive	  to	  keep	  the	  judiciary	  happy	  by	  conceding	  that	  yes,	  as	  head	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  leads	  the	  judiciary,	  but	  that	  fundamentally,	  the	  executive	  manage	   it	   –	   i.e.	   control	   and	   administer	   the	   resources.	   	  However,	   the	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language	   of	   headship	   and	   leadership,	   previously	   so	   perverse	   to	   judges,	   has	  initiated	  shifts	  and	  exchanges	  that	  perhaps	  were	  not	  possible	  before,	  especially	  in	   South	   Africa,	   where	   disagreements	   over	   the	   scope	   of	   “leadership	   of	   the	  judiciary”	   have	   lead	   to	   a	   stalemate	   over	   the	   precise	   boundaries	   between	  executive	   and	   judicial	   control	   of	   the	   judiciary.	   	   However,	   there	   is	   a	   clear	  recognition	   that	   leadership	   entails	   more	   than	   simple	   headship.	   	   Crucially,	   for	  judges,	  it	  involves	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  retaining	  the	  right	  of	  decision-­‐making	  in	  key	  areas,	   and	   a	   level	   of	   involvement	   in	   the	  way	   the	   judiciary	   is	   run	   and	  managed	  that	  the	  executive	  is	  uncomfortable	  with.	  	  	  Many	   judges	   are	   quite	   happy	  with	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   burden	   of	   the	  administration	  of	  the	  courts	  be	  almost	  sub-­‐contracted	  out	  to	  independent	  court	  administrators.	  	  The	  difficulty	  lies	  in	  determining	  who	  makes	  key	  decisions,	  and	  judges	   are	   keen	   to	   be	   more	   involved,	   or	   at	   least	   to	   remain	   involved.	   	   The	  experience	  of	  the	  South	  African	  Constitutional	  Court	  shows	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  judges	   to	   be	   very	   closely	   involved	   in	   the	   administration	   of	   their	   courts	   and	   to	  work	   in	   harmony	   with	   professional	   court	   administrators	   who	   provide	  professional	   support	   services	   to	   the	   judges.	   	   The	   concern	   is	   over	   the	   status	   of	  these	  administrators	  –	  are	  they	  providing	  support	  or	  control?	  	  The	  worry	  is	  that	  where	   judges	   are	   not	   involved	   in	   decision-­‐making	   about	   resources,	   these	  decisions	   can	   somehow	   be	   used	   against	   the	   judiciary,	   punishing	   individual	  judges	   or	   individual	   courts	   by	   limiting	   their	   resources.	   Clearly,	   judicial	  independence	  would	   require	   that	   the	   balance	   falls	   in	   favour	   of	   administrative	  support	  over	  control,	  but	  experiences	  in	  Kenya	  show	  that	  there	  is	  a	  very	  fine	  line	  between	   support	   and	   control,	   and	   further	   that	   even	  where	   the	   administrative	  decisions	   are	   being	  made	   by	   a	   judge	   (in	   Kenya,	   by	   the	   Chief	   Justice),	   a	   broad	  unbounded	   discretion	   can	   be	   just	   as	   harmful	   to	   individual	   perceptions	   of	  interference	   as	   an	   apparently	   controlling	   external	   manager.	   	   The	   situation	   in	  Kenya	  is	  compounded	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  apparently	  has	  very	  broad	  discretionary	  powers,	  yet	  has	  little	  or	  no	  power	  over	  resources.	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7.4	   Leadership	   as	   a	   solution	   to	   defining	   boundaries	   and	   creating	  
accountability	  in	  the	  judiciary	  	  
	  There	   are	  many	   expectations	   of	   Chief	   Justices,	   and	   failing	   to	   meet	   any	   one	   of	  those	   expectations	   undermines	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   ability	   to	   lead	   effectively.	   	   A	  Chief	   Justice	  who	   prioritizes	   his	   administrative	   or	   public	   role	   over	   his	   judicial	  role	  is	  seen	  by	  fellow	  judges	  to	  be	  abandoning	  his	  essential	  function	  as	  a	  judge,	  and	   thus	   abandoning	   a	   vital	   role	   of	   the	   courts.	   	   Similarly,	   a	   Chief	   Justice	   who	  implements	   administrative	   decisions	   for	   reasons	   that	   are	   unclear	   to	   judges	   is	  seen	  as	  secretive	  and	  possibly	  with	  a	  hidden	  agenda.	  	  And	  a	  refusal	  to	  engage	  or	  failure	   to	   engage	   fully	  with	   judges	   is	   bad	   for	  morale.	   	   Judges	   expect	   the	   Chief	  Justice	   to	   be	   the	   intellectual	   leader	   of	   the	   courts,	   judges	   expect	   to	   be	   treated	  fairly	  and	  professionally,	  and	  when	  they	  aren’t	  they	  suspect	  foul	  play,	  and	  judges	  like	  to	  be	  consulted	  about	  decisions	  concerning	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  courts.	  	  	  	  Yet,	  these	  are	  not	  the	  only	  expectations	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  Both	  the	  public	  and	  politicians	   expect	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   to	   be	   accountable	   in	   some	   way	   for	   the	  judiciary,	   and	   for	   the	   legitimacy	  and	   integrity	  of	   the	   judiciary.	   	  Lawyers	  expect	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  courts	  are	  run	  effectively	  and	  efficiently.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  interviews	  revealed	  several	  things.	   	  Changes	  were	  occurring	  in	   the	   practices	   of	   leadership	   and	   administration	   of	   the	   courts,	   particularly	   in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ghana.	  	  These	  changes	  appeared	  to	  be	  occurring	  in	  anticipation	  of	  proposed	  legislative	  changes	  that	  (at	  least	  in	  South	  Africa)	  were	  being	  stalled	  by	   the	   political	   process	   –	   in	   essence	   demonstrating	   the	   willingness	   by	   the	  judiciary	   (or	   perhaps	   really	   the	   Chief	   Justice)	   to	   lead	   through	   action.	   	   The	  changes	   are	   concentrated	   around	   the	   need	   for	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   to	   balance	   the	  judicial	  and	  administrative	  functions,	  and	  choosing	  to	  do	  so	  by	  engaging	  senior	  judges	   in	   administrative	   tasks.	   In	   South	  Africa,	   in	   the	   Constitutional	   Court,	   the	  involvement	  of	  judges	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  management	  of	  the	  court	  is	  essentially	  a	  product	   of	   a	   democratic	   ethos	   and	   a	   deep	   desire	   to	   transform	   the	   judiciary,	  shirking	  all	  remnants	  of	  the	  past.	   	   In	  Ghana,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  multiple	  roles	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and	   considerable	   support,	   but	   turns	   to	   senior	   judges	   for	   assistance	   in	   her	  “supervisory”	  role,	  which	  is	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  judicial	  function.	  	  In	  Kenya,	  the	   Chief	   Justice	   has	  more	   or	   less	   abandoned	  his	   judicial	   role,	   in	   favour	   of	   the	  administrative	   function.	   	   Considering	   the	   data	   in	   light	   of	   the	   conceptual	  framework,	  it	  becomes	  evident	  that	  where	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  engages	  with	  various	  constituents	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   is	   consistent	   with	   transformational	   leadership,	  individuals	   respond	   well	   and	   the	   organization	   benefits.	   In	   the	   South	   African	  Constitutional	   Court	   and	   in	   Ghana,	   interview	   subjects	   	   (both	   judges	   and	  administrators)	  describe	   these	  practices	   in	  very	  positive	   terms,	  and	  some	  even	  go	   so	   far	   as	   to	   express	   pride,	   and	   a	   sense	   of	   continued	  motivation;	   in	   Kenya,	  where	  there	   is	  no	  engagement	  by	  the	  Chief	   Justice,	   judges	  describe	  practices	   in	  very	  poor	  terms,	  and	  express	  a	  lack	  of	  motivation,	  a	  lack	  of	  belief	  in	  the	  system,	  and	  sense	  of	  not	  belonging.	  	  	  	  Individuals	  also	  expressed	  views	  about	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   leadership	  role	  of	   the	  Chief	  Justice,	  and	  most	  were	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  judicial	  function	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  and	  his	  or	  her	  leadership	  of	  the	  final	  court,	  is	  very	  important,	  and	  could	  even	  be	  considered	  on	  of	  the	  “core”	  functions	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  Ensuring	  that	  the	  Chief	   Justice	   has	   the	   time	   and	   space	   to	   carry	   out	   this	   function	   is	   therefore	  necessary,	   but	   there	   is	   a	   sense	   that	   control	   over	   administration	   should	   not	   be	  lost.	  	  	  	  If	  we	  think	  of	  these	  sources	  of	  expectation	  as	  potential	  constituents	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  leadership,	  and	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  constituents	  that	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  can	  (and	  perhaps	  should)	  engage	   in	   leading	   the	   judiciary,	  we	  can	   then	   think	   in	  terms	   of	   possible	   sources	   of	   assistance,	   shared	   leadership	   or	   even	   collective	  leadership.	   	   Judges	   can	   be	   involved	   in	   decision-­‐making	   about	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  management	  of	  the	  courts	  where	  the	  various	  constituents	  are	  led	  and	  guided	  by	  the	  Chief	   Justice	   -­‐	  as	  they	  are	   in	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  South	  Africa	  where	  judges	  are	  tasked	  with	  specific	  leadership	  roles	  and	  work	  with	  the	  court	  director	  and	  other	  administrator	  in	  specific	  areas,	  always	  overseen	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  If	  the	   overall	   leadership	   resides	  with	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   even	   if	   this	   is	   shared,	   the	  practicalities	  of	   the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  management	  of	   the	  courts	  can	  be	   left	  with	  non-­‐
	   285	  
judicial	   court	   administrators,	   who	   with	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   and	   judges,	   would	  together	  be	  working	  towards	  the	  collective	  goals	  of	  the	  administration	  of	  justice.	  	  The	  Chief	   Justice’s	   role	   then	  would	  be	   to	   steer	   the	   collective	   towards	   specified	  goals.	  	  	  	  	  In	  South	  Africa	  and	  Kenya,	  the	  judicial	  systems,	  and	  the	  processes	  and	  practices	  of	  administration	  of	  the	  courts	  are	  in	  flux.	  	  In	  Ghana,	  things	  are	  a	  lot	  more	  stable	  but	   there	   are	   indications	   that	   big	   changes	   are	   likely.	   	   However,	   the	   changes	   I	  have	  come	  across	  are	  happening	  anyway	  (in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ghana),	  but	  there	  are	   of	   course	   barriers	   applying	   this	   model,	   and	   I	   think	   these	   can	   loosely	   be	  categorised	  as	  practical,	  political	  and	  what	  I	  think	  of	  as	  “jurisdictional”	  (I	  haven’t	  come	  up	  with	  a	  better	  word).	  	  The	  practical	  barriers	  include:	  geography	  –	  these	  are	   large	   countries	   and	   it	   is	   quite	   difficult	   for	   a	   Chief	   Justice	   to	   “engage”	  with	  people	   who	   are	   far	   away,	   sometimes	   in	   remote	   locations	   (but	   in	   Ghana,	   the	  delegation	   of	   certain	   functions	   to	   senior	   judges	   is	   to	   some	   extent	   intended	   to	  address	  this	  problem	  –	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  can’t	  be	  everywhere	  at	  once,	  but	  she	  can	  send	  representatives).	  They	  are	  also	  organizational	  –	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  of	  replacing	  one	   bureaucracy	   with	   another,	   possibly	  more	   cumbersome	   one.	   	   The	   political	  barriers	  come	  down	  to	  control,	  and	  an	  unwillingness	  to	  relinquish	  control	  over	  certain	  aspects	  of	  court	  administration.	  	  This	  battle	  is	  raging	  quite	  spectacularly	  in	   South	   Africa,	   and	   is	   as	   yet	   unresolved.	   	   The	   “jurisdictional”	   barrier	   comes	  down	  to	  how	  we	  define	  “The	  Judiciary”.	   	   In	  Ghana,	  the	  “Judiciary”	   is	  part	  of	  the	  “Judicial	  Service”	  –	  a	  public	  service.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  the	  most	  senior	  judge	  in	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  head	  of	  the	  judicial	  service.	  	  She	  therefore	  is	  the	  head	  of	  all	  services	  relating	  to	  the	  administration	  of	  justice.	  	  However,	  even	  in	  a	  system	  that	  seems	   so	   broad	   some	   aspects	   of	   the	   administration	   of	   justice	   fall	   outside	   her	  “jurisdiction”,	  and	  these	  are	  the	  traditional	  Chief	  Courts,	  where	  matters	  relating	  to	   Chiefs,	   and	   succession	   are	   decided.	   	   Very	   recently	   it	   became	   possible	   for	  parties	  to	  disputes	  in	  Chiefs	  Courts	  to	  apply	  for	  judicial	  review	  of	  their	  decisions,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  administration,	  these	  courts	  are	  not	  within	  the	  remit	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	   	   In	   South	  Africa	   “The	   Judiciary”	   only	   includes	   the	   senior	   judiciary,	   and	  does	  not	  include	  the	  magistracy,	  or	  the	  court	  service.	  	  The	  intention	  was	  to	  create	  a	  unified	   judiciary	  with	  the	  Chief	   Justice	  as	   its	  head,	  but	  that	  has	  not	  happened	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yet,	  partly	  because	  the	  boundaries	  of	  control	  cannot	  be	  agreed.	   	   In	  Kenya,	  “The	  Judiciary”	   includes	   the	   senior	   judiciary	   and	   the	  magistracy	   (and	   the	   Kadhi,	   or	  Islamic	   courts),	   but	   not	   the	   court	   administrative	   support	   staff,	   who	   are	   civil	  servants.	  	  	  	  Thinking	   about	   the	   problems	   faced	   by	   Chief	   Justices	   as	   leadership	   problems,	  suggests	  that	  one	  approach	  to	  addressing	  the	  conundrum	  of	  how	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	   Chief	   Justice	   retains	   his	   or	   her	   vital	   judicial	   role	   while	   also	   maintaining	  sufficient	   administrative	   control	   over	   the	   courts,	   would	   be	   to	   identify	   and	  evaluate	   leadership	   processes	   and	   practices.	   	   The	   historic	   approach	   to	  “leadership”	  in	  the	  courts	  (a	  word	  which	  some	  judges	  could	  hardly	  bear	  to	  utter	  in	   the	  relation	   to	   the	   judiciary	  not	  so	   long	  ago)	  was	   to	  reject	   it	  on	   the	  grounds	  that	   it	  was	   prohibited	   by	   judicial	   independence.	   	   This	  was	   taken	   to	  mean	   that	  judges	  working	  “independently”	  had	  to	  work	  separately,	   the	  need	   for	   judges	  to	  be	   left	   completely	   to	   their	   own	   devices,	   and	   the	   idea	   of	   leadership,	   connoting	  improper	  influence,	  was	  inconceivable.	  	  But	  as	  attitudes	  to	  judicial	  independence	  change,	  the	  notion	  of	  leadership	  becomes	  more	  acceptable.	  	  It	  is	  now	  recognised	  that	  judicial	  independence	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  judges	  have	  to	  be	  completely	  cut	  off	   from	   one	   another,	   and	   that	   they	   can	   work	   together	   to	   foster	   integrity,	  impartiality,	  individual	  and	  institutional	  independence.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  limits,	  any	  leadership	  in	  the	  judiciary	  must	  accommodate	  the	  special	   requirement	   for	   autonomy	   in	   leading	   collective	   action.	   	   And,	  transformational	   leadership	   can	   be	   a	   way	   creating	   decision-­‐making	   processes	  that	  are	  participatory	  and	  inclusive	  and	  working	  practices	  that	  are	  in	  tune	  with	  the	   unique	   nature	   of	   the	   judicial	   organization.	   Ethically	   sound,	   fair,	   clear	  processes	  can	  be	  a	  way	  of	  ensuring	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  individual	  within	  the	  organization.	   	   And	   thinking	   about	   judicial	   leadership	   in	   terms	   of	   leadership	  ethics	   (the	   ethics	   of	   the	   leader	   as	   a	   person;	   the	   ethics	   of	   the	   leader-­‐follower	  relationship	  –	  how	  they	  treat	  each	  other;	  and	  the	  ethics	  of	  the	  processes	  involved	  and	   what	   the	   leader	   does	   or	   does	   not	   do)	   creates	   a	   kind	   of	   accountability	  function	  for	  leadership	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  	  Transformational	  and	  ethical	  leadership	  can	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  judicial	  leadership	  that	  supports	  and	  enhances	  the	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independence	   of	   judges	   (even	   where	   other	   non-­‐judges	   are	   involved	   in	   the	  working	   practices	   of	   the	   courts)	   because	   it	   emphasizes	   the	   autonomy	   of	  individuals,	   and	   the	   engagement	   and	   motivation	   of	   a	   variety	   of	   constituents	  working	  collectively	  and	  collaboratively	   to	  protect	   the	  values	  of	   the	   institution,	  guided	  by	  clear,	  fair	  and	  ethical	  processes.	  	  And,	  accepting	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  has	  another	  consequence	  too:	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  not	  longer	  seen	  as	  merely	   the	  head	  of	   the	   judiciary,	   an	   independent	  but	  dependent	   institution.	  	  Asserting	   the	   leadership	   role	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   –	   that	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   is	   “of	  course”	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   third	   arm	   of	   government	   –	   is	   a	  way	   of	   asserting	   the	  independence	  and	  institutional	  identity	  of	  the	  judiciary.	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Appendix	  A	  	  
Invitation	  to	  be	  interviewed	  on	  a	  confidential	  basis	  	  Dear	  …	  	  
Interview on the Role of Chief Justices in the Commonwealth  
 
I am writing to request an interview with you as part of my research on the role of Chief 
Justices in Commonwealth Africa.  
 
I am conducting this research in my capacity as a PhD candidate in the Department of Law at 
Queen Mary, University of London, under the supervision of Professor Kate Malleson and 
Professor Andrew Le Sueur (they write in support of my research in the enclosed letter).  This 
is a comparative study of the office of Chief Justice in South Africa, Kenya and Ghana.  The 
aim is to develop an understanding of the functions and role of the Chief Justice in balancing 
the diverse needs of the judiciary with the multiple demands on the judiciary and the often 
competing needs of the political bodies of the state.  This understanding will also help to shed 
light on the role of the office of Chief Justice in developing, nurturing and maintaining 
relations between the judiciary and political actors.    
 
As a serving judge it is hoped that you will be in a position to offer valuable insights into the 
role that the Chief Justice plays in the judiciary and its administration, and in relations 
between the judiciary, the public and the wider justice system.  I would like to conduct a 
confidential individual interview with you which would last no longer than one hour.   I will 
ask a range of questions which will follow the attached topic guide.   The questions will be 
adapted, as appropriate, to your particular circumstances and you may choose to decline to 
answer any of them or discuss other issues that you feel are relevant.    
 
The principal outcome of this research will be my doctoral thesis, although the successful 
completion of the PhD may lead to future academic publication opportunities.   Any 
statements you make will not be attributed to you in the thesis or any published material 
resulting from this research without your prior consent.  Every effort will be made to draft the 
text to avoid identification of you or any person you refer to.    
 
	   289	  
If you require any further information regarding the project or the proposed interview please 
do not hesitate to contact me by email on: … or by telephone on: … ; or …. while I am in 
[Johannesburg, Accra, Nairobi].   For further information about the Department of Law at 
Queen Mary, see www.law.qmul.ac.uk  
 
Many thanks for your time and consideration of this project.  
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
 
Kyela Leakey  
PhD Candidate 
Department of Law, Queen Mary, University of London  
Department web: http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk 
Email: … 
Tel: …  	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Invitation	  to	  be	  interviewed	  without	  confidentiality	  
 
Dear …  
 
Re: Interview on the Role of Chief Justices in the Commonwealth 
 
Further to the letter of introduction…. that I delivered to your office yesterday, I write to 
request an interview with you as part of my research on the role of Chief Justices in 
Commonwealth Africa.  
 
I am conducting this research in my capacity as a PhD candidate in the Department of Law at 
Queen Mary, University of London, under the supervision of Professor Kate Malleson and 
Professor Andrew Le Sueur.  This is a comparative study looking at the experiences of 
judiciaries from several Commonwealth countries using South Africa, Kenya and Ghana as 
case studies.  The aim is to develop an understanding of the functions of the Chief Justice and 
the significance of the office of Chief Justice in the administration of justice.    
 
As the Registrar of the High Court it is hoped that you will be in a position to offer valuable 
insights into the role of the Chief Justice in relation to the administration of the judiciary, the 
public and the wider justice system.  I would like to conduct an individual tape-recorded 
interview with you which would last no longer than one hour.   If you agree, I will ask a range 
of questions which will follow the attached topic guide.   You may choose to decline to 
answer any of my questions or discuss other issues that you feel are relevant.   The principal 
outcome of this research will be a doctoral thesis, although the successful completion of the 
PhD may lead to future academic publication opportunities.    
 
If you require any further information regarding the project or the proposed interview please 
do not hesitate to contact me by email on: … or by telephone on: … ; or …. while I am in 
[Johannesburg, Accra, Nairobi].   For further information about the Department of Law at 
Queen Mary, see www.law.qmul.ac.uk  
 
Many thanks for your time and consideration of this project.  
 
Yours sincerely,  
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Kyela Leakey  
PhD Candidate 
Department of Law, Queen Mary, University of London  
Department web: http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk 
Email: … 
Tel: …  	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Appendix	  B	  
Examples	  of	  questions	  and	  topic	  guide	  
	  Thee	   are	   examples	   of	   topic	   guides	   used	   in	   the	   interviews.	   	   For	   each	   interview	  some	  of	   the	   initial	  questions	  were	   tailored	   to	  allow	   for	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	  an	  individual’s	  role	  –	  these	  are	  not	  reproduced	  here	  because	  they	  may	  compromise	  the	  anonymity	  of	  individuals.	  	  The	  general	  questions	  are,	  however,	  all	  similar.	  	  
Topic	  guide	  for	  judges	  	  	  
SOUTH	  AFRICA	  
	  
The	  Office	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  	  	  When	  did	  the	  Office	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  come	  into	  being?	  	  	  What	  was	  the	  impetus	  for	  setting	  up	  the	  Office	  of	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  Can	  you	  describe	  your	  main	  role	  and	  duties?	  	  	  How	  is	  your	  working	  relationship	  with	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  organized?	  	  	  Do	  you	  work	  with	  the	  Deputy	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  Do	  you	  work	  with	  other	  senior	  judges	  in	  South	  Africa?	  	  	  How	  is	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  involved	  in	  administration	  of	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole?	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  meet	  other	  judges?	  	  	  How	  would	  you	  describe	  the	  broad	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  initiate	  and	  lead	  reform	  activities?	  Can	  you	  describe	  an	  example	  of	  that?	  	  	  
The	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  other	  branches	  	  Are	  there	  any	  duties	  or	  responsibilities	  relating	  to	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	  that	  are	  shared	  by	  the	  Minister	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  Do	  the	  Minister	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  communicate	  with	  each	  other?	  	  Do	  the	  Minister	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  meet?	  	  	  Does	  the	  Minister	  meet	  with	  other	  judges?	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The	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  	  How	  are	  cases	  assigned?	  	  	  	  Do	  senior	  judges	  ever	  meet	  to	  discuss	  court	  processes	  and	  administration?	  	  	  How	  are	  Judges	  assigned	  to	  different	  courts?	  	  	  How	  are	  candidates	  for	  judicial	  promotion	  nominated?	  	  How	  does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  communicate	  with	  judges	  in	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole?	  	  Are	   there	   any	   internal	   accountability	  mechanisms	  within	   the	   judiciary	   to	   ensure	   that	  standards	  of	  judicial	  conduct	  are	  met	  by	  all	  judges?	  	  How	  do	  heads	  of	  courts	  and/or	  heads	  of	  divisions	  relate	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  How	  are	  candidates	  for	  the	  position	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  nominated?	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  initiate	  and	  lead	  reform	  activities?	  Can	  you	  describe	  an	  example	  of	  that?	  	  	  What	  is	  the	  overall	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole?	  	  What,	  in	  your	  view,	  is	  the	  most	  challenging	  aspect	  of	  the	  job	  of	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  
The	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  external	  relations	  	  	  How	  does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  interact	  with	  other	  organs	  of	  Government?	  	  	  How	  does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  interact	  with	  the	  public?	  	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  initiate	  and	  lead	  reform	  activities?	  Can	  you	  describe	  an	  example	  of	  that?	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  Any	  other	  matters	  you	  may	  wish	  to	  discuss	  
	  
GHANA	  	  
The	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  	  How	  are	  cases	  assigned?	  	  	  	  Do	  senior	  judges	  ever	  meet	  to	  discuss	  court	  processes	  and	  administration?	  	  	  How	  are	  Judges	  assigned	  to	  different	  courts?	  	  	  How	  are	  candidates	  for	  judicial	  promotion	  nominated?	  	  How	  does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  communicate	  with	  judges	  in	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole?	  	  Are	   there	   any	   internal	   accountability	  mechanisms	  within	   the	   judiciary	   to	   ensure	   that	  standards	  of	  judicial	  conduct	  are	  met	  by	  all	  judges?	  	  How	  do	  heads	  of	  courts	  and/or	  heads	  of	  divisions	  relate	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  How	  are	  candidates	  for	  the	  position	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  nominated?	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  initiate	  and	  lead	  reform	  activities?	  Can	  you	  describe	  an	  example	  of	  that?	  	  	  What	  is	  the	  overall	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole?	  	  What,	  in	  your	  view,	  is	  the	  most	  challenging	  aspect	  of	  the	  job	  of	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  	  
The	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  external	  relations	  	  	  How	  does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  interact	  with	  other	  organs	  of	  Government?	  	  	  How	  does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  interact	  with	  the	  public?	  	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  initiate	  and	  lead	  reform	  activities?	  Can	  you	  describe	  an	  example	  of	  that?	  	  	  	  Any	  other	  matters	  you	  may	  wish	  to	  discuss	  	  
Topic	  guide	  for	  court	  administrators	  	  	  
SOUTH	  AFRICA	  
	  
The	  Office	  of	  Chief	  Justice	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  When	  did	  the	  Office	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  come	  into	  being?	  	  	  What	  was	  the	  impetus	  for	  setting	  up	  the	  Office	  of	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  Can	  you	  describe	  your	  main	  role	  and	  duties?	  	  	  How	  is	  your	  working	  relationship	  with	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  organized?	  	  	  Do	  you	  work	  with	  the	  Deputy	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  Do	  you	  work	  with	  other	  senior	  judges	  in	  South	  Africa?	  	  	  How	  is	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  involved	  in	  administration	  of	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole?	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  meet	  other	  judges?	  	  	  How	  would	  you	  describe	  the	  broad	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  initiate	  and	  lead	  reform	  activities?	  Can	  you	  describe	  an	  example	  of	  that?	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The	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  Judiciary	  	  How	  does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  communicate	  with	  judges	  in	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole?	  	  Are	   there	   any	   internal	   accountability	  mechanisms	  within	   the	   judiciary	   to	   ensure	   that	  standards	  of	  judicial	  conduct	  are	  met	  by	  all	  judges?	  	  How	  are	  candidates	  for	  the	  position	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  nominated?	  	  	  How	  do	  heads	  of	  courts	  and/or	  heads	  of	  divisions	  relate	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  initiate	  and	  lead	  reform	  activities?	  Can	  you	  describe	  an	  example	  of	  that?	  	  	  What	  is	  the	  overall	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole?	  	  What,	  in	  your	  view,	  is	  the	  most	  challenging	  aspect	  of	  the	  job	  of	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  
The	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  external	  relations	  	  	  What	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Judiciary	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice?	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  communicate	  with	  the	  executive	  on	  any	  matters?	  	  If	  so,	  how?	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  communicate	  with	  the	  legislature	  on	  any	  matters?	  If	  so,	  how?	  	  	  How	  does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  relate	  to	  the	  public?	  	  Any	  other	  matters	  you	  may	  wish	  to	  discuss	  	  
KENYA	  	  	  
General	  duties	  of	  the	  Registrar	  	  	  Please	  briefly	  explain	  the	  role	  and	  duties	  of	  the	  Registrar	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Kenya	  	  What	  is	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Registrar	  in	  relation	  to	  judges	  and	  other	  administrative	  staff?	  	  Who	  do	  the	  Registrar	  report	  to?	  	  How	  is	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  organized?	  	  Do	  you	  interact	  with	  other	  courts	  and	  their	  administrative	  staff?	  	  	  Are	  you	  involved	  in	  managing	  the	  budget	  of	  the	  courts	  in	  any	  way?	  	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  	  	  How	  is	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  involved	  in	  court	  administration?	  	  	  How	  would	  you	  describe	  the	  broad	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice?	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How	  does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  communicate	  with	  judges?	  	  How	  does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  interact	  with	  other	  organs	  of	  Government?	  	  	  How	  does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  interact	  with	  the	  public?	  	  	  What,	  in	  your	  view,	  is	  the	  most	  challenging	  aspect	  of	  the	  job	  of	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  initiate	  and	  lead	  reform	  activities?	  Can	  you	  describe	  an	  example	  of	  that?	  	  	  Any	  other	  matters	  you	  wish	  to	  discuss	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Topic	  guide	  for	  others	  	  	  
GHANA	  	  
The	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  Judiciary	  	  How	  does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  communicate	  with	  judges	  in	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole?	  	  How	  are	  candidates	  for	  judicial	  promotion	  nominated?	  	  Are	   there	   any	   internal	   accountability	  mechanisms	  within	   the	   judiciary	   to	   ensure	   that	  standards	  of	  judicial	  conduct	  are	  met	  by	  all	  judges?	  	  How	  do	  heads	  of	  courts	  and/or	  heads	  of	  divisions	  relate	  to	  the	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  How	  are	  candidates	  for	  the	  position	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  nominated?	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  initiate	  and	  lead	  reform	  activities?	  Can	  you	  describe	  an	  example	  of	  that?	  	  	  What	  is	  the	  overall	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  whole?	  	  What,	  in	  your	  view,	  is	  the	  most	  challenging	  aspect	  of	  the	  job	  of	  Chief	  Justice?	  	  	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Secretary	  	  What	  is	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Secretary	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court?	  	  	  What	  is	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Secretary	  in	  the	  Judiciary	  as	  whole?	  	  	  
The	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  external	  relations	  	  	  How	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  Judiciary	  organized?	  	  Is	  the	  Judicial	  Reform	  Unit	  part	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  or	  part	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice?	  	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  communicate	  with	  the	  executive	  on	  any	  matters?	  	  If	  so,	  how?	  	  Does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  communicate	  with	  the	  legislature	  on	  any	  matters?	  If	  so,	  how?	  	  	  How	  does	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  relate	  to	  the	  public?	  	  Any	  other	  matters	  you	  may	  wish	  to	  discuss	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